Citation: 2004TCC707
|
Date: 20041021
|
Docket: 2003-521(EI)
|
BETWEEN:
|
MARC BÉGIN,
|
Appellant,
|
and
|
|
THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL REVENUE,
|
Respondent.
|
[OFFICIAL ENGLISH TRANSLATION]
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Archambault J.
[1] Pursuant to subsection 103(1)
of the Employment Insurance Act ("the Act"),
Marc Bégin appeals a decision rendered by the
Minister of National Revenue ("the Minister") on
January 24, 2003, under subsection 93(3) of the
Act. The decision states that Mr. Bégin did not
hold insurable employment from January 1 to May 31,
2002 ("the second relevant period") because
there was no employer-employee relationship between him and
Université Laval during this period. Mr. Bégin
contests the Minister's decision, not only in relation to the
second relevant period, but in relation to the period commencing
July 10, 2000, and ending December 31, 2001
(the "first relevant period"), as well.[1]
[2] In light of the controversy
regarding the relevant periods, it is important to go over the
periods prior to the decision of January 24, 2003. The
Minister's decision pertains to an appeal based on
section 91 of the Act. Mr. Bégin instituted the
appeal on November 14, 2002, in response to a ruling
made under section 90, on October 28, 2002, by an
officer authorized by the Minister
("the authorized officer"). According
to that ruling, Mr. Bégin did not hold insurable
employment during the first[2]and second relevant periods [TRANSLATION]
"because no service was rendered during these
periods." The authorized officer also established that
there were [TRANSLATION] "415 insurable hours for the
period of July 10 to September 30, 2001, and $12,795.52 in
insurable earnings for the above period."[3] Based on paragraph
2(3)(b) of the Insurable Earnings and Collection of
Premiums Regulations ("the Regulations"),
he decided not to include in the insurable earnings an amount of
$76,000 paid pursuant to an out-of-court settlement
[TRANSLATION] "because the amount was paid as damages
stemming from the loss of your employment."
[3] However, since
Mr. Bégin's request was only made to the
authorized officer on August 30, 2002,[4] the officer granted
[TRANSLATION] "a right of appeal solely in relation to the
period of January 1 to May 31, 2002" based on
subsection 90(2) of the Act.
[4] In his appeal to the Minister
dated November 14, 2002, Mr. Bégin contested not
only the authorized officer's ruling regarding the
insurability of his employment for the period of July 10,
2000, to May 31, 2002 ("the initial relevant
period"), but also the [TRANSLATION]
"non-insurability of the $76,000 received from the payor as
a final settlement."[5] Nonetheless, the Minister's decision dated
January 24, 2003, pertains only to the first
question.
[5] In the Notice of Appeal filed in
this Court, Mr. Bégin reiterates that the relevant
period contemplated in his appeal is the initial relevant period.
Moreover, he submits that he was under an employment contract
with Université Laval during that entire period. For his
part, the Minister submits that (i) the Court has no jurisdiction
over the first relevant period; (ii) as far as the second
relevant period is concerned, Mr. Bégin performed no
services for Université Laval because the contract had
ended on October 1, 2001; and (iii) the $76,000 that
Mr. Bégin received from Université Laval does
not constitute insurable earnings under the Regulations.
Facts
[6] The Minister's decision was
based on certain factual assumptions set out in paragraphs 9(a)
through (l) of the Reply to the Notice of Appeal. At the hearing,
Mr. Bégin's counsel admitted to all of these
paragraphs except paragraph (l). I reproduce paragraphs 9(a)
through 9(k) below:
[TRANSLATION]
(a) The appellant
was employed by the payor as a lecturer since 1981. Effective
October 1, 1985, he was in charge of performance at the Faculty
of Music.
(b) On May
27, 1997, the payor renewed the appellant's employment
contract for a five-year term commencing June 1, 1997, and
ending May 31, 2002.
(c) As of
June 1, 1997, his annual salary under the contract was
$53,353.
(d) On or about
February 29, 2000, the appellant was suspended from his
position with pay.
(e) On or about
May 30, 2000, the payor suspended the appellant without pay
for the period of July 10, 2000, to July 10, 2001.
(f) On
February 26, 2001, following this suspension, the appellant
sued the payor in Superior Court for damages in the amount of
$99,197.33, including $54,153 in loss of remuneration.
(g) On
October 1, 2001, the payor terminated the appellant's
employment definitively.
(h) The appellant
received remuneration from the payor for the period of
July 10 to September 30, 2001.
(i) The
appellant filed a complaint against the payor with the Commission
des normes du travail for unjust and wrongful dismissal.
(j) On
March 19, 2002, the appellant and the payor, through their
respective counsel, came to an agreement in principle for the
full and final settlement of all disputes and claims.
(k) On March 25,
2002, the Labour Commissioner confirmed the agreement between the
parties.
[7] Several documents were tendered at
the hearing, including the agreement of March 19, 2002
("theMarch 2002 agreement") between
Mr. Bégin and Université Laval.
Mr. Bégin only signed the agreement on May 30,
2002, and the person representing Université Laval only
signed it on June 10, 2002. The most relevant passages
are paragraphs 2 and 3, which I reproduce here:
[TRANSLATION]
2. The
Employee recognizes that his employment ended on
October 1, 2001, as any employment relationship
with the University was definitively terminated on
October 1, 2001;
3. The
University shall pay the Employee a total of $76,000 as severance
pay and for loss of salary, and the Employee acknowledges
that this amount is sufficient and reasonable.
The reimbursement of lost salary covers the period[s] of
July 10, 2000, to July 10, 2001, and
October 1, 2001 to May 31, 2002.
The amount is payable as follows:
3.1. In accordance with
section 46 of the Employment Insurance Act, the
University shall pay the Receiver General for Canada, out of the
$76,000 mentioned above, the requisite repayment of the
overpayment of benefits received by the Employee;
3.2. The University shall then
pay the balance to the Employee as follows:
i.
$30,000 shall be paid into an appropriate retirement vehicle,
as a retiring or departure allowance, based on the instructions
given in this regard by the Employee or his counsel upon
presentation of the applicable income tax waiver forms, and this
amount shall be paid after the University receives the
instructions and forms;
ii. In
order to enable the employee to request a special tax
calculation, the Employer shall complete and provide the Employee
with a Canada Customs and Revenue Agency Statement of Qualifying
Retroactive Lump-Sum Payment;
iii. The
residual amount, subject to the usual tax and statutory
deductions, shall be remitted to the Employee no more than 15
working days after the amount payable to the Receiver General for
Canada has been paid;
[Emphasis added.]
[8] Mr. Bégin testified
about the circumstances that led him to sign this agreement,
which establishes October 1, 2001, as his termination
date. He said he signed the agreement solely to satisfy a
request by Université Laval, which told him that it would
be too complicated to have the trustee of the Université
Laval pension fund recalculate the retirement benefits to which
Mr. Bégin would be entitled upon retirement. On
October 1, 2002, Université Laval definitively
terminated Mr. Bégin's employment, and he said
the university was unable to see how it could revisit the
consequences of the termination of the employment contract.
[9] It should be mentioned that, in
addition to the $76,000, an amount of $24,000 was paid as
liquidated legal costs and as compensation for the harm that
Mr. Bégin said his reputation suffered following the
suspension and premature termination of his employment contract.
After the March 2002 agreement was signed, the
Université Laval's lawyers issued certain documents on
July 17, 2002, including a Record of Employment (ROE)
prepared by their client. The ROE is dated
July 11, 2002, and indicates July 10, 2002, as the
first day worked and September 30, 2001, as the final
pay period ending date. The ROE reports 415 hours of
insurable employment and $12,795.52 in total insurable
earnings.[6]
[10] Although he received pay for the period
commencing in July 2001 and ending on
September 30, 2001, Mr. Bégin testified
that he received no instructions from Université Laval
regarding the preparation of his course.
[11] The documents attached to the letter
from Université Laval dated July 17, 2002,
include Form T1198F (Exhibit A-7H), "Statement of
Qualifying Retroactive Lump-Sum Payment." The form
pertains to the $76,000 paid by Université Laval and
states how a part of the amount is allocated. $21,839 was
allocated to the year 2000 and $35,317 was allocated to the year
2001, for a total of $57,156.[7] Based on the information in the letter of
May 10, 2004, one can conclude that the $35,317 for
2001 is broken down as follows: $23,836 (191 x $124.79)
for the period of January 1 to July 10, 2001, and
$11,481 (92 x $124.79) for the period of October 1
to December 31, 2001. It can be added that
Université Laval paid $30,000 of the $76,000 directly into
Mr. Bégin's RRSP as a "retiring
allowance" (see the letter of June 17, 2002, by
Université Laval (Exhibit A-7B, E, F and
G)).
[12] The documents tendered as evidence
include a letter dated October 3, 2000, in which
Mr. Bégin's demand that Université Laval
to pay their client $54,802 in damages for loss of salary and
$6,000 for loss of benefits. More specifically, the demand
letter urged the following:
[TRANSLATION]
You are in default and must pay our client the sum of one
hundred and five thousand eight hundred and two dollars
($105,802) for the following damages:
Loss of salary and other benefits under the
contract:
|
$60,802
|
Moral damages:
|
$15,000
|
Exemplary damages:
|
$15,000
|
Damage to reputation
|
$15,000
|
TOTAL:
|
$105, 802
|
[Emphasis added.]
[13] There was also an action commenced by
Mr. Bégin against Université Laval on
February 26, 2001. In the action, Mr. Bégin
asked the Superior Court to order Université Laval to pay
him $99,197.33 in damages. Paragraphs 49 and 50 of the
originating process states as follows:
[TRANSLATION]
49 The following
damages were caused by the actions of Université
Laval:
► Loss of earnings:
|
$54,153
|
► Fringe benefits:
|
$6,044.33
|
► Legal fees:
|
$9,000
|
► Moral damages:
|
$5,000
|
► Damage to reputation
|
$10,000
|
50 Since the
violation of the right is malicious, grossly negligent and
intentional, the plaintiff is entitled to seek exemplary damages
in the amount of fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000);
[Emphasis added.]
[14] In addition, Mr. Bégin
commenced a recourse under section 124 of the
Act respecting labour standards on
September 21, 2001.
Analysis
The Court's jurisdiction over the first relevant
period
[15] Counsel for the respondent submits that
this Court does not have jurisdiction to determine whether Mr.
Bégin held insurable employment during the second relevant
period. He relies on subsection 90(2) of the Act, which
states that a request by any person other than the Commission
must be made before June 30 following the year to which the
question relates.[8] In this instance, the request was only made on
August 30, 2002.
[16] If the authorized officer, to whom the
request of August 30, 2002, was made, had only made a
ruling with regard to the second relevant period, I would have
been inclined to agree with the submission of counsel for the
respondent. However, when the officer made his ruling on
October 28, 2002, he did not limit himself to the
second relevant period. He also ruled with regard to the entire
initial relevant period. Specifically, he found that Mr.
Bégin held insurable employment for the period of
July 10 to September 30, 2001. In my opinion, the
officer had jurisdiction to rule on the first relevant period by
reason of section 94 of the Act,[9] which provides that nothing in
sections 90 to 93 restricts the authority of the Minister to
render a decision on the Minister's own initiative, under
Part IV of the Act, subsequent to the date contemplated in
subsection 90(2). On an initial reading, one might believe
that the authorized officer referred to in section 90 of the
Act and the Minister referred to in sections 91 and 94 are
two separate persons and consequently, that the power described
in section 94 is conferred only on the Minister (and not on
the authorized officer). However, the powers conferred by
sections 90, 91 and 94 are always conferred on officers
authorized by the Minister.
[17] The best way to understand this
administrative arrangement is to compare it to the arrangement
for the administration of the Income Tax Act
("the ITA"). The ITA confers on the
"Minister" the power to assess the tax payable by a
taxpayer (section 152 of the ITA) but, in practice, this
administrative act is carried out by an official (an auditor)
authorized by the Minister. When a taxpayer wishes to contest the
assessment, he may "serve on the Minister a notice of
objection" and "the Minister
shall . . . reconsider the assessment and
vacate, confirm or vary the assessment or reassess"
(subsections 165(1) and (3) of the ITA). In practice, this
administrative act is carried out by another officer (an appeals
officer) authorized by the Minister. In administering the Act,
the authorized officer contemplated in section 90 is an auditor
and the authorized officer under section 91 is an appeals
officer. All of these authorized officers act on the
Minister's behalf. Thus, the Minister is the one who
issues the rulings contemplated by sections 90 and 91 of the
Act. Consequently, the jurisdiction of the authorized officer was
not limited to the second relevant period in the instant case.[10] He could make a
ruling with regard to the first relevant period.
[18] In my opinion, once the authorized
officer decided to make a ruling concerning the first relevant
period, and the person concerned decided to appeal the ruling to
the Minister under section 91 of the Act, the period
contemplated by the authorized officer's ruling was the
relevant period for the purposes of the section 91 appeal.
The ruling under appeal was that of the authorized officer, and
it applied not only to the second relevant period, but to the
first relevant period as well. The fact that the Minister
(appeals officer) improperly failed to examine the first relevant
period does not deprive this Court of its right of review with
regard to that period.[11]
[19] In conclusion, this Court has
jurisdiction to hear Mr. Bégin's appeal, not only
with regard to the second relevant period, but with regard to the
first one as well.
Did Mr. Bégin hold insurable employment during
the first and second relevant periods?
[20] Counsel for Mr. Bégin
submits that the employment contract, which Université
Laval renewed on June 1, 1997, for a period of five
years ending May 31, 2002, was in force for that entire
period. In her submission, the fact that Université Laval
paid compensation equivalent to the entire salary that
Mr. Bégin was entitled to receive under that
employment contract supports her argument that Université
Laval paid him a salary until May 31, 2002. In her
view, the fact that section 2 of the March 2002
agreement stipulated that Mr. Bégin's employment
contract ended on October 1, 2001, merely had the
effect of specifying Mr. Bégin's potential
pension plan rights.
[21] I am unable to subscribe to this view.
Firstly, nowhere is it stated that the clause applies only to
pension plan matters. If the parties had intended to stipulate
this, it would have been easy to do. In fact, the contrary is
true: the provision is broad is scope, stating clearly and
without reservation that the employee recognizes that his
employment ended on October 1, 2001, Moreover, the ROE
prepared by Université Laval, and sent to the Department
of Human Resources Development Canada, is consistent with the
agreement because it states that the last day of work was
September 30, 2001. The parties to the March 2002 agreement
agreed that the employment had ended, as stated in the letter of
October 1, 2001, in which the vice-rector, human
resources, unilaterally terminated Mr. Bégin's
contract. Consequently, as of that date, there was no longer an
employment contract between Université Laval and
Mr. Bégin.
[22] In fact, the demand letter that
Mr. Bégin sent, and the action commenced in Superior
Court, demand "damages", not unpaid "salary"
or "remuneration." They do not require the payment
of moneys due under the employment contract, i.e. salary,
but rather "damages" in an amount equal to what
Mr. Bégin would have been paid if the employment
contract had not ended, and other "damages" for harm
suffered. The idea that the Superior Court might set aside the
notice of termination of employment and order
Mr. Bégin reinstated in his duties was not under
discussion. Thus, he could not have held insurable employment at
the university starting October 1, 2001 (the date on
which the contractual employment relationship between the parties
ended) and during the entire second relevant period. However,
since the employment contract only ended on
October 1, 2001, there was an employment contract
between the parties from July 19, 2000, to
October 1, 2001, and, in fact, the authorized officer
properly determined that Mr. Bégin held insurable
employment from July 10, 2001, to
September 30, 2001.[12]
[23] The unpaid salary resulting from
Mr. Bégin's suspension without pay was ultimately
remitted under the March 2002 agreement. All the conditions
necessary to the existence of an employment contract were present
at that time: services, remuneration and an employer-employee
relationship. In point of fact, the services, which began in
June 1997 under the last employment contract, were suspended
at the employer's request effective February 29, 2000,
but Mr. Bégin was available to perform them. I will
come back to this issue under the next heading.
Amount of insurable earnings
[24] Under section 90 of the Act, a person
may request that an authorized officer make a ruling with regard,
inter alia, to the amount of any insurable earnings
(paragraph 90(1)(c) of the Act). In his ruling of
October 28, 2002, the authorized officer determined
that, based on paragraph 2(3)(b) of the Regulations,
the $76,000 paid under the settlement was excluded from insurable
earnings [TRANSLATION] "because it was paid as damages
stemming from the loss of your employment." As the
respondent himself acknowledges, Mr. Bégin appealed
this ruling. The Minister improperly failed to decide this
question in his decision of January 24, 2003. It is
therefore appropriate for this Court to decide it.
[25] First of all, subsection 2(1) of
the Act defines insurable employment as follows:
"insurable earnings" means the total amount of the
earnings, as determined in accordance with Part IV, that an
insured person has from insurable employment;
[26] In Part IV, entitled "Insurable
Employment and Collection of Premiums", paragraph
108(1)(g) describes the Minister's power, with the
approval of the Governor in Council, to make regulations
"for defining and determining
earnings . . . and the amount of insurable
earnings of insured persons and for allocating their earnings to
any period of insurable employment."
The relevant provisions are found in section 2 of the
Regulations.
2(1) For the purposes of the
definition "insurable earnings" in subsection 2(1) of
the Act and for the purposes of these Regulations, the total
amount of earnings that an insured person has from insurable
employment is
(a) the total
of all amounts, whether wholly or partly pecuniary, received or
enjoyed by the insured person that are paid to the person
by the person's employer in respect of that
employment, and
(b) the
amount of any gratuities that the insured person is required to
declare to the person's employer under provincial
legislation.
2(2) For the purposes of this
Part, the total amount of earnings that an insured person has
from insurable employment includes the portion of any amount of
such earnings that remains unpaid because of the employer's
bankruptcy, receivership, impending receivership or non-payment
of remuneration for which the person has filed a complaint with
the federal or provincial labour authorities, except for any
unpaid amount that is in respect of overtime or that would have
been paid by reason of termination of the employment.
2(3) For the purposes of
subsections (1) and (2), "earnings" does not
include
(a) any
non-cash benefit, other than the value of either or both of any
board or lodging enjoyed by a person in a pay period in respect
of their employment if cash remuneration is paid to the person by
their employer in respect of the pay period;
(a.1) any amount excluded as
income under paragraph 6(1)(a) or (b) or subsection 6(6) or (16)
of the Income Tax Act;
(b) a
retiring allowance;
(c) a
supplement paid to a person by the person's employer to
increase worker's compensation paid to the person by a
provincial authority;
(d) a
supplement paid to a person by the person's employer to
increase a wage loss indemnity payment made to the person by a
party other than the employer under a wage loss indemnity
plan;
(e)
supplemental unemployment benefit payment made under a
supplemental unemployment benefit plan as described in subsection
37(2) of the Employment Insurance Regulations; and
(f) a payment
made to a person by the person's employer to cover the
waiting period referred to in section 13 of the Act, or to
increase the pregnancy, parental or compassionate care benefits
payable to the person under section 22, 23 or 23.1 of the Act if
the payment meets the criteria set out in section 38 of the
Employment Insurance Regulations.
[27] An analysis of all these provisions
discloses that an employee can only derive insurable earnings
from insurable employment. Moreover, the insurable earnings must
actually have been received, subject to a few exceptions,
including cases where the earnings are unpaid because of the
employer's bankruptcy or receivership, or where the employee
has filed a complaint with the federal or provincial labour
authorities.
[28] Since there is no evidence in the
record that Université Laval had a valid reason to
terminate the employment contract before the expected term, it
could be required to pay damages for the breach of the employment
contract. The total of the amounts of $11,481 (92 x $124.79) for
the period of January 1 to May 31, 2001, and
$18,844 (151 x $124.79) for the period of
January 1 to May 31, 2002, must be considered
damages in respect of a loss of employment, and such damages
constitute a "retiring allowance" within the meaning
ascribed to that term in subsection 1(1) of the Regulations
made under the Act:
1. (1) The definitions in this subsection apply in these
Regulations.
"retiring allowance" means an amount received by
a person
(a) on or
after retirement of the person from an office or employment in
recognition of the person's long service, or
(b) in
respect of a loss of an office or employment of the person,
whether or not received as, on account or in lieu of payment
of, damages or pursuant to an order or judgment of a
competent tribunal. (allocation de retraite)
[Emphasis added.]
[29] Consequently, the portion of the
$76,000 that is attributable to the period subsequent to
September 30, 2001, namely $30,325, does not
constitute insurable earnings.
[30] As for the portion of the $76,000
attributable to the period preceding October 1, 2001,
namely $45,675 ($76,000 - $30,325), it must be regarded as unpaid
salary to which Mr. Bégin was entitled. The March
2002 agreement shows that Université Laval acknowledged,
at least implicitly, that it had not followed the appropriate
procedure to take the necessary disciplinary measures in response
to the complaint filed against Mr. Bégin, and
therefore had to pay Mr. Bégin the salary to which he
was entitled under the employment contract during the period when
"the employment relationship between Université Laval
and [its employee] continued to exist."[13] If it had had a valid reason
to suspend him without pay from July 10, 2000, to
July 10, 2001, Université Laval would not have
had to pay Mr. Bégin his salary. Hence, the
March 2002 agreement acknowledged that Mr. Bégin
was entitled to the "lost salary" for that period.
[31] Consequently, since the employment
relationship between Université Laval and
Mr. Bégin continued to exist during this period, and
since Université Laval implicitly acknowledged that it
could not justify a suspension without pay, Mr. Bégin
was entitled to his salary, and that is what he received from the
university. Although the amount corresponding to this salary was
paid after the employment terminated, it was not paid "by
reason of the termination of the employment" but rather,
"in respect of that employment" because it corresponded
to the unpaid salary for the period preceding the termination of
employment.
[32] For his part, counsel for the
respondent submits that Mr. Bégin did not hold
insurable employment during the first relevant period because he
did not perform services for the payor during that period.
Counsel relies on two decisions of the Federal Court of Appeal,
namely Élément v. Canada (Minister of
National Revenue), [1996] F.C.J. No. 718 (QL), and
Forrestall v. Canada (Minister of National
Revenue), [1996] F.C.J. No. 1638 (QL), in which it
was held that a person who is not working and is not obtaining a
salary does not hold insurable employment within the meaning of
paragraph 3(1)(a) of the Unemployment Insurance Act
(now paragraph 5(1)(a) of the Act. In my opinion,
both decisions apply here, but only in relation to the second
relevant period, because the amounts that Université Laval
paid in respect of that period constitute damages, as there was
no longer any employment contract because Université Laval
had terminated it unilaterally effective
October 1, 2001. Since no order was issued to set aside
this decision made by Université Laval, the employment
contract ended.
[33] However, Université Laval's
wrongful suspension of Mr. Bégin for a certain period
prior to October 1, 2001, did not have the effect of
terminating the employment contract. Far from it. Consequently,
the amounts that Université Laval paid
Mr. Bégin in respect of the period prior to
October 1, 2001, constitute salary that
Université Laval owed Mr. Bégin.
[34] The fact that he did not perform
services prior to October 1, 2001, does not establish
that there was no employment contract. In fact, the Federal Court
of Appeal recognized this in Université Laval,
supra. What is more, the Court confirmed that there can be
insurable earnings without services. As Décary J.A.
stated at paragraph 17 of the decision:
17 The mere fact that
subsection 2(3) of the Regulations, which deals with situations
in which the insured person does not perform any services
contains all of these items, is sufficient to reject the
employer's legal argument that there can be no insurable
earnings within the meaning of the Regulations where no services
are performed.
[35] I subscribe fully to the analysis of
Décary J.A. The fact that someone is receiving his salary
while on vacation and not working does not mean that there is no
employment contract and that the vacation pay does not constitute
earnings. The same can be said of a salary that a person on
sick leave receives from his employer, as it was held in
Université Laval.
[36] Naturally, where an employer terminates
the employment contract and pays moneys in respect of periods
subsequent to the termination, the contract no longer exists.
Consequently, the moneys paid cannot constitute salary.
[37] Since Mr. Bégin held
insurable employment until October 1, 2001, he held
insurable employment during the first relevant period. In
addition, the pay that he received in 2002, and is attributable
to the period prior to October 1, 2001, is salary and
therefore constitutes insurable earnings within the meaning of
the Regulations. As mentioned above, the amount of these
insurable earnings for the first relevant period is $55,908,
calculated as follows:
$21,839
|
-
|
July 10 to December 31, 2000
|
$23,836
|
-
|
January 1 to July 10, 2001
|
$10,233
|
-
|
July 11 to September 30, 2001
|
$55,908
|
|
|
[38] For all these reasons,
Mr. Bégin's appeal is allowed.
Mr. Bégin held insurable employment from
July 10, 2000, to September 30 2001, and his
insurable earnings during that period amounted to $55,908.[14]
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 21st day of October 2004.
Archambault J.
Translation certified true
on this 21st day of February 2005.
Jacques Deschênes, Translator