Docket: 2002-4042(IT)I
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BETWEEN:
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BRUCE VanNIEUWKERK,
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Appellant,
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and
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HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
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Respondent.
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____________________________________________________________________
Appeal heard on September 11, 2003 at Vancouver,
British Columbia
By: The Honourable D.G.H. Bowman, Associate Chief
Justice
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Appearances:
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Counsel for the Appellant:
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Michael J. Goeres
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Counsel for the Respondent:
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Victor Caux
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____________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
The
appeals from the reassessments made under the Income Tax Act for
the 1998 and 1999 taxation years are allowed, and the
reassessments are referred back to the Minister of National
Revenue for reconsideration and reassessment in accordance with
the Reasons for Judgment.
Signed at Toronto, Ontario this 15th day of September,
2003.
A.C.J.
Citation: 2003TCC670
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Date: 20030915
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Docket: 2002-4042(IT)I
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BETWEEN:
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BRUCE VanNIEUWKERK,
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Appellant,
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and
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HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
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Respondent.
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REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Bowman, A.C.J.
[1] These appeals are from assessments
for the Appellant for the 1998 and 1999 taxation years.
[2] In assessing the Appellant the
Minister of National Revenue added $27,974 and $15,851 to his
income for 1998 and 1999 respectively under subsection 15(2) of
the Income Tax Act and $5,753 and $3,656 as a benefit in
respect of interest under subsection 80.4(1).
[3] The issue is a purely factual one
and it stems from a shareholder loan account. Van New
Construction (1985) Ltd. carried on a construction related
business in British Columbia. Its issued and outstanding shares
are owned equally by the Appellant and his wife, Patrice.
[4] At the end of 1997 the shareholder
loan account showed shareholder loans outstanding in the amount
of $95,013.23. The company's accountants realized that
subsection 15(2) taxes shareholders on indebtedness to their
corporation arising in the year but that if it was paid off
within one year from the end of the year when the indebtedness
arose subsection 15(2.6) excluded the operation of subsection
15(2). Therefore, they developed a plan to reduce the
indebtedness existing at the end of 1997 by transferring certain
assets owned by the Appellant and his wife to the company at
cost. The assets to be transferred were a piece of land
($17,500), a motor home ($46,000) and a boat ($20,000). An
agreement was prepared by the accountants showing Mr. and Mrs.
VanNieuwkerk as vendors and the company as purchasers whereby the
vendors sold the "Property" described in Schedule A to
the agreement to the company for $83,500. The agreement was put
in evidence but not Schedule A, but I think it is reasonably
clear that the property intended to be covered by the agreement
was the assets referred to above. The agreement was said to be
"dated for reference" the first day of January, 1998.
Other documents were a Resolution of Directors of the company
confirming the agreement and dated "as of the first day of
January, 1998", promissory notes for $41,750 signed by the
company in favour of each of the Appellant and his wife dated as
of January 11, 1998 and a Trust Declaration "made as of the
first day of January, 1998" declaring that the Appellant and
his wife were holding title to the motor home, the boat and land
in trust for the company. A few observations should be made
here.
(a) The transfers of the various
assets were not registered anywhere - the land registry, the
automobile registry or the boat registry. The documents were not
put in the minute book which was kept by the company's
lawyer. They were kept by the accountants.
(b) There is no evidence that the fair
market value of the assets was the same as their cost. It seems
unlikely that the boat or the motor home would have kept their
value. This thought crossed the assessor's mind but she did
not pursue it because she concluded that no transfer took place
at all.
(c) The function of the promissory
notes is a little puzzling. Why would the company give promissory
notes in payment of the property if the intent was to pay off an
indebtedness? I put this question to the Appellant's
representative and his answer was "to offset the
indebtedness". This was not a very satisfactory answer. The
point was not raised in the Reply and was not pursued by the
Respondent because it was not the basis of the assessment. This
legal effect of giving a promissory note seems not to have been
fully comprehended by the accountant or the Appellant.
(d) There is no evidence when the
various documents were signed. Neither the accountant nor the
Appellant knew when they were signed. The expression "as
of" or "dated for reference" make it reasonably
clear that they were not signed on January 1, 1998 (New
Year's day). It was admitted by the witness Mr. Goeres and
the Appellant that they might have been signed in 1999.
(e) The Appellant and his wife
went on using the motor home and the boat just as before, as
personal use property. The company had no need for these assets,
but that is not really germane to this case.
(f) The assets were shown on the
balance sheet of the company for 1998.
[5] The purpose of the transfer was to
prevent the Appellant being taxed in 1997 on the $95,013.23. The
auditor, Ms. Flora Lee, proceeded on the assumption the property
never was transferred to the company, yet she did not tax the
Appellant in 1997. She calculated the amount of indebtedness that
arose in 1998 and 1999 on the assumption that no transfer took
place at any time. This is set out very clearly in Exhibit
R-7.
[6] Part of the confusion stems from
the accounting records which show either no transfer, or a
transfer on December 31, 1998 or January 1, 1998 depending on
which version you look at. It has been said on many occasions in
this Court that accounting entries do not create reality. They
simply reflect reality. There must be an underlying reality that
exists independently of the accounting entries. I accept Mr.
Goeres' explanation that adjusting entries, such as entries
reflecting the transaction involved here or capital cost
allowance, are all shown in the general ledger on December 31.
That may well be so, but it does underline how unreliable
accounting records are in determining when a transaction has
taken place.
[7] Here we have documents that have
been signed at some point and are intended to have some legal
effect. Sham is not pleaded and the only way I can ignore them is
to find that they are shams or not legally effective.
[8] The best conclusion I can reach on
the somewhat unsatisfactory evidence is that the documents were
signed some time in 1999 and the transfer took place in that year
and the fair market value of the transferred property is to be
treated as reducing the earliest indebtedness existing at that
time.
[9] Accordingly the calculation in
Exhibit R-7 should be reworked and give effect to this
conclusion.
[10] The other point is whether the
Appellant should have been taxed on the full amount of the
assumed benefit under subsection 15(2) or only one-half. I think
the better view is one half. The Appellant and his wife shared
everything - including the joint bank account - on a 50/50 basis.
Any draws or advances that he got from the company were on his
own behalf and on behalf of his wife. I think she bore the
indebtedness equally with him.
[11] The appeal is allowed and the
assessment referred back to the Minister of National Revenue for
reconsideration and reassessment in accordance with these
reasons.
Signed at Toronto, Ontario this 15th day of September,
2003.
A.C.J.