Date: 20060329
Docket: T-416-05
Citation: 2006 FC 385
Ottawa, Ontario,
March 29, 2006
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Beaudry
BETWEEN:
PURDUE
PHARMA
Applicant
and
NOVOPHARM LIMITED and
THE MINISTER OF HEALTH
Respondents
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
[1]
This is a
motion by the applicant appealing a discretionary Order of Prothonotary Tabib
dated February 13, 2006 (Order under Appeal). In the Order under Appeal,
Prothonotary Tabib:
a) dismissed the applicant’s
motion for an Order preventing the respondent Novopharm Limited (Novopharm)
from relying on certain portions of its affidavits;
b) dismissed the applicant’s
motion for leave to file new evidence;
c) awarded costs to the
respondent.
[2]
The
applicant alleges that Prothonotary Tabib erred in law in her decision, and
that this Court should therefore consider the issues de novo.
I. Issues
[3]
The
applicant raises the following issues:
a) Did
Prothonotary Tabib err in law in applying the test set out in Canadian Tire Corp.
v. P.S. Partsource Inc., 2001 FCA 8, [2001] F.C.J. No. 181 (F.C.A.) (QL) to
determine whether the respondent should be
entitled to rely on portions of its affidavits?
b) Did
Prothonotary Tabib err in law in requiring the applicant to establish that the reply
evidence it intended to file would “serve the interests of justice” instead of determining
whether or not it was “in the interests of justice to file reply evidence”?
c) Did
Prothonotary Tabib err in law in awarding costs to the respondent?
[4]
For the
following reasons, the answer to all three questions is negative and the appeal
shall be dismissed.
II. Standard of Review
[5]
The
decision under appeal is a discretionary order of a prothonotary. Such
decisions ought only to be disturbed by a motions judge where
a) the prothonotary improperly
exercised his or her discretion on a question vital to the final issue of the
case;
b) the decision is clearly wrong,
in that the exercise of discretion was based upon a wrong principle or a
misapprehension of the facts (Z.I. Pompey Industrie v. ECU-Line N.V., [2003]
1 S.C.R. 450 at 461, Merck & Co. v. Apotex Inc (2003), 30 C.P.R. (4th)
40 at 53 (FCA)).
[6]
The
applicant has not argued that the order under appeal deals with questions vital
to the final issues of the case. It therefore has the onus of establishing that
Prothonotary Tabib’s decision was clearly wrong.
III. Analysis
a) Did Prothonotary
Tabib err in law in applying the test set out in Canadian Tire Corp. v. P.S.
Partsource Inc., 2001 FCA 8, [2001] F.C.J. No. 181 (F.C.A.) (QL) to determine
whether the respondent should be entitled to rely on portions of its
affidavits?
[7]
The
applicant argues that the correct test to be applied in regard to a motion to
ignore evidence in proceedings brought pursuant to the Patented Medicines
(Notice of Compliance) Regulations, SOR/93-133 (the Regulations) was
clearly set out by the Federal Court of Appeal in AB Hassle v. Canada
(Minister of National Health and Welfare) (2000), 7 C.P.R. (4th)
272.
[8]
With
respect to the applicant’s submissions, I cannot detect any “clear test” in AB
Hassle that is less stringent than that set out in Partsource regarding
motions to strike. The principles set out in both of these decisions are
not incompatible, and they can and should rather be read together.
[9]
A motion
to ignore evidence and a motion to strike are practically indistinguishable. It
is relevant to note that in similar proceedings brought pursuant to the
Regulations, the Federal Court of Appeal has relied on Partsource in AstraZeneca
Canada Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 2003 FCA 487, [2004] 2 F.C.R. 364 (C.A.), and
cited both Partsource and A.B. Hassle in Mayne Pharma (Canada)
Inc. v. Aventis Pharma Inc., 2005 FCA 50, [2005] F.C.J. No. 215 (F.C.A)
(QL). Justice Eleanor Dawson also relied on both Partsource and A.B.
Hassle in GlaxoSmithKline Inc. v. Genpharm Inc. (April 23, 2002)
T-1755-01 (FCTD)).
[10]
I
therefore conclude that Prothonotary Tabib did not err in applying the test set
out in Partsource.
b) Did Prothonotary
Tabib err in law in requiring the applicant to establish that the reply
evidence it intended to file would “serve the interests of justice” instead of
determining whether or not it was “in the interests of justice to file reply
evidence”?
[11]
The
applicant alleges that Prothonotary Tabib erred in requiring it to satisfy the
Court that the evidence it intended to file would “serve the interests of
justice”. The applicant urges that it needed only demonstrate whether it was in
the interests of justice to allow reply evidence, and that this is a
significantly lower threshold than that required by the test applied by the
Prothonotary.
[12]
Rule 312
of the Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106 gives the Court a discretionary
power to allow parties to file supplementary evidence. In Mazhero v. Canada
(Industrial Relations Board), 2002 FCA 295, [2002] F.C.J. No. 1112 (F.C.A.)
(QL), Justice John M. Evans wrote that applications for judicial review were
summary proceedings that should be determined without undue delay, and that the
discretion of the Court to permit the filing of additional material should be
exercised with great circumspection.
[13]
In Atlantic
Engraving Ltd. v. Lapointe Rosenstein, 2002 FCA 503, [2002] F.C.J. No 1782
(F.C.A.) (QL), Justice Marc Nadon stated that the Court may allow the filing of
additional evidence if the following requirements are met:
a) the evidence to be adduced will serve the interests of
justice;
b) the evidence will assist the
Court;
c) the evidence will not cause
substantial or serious prejudice to the other side;
d) the evidence was not available
at an earlier date.
[14]
I disagree
with the applicant on this issue, and agree with the respondent that the
applicant is attempting to make a distinction where there is no difference.
Prothonotary Tabib did not require it to tender the affidavits it proposed to
file, but dismissed its motion because it could not provide it with a
sufficient indication of what this evidence would establish.
[15]
In any
event, the words of Justice Nadon in Atlantic Engraving lead me to
conclude that Prothonotary Tabib did not err in requiring the applicant to
demonstrate that the further evidence it sought to file “will serve the
interests of justice.”
c) Did Prothonotary
Tabib err in law in awarding costs to the respondent?
[16]
The
applicant argues that Prothonotary Tabib erred in awarding costs to the respondent
because she found that the applicant had not provided guidance to the
respondent of the evidence it intended to file. The applicant submits that it
was not required to do so by the jurisprudence of this Court.
[17]
After
reading Prothonotary Tabib’s reasons, I cannot agree with the applicant. The
reasons clearly show that costs were awarded to the respondent because of the
Court’s disapproval of the applicant’s behaviour in the course of the
proceedings, including its failure to give sufficient indications as to the
substance of the further evidence it sought permission to adduce. In light of
my findings regarding the second issue in this case, I do not think that
Prothonotary Tabib erred in awarding costs to the respondent.
ORDER
THIS COURT ORDERS that the appeal is dismissed, with
costs.
“Michel
Beaudry”
FEDERAL COURT
NAME OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET: T-416-05
STYLE OF CAUSE: PURDUE
PHARMA
and
NOVOPHARM
LIMITED and
THE
MINISTER OF HEALTH
PLACE OF HEARING: Ottawa, Ontario
DATE OF HEARING: March 9, 2006
REASONS FOR ORDER: BEAUDRY J.
DATED: March 29, 2006
APPEARANCES:
James Mills FOR
APPLICANT
Mark Edward
Davis FOR RESPONDENT
NOVOPHARM
LIMITED
SOLICITORS
OF RECORD:
GOWLING LAFLEUR FOR
APPLICANT
HENDERSON LLP
Ottawa, Ontario
HEENAN BLAIKIE
LLP FOR RESPONDENT
Toronto,
Ontario NOVOPHARM
LIMITED
John H. Sims,
Q.C. FOR
RESPONDENT
Deputy Attorney
General MINISTER OF
HEALTH