Gee v. The Queen, 2003 TCC 533

Docket: 2001-3359(IT)G

BETWEEN:

WENDY WAI YU GEE,

Appellant,

and

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,

Respondent.

____________________________________________________________________

Motion heard on July 22, 2003 at Toronto, Ontario.

Before: The Honourable Justice Gerald J. Rip
Appearances:
Counsel for the Appellant:	Richard G. Fitzsimmons
Counsel for the Respondent:	Marie-Thérèse Boris

____________________________________________________________________

ORDER

          Upon motion made by the appellant to strike portions of the Reply to the Notice of Appeal:

1)                  The following paragraphs are stricken from the respondent's Reply to the Notice of Appeal: paragraphs 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9.

2)                  The following portions are stricken from the respondent's Reply to the Notice of Appeal:

(a)        That part of paragraph 6 which states: "He further states that at no time did the Appellant state, indicate or suggest, to the Minister of National Revenue (the "Minister") that she was dependent upon or received financial support from Mr. Seun, or that she was or ever had been married."

(b)       From paragraph 16, which states: "In so reassessing and confirming the Appellant, the Minister made, inter alia, the following assumptions of fact", the words "and confirming" and "inter alia".

(c)       That part of subparagraph 16 n), which is pleaded as an assumption of fact and states: "as a consequence of the stated understatement of income,"

3)      The respondent shall have 21 days from date of this Order to file an amended Reply to the Notice of Appeal. Any amendment will provide the appellant with the particulars she sought in her Demand for Particulars.

4)      The Order of Miller J. dated May 7, 2003, is varied to extend the time within which to complete examination for discoveries to the earliest of 30 days after the respondent's Reply to the Notice of Appeal is amended either on filing the appellant's consent or with leave of the Court or leave of the Court is denied.

           5)      Costs of this motion shall be in the cause.

Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 31st day of July, 2003.

"Gerald J. Rip"

Rip, J.

Citation: 2003TCC533

Date: 20030731

Docket: 2001-3359(IT)G

BETWEEN:

WENDY WAI YU GEE,

Appellant,

and

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,

Respondent.

REASONS FOR ORDER

Rip, J.

[1]      The appellant has applied for an Order:

(a)    striking from the respondent's Reply to the Notice of Appeal[1] the following paragraphs and subparagraphs and portions of paragraphs and subparagraphs

1.                  Paragraph 2 in its entirety: "2. He admits the authenticity of the Affidavit with the attached exhibits, which was filed in the Tax Court of Canada for the purposes of applying for an extension of time."

2.          Paragraph 3 in its entirety: "3. He admits the authenticity of the Notices of Reassessment, the accompanying T7W-Cs, the Notices of Objection, and the Order of His Honour Judge Miller, of the Tax Court of Canada, dated February 4^th, 2002, attached to the Notice of Appeal."

3.          That part of paragraph 6 which states: "He further states that at no time did the Appellant state, indicate or suggest, to the Minister of National Revenue (the "Minister") that she was dependent upon or received financial support from Mr. Seun, or that she was or ever had been, married."

4.          From paragraph 16, which states: "In so reassessing and confirming the Appellant, the Minister made, inter alia, the following assumptions of fact", the words "inter alia".

5.          Subparagraph 16(b), which is pleaded as an assumption of fact and states: "in reporting income for the 1992, 1993, 1994 and 1995 taxation years the Appellant did not include all of the taxable income received in those years;"

6.          Subparagraph 16(i), which is pleaded as an assumption of fact and states: "the Appellant did not respond to requests by the Minister for financial information to enable a proper audit of her financial matters;"

7.          Subparagraph 16(j), which is pleaded as an assumption of fact and states: "the amounts that the Appellant reported as total income on her returns of income were not sufficient to support a single person;"

8.          Subparagraph 16(k), which is pleaded as an assumption of fact and states: "in the filing of her returns of income for the taxation years at issue, the Appellant knowingly or under circumstances amounting to gross negligence, in carrying out a duty or obligation imposed under the [Income Tax] Act, made or participated in, assented to or acquiesced in the making of false statements or omissions in the income tax returns filed for the 1992, 1993, 1994, and 1995 taxation years, as a result of which the tax that would have been payable assessed on the information provided in the Appellant's income tax return filed for the 1992, 1993, 1994 and 1995 year, was less than the tax in fact payable;"

9.          Subparagraph 16(l), which is pleaded as an assumption of fact and states: "in the filing of her returns of income for the taxation years at issue, the Appellant made misrepresentations that are attributable to neglect, carelessness or wilful default or has committed fraud in the filing of her return or in supplying information under the Act;"

10.     That part of subparagraph 16(n), which is pleaded as an assumption of fact and states: "as a consequence of the stated understatement of income,"

(b) in the alternative, compelling the respondent to provide the appellant         with further and better particulars the appellant has demanded;

[2]      The appellant also asked that the dates fixed for examination for discovery in an Order of May 7, 2003 be extended to 60 days after the final disposition of her application and to satisfy any undertakings resulting from such examinations by another 30 days. The appellant also asked for costs on a solicitor and client basis, plus Goods and Services tax.

[3]      The appellant's grounds for her motion are:

(a)           that the Reply contains irrelevant and improper pleadings that may prejudice or delay the fair hearing of the appeal;

(b)          that the Reply and Response to Demand for Particulars do not provide sufficient particulars and this may prejudice or delay the fair hearing of the appeal;

(c)          Rules 49, 52 and 53 of the Tax Court of Canada Rules (General Procedure).

[4]      The appeals are from net worth assessments for 1992, 1993, 1994 and 1995. The first three years were assessed after the appellant's normal assessment periods for the respective years and therefore the respondent must prove the appellant made any misrepresentation that is attributable to neglect, carelessness or wilful default or has committed any fraud in filing an income tax return for 1992, 1993 and 1994 or in supplying any information under the Act: subsection 152(4). In each of the four years, the Minister of National Revenue also assessed a subsection 163(2) penalty.

[5]      During the past several months the parties have discussed dates for examinations for discoveries. Since the appellant now resides in China, respondent's counsel has been reluctant to examine her during the SARS epidemic. Both sides are now prepared to proceed to discoveries, subject to the motion before me.

[6]      Respondent's counsel rightly argued that I should dismiss the appellant's motion since it has been over one year since the respondent filed her Reply to the Notice of Appeal[2] and that after being served with the Reply, the respondent took fresh steps, in particular, her counsel participated at a status hearing on May 6, 2003 and informed the Court the appellant was prepared to complete discoveries by the end of July. As a result, on May 7, 2003 an Order was issued by Miller J. that, among other things, discoveries were to be completed by July 31, 2003. Counsel referred to Rule 8 of the Tax Court of Canada Rules (General Procedure):

      A motion to attack a proceeding or a step, document or direction in a proceeding for irregularity shall not be made,

      (a) after the expiry of a reasonable time after the moving party          knows or ought reasonably to have known of the irregularity,     or

    (b) if the moving party has taken any further step in the         proceeding after obtaining knowledge of the irregularity,

except with leave of the Court.

[7]      The appellant's Notice of Demand for Particulars is dated May 6, 2002 and the Response to Demand for Particulars is dated June 28, 2002. Respondent's counsel stated that since June, 2002 the appellant's counsel had said nothing concerning the adequacy of the particulars until June, 2003. If the particulars were not adequate, she declared, the appellant should have complained on a timely basis.

[8]      Counsel for the respondent referred me to several cases in defence of her position. In Mackenzie v. Wood Gundy Inc.,[3] Montgomery J. agreed with the Master that a delay of five to six months in launching a motion to have pleading struck out was too long. "The time is long past when this type of delay can be tolerated in the course of the pleading stage of an action. We are into the era of judicial supervision of the conduct of a lawsuit, and it is imperative that cases be moved on through the preliminary stages and get to trial as expeditiously as possible."

[9]      Lerner J. was of the view that if a party serves an appointment for examination for discovery (or, as respondent's counsel added, agrees to an examination for discovery in a status hearing) there is an implication that the pleadings of the opposing party have been accepted and any irregularity waived.[4] Whatever merit the appellant may have, counsel concluded, she has closed any availability to seek the leave requested because of fresh steps taken during the year and the delay in pursuing such leave. Appellant was represented by competent counsel and the Court should not act on its own motion, counsel asserted.

[10]     Appellant's counsel replied that the Demand for Particulars was served almost immediately after he received the Reply; there was no delay. Counsel also stated that the appellant now resides in China and that he corresponds with her by e-mail. He informed me that for several months in the interim period the appellant was not able to receive e-mail from Canada and he had difficulty obtaining instructions.

[11]     Where an applicant has delayed for as long as the appellant has in bringing a motion to strike or has taken fresh steps after being served with a pleading, I normally would reject the applicant's motion. However, in the matter before me, the Reply is so deficient that to dismiss the motion would lead to fractious examinations for discovery and lengthen unduly the trial of the appeal. Also, the particulars are not complete; one demand is completely ignored, for example. The drafting of the Reply and the Answer to the Demand for Particulars is not one of the respondent's finer efforts. For example, section D of the Reply, entitled "Relief Sought", contains six paragraphs of argument. This is in addition to the appellant's complaint. I must inform the reader that neither Ms. Borris, who acted for the respondent during the hearing of the motion, nor Ms. Moldaver, who now has carriage of this appeal for the respondent, prepared the Reply to the Notice of Appeal or the Response to the Demand for Particulars.

[12]     Rule 49(1) of the Tax Court of Canada Rules (General Procedure) provides that every Reply shall state:

          (a) the facts that are admitted,

(b) the facts that are denied,

(c) the facts of which the respondent has no knowledge and puts in issue,

(d) the findings or assumptions of fact made by the Minister when making the assessment,

(e) any other material fact,

(f) the issues to be decided,

(g) the statutory provisions relied on,

(h) the reasons the respondent intends to rely on,

and

(i)    the relief sought.

[13]     My colleague Bowie J. explained the purpose of pleadings in Zelinski v. The Queen:[5]

   [4] The purpose of pleadings is to define the issues in dispute between the parties for the purposes of production, discovery and trial. What is required of a party pleading is to set forth a concise statement of the material facts upon which she relies. Material facts are those facts which, if established at the trial, will tend to show that the party pleading is entitled to the relief sought. Amendments to pleadings should generally be permitted, so long as that can be done without causing prejudice to the opposing party that cannot be compensated by an award of costs or other terms, as the purpose of the Rules is to ensure, so far as possible, a fair trial of the real issues in dispute between the parties.

   [5] The applicable principle is stated in Holmsted and Watson: [FOOTNOTE 1 : Holmsted and Watson, Ontario Civil Procedure, Vol. 3, pages 25-20 to 25-21.]

   This is the rule of pleading: all of the other pleading rules are essentially corollaries or qualifications to this basic rule that the pleader must state the material facts relied upon for his or her claim or defence. The rule involves four separate elements: (1) every pleading must state facts, not mere conclusions of law; (2) it must state material facts and not include facts which are immaterial; (3) it must state facts and not the evidence by which they are to be proved; (4) it must state facts concisely in a summary form.

[14]     I have approached the motion at bar on the same basis as Bowie J., that the test to be applied is whether the paragraphs in dispute are proper pleadings of material facts. I shall consider the provisions of the Reply attacked by the appellant in the same sequence (using the paragraph numbers in the Notice of Motion in italics) as the appellant.

[15]     Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Notice of Motion. I agree that paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Reply relate not to the appeal but to the appellant's application for an extension of time within which to file a notice of appeal. The facts in paragraphs 2 and 3 are immaterial allegations and should be treated as surplusage and left alone.[6] They add nothing to the pleadings and might be deleted. Were these the only two paragraphs in the Reply complained of by the appellant, I would not disturb them. They will be struck.

[16]     Paragraph 3. The second sentence of paragraph 6 of the Reply is evidence that the respondent hopes to prove is a fact. It is not material. The respondent also appears to be questioning the appellant's credibility by anticipating the appellant's evidence. Pleadings must state facts, and not the evidence by which they are to be proved.[7] I would strike out this portion of paragraph 6.

[17]     Paragraph 4. The phrase inter alia in paragraph 16 of the Reply to introduce the facts the Minister assumed in assessing denies the taxpayer full disclosure of the precise findings of facts giving rise to the assessment. In Johnston v. M.N.R.,[8] Rand J. explained that "Every such fact found or assumed by the assessor or the Minister must then be accepted as it was dealt with by these persons unless questioned by the appellant." The taxpayer has an onus to disprove the facts that led the Minister to assess. The use of the term "inter alia" in this context is lazy pleading and is contemptuous of case law and accepted practice. In short, these words are improperly used. They will be struck.

[18]     I also would strike the words "and confirming" from the opening words of paragraph 16, although appellant has not moved for such an order. Any fact assumed after the assessment was made is not a fact the Minister assumed in assessing: Anchor Pointe Energy Limited v. The Queen.[9]

[19]     Paragraph 5. Paragraph 16(b) of the Reply contains mixed fact and law. The respondent concludes that the appellant "did not include all of the taxable income received". The respondent is alleging a misrepresentation. The respondent refers to "taxable income". Taxable income is computed by reference to income computed pursuant to Division B of Part I of the Act. Division C of Part I of the Act sets out the rules for computing taxable income. The respondent does not describe what the appellant failed to include in computing her taxable income. There is nothing in paragraph 15 of the Reply to indicate an omission of an item that is to be included in taxable income. The amounts described in paragraph 15 were applied to compute income. Indeed, taxable income results from deducting amounts from income, not adding to income. The respondent should detail what "taxable" income, as opposed to income, was received but not included. The appellant is entitled to know the particulars of the misrepresentation.[10] The paragraph will be struck.

[20]     Paragraph 6. What relevance subparagraph 16(i) has to the merits of the appeal is beyond me. One may ask if the Minister assessed, in part, because she did not have a particular fact before her at time of assessment. This, too, will be struck.

[21]     Paragraph 7. Subparagraph 16(j) is merely an opinion of the assessor which may have influenced the making of the assessment but cannot be a fact that was relied on in assessing. Again, this provision will be struck.

[22]     Paragraphs 8 and 9. Subparagraphs 16(k) and (l) of the Reply are conclusions of the assessor and do not set out facts. Conclusions of law have no place in assumptions of fact and will be struck.[11]

[23]     I question the practice of the respondent including or mixing among the Minister's facts assumed when assessing, facts which the Minister has to prove. This is what takes place in subparagraphs 16(k) and (l) of the Reply. I refer, for example, to subparagraph 152(4)(a)(i) of the Act where the Minister must prove misrepresentation of the taxpayer in order to assess a taxation year after the taxpayer's normal assessment period in respect of the year and the statutory requirement for the Minister to establish facts justifying a subsection 163(2) penalty. In both situations, the comments of Rand J. in Johnson, supra, that every fact assumed by the assessor must be accepted as dealt with do not apply. The respondent must, of course, set out in the Reply the facts that the Minister assumed in making the assessments for penalties. In Elchuk v. M.N.R.,[12] Jackett P., as he then was, suggested that the Reply should allege the amount of tax that was not reported by the taxpayer so that the Court may determine whether the penalty assessed was authorized by subsection 163(2). The taxpayer should be put on notice of what was alleged against her that warranted the penalties or assessment beyond the normal assessment period for the particular year. It may be better pleading if the facts assumed in assessing a penalty or assessing beyond the normal assessment period were separated from the facts assumed in assessing on the merits.[13] In Pillsbury Holdings,[14] Cattanach J. suggests that as an alternative to relying on facts the Minister found or assumed in assessing that support the assessment, the Minister allege further or other facts and the onus to prove such facts would be on the Minister. Cattanach J.'s comments ought to be seriously considered by the Attorney General in drafting pleadings in support of penalties and assessments beyond the normal assessment period.

[24]     Paragraph 10. The phrase "as a consequence of the stated understatement of income" in subparagraph 16(n) is a conclusion of law and should be struck.

[25]     The respondent shall have 21 days from date of the Order issued pursuant to these reasons to serve and file an amended Reply to the Notice of Appeal with the appellant's consent or with leave of the Court in accordance with Rules 54, 55 and 56 of this Court. Any amendment will provide the appellant with the particulars she sought in her demand for particulars.

[26]     The Order of Miller J. dated May 7, 2003, will be varied to extend the time within which to complete examination for discoveries to the earlier of 30 days after the respondent's Reply to the Notice of Appeal is amended either on filing the appellant's consent or with leave of the Court or leave of the Court is denied.

[27]     The appellant was late in filing her motion to strike. She was late in expressing her dissatisfaction with the particulars. She also took fresh steps after the Reply was filed and her counsel informed Miller J. that she was prepared to proceed to discoveries. On the other hand, respondent's pleadings are deficient in no small way.

[28]     Costs will be in the cause.

Signed at Ottawa, Canada this 31st day of July, 2003.

"Gerald J. Rip"

Rip, J.

CITATION:

2003TCC533

COURT FILE NO.:

2001-3359(IT)G

STYLE OF CAUSE:

Wendy Wai Yu Gee and Her Majesty The Queen

PLACE OF HEARING:

Toronto, Ontario

DATE OF HEARING:

July 22, 2003

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY:

Justice Gerald J. Rip

DATE OF JUDGMENT:

July 31, 2003

APPEARANCES:

Counsel for the Appellant:

Richard G. Fitzsimmons

Counsel for the Respondent:

Marie-Thérèse Boris

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For the Appellant:

Name:

Fitzsimmons & Company

Firm:

Barristers & Solicitors Suite 1510, 5140 Yonge Street Toronto, Ontario M2N 6L7

For the Respondent:

Morris Rosenberg Deputy Attorney General of Canada Ottawa, Canada

SCHEDULE I

2001-3359(IT)G

TAX COURT OF CANADA

BETWEEN:

WENDY WAI YU GEE

Appellant

- and -

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

Respondent

REPLY

In reply to the Appellant's Notice of Appeal with respect to the 1992, 1993, 1994 and 1995 taxation years, the Deputy Attorney General of Canada says:

A.         STATEMENT OF FACTS

. . . . .

2.           He admits the authenticity of the Affidavit with the attached exhibits, which was filed in the Tax Court of Canada for the purposes of applying for an extension of time to file an appeal.

3.           He admits the authenticity of the Notices of Reassessment, the accompanying T7W-Cs, the Notices of Objection, and the Order of His Honour Judge Miller, of the Tax Court of Canada, dated February 4^th, 2002, attached to the Notice of Appeal.

. . . . .

6.           With respect to the allegations of fact contained in paragraph 3, he states that he has no knowledge of those facts, and puts the Appellant to strict proof, thereof. He further states that at no time did the Appellant state, indicate or suggest, to the Minister of National Revenue (the "Minister") that she was dependant upon or received financial support from Mr. Seun, or that she was or ever had been, married.

. . . . .

11.         In computing income for the taxation years at issue, the Appellant reported the following amounts as income:

                                                                                    Reported Income:

1992	$8,000
1993	$9,500
1994	$6,000
1995	$7,500

12.         As a result of the [sic] a net worth method of assessment, the Minister reassessed the Appellant for all of the taxation years at issue on June 21, 1999, increasing her total income in, and assessing penalties, pursuant to subsection 163(2), of the Act, in the following amounts:

                                                                              Increase                             Penalty

1992	$113,055	$15,538
1993	$108,394	$15,569
1994	$113,739	$16,073
1995	$113,810	$16,690

. . . . .

15.        The above noted reassessments and confirmation resulted in the following net worth       statement:

Description	1992	1993	1994	1995
Funds advanced to Tung Tai Limited	($ 7,066.)	$ 49,566.	$ 49,566.	$ 49,566.
Funds advanced to Tung Tai Books and Gifts	27,610.	27,610.	27,662.	23,234.
Living Expenses (remain unchanged)	40,718.	40,718.	42,511.	44.082.
Purchase of House (Down Payment)	________	________	59,793.	________
Subtotal revised Unreported Income	$61,262.	$117,894.	$179,532.	$116,882.
Less:
Amounts received from abroad	0	0	( 3,980.)	( 16,355.)
Reported Income	( 8,279.)	( 9,500.)	( 6,000.)	(    7,500.)
Total Unreported Income	$53,983.	$108,394.	$169,552.	$ 93,027.

16.         In so re-assessing and confirming the Appellant, the Minister made, inter alia, the following assumptions of fact:

. . . . .

b)                   in reporting income for the 1992, 1993, 1994 and 1995 taxation years the Appellant did not include all of the taxable income received in those years;

c)                   the income of the Appellant was understated by $52,983, $108,394, $169,552 and $93,027, for the 1992, 1993, 1994 and 1995 taxation years, respectively;

. . . . .

i)                     the Appellant did not respond to requests by the Minister for financial information to enable a proper audit of her financial matters;

j)          the amounts that the Appellant reported as total income on her returns of income were not sufficient to support a single person;

k)         in the filing of her returns of income for the taxation years at issue, the Appellant knowingly, or under circumstances amounting to gross negligence, in carrying out a duty or obligation imposed under the Act, made or participated in, assented to or acquiesced in the making of false statements or omissions in the income tax returns filed for the 1992, 1993, 1994, and 1995 taxation years, as a result of which the tax that would have been payable assessed on the information provided in the Appellant's income tax return filed for the 1992, 1993, 1994, and 1995 year, was less than the tax in fact payable;

l)                 in the filing of her returns of income for the taxation years at issue, the Appellant made misrepresentations that are attributable to neglect, carelessness or wilful default or has committed fraud in the filing of her return or in supplying information under the Act;

. . . . .

n)         as a consequence of the stated understatement of income, the Minister assessed the Appellant federal penalties under subsection 163(2) of the Act, as follows:

1991	1992	1993	1994
$5,912	$15,569	$23,548	$11,791

. . . . .

D.         RELIEF SOUGHT

19.        He respectfully submits that the Appellant underreported her income for the 1992, 1993, 1994 and 1995 taxation years.

20.        He submits that the Minister properly assessed and reassessed the Appellant pursuant to subsection 152(4) of the Act.

21.        He submits that the Appellant, in the filing of her returns of income for the taxation years at issue, or in supplying information under the Act, made misrepresentations that are attributable to neglect, carelessness or wilful default or were fraudulent, within the meaning of subsection 152(4) and 152(4.01) of the Act.

22.        He submits that the Appellant was aware, or ought to have been aware, that her income was greater then [sic] the amounts reported, in the taxation years at issue.

23.        He submits that the Minister properly assessed federal negligence penalties, pursuant to subsection 163(2) of the Act.

24.        He submits that in the filing of her returns of income for the taxation years at issue, the Appellant knowingly, or under circumstances amounting to gross negligence, in carrying out a duty or obligation imposed under the Act, made or participated in, assented to or acquiesced in the making of false statements or omissions in the income tax returns filed for the 1992, 1993, 1994, and 1995 taxation years, as a result of which the taxes that would have been payable assessed on the information provided in the Appellant's income tax return filed for the 1992, 1993, 1994, and 1995 year, was less than the taxes in fact payable, within the meaning of subsection 163(2), of the Act.

He requests that the appeal be dismissed with costs.

DATED at the City of Toronto, Ontario, this 24^th day of April, 2002.

SCHEDULE II

2001-3359(IT)G

TAX COURT OF CANADA

In re: The Income Tax Act

BETWEEN:

WENDY WAI YU GEE

Appellant,

- and -

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

Respondent.

DEMAND FOR PARTICULARS

The Appellant hereby demands particulars in respect of the following allegations in the Reply of the Respondent dated the 24^th day of April, 2002.

1.        The allegation contained in paragraph 16(k) of the Reply states that the Appellant "made or participated in, assented to or acquiesced in the making of false statements or omissions in the income tax returns filed for the 1992, 1993, 1994 and 1995 taxation years." Please provide particulars of:

(1)     each instance of a false statement or omission in the Appellant's tax returns for her 1992 through 1995 taxation years inclusive, and

(2)     each instance that the Appellant participated in, or assented to, or acquiesced in the making of false statements or omissions in her tax returns for the 1992, 1993, 1994 and 1995 taxation years.

2.        With respect to paragraph 16(l) of the Reply, the Minister assumed that the Appellant made misrepresentations attributable to neglect, carelessness or wilful default or has committed fraud in the filing of her return or in supplying information under the Income Tax Act:

(1)               please provide particulars of each misrepresentation the Minister assumed the Appellant made in each of her returns of income for the 1992 through 1995 inclusive taxation years;

whether the Minister assumed the misrepresentation was attributable to neglect or to carelessness or to wilful default, or to fraud, and

(3) please provide particulars of the neglect, carelessness, wilful default or fraud to which the Minister assumed each such misrepresentation was attributable.

Date of demand May 6th, 2002

2001-3359(IT)G

TAX COURT OF CANADA

BETWEEN:

WENDY WAI YU GEE

Appellant

- and -

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

Respondent

RESPONSE TO DEMAND FOR PARTICULARS

In response to your demand for particulars dated May 6^th, 2002, the Respondent responds as follows:

1.                  With respect to paragraph 16(k) of the Reply, the Appellant made, participated in, assented to or acquiesced in the making of false statements or omissions in her income tax returns filed for the 1992, 1993, 1994, and 1995 taxation years by:

           a) not reporting in her returns of income all of the income that she received in the 1992 to 1995 taxation years, as follows:

                92          $53,983

93                         $108,394

94                         $169,552

95                         $93,027

2.         With respect to paragraph 16(l) of the Reply, the Appellant made misrepresentations attributable to neglect, carelessness or wilful default or committed fraud in the filing of her return or in supplying information under the Income Tax Act by:

a)              not reporting in her returns of income all of the income that she received in the 1992 to 1995 taxation years, as follows:

96                  $53,983

97                  $108,394

98                  $169,552

99                  $93,027

b)               and, by not co-operating with the Minister in not providing information to the Minister after repeated requests, to enable a proper audit of the taxation years in question.

DATED at the City of Toronto, Ontario, this June 28^th, 2002.

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