Docket: 2003-513(GST)I
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BETWEEN:
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NIKOLA ZUBIC,
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Appellant,
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and
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HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
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Respondent.
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__________________________________________________________________
Appeal heard on December 17, 2003 at Windsor,
Ontario
Before: The Honourable Justice G. Sheridan
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Appearances:
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For the Appellant:
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The Appellant himself
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Counsel for the Respondent:
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Ifeanyi Nwachukwu
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__________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
The
appeal from the assessment made under the Excise Tax Act,
notice of which is dated June 4, 2002 and bears number
02100008412370006 is dismissed in accordance with the attached
Reasons for Judgment.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 22nd day of September,
2004.
Sheridan, J.
Citation: 2004TCC533
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Date: 20040922
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Docket: 2003-513(GST)I
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BETWEEN:
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NIKOLA ZUBIC,
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Appellant,
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and
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HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
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Respondent.
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REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Sheridan, J.
[1] The Appellant, Nikola Zubic,
immigrated to Canada from Bosnia during the years when that
country was in turmoil. He arrived unable to speak English,
without employment and full of hope. Less than a decade later, he
had established himself as a Canadian citizen with a good career,
settled his family in the community and built himself a house. It
is this last accomplishment that brought him before this Court.
As permitted by the Excise Tax Act Mr. Zubic applied
for a rebate of the GST paid in the construction of his house.
His application for a rebate of $4,109.25 was disallowed on the
grounds that he had not filed his application within the time
limit set out in subsection 256(3) of the Act.
[2] The relevant provision of the
Excise Tax Act read as follows:
256(2) Where
(a) a particular
individual constructs ... or engages another person to construct
... a residential complex that is a single unit residential
complex ... for use as the primary place of residence of the
particular individual ...the Minister shall, subject to
subsection (3) pay a rebate to the particular individual ...
This general section giving the Minister of National Revenue
the authority to pay the GST rebate is restricted by subsection
256(3) which states that "[a] rebate under this section in
respect of a residential complex shall not be paid to an
individual unless the individual files an application for the
rebate within two years after the earliest of:
(a) the day that is
two years after the day the complex is first occupied ...
(a.1) the day ownership is transferred
..., or
(b) the day
construction or substantial renovation of the complex is
substantially completed".
[3] Mr. Zubic represented himself at
the hearing. He admits that he and his family occupied the house
in February 1997 and that construction was substantially
completed by September 1997. Nor does he deny that he did not
file his application until March 2002, some three years after the
deadline. The issue is, having regard to Mr. Zubic's failure to
apply within the statutory time limit, whether the GST rebate can
be paid to him.
[4] Shortly after moving into the
house in February 1997, Mr. Zubic went to the Taxation Office in
Windsor to find out how to go about applying for a GST rebate. As
a result of his conversations with the GST officials, he came
away with the impression that even though he was occupying the
house, he was not eligible to apply because it was not yet
completed. His understanding was that he could not apply until
two years after completion of the construction; he understood
"completion" to mean the moment when the house had
undergone its final inspection. Satisfied that he still had
plenty of time to claim the GST, Mr. Zubic resumed work on
the house as time and resources permitted. At the time, he was
the sole breadwinner for his family of six, working his regular
job plus as much overtime as he could manage. With so much on his
plate, Mr. Zubic was not able to finish the house as quickly
as he would have liked. It meant his family lived uncomfortably
for several months in a construction zone but, used to hardship,
they persevered.
[5] In February 2000, Mr. Zubic
received a letter from the City of Windsor warning him that,
contrary to the municipal bylaws, he was occupying a residence
that had not yet had its final inspection. He scrambled to get
the house up to code and an inspection was done sometime in March
2000. Still believing that he was not eligible to apply for his
GST rebate until two years following the final inspection, Mr.
Zubic patiently waited until March 2002 whereupon he promptly
filed his application. The Minister received his application on
April 2, 2002.
[6] Mr. Zubic was a credible witness.
In spite of being a newcomer to the English language, the
relative complexity of the legislative provisions and the
numerous pressures on him at the time, he exercised due diligence
in his efforts to ascertain and to comply with what was required
of him to claim the GST rebate. On the evidence presented, I am
satisfied that but for his exchange with the Taxation Office
officials, Mr. Zubic would have applied for the rebate early
in 1997, well within the time permitted by the Act. It was
only after his discussions with the officials that he (wrongly)
concluded he could not apply at that time. His having made his
application in March 2002 is entirely consistent with his
understanding of what he had been told at the Taxation
Office.
[7] Unfortunately, although I accept
his evidence as to how his mistaken belief came about, this does
not help Mr. Zubic against the clear wording of subsection
256(3). Whether the information Mr. Zubic received from the
officials at the Windsor Taxation Office was blatantly incorrect
or merely left him with a wrong interpretation, the case law is
clear that a GST representative cannot change the effect of the
legislation[1].
Pursuant to the legislation, Mr. Zubic's
deadline for filing the application was February 1999, two years
after he and his family occupied the house. There is no question
that Mr. Zubic applied well after that time. Counsel for the
Respondent argued, quite rightly, that because Mr. Zubic
failed to file his application within the time permitted under
subsection 256(3), the Minister was prohibited by the clear
wording of the legislation from paying the rebate to
Mr. Zubic: "a rebate ... shall not be paid
...". The use of the words "shall not"
deprives both the Minister and this Court of any discretion to
extend the time for filing, even where the circumstances, as in
the present case, call out for such an extension to be granted[2]. Accordingly,
there is nothing in the provisions of the Excise Tax Act
that permits the Minister to pay the GST rebate to Mr. Zubic
after the statutory time period.
[8] The only other avenue that may be
open to Mr. Zubic is to seek relief under paragraph 23 of the
Financial Administration Act[3]. In Didkowski v. The Queen[4], the Court was
unable to allow the appeal because the Appellant had not filed
his application for the GST rebate in time. Reflecting on the
unfairness of the position in which this left the Appellant and
his wife, Mr. Justice McArthur raised with the Appellant and
his counsel the possibility of seeking a Remission Order[5]. It was not clear at
this hearing whether, in Mr. Zubic's various dealings with
officials, anyone had explored this alternative with him. It
seems to me that in this sort of case, where language
difficulties have resulted in such needless hardship,
departmental officials may wish to discuss this possibility with
Mr. Zubic. In any event, it is not for this Court to
consider whether Mr. Zubic should seek or would be
successful in obtaining a Remission Order. My decision must be
based on the provisions of the Act as they are now. On the
evidence presented and a proper interpretation of the statute, I
can only conclude that the Act does not permit the
Minister to pay the GST rebate to Mr. Zubic when his application
was made after the time set out in subsection 256(3) of the
Act. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 22nd day of September,
2004.
Sheridan, J.
[1] S.
Goldstein v. Canada, [1995] 2 C.T.C. 2036
[2] That this
lack of discretion has resulted in unfairness in certain
circumstances is reflected in the Proposed Amendment to
subsection 256(3) which would give the Minister discretion to
pay the rebate where an application has been received after the
due date.
[3] The
following overview of the operation and availability of
Remission Orders appeared, at the time of this writing, in
McMechan and Bourgard's Tax Court Practice, Vol. 2
at p. 21-2: "Where a taxpayer feels circumstances call for
the forgiveness or release from a debt or payment of tax,
interest and penalties and all rights of objection and appeal
have been exhausted, an application may be made for a remission
order pursuant to section 23 of the Financial Administration
Act, R.S.C., c. F-11 as amended by S.C. 1991, c. 24.
The order to remit is made by the Governor in Council on the
recommendation of the appropriate Minister. Where the matter
involves one of policy, or will impact on a class of taxpayers,
the application should be made to the Minister of Finance.
Where the matter arises out of the administration and
enforcement of the Income Tax Act or Excise Tax
Act in cases where enforcement would cause undue hardship
or where there has been detrimental reliance on information
provided the application should be made to the Minister of
National Revenue. The application can be made directly to the
Minister in writing by setting out all the material facts and
explaining why the circumstances support the relief sought.
Where the matter is one which would be brought to the
attention of the Minister of National Revenue the practice
which is encouraged by that Department is that the application
be made to the Director of Taxation of the taxpayer's
region. The local Director has ready access to the facts which
the Minister would be seeking if the application was made
directly to Ottawa. If the Director considers the case to be
appropriate for further consideration a report will be
forwarded to the Tax Remission Committee in the Department of
National Revenue. An adverse decision by the local Director
does not, of course, preclude direct application to the
Minister."
[4] [2000]
T.C.J. No. 899
[5] For
additional information on Remission Orders, see: Sharon
Waldron Remission Order, SI/TR, JUS-601168, August 25,
1999. Wong v. Canada,[1996] T.C.J. No.
1237; Whitehouse v. Canada, [2000] T.C.J. No. 328;
Snider v. Canada, [2002] T.C.J. No.
205.