REASONS
FOR JUDGMENT
Hogan J.
[1]
The Appellant, Sandra Ellis, is appealing an
assessment made pursuant to section 160 of the Income Tax Act (the
“Act”) in respect of the transfer to her by her husband, Tom Ellis, of a 50% undivided
interest in the matrimonial home.
I. Factual Background
[2]
The transfer of the 50% undivided interest in
the family home took place on June 2, 2006.
[3]
At the commencement of the hearing, the
Appellant accepted that she did not pay adequate consideration for the
property. In other words, the value of the property that was transferred to her
was greater than her husband’s unpaid income tax liability.
[4]
At the time of the transfer, Tim Ellis (the
“Transferor”) owed the following amounts:
Tax Year
|
Federal Income Tax
|
Penalty
|
Interest
|
Total
|
2004
|
$12,695.30
|
$0.00
|
$6,267.70
|
$18,963.00
|
2005
|
$13,311.74
|
$6,132.52
|
$6,189.63
|
$25,633.89
|
2006
|
$2,904.34
|
$1,794.24
|
$1,222.31
|
$5,920.89
|
|
|
|
|
|
Tax Year
|
Provincial Income Tax
|
Penalty
|
Interest
|
Total
|
2005
|
$0.00
|
$2,142.14
|
$0.00
|
$2,142.14
|
2006
|
$0.00
|
$524.75
|
$0.00
|
$524.75
|
|
|
|
|
|
[5]
The Respondent called one witness, Wendy Rueger,
a complex case officer employed by the Canada Revenue Agency (the “CRA”).
Ms. Rueger explained that she was asked to prepare amended particulars of
assessment for the purpose of this appeal to take into account reductions to
Mr. Ellis’ tax debt after the Appellant was assessed under section 160 of
the Act. As a result of these changes, the Respondent now concedes that the
Appellant owes $38,380.65 determined as follows:
Tax Year
|
Federal Income Tax
|
Penalty
|
Interest
|
Total
|
2004
|
$6,442.53
|
$0.00
|
$1,904.48
|
$8,347.01
|
2005
|
$11,840.70
|
$8,024.58
|
$5,639.28
|
$25,504.56
|
2006
|
$1,465.91
|
$2,175.15
|
$888.02
|
$4,529.08
|
|
|
|
|
|
[6]
Ms. Rueger confirmed that the above amount
included only federal income tax. She presented a complete analysis of how
adjustments were made to eliminate Mr. Ellis’ provincial income tax
liability. I am satisfied that the assessment under appeal covers only amounts
due under the Act.
[7]
Considering the above, the issues in dispute can
be summarized as follows:
(a) Were the refunds of tax owed to Mr. Ellis applied to
the correct taxation years?
(b) Does the
Respondent bear the initial burden of establishing the Transferor’s tax debt,
and if so, has she satisfied her burden in that regard?
II. Analysis
[8]
The Appellant’s main argument was that the
Respondent has the burden of establishing the amount of Mr. Ellis’ tax
liability and that the Respondent has failed in that regard.
[9]
I agree with the Appellant that the Respondent
bears the initial burden of establishing the Transferor’s tax debt.
[10]
In Beaudry v. The Queen, my colleague Tardif J.
describes the Crown’s burden in the context of a subsection 160(1)
assessment as follows:
[26] There is an exception, and Archambault
J. dealt with that exception in Gestion Yvan Drouin:
Since it is the Minister who takes
measures against a third party to recover the tax owed to him by the tax
debtor, it seems entirely reasonable to me that it should be incumbent on the
Minister to provide prima facie evidence of the existence of the tax
liability. To do this, the Minister usually has in his possession the tax
debtor's tax return and, if he has carried out an audit, he may have copies of
the source documents or other relevant documents supporting his assessment. He
is therefore the one who is in the best position to establish the quantum of
the tax liability. I thus conclude that the onus of providing prima facie
evidence of the tax liability where an assessment has been made under
subsection 160(1) of the Act generally falls on the Minister.
… As soon as the Minister has proved prima facie the
existence of the tax liability, the onus is on the transferee to provide
evidence to the contrary.
[Emphasis added.]
[11]
I agree with this observation.
[12]
Ms. Rueger testified at length on how the
Appellant’s liability under section 160 was redetermined to take into account
the adjustments to Mr. Ellis’ tax liability under Part I of the Act
brought about by numerous reassessments. Her evidence was not contradicted by
the Appellant. Therefore, I am satisfied that the Crown has met its initial
burden with respect to the amounts owed by the Appellant in connection with her
husband’s Part I liability.
[13]
Ms. Rueger, however, provided no
explanation as to why Mr. Ellis was assessed gross negligence penalties
under subsection 163(1) of the Act. In view of the failure to establish the circumstances
that justify the imposition of a penalty, the penalties must be eliminated from
the Appellant’s assessment.
[14]
In her written representations, the Respondent
argues that the Appellant did not dispute the Transferor’s tax debt in her
amended notice of appeal. I observe that the Appellant was not represented by
counsel when she prepared her amended notice of appeal. I do not believe that the
Respondent suffered prejudice from the aforementioned shortcoming. The
Appellant had arranged to call Ms. Rueger as a witness. Her testimony was
required to explain the significant changes to Mr. Ellis’ tax liability
brought about by the numerous reassessments that were issued against him, since
the Appellant was assessed under subsection 160(1). In that context, it
was clear that Mr. Ellis’ tax liability had to be established at trial.
[15]
For these reasons, the Appellant’s appeal is
allowed in part and the matter is referred back to the Minister for
reconsideration and reassessment to remove the penalty of $10,199.73. Interest
shall be adjusted accordingly. Each party is to bear its own costs.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 17th day of November 2015.
“Robert J. Hogan”