Date: 20061220
Docket: IMM-2924-06
Citation: 2006 FC 1519
BETWEEN:
ISRAEL BARRIONUEVO
Applicant
and
MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND
IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR
JUDGMENT
Pinard J.
[1]
This is an application for judicial review of a decision
dated May 1, 2006, by the Refugee Protection Division of the Immigration and
Refugee Board (the IRB), that the applicant is not a “Convention refugee” or a
“person in need of protection” under the definitions in sections 96 and
97, respectively, of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C.
2001, c.-27.
[3]
The
IRB found the incidents involving the applicant, members of his family and the
police to be plausible, and considered these incidents to be reprisals for the
activities of the applicant’s mother, who, it seems, publicly denounced the
actions of the police.
[4]
However,
the Board concluded that the applicant was not a “refugee” or a “person in need
of protection” on the ground that he had an internal flight alternative. The
panel stated the following on this issue:
The
panel is of the opinion that the claimant had an internal
flight alternative in Argentina, for the
following reasons.
(a) The
incidents involving him took place in Mar del Plata.
(b) He
is not being sought by the police, as he himself confirmed at the hearing on
April 7, 2006.
(c) His
movements are not restricted. He stated in fact that he left the airport to
travel to Canada with no
difficulty.
(d) The
panel suggested to him the city of Buenos Aires, with a population of over 12
million, more than 500 km from Mar del Plata, and the cities of
Rosario and Tucuman.
When asked
about this possibility, he claimed to be on a black list. The panel is not
satisfied with such an answer, which does not explain how it is that the list
exists only in the city of Buenos
Aires, and not at a strategic
location such as the airport, through which he passed without difficulty.
(e) Argentinean
citizens are free to settle wherever they wish within the borders of their
country.
.
. .
During its
deliberations, the panel received Exhibit P-12, which describes the conditions
in Argentinean prisons as being characterized by violence, revolt, torture and
killings. Having reviewed this document, the panel determines that, since the
claimant is not being sought by the police, it does not believe that he would
be thrown into jail to suffer the fate described in Exhibit P-12.
* * * * * * *
*
[5]
The
standard of review applicable to the IRB’s conclusion regarding an internal
flight alternative is patent unreasonableness (see, inter alia, Chorny
v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, 2003 FC 999 and Ramachanthran
v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, 2003 FCT 673). The standard of
review on the issue of whether the IRB properly applied the principles set out
in the case law pertaining to internal flight alternatives is correctness (Ezemba
v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, 2005 FC 1023).
[6]
In
this case, the applicant’s submissions essentially deal with the assessment of
the facts leading to the conclusion that he had an internal flight alternative.
The application of the principles delineated in Rasaratnam v. Canada
(M.E.I.), [1991] F.C.J. No. 1256 (F.C.A.) (QL) and Thirunavukkarasu v.
Canada (M.E.I.), [1994] 1 F.C. 589 (C.A.) is not disputed.
[7]
The
onus is on the applicant to prove that there is a serious possibility he will
be subject to persecution everywhere in Argentina, in
accordance with the principle aptly stated by the Federal Court of Appeal in Thirunavukkarasu,
above, at page 595:
On the one hand, in
order to prove a claim to Convention refugee status, as I have indicated above,
claimants must prove on a balance of probabilities that there is a serious
possibility that they will be subject to persecution in their country. If the
possibility of an IFA is raised, the claimant must demonstrate on a balance of
probabilities that there is a serious possibility of persecution in the area
alleged to constitute an IFA. . . .
[8]
The
applicant essentially maintains that the police force harassing him exists
throughout the country, and therefore he cannot find refuge anywhere in Argentina.
[9]
Relying
on Thirunavukkarasu, above, the respondent replies that if the agents of
persecution are agents of the state, the burden of proof is on the applicant to
establish that he was not a victim of purely local agents, but that the entire
Argentine police force persecuted him, including the federal police in Buenos Aires.
[10] The
respondent also refers to the documentary evidence, which clearly indicates
that each province in Argentina has its own police
force (U.S. Department of State, Argentina, Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices – 2004, at page 93 of the panel record). Moreover, the respondent
correctly points out that the applicant failed to adduce any evidence to
support his allegation that the entire police force is persecuting him. In Ranganathan
v. Canada (M.C.I.), [2000] F.C.J. No. 2118 (QL), at paragraph 11, the
Federal Court of Appeal stated that “[a] failure by a claimant to fulfill his
obligations and assume his burden of proof cannot be imputed to the Board so as
to make it a Board’s failure.”
[11] Thus, under the
circumstances, I concur with the respondent that the applicant failed to
establish that it was patently unreasonable for the IRB to find as it did
regarding an internal flight alternative. Accordingly, the intervention of this
Court is not warranted, and the application for judicial review is dismissed.
“Yvon Pinard”
Ottawa, Ontario
December
20, 2006
Certified
true translation
Mary
Jo Egan, LLB
Email this Content