Date: 20061214
Docket: IMM-98-06
Citation: 2006 FC 1503
Ottawa, Ontario, December 14,
2006
PRESENT: The Honourable Madam Justice Tremblay-Lamer
BETWEEN:
MOHAMMAD
ZEKI MAHJOUB
applicant
and
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
and
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL OF CANADA
respondents
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION AND
BACKGROUND FACTS
[1]
There have been considerable
proceedings related to the present matter. In addition to the following cursory
overview, Appendix A to these reasons contains a more detailed chronology of
related events.
[2]
Mr. Mohamed Zeki Mahjoub (the applicant)
is an Egyptian national who came to Canada in 1995 and was found to be a Convention refugee in
October 1996.
[3]
Mr. Mahjoub has been in
detention since the Spring of 2000, when the Solicitor General of Canada and
the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (the Ministers) issued a
security certificate qualifying Mr. Mahjoub as inadmissible under section 19 of
the Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2 (former Act) in effect at that
time. Appendix B to these reasons sets
out the relevant parts of the former Act. This opinion was based on a security
intelligence report expressing the belief of the Canadian Security Intelligence
Service (CSIS) that Mr. Mahjoub was a member of an inadmissible class referred
to in the former Act, by virtue of CSIS’ opinion that he:
·
will, while in Canada, engage in, or instigate, the subversion by
force of the government of Egypt
·
is a member of the Vanguards of Conquest (VOC),
a faction of Al Jihad (AJ). The VOC is an organization that there are
reasonable grounds to believe will engage in, or instigate, the subversion by
force of the government of Egypt, and will engage in terrorism;
·
is, and was, a member of the VOC, which is an
organization that there are reasonable grounds to believe is, or was, engaged
in terrorism; and
·
has engaged in terrorism.
[4]
The security certificate issued by
the Ministers was challenged by Mr. Mahjoub, but was found to be reasonable by
Mr. Justice Marc Nadon in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)
v. Mahjoub, [2001] 4 F.C. 644 (T.D.), 2001 FCT 1095.
[5]
In a July 2004 decision, the
Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (the Minister) determined that Mr.
Mahjoub was a danger to the security of Canada, and upon being returned to Egypt would
probably be detained and could suffer human rights abuses. Notwithstanding the
finding of a “substantial risk of ill-treatment and human rights abuses” the
Minister decided that Mr. Mahjoub should be removed to Egypt, pursuant
to paragraph 115(2)(b) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act,
S.C. 2001, c. 27 (the Act). Mr. Mahjoub applied for judicial review of that
decision.
[6]
In Mahjoub v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2005] 3 F.C.R. 334, 2005 FC 156 (Mahjoub 2005) Justice Eleanor
Dawson found that the Minister’s decision on the danger issue was based on incomplete
evidence. The Minister’s delegate had relied only on a CSIS narrative
report, and lacked the detailed confidential information upon which the
narrative was based. Consequently, the Court found that the delegate could not
properly assess the danger posed by Mr. Mahjoub, and by extension, could not
properly balance the competing interests at stake. The application for judicial
review was allowed, and the matter was remitted for re-determination by another
delegate of the Minister.
[7]
On re-determination of the matter,
a different delegate of the Minister (the delegate) concluded in a decision
dated January 3, 2006, that Mr. Mahjoub poses a danger to the security of
Canada, that there were sufficient grounds for believing he would not be at substantial
risk of torture or other ill-treatment in Egypt, and therefore that he
should be returned there.
[8]
Mr.
Mahjoub brings the present application for judicial review of this January 3,
2006 decision.
APPLICABLE LEGISLATION
[9]
Subsection 115(1) of the Act
generally prohibits the return of a protected person, including a Convention
refugee, to a country where he or she would be at risk of persecution or torture
or cruel or unusual treatment or punishment (torture). Subsection 115(2) of the
Act sets out exceptions to this general principle. Section 115 of the Act is as
follows:
115.(1) A protected person or a person who is recognized
as a Convention refugee by another country to which the person may be
returned shall not be removed from Canada to a country where they would be at
risk of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in
a particular social group or political opinion or at risk of torture or cruel
and unusual treatment or punishment.
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply in the case of a person
(a) who
is inadmissible on grounds of serious criminality and who constitutes, in the
opinion of the Minister, a danger to the public in Canada; or
(b) who
is inadmissible on grounds of security, violating human or international
rights or organized criminality if, in the opinion of the Minister, the
person should not be allowed to remain in Canada on the basis of the nature
and severity of acts committed or of danger to the security of Canada.
(3) A person, after a determination under paragraph
101(1)(e) that the person’s claim is ineligible, is to be
sent to the country from which the person came to Canada, but may be sent to
another country if that country is designated under subsection 102(1) or if
the country from which the person came to Canada has rejected their claim for
refugee protection.
|
115.(1) Ne peut être renvoyée dans un
pays où elle risque la persécution du fait de sa race, de sa religion, de sa
nationalité, de son appartenance à un groupe social ou de ses opinions
politiques, la torture ou des traitements ou peines cruels et inusités, la
personne protégée ou la personne dont il est statué que la qualité de réfugié
lui a été reconnue par un autre pays vers lequel elle peut être renvoyée.
(2) Le paragraphe (1) ne s’applique pas à
l’interdit de territoire :
a) pour grande criminalité
qui, selon le ministre, constitue un danger pour le public au Canada;
b) pour raison de sécurité ou
pour atteinte aux droits humains ou internationaux ou criminalité organisée
si, selon le ministre, il ne devrait pas être présent au Canada en raison
soit de la nature et de la gravité de ses actes passés, soit du danger qu’il
constitue pour la sécurité du Canada.
(3) Une personne ne peut, après prononcé
d’irrecevabilité au titre de l’alinéa 101(1)e), être renvoyée que vers
le pays d’où elle est arrivée au Canada sauf si le pays vers lequel elle sera
renvoyée a été désigné au titre du paragraphe 102(1) ou que sa demande
d’asile a été rejetée dans le pays d’où elle est arrivée au Canada.
|
ISSUES
[10]
The following issues are raised in
this judicial review application:
1. Applicable standard of review
2. Danger to the security of Canada
a. Sources of evidence
i. Reliance on
evidence likely to have been obtained by torture
ii. Burden of proof
b. Assessment of the evidence by
the delegate
3. Substantial risk of death and/or torture
upon return to Egypt
a. Country conditions
i. Death penalty
ii. Substantial risk
of torture
b. Egypt’s assurances
4. Best interests of the children
5. Alternatives to removal
ANALYSIS
1. Applicable standard of
review
[11]
Both the danger to the
security of Canada and the substantial risk of torture questions are
predominantly fact-driven inquiries (Mahjoub 2005, above at para.42; Almrei
v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2005 FC 355, [2005] F.C.J. No. 437 (QL) at para. 32). I
agree with my colleague Mr. Justice Andrew MacKay that Parliament has vested
the Minister with broad discretion to balance both these factors in making the
relevant determinations (Re Jaballah, 2006 FC 346, [2006] F.C.J. No. 404
(QL) at para. 18) (Jaballah). Accordingly, a deferential approach must
be taken and the delegate's decision must only be set aside if it is patently
unreasonable. In order to intervene, a reviewing Court must be satisfied that
the decision was made arbitrarily, or in bad faith, or without regard to the
appropriate factors, or the decision cannot be supported on the evidence; the
Court is not to re-weigh the factors considered or interfere simply because the
Court would have reached a different conclusion (Suresh v. Canada
(M.C.I.), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3, 2002 SCC 1 at paras. 29, 39, 41) (Suresh). As the Supreme
Court of Canada stated in Law Society of New Brunswick v. Ryan, [2003] 1
S.C.R. 247, 2003 SCC 20 at paragraph 52, “[…] a patently unreasonable defect, once identified, can be explained simply and easily,
leaving no real possibility of doubting that the decision is defective” and “[…]
[a] decision that is patently unreasonable is so flawed that no amount of curial deference can justify
letting it stand.”
[12]
Given that
this application centres on the relatively lengthy reasons of the delegate's
decision, and the evidence
upon which it was based, it is worth canvassing in tandem with an issue-by-issue analysis.
2. Danger to the
security of Canada
Delegate’s Reasons
[13]
The delegate
began by reviewing the circumstances surrounding Mr. Mahjoub’s arrival in Canada. She noted that Mr. Mahjoub
first came to Canada in 1995 with the use of a forged Saudi passport. She mentioned that his
whereabouts from 1986 to 1995 were largely unaccounted for, with the exception
of a period in 1992-1993 when he was in Sudan working for a Bin Laden company. At this time Al
Qaeda was headquartered in Sudan. She also referred to the fact that Mr. Mahjoub was
interviewed in person
by Osama Bin Laden and given the position of Deputy General Manager in charge
of some 4,000 employees with a considerable salary (in relative terms), despite the fact that he had no prior relevant
experience.
[14]
She referred to evidence
suggesting Mr. Mahjoub's connection to a terrorist organization, citing among
other things his arrival in Canada shortly after Sudan expelled Egyptian
extremists. She cited his direct and indirect connections with known terrorists, along with his repeated
attempts to intentionally conceal these
connections from Canadian authorities. She found that these patterns of connections and
persistent attempts to mislead Canadian authorities revealed "an
in-depth involvement in the terror network".
[15]
With regard to the Al Jihad/Vanguards of Conquest (AJ/VOC) group, the
delegate concluded on the basis of the public and classified record that
there was sufficient evidence that Mr. Mahjoub is a senior member. She noted
that he has maintained close contacts with operatives of the group, and that prior
to his detention he had “constant and high level contacts with members of Osama Bin
Laden's terrorist network all over the world, that he likely facilitated
the planning of terrorist attacks and provided logistical support”.
[16]
In summary, the delegate concluded
that she was persuaded that “Mr. Mahjoub was and continues to be a high
ranking member of the AJ”, that the
AJ/VOC has now merged with Al Qaeda, and that the group's targets have
widened beyond overthrowing the Egyptian government to the present goal of
“indiscriminately attack[ing] Western civilians and economic interests
all over the world”. She pointed out that the merged organization has openly threatened all
Western countries, that Canada has been specifically targeted, and is currently the
only such country that has not been directly attacked. This group has shown that it is
extremely dangerous and has the capacity to carry out its mandate all over the world,
viewing civilians as legitimate targets.
[17]
Given its current
decentralization, the delegate was satisfied that the evidence showed that the Al Qaeda network
was still capable of executing terrorist
acts despite the
deaths and detentions of senior members. She
concluded that rather than being an impediment to him, the voids left by senior
members would permit Mr. Mahjoub to be better positioned to become prominent in
the network, and thereby plan further terrorist attacks. Even if he were not
able to reinsert himself in the same branches of the organization, she
reasoned, he would be able to proceed with terrorist activities targeting
Western nations, including Canada, due to “his experience, his influence and his
network”.
[18]
In consideration of the submissions that Mr. Mahjoub could no longer
pose a threat to Canada due to his current state of mental and physical
health, the delegate was not satisfied that this lessened the threat that he
posed to Canada. She similarly rejected the notion that his notoriety would be an
impediment to his ability to be involved in future terrorist
activities. In view of all the evidence, she was convinced that the “threatened
harm posed by Mr. Mahjoub is substantial, serious, and grounded on objectively
reasonable suspicion”.
a) Sources
of evidence
i. Reliance
on evidence likely to have been obtained by torture
[19]
The applicant submits that
Canadian officials have relied on evidence from Egypt in making its case against
him. He maintains the delegate failed to meet the standard of “cogent evidence”
required for such an important decision as she impermissibly relied on some
information that is “likely to have been obtained by torture”, given Egypt’s
record of using torture for interrogatory purposes. Similarly, he argues, the
delegate impermissibly considered his conviction by an Egyptian military court
arising from an in absentia proceeding, which probably also
relied on evidence likely obtained by torture.
[20]
For
the respondents, there is no basis for the speculation that the delegate relied
on evidence which was likely obtained by torture. The delegate took note of the
submission that information from Egypt should be treated as suspect, and affirmed that
the evidence she considered came from a wide variety of sources over a period
of time, with all of it being weighed for its probity. Any elaboration relating
to specific evidence beyond that provided in her reasons would have resulted in
improper breaches of national security.
[21]
A
review of the existing jurisprudence will help to provide a useful framework
for the present analysis of this issue.
[22]
In Lai
v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2004 FC 179, [2004] F.C.J. No. 113 (QL) (Lai
FCTD), my colleague Justice Andrew MacKay held at paragraph 24:
I agree … that evidence obtained by torture, or other means
precluded by the International Convention against Torture and other Cruel,
Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, ought not to be relied upon by a
panel considering a refugee application. […]
[23]
This
view was confirmed by the Federal Court of Appeal in Lai v. Canada (M.C.I.),
2005 FCA 125, [2005] F.C.J. No. 584 (QL) (Lai FCA), where Justice
Brian Malone concluded at paragraph 95 sub-paragraph (a) that “[…] [s]tatements obtained by torture or other cruel, inhumane or
degrading treatment or punishment are neither credible or trustworthy.”
[24]
In Re
Charkaoui, 2004 FC 1031, [2004] F.C.J. No. 1236 (QL) (Charkaoui), my
colleague Justice Simon Noël considered challenges to the evidence on the
grounds that it had been obtained by torture. At paragraphs 28 and 29 of Charkaoui,
above, he essentially found that the evidence at issue from
Mr. Rezzam had not been tainted by torture, and that it could form part of
the evidentiary record. However, Justice Noël was not satisfied that
information against Mr. Charkaoui from Mr. Abu Zubaida had not likely been
obtained by torture/mistreatment, as there was contradictory evidence
surrounding the circumstances of its production (Charkaoui, above, at
paragraphs 30, 31). With regard to this particular evidence, Justice Noël
stated at paragraph 31 of Charkaoui, above:
[…] bearing in mind the objectives of the Convention Against
Torture and the conflicting evidence presented by the two parties, it is the
Court's intention not to take into consideration the statement of Mr. Zubaida
and not to assign it any importance for the time being in my analysis of the
facts. However, the Court is not withdrawing this statement as presented from
the record, in view of the type of evidence presented by the parties and the
contradiction that exists in the evidence in support of the respective
submissions of the parties.
[25]
Another
colleague, Justice Eleanor Dawson, considered a similar argument made on behalf
of Mr. Harkat that torture had tainted evidence obtained from Mr. Abu Zubaida
and therefore that it should be inadmissible (re Harkat, 2005 FC 393,
[2005] F.C.J. No. 481 (QL) at para. 115) (Harkat 2005). Mr. Harkat
referred to indirect and direct evidence of mistreatment likely suffered by Mr.
Abu Zubaida in support of his position, and the Court held that there was “[…] significant concern about the methods used to interrogate
Abu Zubaida” (Harkat 2005, above, at para. 120). It may be relevant to
note that aside from the torture/mistreatment issue there was an “additional
pressing concern” of the weight to accord the information from Mr. Abu Zubaida,
as there was no evidence before the Court of the specific questions and answers
used in producing the information (Harkat 2005, above, at
para. 122). Ultimately, Justice Dawson concluded that she was “[…] left in
doubt as to how Mr. Abu Zubaida came to provide information about Mr. Harkat”
and she decided to “give no weight to the information provided to the Court
through Abu Zubaida” (Harkat 2005, above, at para. 123).
[26]
In
light of the above, I agree with the applicant that reliance on evidence likely
to have been obtained by torture is an error in law. Though not been explicitly
articulated, I am persuaded that this general principle has essentially been
applied and adopted in Canada in recent cases. It is
also consistent with Canada’s signing of the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman and
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (G.A.
res. 39/46, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984)). This
view is also consonant with a recent House of Lords decision which held
that reliance on evidence likely to have been obtained by torture is an error
in law (A (FC) and others (FC) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department,
[2005] UKHL 71), [2005] H.L.J. No. 13 (QL) (A(FC)).
[27]
However,
it is also important to note that there must be a credible evidentiary
basis linking torture to the specific evidence at issue in order to justify its
exclusion (Lai FCTD, above, at paras. 28, 50; aff’d Lai FCA,
above, at paras. 38-42; Charkaoui, above, at paras. 27-31). The Federal
Court of Appeal has held that general country condition information citing the
use of torture should not inevitably lead to a finding that all specific
evidence from that country should be excluded, without further substantiation (Lai
FCA, above, at para. 42). On this point Justice Malone concluded at
paragraph 42 of Lai FCA, above, “[…] the very
general evidence offered by the appellants about torture by Chinese
investigators was not specific and certainly not specific to the statements
offered by the Minister in this appeal. […]”
ii. Burden
of proof
[28]
The respondents
submit that a party alleging that specific evidence was obtained by torture bears
the onus of adducing proof to establish the claim, on a balance of probabilities
standard, though no authorities were submitted on this point. I am not
convinced this is the proper burden in the special circumstances of the present
matter.
[29]
In a
proceeding where evidence is public, the person concerned has the ability to
challenge specific evidence. Thus, it is appropriate to impose such a burden in
the circumstances, as this person has the opportunity and means to properly
discharge it. For instance, in India v. Singh, [1996] B.C.J. No.
2792 (QL), the British Colombia Supreme Court had the role of determining if
there was sufficient evidence to order Mr. Singh to surrender for extradition
to India where India relied upon confessional statements of five
individuals detained there.
[30]
In that
case, Mr. Singh submitted that the statements were obtained by torture, and
should be excluded. In this context, he knew the content of the statements and
the identities of those who made them, and had the opportunity to produce
specific evidence attempting to prove the statements were obtained under
torture. The Court concluded at paragraph 21 that “[t]he burden of proving that
the confessional statements were obtained as a result of the commission of an
offence under this torture section [section 269.1 of the Criminal Code of
Canada] rests upon the Fugitive who makes the allegation … [and] must be
proved upon a balance of probabilities”. Due to the nature of the proceedings,
Mr. Singh was aware of all of the evidence against him, and therefore had the
opportunity to adduce evidence necessary to meet the burden placed upon him. In
contrast, due to the special nature of the present matter, where part of
the evidence is not disclosed to Mr. Mahjoub, this opportunity is somewhat
limited. This is a crucial distinction of which I am particularly mindful, and
one which I believe is reflected in existing jurisprudence.
[31]
In Harkat
2005, above, the Ministers submitted that Mr. Harkat had the burden of
proving, on a balance of probabilities, that evidence from Mr. Abu Zubaida had
been obtained by torture (Harkat 2005, above, at para. 116). Mr. Harkat
responded that as the location and condition of Mr. Abu Zubaida were unknown,
he was limited to putting public material before the Court and inferring the
occurrence of torture; some of this public material related directly and
indirectly to Mr. Abu Zubaida (Harkat 2005 at para. 117). After
reviewing the public evidence, Justice Dawson stated that “[t]he evidence
before the Court satisfies me that better evidence about conditions Mr. Abu
Zubaida has been subjected to is not likely to be available to Mr. Harkat” and
then concluded that it did raise “significant concern” about the methods used
to obtain the evidence (Harkat 2005 at para. 120). In light of her doubt
with regard to this evidence, she gave it no weight (Harkat, above, at
para. 123).
[32]
In a
similar vein, Justice Noël decided not to rely on potentially suspect
evidence where there was a specifically founded “possibility that such
mistreatment occurred” (Charkaoui, above, at para. 31). Thus, the
Court’s doubt was resolved by giving no weight to the evidence.
[33]
In
my view, my colleagues’ approaches to the burden of proof suggest an
appropriate consideration of the special nature of matters such as these, and a
recognition of the inherent limitations placed upon individuals such as the applicant.
I find such an approach preferable to that proposed by the respondents in the
special circumstances of the present context.
[34]
In
my opinion, in light of the preceding jurisprudence, where the issue is raised
by an applicant offering a plausible explanation why evidence is likely to have
been obtained by torture, the decision-maker should then consider this issue in
light of the public and classified information. Where the decision-maker finds
there are reasonable grounds to suspect that evidence was likely obtained
by torture, it should not be relied upon in making a determination.
[35]
This
view is reflected in A(FC), above, where the House of Lords found, in a
substantively similar context, that a conventional burden of proof should not be
placed on the detainee (at paras. 55, 80, 98, 116, 155). Lord Hope of
Craighead, in the majority, wrote at paragraph 116:
[…]
It would be wholly unrealistic to expect the detainee to prove anything, as he
is denied access to so much of the information that is to be used against him.
He cannot be expected to identify from where the evidence comes, let alone the
persons who have provided it. All he can reasonably be expected to do is to raise
the issue by asking that the point be considered by SIAC. There is, of
course, so much material in the public domain alleging the use of torture
around the world that it will be easy for the detainee to satisfy that simple
test. All he needs to do is point to the fact that the information which is to
be used against him may have come from one of the many countries around the
world that are alleged to practise torture, bearing in mind that even those who
say that they do not use torture apply different standards from those that we
find acceptable. Once the issue has been raised in this general way the onus
will pass to SIAC. It has access to the information and is in a position to
look at the facts in detail. It must decide whether there are reasonable
grounds to suspect that torture has been used in the individual case that
is under scrutiny. If it has such a suspicion, there is then something that it
must investigate as it addresses its mind to the information that is put
before it which has been obtained from the security services.
[My
emphasis]
[36]
Ultimately,
I believe that the determination of whether evidence is likely to have been
obtained by torture is a fact-driven inquiry. It is unequivocally a
conclusion that requires the decision-maker to weigh the evidence in the
record, to determine if it was likely the product of torture or not. Thus,
I agree with the reasoning of my colleague Justice MacKay in Jaballah,
above, at paragraphs 40-42, that this issue is essentially one of the weight
given to evidence by the delegate. As a fact-driven inquiry that involves
weighing the available evidence, as with the other aspects of the decision,
this element would be subject to considerable deference by a reviewing court.
[37]
The applicant
submits the delegate relied on evidence likely to have been obtained by torture
in concluding he has ties to terrorism. He alleges that Egypt has a
record of using torture to secure information and that it “is apparent from the
allegations and summary of the case against him that Canadian officials have
relied on evidence obtained directly or indirectly from Egypt and that this
includes information provided from individuals detained by that country and
from trials [sic] proceedings characterized as unfair by international
human rights organizations”. Specifically, the admissions of Essam Marzouk and
Ahmed Agiza, linking Mr. Mahjoub to terrorist networks, were likely the product
of torture at the hands of Egyptian security services and were relied upon by
the delegate.
[38]
In
her reasons, the delegate took note of Mr. Mahjoub’s position that any
information obtained from the Egyptian security services should be considered
inherently suspect. She indicated that
[t]he
evidence available both public and classified [sic] comes from a
wide-range of sources over a period of time. All the evidence has been
weighted in accordance with its own probative value and in view of the totality
of the body of evidence.
[39]
In
response to the applicant’s submission that the Egyptian conviction should not
be given any weight, the delegate wrote:
The
conviction of Mr. Mahjoub in Egypt is not determinative of whether he is a
danger to the security of Canada since, like the security certificate
conclusion, it is evidence relating to his past membership in a terrorist
organization. There is ample evidence, other that [sic] the conviction,
with regards to Mr. Mahjoub’s involvement with a terrorist organization.
[40]
The
delegate clearly indicates that the Egyptian conviction is “not determinative
of whether he is a danger to the security of Canada” issue. In other words, this single
evidentiary element is neither sufficient, nor necessary, to her determination;
even without the conviction evidence she would have come to the same conclusion
in view of the totality of the evidence. In light of the inherent restrictions
on her ability to reference classified information in her reasons, she could
not have been more explicit.
[41]
In
sum, I find that while the applicant was entitled to raise the
“likelihood obtained by torture” issue, and have it duly considered by the
delegate, this issue ultimately concerns the weight the delegate gave the
information that specific evidence was likely obtained by torture.
[42]
Contrary
to the applicant’s submission, I do not believe that the above reasons reveal
that it is “apparent” that the delegate relied on evidence likely to have been
obtained by torture. Upon reviewing both the public and classified evidence I
am satisfied that the delegate did not err in according the evidence the
probity she believed it deserved in light of its provenance, and in view of the
other available evidence. In coming to this conclusion, I am mindful of the
nature of the present context. It is one where the delegate is obliged (as am
I) to omit any reference to classified information which could be used by an
“informed reader” to the detriment of the security of Canada (Henrie v.
Canada (Security Intelligence Review Committee) (1988), 53 D.L.R.(4th)
568, at 574-575 (F.C.T.D.), aff’d (1992) 88 D.L.R. (4th) 575
(F.C.A.); Re Harkat, 2003 FCT 285, [2003] F.C.J. No. 400 (QL) (Harkat
2003); Almrei v. Canada (M.C.I.), [2004] 4 F.C.R. 327, 2004 FC 420 at
paras. 58, 62) (Almrei 2004).
b) Assessment
of the evidence by the delegate
[43]
The applicant
submits the delegate ignored the exculpatory explanations he offered in
response to allegations against him. I disagree, as she did not ignore his
explanations, but rather found them not to be credible. For instance,
she specifically refers to Mr. Mahjoub’s account that he happened to first meet
Mr. Marzouk at an airport while making a lost luggage claim, and in light of
other evidence, discounts his version as lacking credibility. Indeed, after
having considered his explanations, including Mr. Mahjoub’s own qualification
that certain connections were pure “coincidences”, she stated:
Far
from coincidences, these are part of a pattern and are consistent with the rest
of the evidence that shows an in-depth involvement in the terror network.
[44]
Similarly,
I cannot agree that the delegate untenably concluded that his whereabouts were
“largely unknown” between 1986 and 1995, and that she ignored his explanations
that he went from Saudi
Arabia to
Sudan before coming to Canada. She specifically cited
that his whereabouts in that period were “largely unknown”, save for a period
in 1992-1993 when he was working for a Bin Laden company in Sudan. Neither the
delegate’s reasons, nor her reasoning, constitute an error in this regard.
[45]
Despite
the applicant’s submissions, the delegate did not ignore, but rather directly
addressed his allegations that his current level of notoriety would preclude
any present involvement with covert terrorist networks. On this point, she
specifically articulated that “[…] Mr. Mahjoub’s notoriety, position and
influence, should he remain in Canada and be able to communicate, would be enhanced within the
movement […]”.
[46]
The applicant
further submits that the delegate ignored evidence of the significant
changes in the terror networks with which he was allegedly involved. More
particularly, she ignored the effect of the merger between Al Qaeda and
AJ/VOC which occurred long after he left for Canada. That, coupled with the death or detention
of any significant contacts that he could have conceivably had in those
networks, vitiated any potential risk he could pose.
[47]
On
the contrary, I find that the delegate expressly considered the impact
of these changes since Mr. Mahjoub’s arrival in Canada. This is evident from
her reasons, where she stated:
I
am persuaded that, from Canada, Mr. Mahjoub has been involved in the
terrorist network and would likely continue to be so involved. The death and
detention of other senior member of this group would not, in my opinion deter
M. Mahjoub’s involvement, considering that he would, upon release, be in a
position to gain even more influence as a senior member. [My emphasis]
[48]
Further,
as to the possibility that Mr. Mahjoub might not be able to reintegrate into
the former structure, she articulated:
…
I am convinced nonetheless that he would be in a position and would proceed,
because of his experience, his influence and his network, to carry out the
ideology of targeting for attack Western nations, particularly Canada.
[49]
I am
satisfied that it was reasonable for the delegate to infer that notwithstanding
his considerable public exposure, the applicant could, because of his
experience, his influence and his connections, participate in a terrorist
organization. She was entitled to give little weight to Mr. Mahjoub’s
submission that the passage of time and lengthy detention diminished the danger
he posed to the security of Canada.
[50]
The applicant
challenges the delegate’s decision for ignoring the evidence contained in his
medical and psychological reports, and for not providing adequate reasons why
his current condition does not lessen the risk he poses. The delegate noted
that the psychological report expressed the opinion that Mr. Mahjoub is
exhibiting symptoms of paranoia, and that if he is not released his condition
will continue to deteriorate, “that he suspects others are harming him, he
bears grudges and is quick to react angrily”. She also specifically
acknowledged that “Mr. Mahjoub’s submissions include a psychologist report and
state that Mr. Mahjoub’s mental and physical health has been severely affected
while in detention”. The delegate then stated that she was not satisfied that
this would lessen the danger that he poses to the security of Canada. Thus, it is evident
that she turned her attention to both his current mental and physical
states in making her determination. It was not an error for her to infer that
his condition would not neutralize his capacity to participate in planning
terrorist activities.
[51]
In
response to the “guilty by association” argument, I find that the conclusions
drawn regarding his involvement with terrorist networks were substantiated on a
wide range of evidence, and beyond mere “guilt by association” reasoning. I am
satisfied that the delegate’s conclusions in this regard mirrored findings by
this Court in Canada (M.C.I.) v. Mahjoub, 2005 FC 1596, [2005]
F.C.J. No. 1948 (QL) (Mahjoub DES) at paragraphs 70-73 that the
confidential information “… goes far beyond guilt by association …”, and that
both the public and classified evidence established Mr. Mahjoub’s connections
with “individuals who were very highly placed and influential in the Islamic
extremist movement”. Her determination was substantively in line with that of
Justice Dawson who concluded that there is a “reasonable basis to believe that
Mr. Mahjoub was a leader, a decision-maker, a planner and a recruiter for the
radical Islamic cause” (Mahjoub DES, above, at para. 91).
[52]
Similarly,
with regard to the applicant’s submission that the delegate used
stereotype-based reasoning in concluding that he would engage in terrorism
despite changes in circumstances, I do not agree with him. Rather, the
delegate’s inference with regard to the danger that he posed to the security of
Canada reflected a consideration of all of the evidence and essentially
reiterated the findings in this regard by this Court in Mahjoub DES,
above, at paragraphs 80-82, 89-93 that he could re-establish connections with
terrorist contacts and/or networks, that notoriety was not necessarily a
neutralizing impediment to his continued involvement with terrorist activities,
that the terrorist groups with which he was involved continue to remain
dangerous and ultimately that he continued to pose a danger to national
security or the safety of any person. Further, on this issue, I adopt the
reasoning of Justice MacKay in Jaballah, above, at paragraph 41:
[…] In my view, general descriptive profiles based on more than
one individual may be information of use in intelligence assessments, and the
use of such a profile, by the Minister or his delegate, provided it is not the
exclusive or principal information relied upon, is not so unreasonable in
assessing threats to national security that the Court should intervene on
review.
[53]
The applicant
submits on the authority of VIA Rail Canada Inc. v. National Transportation
Agency, [2001] 2 F.C. 25, [2000] F.C.J. No. 1685 (C.A.) (QL), that the
delegate failed to provide sufficient reasons that articulate and sustain her
findings. The legal duty to provide reasons is well established, the underlying
rationale is varied and what constitutes adequate reasons will change with the
circumstances of each case. (VIA Rail, above, at paras. 17-20). However,
I will stress again that the circumstances of the present matter are
particular, given the inherent constraints imposed by classified information
which cannot be disclosed. Such constraints mean that the delegate had an
overriding legal obligation not to disclose or specifically refer to any
information that might compromise national security or the safety of any person
in her reasons. This necessarily restricts the public articulation of the
specific evidentiary basis underpinning conclusions, where any of the evidence
relied upon is classified; in the words of Justice Noël “[o]ften the very form
of disclosure can have an impact on national security or the safety of any
person” (Re Charkaoui, 2003 FC 1418, [2003] F.C.J. No. 1815 (QL)
at para. 16; see also Harkat 2003, above). On a tangential note, I find
myself in a similar position with regard to the present matter, as stated by
Mr. Justice Edmond Blanchard in Almrei 2004, above, at paragraph 62:
[…]
I am obligated by law not to disclose any information which would be injurious
to national security or to the safety of any person. In consequence, my reasons
cannot be as complete as they would otherwise be with respect to why such
information was either accepted or rejected in whole or in part.
[54]
In
relation to the issue of the danger that Mr. Mahjoub poses to the security of Canada, there was much
relevant classified information, not contained in the public record. Having
personally reviewed all of the information, both classified and public, which
was before the delegate, I recognize how her findings could appear
insufficiently corroborated solely through the lens of the public record. However,
when considered in concert with the classified evidence, I am satisfied that
her conclusions were well-grounded in the evidence before her. I do not find
that she committed any reviewable errors with regard to the danger to the
security of Canada issue.
3. Substantial
risk of death and/or torture upon return to Egypt
Delegate’s Reasons
[55]
The
delegate first considered Mr. Mahjoub's submission that he could be
executed if returned to Egypt,
substantiated by the fact that other Egyptians tried at the same time received this penalty. She decided that in light of his 15-year sentence,
and her examination of the Egyptian Criminal Code, that he “does not
face a harsher punishment than the one he received”. She also concluded that
there was no evidence to support the allegation that
others who were sentenced to imprisonment along with Mr. Mahjoub were subsequently
executed. Consequently, she declared that there was no substantial risk that
Mr. Mahjoub would face the death penalty upon his return to Egypt.
[56]
The
delegate enumerated the sources she had considered in her assessment of the
country conditions in Egypt. She
mentioned according more weight to recent reports as they were “more likely to
reflect the situation that Mr. Mahjoub would face upon return”, and giving less weight to those that failed to cite methodologies or failed to
express the basis for their conclusions.
[57]
She remarked
that US Department of State (US DOS) reports concluded that Egypt’s “human rights record
remain [sic] poor”. She also cited Human Rights Watch (HRW) that
“torture and mistreatment are routine, particularly during interrogation and
criminal investigation”. However,
she concluded the Egyptian government was making efforts to hold security
officials accountable
for such abuses, and generally the human rights situation had been improving in Egypt in recent years.
[58]
The
delegate gave little weight to a 2005 Amnesty International (AI) report that
concluded that torture is used systematically
throughout Egypt on the grounds that it cited no definite sources of evidence. She opined that it was based on vague, anecdotal and
uncorroborated evidence.
[59]
With regard to a document
chronicling the experiences of Mr. Al Maati upon his return to Egypt under circumstances
similar to Mr. Mahjoub, the delegate determined that the document
“contains numerous conjectures, suppositions and hearsay allegations” and fails
to corroborate its allegations, thereby undermining its probity. Furthermore,
she decided
that the two cases were to be distinguished, and consequently the alleged experiences
of Mr. Al Maati had little bearing on the present matter, and deserved little
weight.
[60]
The
delegate accorded considerable weight to the 2002 Bilasi-Ashri decision
of the Court of
Appeal of Austria in concluding there were not
large scale violations of human rights in
Egypt, and that such abuses were not an “institutionalized every day practice”. The delegate deemed
that the rigour of the judicial process in that matter conferred a greater degree of probity on its
conclusions, compared with that of other evidence. However,
she found that “there is sufficient evidence that torture remains a
problem” and therefore that it was necessary to assess the assurances Egypt provided.
[61]
Egypt had given assurances to Canada that Mr.
Mahjoub would not be tortured upon his return, in the form of two diplomatic
notes and a letter from Major General Omar M. Soliman, GIS Chief. The
delegate reviewed the trustworthiness of the assurances “as to their nature,
their content as well as precedents and incentives with regards to the Egyptian
government”. She gave little weight to the letter in view of its unofficial
nature. However, she did accord considerable weight to the diplomatic notes as
they constituted "part of the official record of bilateral relations between Canada and Egypt". She decided that
Egypt would not torture
Mr. Mahjoub after officially denying it would, concluding it had too
much to lose in the event it reneged on its guarantee.
[62]
In response to the submissions
that the Egyptian assurances were not reliable, substantiated on the basis of HRW reports, an
affidavit from AI's Ms. Gloria Nafziger
and a letter from an Egyptian-American professor, the delegate questioned the
basis on which these assertions were founded. She preferred to rely on the
submissions of the Swedish government to the Committee
Against Torture (CAT) in the Agiza v. Sweden matter ((2005) U.N. Doc.
CAT/C/134/D/233/2003), where Sweden maintained that Egypt abided by its
assurances, though this was contradicted by HRW, the alleged victim of the abuses and his mother.
The delegate also favoured the Swedish position that the notoriety of a
case will tend to enhance the likelihood of compliance with assurances.
[63]
In
relation to the cases of deportation from Sweden to Egypt,
specifically the matter involving Mr. Agiza, the delegate undermined the
statements by the CAT that Sweden should have known that Egypt “resorted to
consistent and widespread use of torture against detainees”. She decided
that the CAT's conclusions to this effect relied on its own dated
findings from 1996, and disregarded later reports which did not specifically
mention systemic torture, and which stated that Egypt had been
improving. In the delegate's view this dictated that the CAT evidence deserved
little weight.
[64]
In summary, the delegate gave
little weight to any of the evidence submitted on behalf of Mr. Mahjoub
on the assurances issue, concluding that it all essentially stemmed from
the Agiza case, which lacked probity in her view.
a) Country conditions
i. Death
Penalty
[65]
The applicant submits that the
delegate ignored evidence that others tried along with Mr. Mahjoub, when he was
convicted in absentia, received the death penalty. Upon careful
review of the evidence on this issue, I find no direct reference to the alleged
execution of those convicted in absentia along with Mr. Mahjoub. Thus, I
am not persuaded that the delegate ignored evidence. Even if I
could have reached a different conclusion, I find that it was not
patently unreasonable for her to conclude that there was no substantial risk
that Mr. Mahjoub would face the death penalty upon return.
ii. Substantial
risk of torture
[66]
The assessment of whether Mr.
Mahjoub faces a substantial risk of torture upon return to Egypt required the
delegate to consider the country’s general human rights record as well as the
personal risk to him, assurances provided by Egypt that he will not be tortured
along with a concomitant assessment of the value of these assurances, the
ability of the Egyptian government to effectively control its own security
forces, and more (Suresh, above). This issue is a fact-driven inquiry
and requires me to accord a high level of deference to the decision-maker. However,
I remain mindful of the Supreme Court of Canada’s articulation at paragraph 126
of Suresh, above that:
The
Minister must provide written reasons for her decision. These reasons must
articulate and rationally sustain a finding that there are no substantial
grounds to believe that the individual … will be subjected to torture,
execution or other cruel or unusual treatment, so long as the person under
consideration has raised those arguments. […]
[67]
The delegate properly determined that the risk of torture must be
“personal and present” and evaluated against a “balance of probabilities” standard
in order to constitute a “substantial risk” in this context (Suresh v.
Canada (M.C.I.), [2000] F.C.J. No. 5 at paragraphs 150-152 (C.A.)(QL) (Suresh
FCA). In other words, whether on the finding of facts, it is more likely than not that the individual would be
personally subjected to a danger of torture (Li v. Canada
(MC.I.), [2005] 3 F.C.R. 239, 2005 FCA 1 at paragraph 29.
[68]
The
applicant submits the delegate selectively relied on information that went
against the bulk of the evidence in concluding there was no institutionalized torture
in Egypt. In his view, this
suggests an arbitrary rejection of important, credible evidence on this issue.
I agree with the applicant. In coming to
this conclusion, the delegate determined that the human rights documentation
from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch was unreliable and not
credible, and therefore gave it little or no weight.
[69]
Referring to the 2005 AI
report on Egypt citing the systematic use of torture in Egyptian detention
centres, she categorized the report as “anecdotal and hearsay” in nature, using
vague and uncorroborated statements such as “circumstances suggesting that
torture … may have caused or contributed to their deaths” or “several members …
were reportedly tortured … others were apparently denied medical attention in
prison”. Thus, she would give the AI report little weight as a result.
[70]
In my opinion, it was
arbitrary for the delegate to reject the probity of the 2005 AI report
on the grounds that it was “hearsay and anecdotal”, and then subsequently rely
on the US DOS reports that could be similarly qualified. The latter
reports, which the delegate preferred over the others, are also “anecdotal” in
their reliance on individual instances of torture and citations of police
prosecution for abuses, and “hearsay” in their reproduction of findings made by
third parties, such as international agencies like HRW. Ironically, it is
interesting to note the 2004 US DOS report itself cited HRW with regard to the
2002 torture of Zaki Abd al-Malak in Ismailia, Egypt, and
the 2003 US DOS report cited AI concerning the State Security
Investigations Service (SSIS) use of torture in
March and April, 2003.
[71]
The delegate effectively ignored the ultimate findings of the
Committee Against Torture (CAT) in the Agiza v. Sweden matter ((2005)
U.N. Doc. CAT/C/134/D/233/2003) that torture was systemic in Egypt. She
rejected its probity as it “used its own findings from 1996” and the fact that
a later CAT report from 2002 made “no conclusion as to institutionalized and
systemic torture”. In my opinion, this was misleading. In fact, CAT relied on its
1996 report, as one “among other” more recent sources cited in the Agiza
matter. Further, the 2002 CAT report (Conclusions and recommendations of the
committee against torture : Egypt. 23/12/2002; . CAT/C/CR/29/4, December 23,
2002), referenced in the Agiza citation found “the persistence of
the phenomenon of torture and ill-treatment of detainees by law enforcement
officials” and also “the widespread evidence of torture and ill-treatment in
administrative premises under the control of the State Security Investigation
Department” in finding that Egypt systematically used torture.
[72]
The delegate’s blanket
rejection of information from agencies with worldwide reputations for
credibility such as AI and HRW is puzzling, especially given the
institutional reliance of Canadian courts and tribunals on these very sources.
Indeed, the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration frequently relies on
information from these organizations in creating country condition reports,
which in turn are used by Immigration and Refugee tribunals, in recognition of
their general reputation for credibility (France Houle, «Le fonctionnement du régime de
preuve libre dans un système non-expert : le traitement symptomatique des
preuves par la Section de la protection des réfugiés» (2004) 38 R.J.T. 263 at
para. 71 and at n. 136).
[73]
This reputation for
credibility has been affirmed by Canadian courts at all levels. The Supreme
Court of Canada relied on information compiled by AI, as well as one of its
reports, in Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779 (at
829, 830, 839). That Court also cited AI in Suresh, above, at paragraph
11 in noting the use of torture in the context of that case.
[74]
Similarly, the Federal Court
has recognized the reliability of both Amnesty International and Human Rights
Watch. For instance, my colleague Justice Michael Kelen referred to a HRW
report as “credible” (Buri v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2001 FCT 1358, [2001]
F.C.J. No. 1867 (QL) at para. 22); another colleague, Justice François Lemieux,
stated that an immigration officer erred in failing to consider a current AI
report relating to country conditions, where the report was not among the
documents she had considered and where the officer’s views were contrary to its
findings (Kazi v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2002 FCT 178, [2002] F.C.J. No. 223
(QL) at paras. 28, 30).
[75]
In Thang v. Canada
(Solicitor General), 2004 FC 457, [2004] F.C.J. No. 559 (QL) at para.8,
Justice James O’Reilly seemingly recognized that the credibility of AI did not
necessarily mandate that a decision-maker agree with the conclusions of its
reports, but it did require her to state why she found the report
unpersuasive. It remains open to this reviewing Court to assess whether the
delegate’s treatment of evidence from such credible sources was done
arbitrarily or by ignoring crucial evidence.
[76]
On country conditions, the
delegate relied on the 2003 and 2004 US DOS reports citing serious human rights
abuses committed by Egyptian Security forces, and qualifying the overall record
as “poor” with “serious problems remain[ing]”. She also mentions a 2005 HRW
report, depicting torture as “routine”, especially during interrogation and
criminal investigation. She highlighted differences between the two sources
with regard to the increasing accountability of police officers, stating that
she preferred the US DOS reports over the HRW report as they contained greater
detail. She concluded that she found “… the statement contained in the US
Report that the Egyptian Government is making efforts to hold security
personnel accountable more persuasive”.
[77]
“Efforts” to improve
accountability do not alter the fundamental, overall findings of the US DOS
reports, reinforced by the HRW report, that serious human rights problems exist
in Egypt.
Crucially, both sources essentially come to similar conclusions on the
determinative issue; the current state of the human rights situation in Egypt. It is
logically flawed for the delegate to highlight difference on ex post facto
accountability when both reports agree on crucial, determinative evidence.
[78]
Further, though the US DOS
reports stated that security personnel have been held accountable for abuses,
the detail provided in these reports related only to police officers, and
to a lesser extent, prison officials. The HRW report superficially differed in
that it only stated that security officials (i.e., non-police) had not been
prosecuted. Substantively, both sources essentially agreed on this point.
[79]
The delegate noted that “victims
can bring criminal or civil actions for compensation relating to police abuse”
as impliedly supporting the conclusion that Mr. Mahjoub does not face
substantial risk of torture upon his return. In my view, even if torture
victims can increasingly bring about ex post facto claims, it does
little to prevent the occurrence of such abuses in the first place. Logically,
such a finding does not relate to the “personal and present” risk of torture
faced by the applicant upon his return to Egypt.
[80]
The delegate expressed her preference
for recent reports over more dated information, as being more likely to reflect
the situation of Mr. Mahjoub. In fact, she did the opposite. Substantively,
she found the 2002 Court of Appeal of Austria Bilasi-Ashri decision, which
relied upon pre-2001 evidence, to be more indicative of the current human
rights situation in Egypt than more recent reports from the US DOS, HRW, and
AI. Although she noted that the extradition never occurred, as Egypt
refused to agree to the conditions stipulated by Austria, she nevertheless found
the 2002 Bilasi-Ashri decision to be persuasive. She ignored that this
refusal is reflective of Egypt’s general attitude towards human rights. It was
not tenable for her to rely on this single source of evidence to conclude that
torture was not prevalent in Egypt, where the bulk of the evidence pointed to
the contrary conclusion.
[81]
I
adopt the position of Justice Marshall Rothstein who stated in Rosales v.
Canada (M.E.I.), [1993] F.C.J. No. 1454 (T.D.) (QL) at paragraph 7 that a
reviewable error is committed when a decision-maker “arrives at its conclusion
by ignoring relevant and apparently overwhelming evidence to the contrary”.
[82]
I
find that the delegate’s selective reliance on one piece of evidence that held that
human rights abuses were not a systemic problem in Egypt, against the
overwhelming bulk of the evidence which essentially pointed to the contrary, to
be patently unreasonable.
[83]
Despite
her conclusion that human rights abuses were not systematic and institutionalized
in Egypt, the delegate
nevertheless found that the situation was problematic. Thus, she proceeded with
an evaluation of Egypt’s assurances not to torture or mistreat Mr.
Mahjoub in the event of his return to Egypt.
(b) Egypt’s assurances
[84]
The
Supreme Court of Canada in Suresh, above, warned against placing too
much reliance on assurances made by governments that have engaged in torture in
the past. Specifically, at paragraph 124, the Court cautioned:
[…]
We would signal the difficulty in relying too heavily on assurances by a state
that it will refrain from torture in the future when it has engaged in illegal
torture or allowed others to do so on its territory in the past. […]
[85]
The
unanimous Court also highlighted the difference between assurances regarding
the death penalty (through a potentially legal process) and torture (an illegal
process), as the former are easier to monitor and generally more reliable than
the latter (Suresh, above, at para. 124).
[86]
The
Court then offered important guidance, suggesting factors the Minister
may take into account in evaluating assurances given by a foreign government
with regards to torture (Suresh, above, at para. 125:
In
evaluating assurances by a foreign government, the Minister may also wish to take
into account the human rights record of the government giving the assurances,
the government’s record in complying with its assurances, and the capacity of
the government to fulfill the assurances, particularly where there is doubt
about the government’s ability to control its security forces. In addition, it
must be remembered that before becoming a Convention refugee, the individual
involved must establish a well-founded fear of persecution (although not
necessarily torture) if deported.
[87]
In
my view, these factors provide a cautious framework for any analysis of the
trustworthiness of assurances given by a foreign government. For
instance, a government with a poor human rights record would normally
require closer scrutiny of its record of compliance with assurances. A poor
record of compliance may in turn require the imposition of additional
conditions, such as monitoring mechanisms or other safeguards which may be
strongly recommended by international human rights bodies. Conversely, a
country with a good human rights record would often likely have a
correspondingly good record of compliance, and therefore additional
conditions may be unnecessary to enhance the reliability of assurances.
[88]
In
the present case, the applicant submits that the delegate failed to apply the
analysis suggested by the Supreme Court and disregarded the bulk of evidence
from a multitude of sources that cited Egypt’s non-compliance with assurances. I agree with
the applicant. Although I recognize that the Supreme Court accorded some
discretion in applying these factors, I nevertheless believe it required at
least a degree of analytical consideration by any decision-maker charged with
assessing the reliability of assurances.
[89]
Although
the delegate gave little weight to an unofficial letter, she accorded
considerable weight to the diplomatic notes “written in the third person and
constituting official government communications”. As a well established
form of high level communication between the countries, she found them to be
more persuasive. However, in doing so she failed to take into account the human
rights record of the government as well as its record of compliance with
assurances. This is particularly troubling in light of the extensive human
rights reports provided to the delegate discussing the poor human rights record
of Egypt. Even more troubling is
the reliance of the delegate on the assurance given by the Egyptian government
that Mr. Mahjoub would be treated in full conformity with the Human Rights
Charter given the uncontradicted evidence before her that there is no such Charter
in Egypt.
[90]
I
further agree with the applicant that the delegate erred by ignoring the
overwhelming bulk of evidence which documents Egypt’s poor record of compliance. For instance, she
rejected multiple reports dealing with assurances by Human Rights Watch (including
“Empty Promises: Diplomatic Assurances No Safeguard Against Torture”; “Still at
Risk: Diplomatic Assurances No Safeguard Against Torture”; “Black Hole: The
Fate of Islamists Rendered to Egypt”), the first two which dealt specifically
and extensively with the issue; the April 2005 report (Still at Risk, at
5) concluded that
[g]overnments
in states where torture is a serious human rights problem almost always deny
such abusive practices. It defies common sense to presume that a government
that routinely flouts its obligations under international law can be trusted to
respect those obligations in an isolated case.
[91]
She
rejected the affidavit of Ms. Gloria Nafziger, Amnesty International (AI) refugee
coordinator in Toronto, which stated
“individuals have reportedly been subjected to torture upon return despite
assurances having been provided by Egyptian officials in advance that they
would not be tortured”, as the delegate found there was “little in the form of
evidenciary [sic] basis for this conclusion”.
[92]
As
it “relies on evidence from other reports, [and] makes general and
unsubstantiated allegations” she gave little weight to a letter from the
American-Egyptian professor which states these assurances are regularly and
consistently violated: “The Government of Egypt frequently fails to abide by
its promises when it comes to the human rights of detainees”; “a culture of
impunity exists with respect to ongoing torture, especially against anyone who
is viewed as an opponent of the regime”; “[i]t is certain that a person
extradited to Egypt under the circumstances involved in this case will be
tortured”; “[i]n my view, it is beyond doubt that if returned to Egypt Mr.
Mahjoub is extremely likely to be tortured, mistreated and abused”.
[93]
In
sum, she gave little weight to any of the reports, the affidavit
and the letter “since they mostly stem from one case, that of Mr. Agiza, that
they mostly rely on the claims from the plaintiff himself, claim [sic] directly
contradicted by the Government of Sweden.”
[94]
Rather
than accepting the bulk of the evidence on Egypt’s poor record of compliance, the delegate unusually
relied almost entirely on the submissions of Sweden in Agiza v.
Sweden, above, that Egypt abided by its
assurances. I find that her favouring of a biased party’s submissions over the
final conclusions of the CAT to be perverse.
[95]
In
the present case, neither of the two diplomatic notes relied upon by the
delegate mention monitoring mechanisms, and they contain no specific
commitments not to abuse Mr. Mahjoub. The only element that could be construed
as an assurance is a general statement that he would be treated in
accordance with the Human Right Charter, though the evidence demonstrates it
does not exist.
[96]
Furthermore,
an effective monitoring mechanism was specifically recommended by the Special
Rapporteur on Torture as a precondition for the return of Mr. Mahjoub (Letter
from Theo van Boven, Special Rapporteur on Torture of the Commission on Human
Rights, to His Excellency The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada; April 2, 2002). There
is nothing in the record that indicates any such mechanism or other
“safeguard”, nor anything to suggest that Canada ever sought such a condition from Egypt. Indeed, there is
nothing in the record which demonstrates any specific requests by the Canadian
government in terms of assurances.
[97]
I
remain mindful that the proper role of this reviewing court does not entail a
reweighing of the evidence. However, the delegate consistently ignored critical
evidence, failed to take important factors into consideration and arbitrarily
relied on selected evidence. This flawed approach can be considered nothing
short of patently unreasonable with regard to the substantial risk of torture
issue.
4. Best
Interests of the children
[98]
The delegate considered the
submissions made by Mr. Mahjoub's wife that his deportation would have a
detrimental impact on their children but concluded that “[h]owever detrimental
the effect that Mr. Mahjoub’s deportation would have [sic] on his
children, I am unable to find that their best interest outweighs my findings
that Mr. Mahjoub is a danger to the security of Canada.”
[99]
The applicant
submits that this statement suggests that the best interests of the children could
not outweigh the danger he posed to Canada; without a corresponding analysis of the
evidence, it does not meet the requirement to provide cogent reasons. Such a
failure to provide reasons addressing the factual specificities of this issue
constitutes an error in his view.
[100] The respondents submit
that Mr. Mahjoub is not entitled to a positive determination of this issue
merely on the grounds that he has children in Canada, and that it is in their interest that he
remains here. The best interests of his children do not trump the substantial
danger that the applicant poses to Canadian security. Therefore this decision
is reasonable, and the reasons sufficiently reveal its basis.
[101] My colleague Justice
MacKay addressed a similar issue in Jaballah, above, at paragraph 38,
and I agree with his finding in that case that the delegate deserves
considerable deference with regard to this issue.
[102] I am not persuaded in
the circumstances of the present matter that the delegate made her
determination without regard to the information before her. She acknowledged
Mr. Mahjoub’s specific situation, as well as the impact that his deportation
was likely to have on his children, but nevertheless concluded that their best
interests did not affect her ultimate determination. I can find no grounds for
this Court’s intervention with regard to this issue.
5. Alternatives
to removal
[103] The delegate concluded that the release of Mr. Mahjoub
under conditions would compromise national security, as he would be able to
re-establish his links to terrorist networks, and be able to participate in the
facilitation and furthering of terrorist activities. She expressed
concern that by virtue of the terrorist network's sophistication and proven capacities, Mr. Mahjoub
could potentially leave the country and "disappear". In her view,
this all precluded any possibility of conditional release.
[104] In considering the
option of removal to a third country, the delegate canvassed his position
on the issue but concluded that “Mr. Mahjoub's counsel has not provided any
listing of countries that would be considered safe third countries [...]”.
[105] The applicant submits
the delegate’s rejection of conditional release as an option usurps the court’s
role in determining whether a release can be made in a way that protects Canada’s security. He argues
the delegate did not properly consider the effect of his “blown cover” and
fragile mental/physical state and that the decision reflects an exaggerated and
stereotypical view of terrorists. He also challenges the delegate’s position
that he has the onus to identify a safe third country alternative.
[106] The respondents distinguish
the present situation from that in Suresh, above, in view of the
delegate’s determination that Mr. Mahjoub does not face substantial risk of torture
or death if returned to Egypt. This essential
difference means that the same importance should not be attached to safe third
country alternatives in the present case.
[107] The delegate’s
expression of her opinion with regard to conditional release does not preclude
this Court from determining whether the applicant may be released with
conditions, where such an application is made. I make no further comment on
this issue, as it forms the subject matter of another proceeding before this
Court.
[108] With regard to the third
country alternative, the Supreme Court of Canada specified that a deportation
to torture issue required the consideration of specific factors such as the
human rights record of the receiving state, personal risk to the individual,
assurances and so on, and that “[i]t may also involve a reassessment of
the refugee’s initial claim and a determination of whether a third country is
willing to accept the refugee” (Suresh, above, at para. 39; emphasis
added). I concur with the respondents that in light of this permissive
language used by the Court in Suresh, above, there was no obligation on
the delegate to necessarily conduct an analysis concerning third country
alternatives. In view of her conclusion that Mr. Mahjoub did not face a
substantial risk of torture on his return to Egypt, there was no reason for the delegate to
proceed with such an analysis.
CONCLUSION
[109] In light of my preceding
reasons, I find that the delegate’s decision with regard to the substantial
risk of torture faced by Mr. Mahjoub on his return to Egypt was patently
unreasonable. Mr. Mahjoub’s application for judicial review is allowed, and the
delegate’s decision is set aside. This matter is to be remitted for re-determination
in accordance with these reasons by another delegate of the Minister.
[110] I am cognizant that in
redetermining this matter, it is possible for the subsequent decision-maker to
conclude that Mr. Mahjoub faces a substantial risk of torture and that he
continues to pose a danger to the security of Canada. This would inevitably lead to the issue
of whether the present circumstances justify deportation to face torture, the
balancing exercise addressed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Suresh,
above.
[111] However, this is not a
live issue in the present matter, and therefore it would be beyond my purview
to consider it. In coming to this conclusion, I rely on comments made by my
colleague Justice Dawson in Mahjoub 2005, above, at paragraph 65,
where she similarly declined to deal with the Charter issues as it was
unnecessary to do so:
The Supreme Court has … cautioned that Charter issues should not
be decided where it is not necessary to do so, and has stressed that Charter
issues are to be decided on a proper evidentiary record. See, for example, Phillips
v. Nova
Scotia
(Commission of Inquiry into the Westray Mine Tragedy), [1995] 2 S.C.R. 97 at
paragraphs 6 to 12 for authority that unnecessary issues of law should not be
decided (particularly constitutional issues) …
[112] At the end of the
hearing, one of the counsel for the applicant, Ms. Jackman, indicated that if
the Court based its decision on administrative law principles, there would
probably not be a certified question.
[113] The Court agreed to
allow the parties one week to make submissions with regard to a potential
question, or questions, to be certified. Accordingly, counsel for the parties
have 7 days following the release of this decision, to file submissions
with the Court in this regard, if they so chose.
JUDGMENT
The application for judicial
review is allowed and the delegate’s decision to return the applicant to Egypt is set aside. This
matter is to be remitted for re-determination in accordance with these reasons
by another delegate of the Minister.
Counsel for the parties have 7 days
following the release of this decision to file submissions with the
Court for certification of a question or questions.
“Danièle
Tremblay-Lamer”