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Citation: 2004TCC632
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Date: 20041104
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Docket: 2003-4201(IT)I
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BETWEEN:
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CAROLE POIRIER,
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Appellant,
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and
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HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
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Respondent,
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and
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DENIS MARTIN,
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Third Party.
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[OFFICIAL ENGLISH TRANSLATION]
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Given verbally at the June 4, 2004, hearing at
Québec, Quebec,
and amended for clarity.)
Archambault J.
[1] Carole Poirier is appealing the
reassessments established March 24, 2003, by the Minister of
National Revenue (Minister) for the taxation years 1999,
2000 and 2001. With these reassessments, the Minister added
$13,935, $13,439 and $13,728 in support payments to the
calculation of Ms. Poirier's income for the three taxation years.
When she filed her income tax return, Ms. Poirier did not claim
any of these amounts.
[2] Clearly, the Minister decided to
include them in Ms. Poirier's income following a decision
rendered by my colleague, Tardif J. in Denis Martin's appeals
regarding the taxation years 1998, 1999 and 2000. In this
February 24, 2003, judgment, Tardif J. found that Mr.
Martin had the right to deduct support payments made to Ms.
Poirier during those taxation years. The Minister claimed that
the support payments Mr. Martin made for his children were not
deductible because of changes made to the Income Tax Act
(Act) that make support payments for children tax exempt
(new rules). Tardif J. concluded that the support payments
made by Mr. Martin were subject to the old system and not to the
new rules.
[3] Shortly before Ms. Poirier's
appeal hearing, the Respondent asked that Mr. Martin be part
of the appeals under section 174 of the Act, and that the Court
also decide on the following questions, found at paragraph 3 of
the application for judicial review:
[translation]
(a) In his income
calculations for the 2001 taxation year, can Denis Martin
deduct the $13,728 paid to Carole Poirier during the year as
support payments?
(b) In her income
calculations for the 2001 taxation year, does Carole Poirier have
to include the $13,728 received from Denis Martin during the year
as support payments?[1]
[4] At the beginning of the hearing,
counsel for the Respondent asked-and all parties consented-that
similar questions regarding the 2002 taxation year also be raised
since Mr. Martin paid support payments in accordance with the
same Superior Court order as the one that affects the other years
in question.[2]
[5] After having heard the evidence
and arguments of each party, I rendered my decision immediately.
I briefly stated the reasons for which I concluded that the
support payments paid by Mr. Martin were subject to the new
rules, and as a result, he could not deduct them. Ms. Poirier was
not required to include them in her income. I then informed Mr.
Martin that if he wished to appeal, I would provide more detailed
reasons. Mr. Martin, who represented himself at the hearing,
instructed counsel to study the advisability of appealing. Thus,
these more detailed written reasons.
Facts
[6] The facts at issue are not
contested by the parties. In fact, all the subparagraphs listed
at paragraph 5 of the Reply to the Notice of Appeal were admitted
by all the parties except maybe subparagraph 5(o), of which Ms.
Poirier claimed to have no knowledge. These subparagraphs are
reproduced here:
[translation]
(a) the Appellant
and Denis Martin were divorced in a judgment pronounced
January 20, 1992;
(b) the Appellant
and Denis Martin are the parents of four children:
(i) Dominic,
born November 20, 1980,
(ii) Émilie,
born May 4, 1982,
(iii) Audray, born
September 24, 1984,
(iv) Joëlle, born
October 8, 1986;
(c) in the divorce,
custody of the children was granted to the Appellant;
(d) on March 15,
1996, support payments were revised to $325 per week with annual
indexation;
(e) on April 11,
1997, the child Dominic moved in with his father,
Denis Martin;
(f) on April
14, 1997, Denis Martin filed a motion to approve the change
in custody of his son Dominic and for a reduction in support
payments to the Appellant;
(g) on April 28,
1997, Denis Martin and the Appellant signed a contract
establishing that, should a change in custody be approved by the
Court, Mr. Martin's support payments to the Appellant would be
reduced to $247.41 per week and that it would remain deductible
for Mr. Martin and taxable for the Appellant;
(h) in accordance
with the April 28, 1997, contract, the Appellant and Denis Martin
let the Court determine the date the change in support payments
would become effective;
(i) on May 1,
1997, an interim order was issued granting custody of Dominic to
Denis Martin, maintaining the status quo for support payments,
and postponing the hearing of the motion to
June 12, 1997;
(j) this May
1, 1997, order also indicated that [translation] "the amount of
support payments will be set retroactively to the date of the
service of the pleadings;"
(k) on July 4, 1997,
the Honourable Justice Raynald Fréchette of the
Superior Court, rendered a decision ordering joint custody of the
child Dominic, and setting the amended support payments at
$247.41[3] per
week, payable by Mr. Martin to the Appellant, effective as of the
date of the judgment;
(l) since the
Honourable Justice Fréchette's July 4, 1997, decision did
not confirm the contract signed April 28, 1997, as such,
according to Denis Martin and the Appellant, the parties signed a
new contract on April 20, 1998, that stated that Mr. Martin
will make monthly support payments to the Appellant for the three
minor children, in the amount of $1,072.11, that these support
payments will remain deductible for Mr. Martin and taxable
for the Appellant, and that they would be retroactive to July 4,
1997;
(m) on May 5, 1998, the
Honourable Justice Raynald Fréchette of the Superior
Court, rendered an amended decision in which, among other things,
he ordered that support payments be payable starting July 1,
1997, and that they would remain taxable for the Appellant and
deductible for Denis Martin;
(n) in accordance
with the amended judgment of May 5, 1998, the Minister deduced,
from his understanding, that the support payments Denis Martin
made to the Appellant from July 1, 1997, were subject to the new
fiscal rules since Fréchette J. did not have the authority
to decide whether support payments were deductible and/or
taxable;
(o) following the
January 23, 2003, hearing of the case of the Appellant's former
spouse, Denis Martin, before the Tax Court of Canada, it
became apparent to Justice Alain Tardif, from his understanding
of the case, that the statement in Fréchette J.'s amended
decision of May 5, 1998, regarding the deductibility/taxation of
the support payments were not intended to tell the Minister how
to handle the situation, but essentially aimed at confirming the
parties' wishes (contract dated April 28, 1997);
(p) regarding the
years in question, for each year, Denis Martin claimed
$13,935, $13,439 and $13,728, respectively, as support
payments or other allowance payable on a periodic basis in the
calculation of his income, for the taxation years 1999, 2000 and
2001;
(q) following the
decision made by the Honourable Justice Alain Tardif, the
Minister added $13,935, $13,439 and $13,728, respectively, as
support payments or other allowance payable on a periodic basis,
to the calculation of the Appellant's income, regarding the
taxation years 1999, 2000 and 2001.
[7] Since this is an excellent summary
of the relevant facts, I will simply add a few facts, mainly from
the documents submitted as evidence. We find in the motion to
amend the corollary relief following a divorce judgment, dated
April 14, 1997, the following details:
[translation]
2. In the
years following the judgment in question, a number of
judgments regarding support payments were rendered in this
case;
3. Finally, on
March 15, 1996, the Honourable Justice Pierre Boily
rendered a new judgment and sentenced the defendant to pay
$325.00 per week in support payments for his
children, indexable annually;
4. Since this
last judgment, some facts have arisen with consequences on the
corollary relief, which must now be revised:
...
6. As a
result, it is requested that the weekly support payments be
reduced from $329.88 to $247.41 per week,
retroactively to April 11, 1997;
[Emphasis added].
[8] Among the conclusions of this
motion, is the following:
[translation]
SENTENCES the defendant to make support payments to the
applicant for their three minor children Émilie, Audray
and Joëlle in the amount of $1,071.29 monthly,
indexable annually, to be made in two payments of $535.64 on
the 15th and the last day of each month, retroactively to
April 11, 1997, in accordance with the Act to facilitate
the payment of support;
[Emphasis added].
[9] Moreover, I find it useful to
reproduce some excerpts from the April 28, 1997 contract:
[translation]
We, the undersigned, Carole Poirier and
Denis Martin, acknowledge that a motion to change custody
of our son Dominic has been filed with the Superior Court,
St-François district and that it should be heard shortly
before the court.
Should there be a change in custody, we agree to the
following:
- reduction of
support payments from $329.88 to $247.41 per week.
...
- support payments
will remain tax deductible for the father and taxable for the
mother;
...
We accept that the following points of disagreement be
brought before the court:
- the reasons and
validity of a change in custody;
- the date
the change in support payments should become effective,
and the amount of retroactivity, if any;
- the change in
recipient of fiscal allocations and family benefits.
We agree that there would be no benefit to submitting this
issue to arbitration or mediation. Moreover, we hope that this
agreement is exempt from the new rules affecting support
payments, in the interest of the parties concerned.
[Emphasis added].
[10] In his July 4, 1997, judgment,
Fréchette J. of the Superior Court of Quebec made the
following preliminary comment:
[translation]
WHEREAS the defendant is presenting a motion to amend
the corollary relief, namely a change in custody of the child
Dominic, now aged 16, and amend visitation rights and support
payments;
[Emphasis added].
[11] I would also like to cite from the
preamble of the April 20, 1998, contract, in which Ms. Poirier
and Mr. Martin recognize the following:
[translation]
WHEREAS the parties signed, on April 28, 1997, an
agreement stating that following the Court's decision on the
amount of the support payments, they would be payable by the
defendant to the applicant and will continue to be
deductible-taxable;
WHEREAS at the July 4, 1997, hearing, the parties
confirmed to the judge that they wanted the support to be
deductible-taxable;
[Emphasis added].
[12] The last document to which I will refer
is the Support Payments Bulletin published by the
Ministère du Revenu du Québec. It is the March 2001
edition, called, "Support Payments," which states, on page
two:
The Ministère requires a judgment in order to carry
out its role in the support-payment collection program. The
more a judgment is explicit the easier it will be to
apply...
[Emphasis added].
We should point out now that this statement is in accordance
with section 1 of the Act to facilitate the payment of
support (AFPS), R.S.Q., c. P-2.2.[4]
Analysis
[13] The main question raised by this case
is whether the support payments paid by Mr. Martin during the
relevant years are subject to the new rules. The relevant
provisions are essentially found in paragraphs 56(1)(b)
and 60(b) and in subsection 56.1(4) of the Act.
Subsection 56.1(4) provides the following definitions of
"commencement day," "support amount" and "child support
amount":
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56.1 (4) Definitions. The definitions in this
subsection apply in this section and section 56.
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56.1(4) Définitions. Les
définitions qui suivent s'appliquent au
présent article et à l'article 56.[5]
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"commencement day" at any time of an agreement or
order means
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« date
d'exécution » Quant à un
accord ou une ordonnance :
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(a) where the agreement or order is made after
April 1997, the day it is made; and
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a) si l'accord ou l'ordonnance est
établi après avril 1997, la date de
son établissement;
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(b) where the agreement or order is made before
May 1997, the day, if any, that is after
April 1997 and is the earliest of
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b) si l'accord ou
l'ordonnance est établi avant
mai 1997, le premier en date des jours suivants,
postérieur à avril 1997 :
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(i) the day specified as the commencement day of the
agreement or order by the payer and recipient under the
agreement or order in a joint election filed with the
Minister in prescribed form and manner,
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(i) le jour précisé par le payeur et
le bénéficiaire aux termes de l'accord ou
de l'ordonnance dans un choix conjoint
présenté au ministre sur le formulaire et
selon les modalités prescrits,
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(ii) where the agreement or order is varied after
April 1997 to change the child support amounts payable
to the recipient, the day on which the first payment of the
varied amount is required to be made,
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(ii) si
l'accord ou l'ordonnance fait l'objet d'une
modification après avril 1997 touchant le
montant de la pension alimentaire pour enfants qui est
payable au bénéficiaire, le jour où le
montant modifié est à verser pour la
première fois,
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(iii) where a subsequent agreement or order is made
after April 1997, the effect of which is to change the
total child support amounts payable to the recipient by the
payer, the commencement day of the first such
subsequent agreement or order, and
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(iii) si un
accord ou une ordonnance subséquent est
établi après avril 1997 et a pour
effet de changer le total des montants de pension
alimentaire pour enfants qui sont payables au
bénéficiaire par le payeur, la date
d'exécution du premier semblable accord ou
de la première semblable ordonnance,
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(iv) the day specified in the agreement or order, or any
variation thereof, as the commencement day of the agreement
or order for the purposes of this Act.
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(iv) le jour
précisé dans l'accord ou
l'ordonnance, ou dans toute modification s'y
rapportant, pour l'application de la présente
loi.
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"support amount" means an amount payable or
receivable as an allowance on a periodic basis for the
maintenance of the recipient, children of the recipient or
both the recipient and children of the recipient, if the
recipient has discretion as to the use of the amount,
and
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« pension alimentaire »
Montant payable ou à recevoir à titre
d'allocation périodique pour subvenir aux
besoins du bénéficiaire, d'enfants de
celui-ci ou à la fois du bénéficiaire
et de ces enfants, si le bénéficiaire peut
utiliser le montant à sa discrétion et, selon
le cas :
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(a) the recipient is the spouse or common-law
partner or former spouse or common-law partner of the
payer, the recipient and payer are living separate and
apart because of the breakdown of their marriage or
common-law partnership and the amount is receivable under
an order of a competent tribunal or under a written
agreement; or
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a) le bénéficiaire est
l'époux ou le conjoint de fait ou
l'ex-époux ou l'ancien conjoint de fait du
payeur et vit séparé de celui-ci pour cause
d'échec de leur mariage ou union de fait et le
montant est à recevoir aux termes de
l'ordonnance d'un tribunal compétent ou
d'un accord écrit;
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(b) the payer is a natural parent of a child of
the recipient and the amount is receivable under an order
made by a competent tribunal in accordance with the laws of
a province.
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b) le payeur est le père naturel ou
la mère naturelle d'un enfant du
bénéficiaire et le montant est à
recevoir aux termes de l'ordonnance d'un tribunal
compétent rendue en conformité avec les lois
d'une province.
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"child support amount" means any support amount
that is not identified in the agreement or order under
which it is receivable as being solely for the support of a
recipient who is a spouse or common-law partner or former
spouse or common-law partner of the payer or who is a
parent of a child of whom the payer is a natural
parent.
[Emphasis added]
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« pension alimentaire pour
enfants » Pension alimentaire qui,
d'après l'accord ou l'ordonnance aux
termes duquel elle est à recevoir, n'est pas
destinée uniquement à subvenir aux
besoins d'un bénéficiaire qui
est soit l'époux ou le conjoint de
fait ou l'ex-époux ou l'ancien conjoint de
fait du payeur, soit le père ou la mère
d'un enfant dont le payeur est le père naturel
ou la mère naturelle.
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[14] Mr. Martin claims that the July 4,
1997, order did not modify the March 15, 1996, order or
change the total of the amounts in the order, since the April 28,
1997, agreement that already did so. As a result, there is no
commencement day.
[15] With respect to those who support this
position, I feel it its poorly grounded. First, it must be
decided whether the April 28, 1997, contract is really an
"agreement" within the meaning of the relevant provisions of the
Act. To fully understand the scope of the concept, its raison
d'être must be examined, it's purpose in the Act. The
relevance of the concept can be found in the definition of
support amount, above. For such a support payment to be
deductible under paragraph 60(b) of the Act, and for
it to be included as income for the beneficiary under paragraph
56(1)(b), it must have been paid either under the terms of
an order issued by a court of competent jurisdiction or under the
terms of a written agreement. It seems that a simple
verbal agreement would not be enough to allow for support
payments to be deducted. There must be a written agreement or an
order[6] by a court
of competent jurisdiction. The obvious goal of the Act is to
ensure that taxpayers are required to pay or have the right to
receive such support payments because of an obligation coming
from either a court order or an agreement that creates the
obligation, and that the obligation is part of a written
document. Even if the definition of "commencement day" merely
makes reference to an "agreement," this is a written agreement. A
verbal agreement would have no relevance.
[16] Not only does the Act recognize that
support payments do not need to be paid in accordance with an
order by a court of competent jurisdiction to be deductible-a
simple written agreement is enough-but, as my colleague,
Lamarre J. stated in Clermont (supra), at
paragraph 16, "it is open to the parties to vary a court
order establishing child support, without necessarily having the
new agreement approved by the court." In support of her findings,
she cited Justice Pierre Dalphond, then Quebec Superior Court
justice, in R.G. v. L.A., [2000] Q.J. No.
1397 Que. Sup. Ct. (Q.L.):
108 Once a judgment of
separation or divorce has been pronounced and the Court has
awarded accessory measures, nothing prevents the parties from
settling between themselves the way they want to execute the
benefits and obligations derived from the judgment. The parties
remain free to negotiate at any time.
109 Though it is absolutely
necessary for a divorce to become effective that it be pronounced
by a Court since marriage is a matter going beyond the private
interests of the parties involved, there is nothing in the
Divorce Act that prevents two parties from making an agreement
about their financial obligations towards each other further to a
judgment of divorce. There is nothing in the laws of Quebec,
Civil Code of Lower Canada or Civil Code of Quebec included, that
prevents it either
[Emphasis added]
[17] It was therefore open to Mr. Martin and
Ms. Poirier to accept the written agreement of April 28, 1997, to
reduce the support payments set by Boily J. on March 15, 1996,
from $325 per week to $247.41. However, they did not do so and I
think there are two reasons for this. First, they did not seem to
agree that it was time for Dominic to live with his father. A
Superior Court justice had to decide this issue. As a result, the
obligation to pay reduced support payments was dependent upon
this issue. Therefore, the April 28 contract did not create the
obligation to pay support payments; it was the Superior Court
that would create it.[7]
[18] Second, it was hoped that the support
payments made by Mr. Martin would be subject to the AFPS, as
confirmed in one of the conclusions of the April 14, 1997,
motion. However, to do so required an order by the Superior
Court. The Ministère du Revenu du Québec, that
applies the AFPS, requires a compliance order from a court for it
to collect support payments for recipients. It is therefore not
surprising that many judgments concerning support payments had
been made in the past in Ms. Poirier and Mr. Martin's case. This
is also indicated in the April 14, 1997, motion.
[19] This analysis of the facts leads me to
make a finding on the nature of the contract signed on April 28,
1997. The purpose of this contract was not to create an
obligation for Mr. Martin to pay child support to Ms. Poirier,
but to come to an agreement on certain issues that were to be
settled in Superior Court, namely, setting the amount of the
reduced support payments if the court decided that Dominic could
live with his father, and deciding on when the reduction would
take effect. In other words, the April 28, 1997, contract was
only a "partial consent to judgment" and not a "written
agreement" within the meaning of subsection 56.1(4) of the Act
that would create an obligation to pay support payments.
[20] Moreover, courts are not required to
accept such consents to judgment. I am sure that the Superior
Court could have modified the amount if it found it unreasonable.
In fact, when the motion was heard on May 1, 1997, the interim
order granting Mr. Martin custody of Dominic maintained the
status quo in terms of support payments, even though Dominic's
parents had agreed on the reduced amount of these payments! For
the reduction to take effect, the Superior Court would have had
to set the amount of the reduction. In their April 20, 1997,
contract, Mr. Martin and Ms. Poirier even acknowledged that
the Superior Court set the support payments ([translation]
"further to the Court's decision on the amount of the support
payments").
[21] Moreover, the commencement day of the
obligation was dependent upon the Superior Court decision, as
stated in the April 28, 1997, contract. It must also be noted
that, contrary to the request in the April 14, 1997, motion, the
reduced support payment obligation was only effective as of July
4, 1997, not April 11, 1997.
[22] Support for this conclusion also comes
from the fact that Mr. Martin and Ms. Poirier felt it was
necessary to have a new order, the May 5, 1998, order, to amend
the July 4, 1997, order that neglected to state that the support
would be deductible for Mr. Martin and taxable for Ms.
Poirier.
[23] I therefore conclude that the April 28,
1997, contract is not an "agreement" within the meaning of
subsection 56.1(4) of the Act. In this case, only an order
from the Superior Court could allow Mr. Martin to deduct the
support payments he made, if the other conditions were also
met.
[24] We must now focus on these other
conditions. The problematic one here is the one regarding the
"commencement date." Was there such a date in the Superior Court
order? If so, the child support payments would be tax exempt. As
I concluded that there was no written agreement in this case,
that there were merely orders by the Superior Court, it is easier
to make a decision on this matter. We shall review the facts. The
last order in effect before Dominic decided to move in with his
father was the one issued by Boily J. on
March 15, 1996. The first order was likely the January
20, 1992, one, also issued by Boily J. These dates precede May
1997. It was the March 15, 1996, order that Mr. Martin wanted to
amend in April 1997, and this is the one Fréchette J.
modified on July 4, 1997. In that order, Fréchette J.
reduced the support payments to $247.41 as of July 4, 1997.
However, the date of the order and the effective date of the
reduced amount of the support payment are both after
April 30, 1997.
[25] In my opinion, there is a commencement
day within the meaning of paragraph (a) or
subparagraphs (b)(ii) and (iii) of the definition of
"commencement day" in subsection 56.1(4) of the Act, which I
will reproduce in part again:
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"commencement day" at any time of an
agreement or order means:
(a) where
the agreement or order is made after
April 1997, the day it is made; and
(b) where
the agreement or order is made before
May 1997, the day, if any, that is after
April 1997 and is the earliest of:
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...
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(ii) where the agreement or order is varied
after April 1997 to change the child support
amounts payable to the recipient, the day on which the
first payment of the varied amount is required to be
made,
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(iii) where a subsequent agreement or order is
made after April 1997, the effect of which is to
change the total child support amounts payable to the
recipient by the payer, the commencement day of the first
such subsequent agreement or order, and
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...
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[26] Earlier, I mentioned that it was easier
to make a decision on the issue in question once the absence of a
written agreement was established. However, this does not mean it
is easy. Actually, the definition of "commencement day" is not
entirely clear. After reading it a number of times and reading
the interpretation bulletin IT-530R on support payments, this is
my understanding: paragraph (a) seems to deal with written
agreements or any order made after April 1997 (whether or not it
is a first written agreement or a first order) while paragraph
(b) seems to deal with written agreements or orders made
before May 1997. Therefore, if the support payments are to be
considered payable under the July 4, 1997, order, then
the commencement day is July 4, 1997, and if they are to be
considered payable under the January 20, 1992, or the March 15,
1996, order, then it must be determined whether one of the
situations in subparagraphs (b)(i) to (iv) applies and
which is the earliest of the days mentioned in these
subparagraphs that is after April 1997.
[27] It is obvious that subparagraphs
(b)(i) and (b)(iv) do not apply in this case
because a joint election was not filed with the Minister and
there was no day specified in the order. This leaves
subparagraphs (b)(ii) and (b)(iii). In my opinion,
these two paragraphs apply in this case since, in the first case,
the January 20, 1992, or March 15, 1996, orders were established
before May 1997; they were the subject of an amendment after
April 1997-in the July 4, 1997, order-which affected the child
support amount to be paid to the recipient. As for the second,
there is a subsequent order established after April 1997-the
July 4, 1997, order-that changed the total amounts of
child support payable to the recipient under an order established
before May 1997. This was the January 20, 1992, or the March
15, 1996, order. In this case, the commencement date is the
commencement date of the subsequent order, or the execution date
of the order, July 4, 1997. In the first case, in which
subparagraph (b)(ii) applies, it would be the day the
amended amount was paid for the first time, which, in all
likelihood, was after July 4, 1997. The evidence did
not indicate the day the amended amount was paid for the first
time. At any rate, the issue is merely theoretical since the
commencement day that is "after April 1997 and is the
earliest" would be July 4, 1997, in this case.
[28] So, whether the support payments were
payable under the July 4, 1997, or the January 20, 1992, or the
March 15, 1996, order, the commencement day is the same, July 4,
1997. The payments under one or the other of these orders are
subject to the new rules and are tax exempt.
[29] Before concluding, I would like to
point out that I have no doubt that Ms. Poirier and
Mr. Martin, when they negotiated the terms of the order to
be rendered by the Superior Court, clearly established that the
support payments would be deductible for Mr. Martin and taxable
for Ms. Poirier. It is therefore surprising that
Ms. Poirier never included support payment from
Mr. Martin in her income. However, designating support
payments as taxable or deductible is not dependent upon the
parties' wishes or those of a judge, whether from this Court
or another superior court. It is the Act that determines the
taxation conditions and determines whether a taxpayer has the
right to deduct certain amounts or is required to include them as
income. If the Superior Court had issued its order before May
1997 or if Ms. Poirier and Mr. Martin had signed a binding
written agreement before this date, the support payments would
not have been subject to the new rules and would have been
deductible by one and included as income for the other. However,
since Ms. Poirier wanted the issue of custody decided by the
Superior court, and she and Mr. Martin wanted the Superior Court
order to be issued so that the support payments could be governed
by the AFPS, and since, unfortunately for Mr. Martin, this
order was not issued before April 1997, the provisions in the Act
lead to the support payments being tax exempt.
[30] For all the above reasons, the appeals
from the reassessments established under the Act for the taxation
years 1999, 2000 and 2001 are allowed and the assessments are
referred back to the Minister of National Revenue for review and
reassessment with the assumptions that the support payments
Ms. Poirier received from Mr. Martin should be excluded
from Ms. Poirier's income.
[31] Moreover, the Court finds that the
support payments Mr. Martin paid in 2001 and 2002 are not
deductible in the calculation of his income for these two
taxation years and that these payments should be excluded from
the calculation of Ms. Poirier's income for the 2002
taxation year. Ms. Poirier and Mr. Martin are bound by
this decision. All without costs.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 4th day of November 2004.
Archambault J.
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