Date: 20060310
Docket: IMM-2593-05
Citation: 2006
FC 317
Ottawa, Ontario, March 10, 2006
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Russell
BETWEEN:
SYED HABIBUR RAHMAN, MARIUM
SIDDIQUA RAHMAN,
SYEDA NOWSHIN RAHMAN, SYEDA NAFISA
RAHMAN,
SYEDA NAIMA RAHMAN
Applicants
and
THE
MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
.
[1]
This
is an application for judicial review under subsection 72(1) of the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (Act) of the decision of the Refugee
Protection Division (Board), dated April 12, 2005 (Decision), dismissing the
refugee claims of the Applicants.
BACKGROUND
[2]
The
Principal Applicant is a citizen of Bangladesh who arrived in Canada
on April 7, 1999 as an assistant cipher and consular officer in the Bangladesh
High Commission in Ottawa. He was accompanied by his wife, Marium Rahman,
as well as his daughter, Syeda Naima. Their other two daughters, Syeda Nowshin
and Syeda Nafisa, were born in Canada during the Applicants’ stay in Ottawa.
[3]
The
Principal Applicant alleges that he is a supporter of the Awami League Party,
which is now in opposition in Bangladesh but which was in power when he was
initially posted to Ottawa in 1999. He says that he would suffer
persecution and torture at the hands of the ruling Bangladesh Nationalist Party
(BNP) and its supporters if he were to return to Bangladesh.
[4]
The
Principal Applicant’s career in the Bangladesh public service began in
1989, and he joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1992.
[5]
In
1996, the Principal Applicant was posted to Sri Lanka. After
bitterly disputed elections in Bangladesh, a movement of civil
servants called the “Janatar mancha” criticized the actions of the ruling BNP
and called for democratic reform. At the time, the Principal Applicant sent a
fax to Bangladesh expressing
his support for the Janatar mancha.
[6]
The
Awami League came to power in 1996. In 1998, the Principal Applicant became the
vice-president of an Awami League-backed professional association.
[7]
The
BNP regained power in 2001 and, after the appointment of a new High
Commissioner, the Applicant says the environment in the Bangladesh High
Commission in Ottawa changed.
[8]
In
August 2003, the Principal Applicant briefly returned to Bangladesh to visit his
mother. During his stay, he visited the Bongobondhu memorial museum, which was
founded by the Awami League in memory of the murdered founder of Bangladesh.
[9]
On
December 31, 2003, the Principal Applicant received a show-cause notice
regarding his visit to the Bongobondhu memorial museum without the prior
authorization required for public servants. The notice also referred to his
association with members of the Awami League during his posting in Ottawa. He was
given seven days to reply to the allegations and explain why sanctions should
not be taken against him. He replied that, since he had been on leave at the
time, no prior authorization was required for him to visit the memorial, and he
denied the allegations that he had associated with members of the Awami League.
No direct sanctions were taken against him.
[10]
During
his posting in Ottawa, the High Commission actively pursued the
extradition of suspects in the assassination of the founder of Bangladesh who had
become Canadian citizens. After the BNP’s return to power, the Principal Applicant
claims he began to hear rumours that efforts were being made to enable such
suspects to escape prosecution by allowing them to flee to a third country, such
as Syria or Libya.
[11]
On
August 26, 2004, the Principal Applicant alleges that the High Commissioner
ordered him to issue a passport to one of the suspects. When he asked that the
High Commissioner’s order be issued in writing, the Applicant says he was
threatened by the High Commissioner for insubordination and his support of the
Awami League.
[12]
Soon
after that, members of the Principal Applicant’s family in Bangladesh started
receiving anonymous threatening telephone calls announcing reprisals if the Principal
Applicant did not follow orders without questioning his superiors. The Principal
Applicant also received letters from colleagues in different parts of the world
warning him not to return to Bangladesh because his life would
be in danger.
[13]
On
August 27, 2004, the Principal Applicant decoded a message from the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs ordering his return to Bangladesh by September
7, 2004. Meanwhile, members of the Awami League were being brutalized in Bangladesh, and the
leadership of the party was the target of an assassination attempt.
[14]
In
his amended Personal Information Form (PIF) the Principal Applicant stated that
he had received a transfer order in May 2004, but that his departure had been
delayed by the unavailability of a replacement officer.
[15]
The
Applicants filed claims for refugee protection on September 3, 2004.
DECISION
UNDER REVIEW
[16]
The
Board determined that the Applicants were not Convention refugees and were not
persons in need of protection on the grounds that the Principal Applicant
lacked credibility and that the Applicants’ fear of return was not well
founded.
[17]
The
Board challenged the following specific aspects of the Principal Applicant’s
testimony:
(a) Omissions in
the PIF narrative that were developed at the hearing; and
(b) Inconsistencies
between the PIF narrative and oral testimony.
[18]
The
Board also challenged the Principal Applicant’s credibility by drawing a
negative inference from the fact that no sanctions were apparently taken
against him for his support of the Janatar mancha in 1996, or following his
reply to the show-cause notice in 2004.
[19]
The
Board determined that the Principal Applicant had changed the nature of his
claim at the hearing, making it quite different from what he had written in his
PIF narrative.
[20]
The
Principal Applicant’s oral testimony revealed that he had been receiving
letters from colleagues warning him not to return to Bangladesh before the
confrontation with the High Commissioner on August 26, 2004, while his PIF
narrative was found to imply otherwise.
[21]
At
page 5 of its reasons, the Board writes as follows:
When asked to explain why it
is that some of these letters had been written to him even before his
confrontation with the High Commissioner in August of 2004, the principal
claimant came up with a different reason for his claim. The claimant stated
that the real reason he fears persecution and possible death in Bangladesh is that he supported the Janatar
mancha in 1996. […]
I find that this explanation
was an effort by the principal claimant to bolster and embellish his claim,
especially because he was unable to offer a reasonable explanation for why he
had received these letters of warnings from colleagues even before his
confrontation with the High Commissioner.
It is reasonable to infer that
if his support for the Janatar mancha had been the real reason for his alleged
fear of persecution in Bangladesh he would have stated so in
his first PIF narrative.
[22]
Documentary
evidence filed before the Board indicated that, upon its return to power, the
BNP had penalized many public servants who had been involved with the Janatar
mancha, while professing to “depoliticize” the administration.
[23]
However,
these purges took place in 2001, and the Board noted that the Principal
Applicant had been allowed to maintain a sensitive position in the High
Commission, and that there was no evidence he had been penalized in any way, even
after he replied to the show-cause notice in 2004.
[24]
The
Principal Applicant’s initial narrative did not mention that he had received a
transfer order in May of 2004, but had remained at his post because no
replacement was available.
[25]
In
his amended PIF narrative, the Principal Applicant did mention this transfer
order, and the Board found that the wording suggested a routine transfer.
[26]
At
the hearing before the Board, the Principal Applicant testified that the normal
duration for a posting in Ottawa is six or seven years, and that a transfer
order after only five years led him to conclude that he was being transferred
for political reasons.
[27]
At
page 8 of its reasons, the Board writes as follows:
It is reasonable to infer that
if [the transfer] had been the result of a political vendetta or had been an
unusual act the claimant would have said so in a narrative that explained in
detail why he was seeking Canada’s protection and why he feared persecution in Bangladesh.
The evidence clearly suggests
that no action was taken against the principal claimant by his government
though many other officers had been transferred, or retired, as a result of
their role in the Janatar mancha.
[28]
Regarding
the Principal Applicant’s confrontation with the High Commissioner and subsequent
threatening telephone calls to his family members, the Board noted that the Principal
Applicant’s oral testimony downplayed the significance of the confrontation in
his overall fear of return to Bangladesh, and that there was no evidence that
any members of his family had actually been harmed.
[29]
While
documentary evidence filed before the Board did indicate that violence was a
pervasive element in Bangladesh’s political life, the Board found that there
was no “reliable, trustworthy evidence, however, of any action against the
principal claimant that would show that the authorities view him as a political
opponent and would persecute him.”
RELEVANT
LEGISLATION
[30]
The
relevant provisions of the Act read as follows:
|
95. (1)
Refugee protection is conferred on a person when
(a) the
person has been determined to be a Convention refugee or a person in similar
circumstances under a visa application and becomes a permanent resident under
the visa or a temporary resident under a temporary resident permit for protection
reasons;
(b) the
Board determines the person to be a Convention refugee or a person in need of
protection; or
(c) except
in the case of a person described in subsection 112(3), the Minister allows
an application for protection.
(2) A
protected person is a person on whom refugee protection is conferred under
subsection (1), and whose claim or application has not subsequently been
deemed to be rejected under subsection 108(3), 109(3) or 114(4).
96. A
Convention refugee is a person who, by reason of a well-founded fear of
persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group or political opinion,
(a) is
outside each of their countries of nationality and is unable or, by reason of
that fear, unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of each of those
countries; or
(b) not
having a country of nationality, is outside the country of their former
habitual residence and is unable or, by reason of that fear, unwilling to
return to that country.
97. (1) A
person in need of protection is a person in Canada whose
removal to their country or countries of nationality or, if they do not have
a country of nationality, their country of former habitual residence, would
subject them personally
(a) to a
danger, believed on substantial grounds to exist, of torture within the
meaning of Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture; or
(b) to a
risk to their life or to a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment
if
(i) the
person is unable or, because of that risk, unwilling to avail themselves of
the protection of that country,
(ii) the
risk would be faced by the person in every part of that country and is not
faced generally by other individuals in or from that country,
(iii) the
risk is not inherent or incidental to lawful sanctions, unless imposed in
disregard of accepted international standards, and
(iv) the
risk is not caused by the inability of that country to provide adequate
health or medical care.
(2) A
person in Canada who is a
member of a class of persons prescribed by the regulations as being in need
of protection is also a person in need of protection.
107. (1)
The Refugee Protection Division shall accept a claim for refugee protection
if it determines that the claimant is a Convention refugee or person in need
of protection, and shall otherwise reject the claim.
(2) If the Refugee Protection Division
is of the opinion, in rejecting a claim, that there was no credible or
trustworthy evidence on which it could have made a favourable decision, it
shall state in its reasons for the decision that there is no credible basis
for the claim.
|
95. (1)
L'asile est la protection conférée à toute personne dès lors que, selon le
cas :
a) sur
constat qu'elle est, à la suite d'une demande de visa, un réfugié ou une
personne en situation semblable, elle devient soit un résident permanent au
titre du visa, soit un résident temporaire au titre d'un permis de séjour
délivré en vue de sa protection;
b) la
Commission lui reconnaît la qualité de réfugié ou celle de personne à
protéger;
c) le
ministre accorde la demande de protection, sauf si la personne est visée au
paragraphe 112(3)
(2) Est
appelée personne protégée la personne à qui l'asile est conféré et dont la
demande n'est pas ensuite réputée rejetée au titre des paragraphes 108(3),
109(3) ou 114(4).
96. A
qualité de réfugié au sens de la Convention — le réfugié — la personne qui,
craignant avec raison d'être persécutée du fait de sa race, de sa religion,
de sa nationalité, de son appartenance à un groupe social ou de ses opinions
politiques :
a) soit se
trouve hors de tout pays dont elle a la nationalité et ne peut ou, du fait de
cette crainte, ne veut se réclamer de la protection de chacun de ces pays;
b) soit, si
elle n'a pas de nationalité et se trouve hors du pays dans lequel elle avait
sa résidence habituelle, ne peut ni, du fait de cette crainte, ne veut y
retourner.
97. (1) A
qualité de personne à protéger la personne qui se trouve au Canada et serait
personnellement, par son renvoi vers tout pays dont elle a la nationalité ou,
si elle n'a pas de nationalité, dans lequel elle avait sa résidence
habituelle, exposée :
a) soit au
risque, s'il y a des motifs sérieux de le croire, d'être soumise à la torture
au sens de l'article premier de la Convention contre la torture;
b) soit à
une menace à sa vie ou au risque de traitements ou peines cruels et inusités
dans le cas suivant :
(i) elle ne
peut ou, de ce fait, ne veut se réclamer de la protection de ce pays,
(ii) elle y
est exposée en tout lieu de ce pays alors que d'autres personnes originaires
de ce pays ou qui s'y trouvent ne le sont généralement pas,
(iii) la
menace ou le risque ne résulte pas de sanctions légitimes — sauf celles
infligées au mépris des normes internationales — et inhérents à celles-ci ou
occasionnés par elles,
(iv) la
menace ou le risque ne résulte pas de l'incapacité du pays de fournir des
soins médicaux ou de santé adéquats.
(2) A
également qualité de personne à protéger la personne qui se trouve au Canada
et fait partie d'une catégorie de personnes auxquelles est reconnu par
règlement le besoin de protection.
107. (1) La
Section de la protection des réfugiés accepte ou rejette la demande d'asile
selon que le demandeur a ou non la qualité de réfugié ou de personne à protéger.
(2) Si elle estime, en
cas de rejet, qu'il n'a été présenté aucun élément de preuve crédible ou
digne de foi sur lequel elle aurait pu fonder une décision favorable, la
section doit faire état dans sa décision de l'absence de minimum de fondement
de la demande.
|
ISSUES
[31]
The
Applicants raise two issues:
1.
Did
the Board commit a reviewable error in determining that the Applicants were
neither Convention refugees nor persons in need of protection?
2.
Did
the Board commit a reviewable error in determining that the Applicants did not
have an objective basis for fear of persecution?
ARGUMENTS
The
Applicants
[32]
The
Applicants urge that the Board misinterpreted the evidence presented before it
and committed reviewable errors in its reasons.
[33]
The
Principal Applicant states that he never invoked one specific and determinant
cause for his fear of return to Bangladesh in his PIF narrative or his oral
testimony at the hearing, but that his fear of persecution stems from four
factors:
(a) His
expression of solidarity for the Janatar mancha movement in 1996;
(b) The
allegations in the government’s show-cause notice of 2003;
(c) The High
Commissioner’s threats during the 2004 altercation;
(d) The
threatening anonymous telephone calls received by his family members in Bangladesh after his altercation
with the High Commissioner.
[34]
The
Applicants submit that the Board capriciously rejected their claim because the
Board’s analysis was narrowly restrained to the search for one individual cause
for their fear of persecution. They argue that their fear of persecution stems
from the cumulative effect of the factors listed above, and that any inference
of a shift of emphasis between the Principal Applicant’s PIF narrative and his
oral testimony results from the Board’s erroneous and unreasonable interpretation
of the evidence.
[35]
As
to the Applicants’ objective fear of persecution, their position is that the
Board applied the wrong test by basing its conclusions on the fact that they
had not been the object of persecution. The Applicants cite Salibian v. Canada
(Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1990] F.C.J. No. 454 to support
the argument that they are not required to prove that they were persecuted in
the past, and that the correct test is whether the evidence indicates that they
are objectively at risk if returned to Bangladesh.
[36]
The
Applicants submit that the Board’s findings were based on mere speculation
rather than the evidence presented before it, which creates a reviewable error.
(Miral v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999]
F.C.J. No. 254). They cite the following examples of the Board’s reliance on
unsupported speculation:
(a) The assertion
that the BNP only sanctioned “major participants” in its reprisals against the Janatar
mancha movement;
(b) The assertion
that if the government wanted to take sanctions against the Principal
Applicant, they would have fined, fired or demoted him;
(c) The
conclusion that the government had decided to take no action against the
Principal Applicant after his reply to the 2003 show-cause notice.
[37]
The
Applicants also argue that the Board misinterpreted the evidence before it when
it came to the following conclusions:
(a) The Principal
Applicant’s PIF narrative implied that his altercation with the High
Commissioner was the “principal reason” for his claim;
(b) The Principal
Applicant’s PIF narrative implied that letters of warning from colleagues in
other Bangladeshi missions around the world only started arriving after his
altercation with the High Commissioner
[38]
Finally,
the Applicants claim that the Board disregarded or ignored crucial evidence
which was placed before it, especially the warning letters from the Principal
Applicant’s colleagues. While the Board addressed the issue of the dates the
letters were received by the Principal Applicant, it failed to address their
contents. They cite Kandiah v. Canada (Minister of Employment and
Immigration), [1994] F.C.J No. 262 to support the argument that the Board
has a duty at least to mention if a specific document is accepted or rejected
and the reasons for doing so, especially when the document supports the Principal
Applicant’s position.
The
Respondent
[39]
The
Respondent submits that the Board’s credibility findings are supported by the
evidence, particularly the discrepancies between the Principal Applicant’s PIF
narrative and his oral testimony during the hearing.
[40]
The
Respondent argues that the shift in emphasis (from the altercation with the
High Commissioner in August 2004 in the Principal Applicant’s PIF narrative to the
May 2004 transfer order linked to his support of the Janatar mancha movement in
1996 in his oral testimony) regarding the principal cause for his fear of
returning to Bangladesh led the Board to conclude reasonably that his
allegations were not credible.
[41]
Regarding
the Board’s finding that the Applicants lacked an objective basis for fear of
persecution, the Respondent cites Adjei v. Canada (Minister of Employment
and Immigration), [1989] F.C.J. No. 67 (F.C.A.) and states that the Board
considered and weighed the evidence before it before it came to its conclusion.
[42]
The
Respondent alleges that the Board’s inferences were reasonably drawn because
there is no evidence that the government of Bangladesh has
identified the Principal Applicant as a political opponent or that it would
persecute him. The fact that he had been allowed to hold a sensitive position
in the High Commission for months, despite the May 2004 transfer order, also
led the Board to conclude that the transfer was routine rather than politically
motivated.
[43]
The
Respondent says that the Applicant did not have any incidents of past
persecution to rely upon so that he had to base his claim upon what had
happened to similarly situated persons, and that he changed his narrative at
the hearing in order to bolster his claim. This is why the Board focussed upon
the changes that the Principal Applicant attempted to make to his claim.
ANALYSIS
Standard
of Review
[44]
The
assessment of a refugee claimant’s credibility falls squarely within the
Board’s jurisdiction, and the appropriate standard of review for this Court to
set aside the Board’s findings is that of patent unreasonableness (Aguebor
v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, [1993] F.C.J. No. 732 (F.C.A.))
[45]
This
Court’s intervention is therefore only justified if the Board’s findings were
made in a perverse or capricious manner, or without regard to the material
presented before the Board. (Medina v. Canada (Minister of Employment and
Immigration), [1990] F.C.J. No. 926 (F.C.A.), Dhillon v. Canada
(Minister of Employment and Immigration, [1990) F.C.J. No. 1040 (F.C.A.))
The Focus of
the Decision
[46]
The
Decision does make it clear that the Board felt the “Principal claimant changed
the nature of his claim at the hearing, making it quite different from what he
had written in his PIF.”
[47]
The
Board singled out the following differences:
(a) The Principal
Applicant had suggested strongly in his PIF that his confrontation with the
High Commissioner was the principal reason for his seeking protection in Canada. However, he
testified at his hearing that his fear arose primarily from his participation
in the Janatar mancha and that his confrontation with the High Commissioner was
a minor consideration;
(b) The Principal
Applicant’s PIF had implied that he received the warning letters from
colleagues in other missions after he had received the threat from the High
Commissioner on August 26, 2004. However, some of the letters that the
Principal Applicant received had been sent to him just before he had met with
the High Commissioner and had received notice of return to Dhaka, even though
most were received after the threat;
(c) The Principal
Applicant testified at the hearing that the Bangladesh government
is taking revenge against all those officers who supported the Janatar mancha
in 1996, and that the government is persecuting Awami League supporters and
killing them, and that is why he is afraid. However, he did not explain in his
PIF, where he made the confrontation with the High Commissioner the pivotal
event, that this was the real reason why he feared to return to Bangladesh. The PIF
narrative “only makes a passing mention” of Janatar mancha and his support of
the movement;
(d) The Principal
Applicant offered no real evidence that he had been penalized in any way for
his involvement in the Janatar mancha. Even the show-cause notice issued in
2003 did not result in anything being done against him. The government appeared
to accept his explanation;
(e) At the
hearing before the Board in May 2004, the Principal Applicant testified that he
received a transfer order after only five years on the job, while normally in
Ottawa similar officers are posted for six or seven years. However, in his PIF
narrative the Principal Applicant does not even mention his being transferred.
[48]
I have
reviewed the record in relation to each of these points. My conclusions are as
follows:
(a) The PIF does not “suggest
strongly” that it was the confrontation with the High Commissioner that was the
principal reason for the Principal Applicant’s seeking protection in Canada. The PIF sets out a whole
history of involvement that would make the Principal Applicant a possible
target for the present government in Bangladesh.
His confrontation with the High Commissioner may have precipitated his return,
but the PIF explains that the reason why his return is dangerous is because of
his historical involvement and his show of solidarity with the Janatar mancha.
At the hearing he explained that the confrontation with the High Commissioner
was not the only reason he faced persecution in Bangladesh. He pointed back to his past history and
involvement with Janatar mancha;
(b) The PIF merely says that “My
friends from various Bangladeshi missions abroad have also warned me and asked
me not to return now.” At the hearing the Principal Applicant provided
clarification on when the letters from friends had been written and why, and he
explained that some of the letters had been written before the meeting with the
High Commissioner. There is no strong support here for a conclusion that the
Principal Applicant changed the nature of his claim or for a material
inconsistency between the PIF and the evidence at the hearing;
(c) There is more than a “passing
mention” to the Janatar mancha in the PIF where the Principal Applicant wrote
as follows:
The general people and the majority
members of the administrative service supported the combined opposition demand
of resignation of the government. A Janatar mancha movement (a movement by
civil servants) was launched and senior members of the administration openly
expressed their support to the opposition demand. Support was also solicited
from the employees of Bangladesh missions abroad. I along with
others stationed in Sri
Lanka expressed
our solidarity with the on-going movement to restore democracy. I along with
some others were summoned to Dhaka much before completion of my tenure in Sri Lanka. Before the government could
take any further action, the government had to call for fresh elections.
The
clear implication in the PIF is that the Principal Applicant was summoned to
Dhaka to face reprisals for expressing solidarity with the Janatar mancha but
no action was taken against him because “In the election Awami League won
plurality and formed a broad based coalition government with the nationalist
and secular parties.” A further clear implication from the whole narrative is
that the Applicant would be in danger again if the BNP ever regained power. The
Applicant also says in his PIF that, as part of the show-cause notice “I was
also accused of engaging in deep conspiracy with the opposition and leaking
state secret (sic). My role during the 1996 movement was also
questioned.” So his PIF narrative made it clear that the concerns of 1996
during the time of Janatar mancha continued to play a role in his fear of what
he might have to face in Bangladesh;
(d) I agree with the Respondent
that the PIF provides no evidence of past persecution. The Applicants make it
clear that they fear a future return. Any objective basis for this fear is
found in the transcript to the hearing when the Principal Applicant mentions
other colleagues who have suffered because they had Awami League associations;
(e) The transfer is not mentioned
in the PIF. The PIF suggests that, following the confrontation with the High
Commissioner, a message came that he was to be sent back to Dhaka by September 7, 2004 and that “I
suspected that something ominous was going to happen to me. The government was
not even willing to give me preparatory time for my departure.”
[49]
So a
comparison of the PIF and the evidence at hearing presents something of a mixed
bag. The Board’s assertions appear wrong to me in some ways, but not in
others. The issue is whether they are so wrong that the Court should intervene.
[50]
While the
Court is always extremely reluctant to interfere on the basis of credibility findings
and the Board’s assessment of the objective nature of a claim, I believe that
interference is warranted in this case.
[51]
One of the
cornerstones of the Decision is that the Principal Applicant changed the nature
of his claim from what was revealed in his PIF, “making it quite different from
what he had written in his PIF.” I don’t believe this is the case. While the
Principal Applicant provides more detail in his PIF about the confrontation
with the High Commissioner, he places that confrontation in the context of his
past support of Janatar mancha, and the High Commissioner refers to the
Principal Applicant’s history as a reason to threaten him. The Board did not
question that the High Commissioner said “Oh, I know that you are a supporter
of the Awami League. Something ought to be done about you. I will see to that (sic)
you are call (sic) back and then taught a lesson for your insolence.”
[52]
So, I
believe it was patently unreasonable for the Board to say he had changed the
nature of his claim from one concerned with a confrontation with the High
Commissioner to one concerned with the Applicant’s past and his involvement
with Janatar mancha and, indirectly, the Awami League. The High Commissioner’s
threats only make sense in the context of a prior history in which the Principal
Applicant has done something to antagonize the BNP.
[53]
Had this
mistake not have been made, the Board’s approach to the rest of the claim might
well have been different. Hence, I believe it would be unsafe for the Decision
to stand, particularly when the Board itself says that “the documentary
evidence states that the BNP government is continuing the tradition of past
governments, of using violence against opponents and committing human rights
violations … .”
[54]
My
conclusion is that the Board’s central credibility finding based upon a change
in the nature of the Applicant’s claim is patently unreasonable when the
evidence before the Board on this issue is reviewed.
[55]
As Justice
Denis Pelletier pointed out in Maruthapillai v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), [2000] F.C.J. No. 761 at para. 13:
Weighing evidence is at the
core of the Refugee Division’s jurisdiction. It is not for the Court to
substitute its own assessment for that of the Refugee Division. However, when
weighing the evidence, the Refugee Division must respect a claimant’s
testimony. The Refugee Division cannot distort a claimant’s testimony and then
find that the claimant lacks credibility.
ORDER
THIS COURT ORDERS that
1.
The
Application is allowed and the matter is referred back for reconsideration by a
differently constituted Board.
2.
There is
no question for certification.
“James
Russell”