Citation: 2005CCI622
Date: 20051108
Docket: 2004-571(GST)G
BETWEEN:
LOUISELLE CLICHE,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Tardif, J.
[1] The case involves
an appeal against an assessment bearing number PQ‑2003‑7319 issued
on November 17, 2003 under the Excise Tax Act (the “Act”).
[2] The
Appellant’s notice of appeal reads as follows:
[TRANSLATION]
[...]
1. The APPELLANT
received from the Ministère du Revenu du Québec, on November 27, 2002, a
notice of assessment bearing number PQ‑2002‑6832 issued under
section 325 of the Excise Tax Act, the whole as appears from the
Notice of Assessment which will be produced and filed at the hearing of this
appeal;
2. On October 11,
1991, a marriage contract was entered into between the APPELLANT and her spouse,
André Parent (hereinafter “Mr. Parent”) before Mtre. Andrée Rancourt,
Notary, pursuant to which Mr. Parent made a gift inter vivos to the APPELLANT
of the sum of forty thousand dollars ($40,000.00), which sum was liquid and
exigible upon the celebration of the marriage, the whole as appears from the
marriage contract which will be produced and filed at the hearing of this
appeal;
3. On June 9,
1999, Mr. Parent made a gift to the APPELLANT of an immovable serving as a
primary residence whose value was estimated by the parties at fifty-nine
thousand and ten dollars ($59,010.00), the whole as appears from a copy of the
deed of sale which will be produced and filed at the hearing of this appeal;
4. Under the terms
of said gift, the APPELLANT assumed the balance of the mortgage loan in
principal and interest, and a part of the sum owing pursuant to the gift by
marriage contract was applied to said gift, the whole as appears from the
marriage contract which will be produced and filed at the hearing of this
appeal;
5. On February 17,
2000, Mr. Parent made a gift to the APPELLANT of a lot adjacent to the
residence whose value was estimated by the parties at seven thousand eight
hundred and seventy-five dollars ($7,875.00), the whole as appears from the
copy of the gift contract which will be produced and filed at the hearing of
this appeal;
6. Under the terms
of said gift, the balance owing to the APPELLANT pursuant to the gift by
marriage contract was also applied to said gift, the whole as appears from the
gift contract which will be produced and filed at the hearing of this appeal;
7. On
December 8, 2000, Mr. Parent made an assignment of his property and Roy,
Métivier, Roberge, syndics, was appointed trustee of the assets of
Mr. Parent’s bankruptcy, the whole as appears from the extract from the
Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy which will be produced and filed at
the hearing of this appeal;
8. Following the
assignment of Mr. Parent’s property, discussions were held between the trustee
and the APPELLANT to the effect that the gifts of June 9, 1999 and of February
17, 2000 may not be set up against him, the whole as appears from the exchanged
letters which will be produced and filed at the hearing of this appeal;
9. Following said
discussions, the APPELLANT agreed to pay the sum of one thousand five hundred
dollars ($1,500.00) for the residence and two thousand dollars ($2,000.00) for
the land, the whole as appears from the transactions entered into which will be
produced and filed at the hearing of this appeal;
10. The
Canada Customs and Revenue Agency was informed of each of the transactions
entered into, the whole as appears from the letters sent which will be produced
and filed at the hearing of this appeal;
11. Following said
transactions, the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency chose not to assess
the APPELLANT, the whole as appears from a letter dated September 30, 2002
produced in support of this appeal;
12. Nevertheless,
the Ministère du Revenu du Québec assessed the APPELLANT on the grounds
that she received a benefit in consideration of the transfer of two (2) immovables
by her spouse in her favour and that she is jointly and severally liable for
the sums owning to the RESPONDENT by her husband up to the amount of the
benefit received;
13. The APPELLANT is
assessed on said basis for the sum of two thousand nine hundred and twenty four
dollars and thirty-three cents ($2,924.33) as appears from Notice of Assessment
PQ-2002-6832 which will be produced and filed at the hearing of this appeal.
14. On January 16,
2003, the APPELLANT filed against the aforementioned Notice of Assessment an
objection in due form accompanied by a schedule, the whole as appears from the
objection and the schedule thereto which will be produced and filed at the
hearing of this appeal;
15. On
November 17, 2003, Mtre. Nathalie Lachance, attorney at the Direction
des oppositions, rendered her decision on said notice of objection by
ordering the issuing of a new Notice of Assessment PQ-2003-7319 dated November
17, 2003 for a total amount of two thousand eight hundred and eighty-six
dollars and eleven cents ($2,886.11) in order to take into account a dividend
paid by the trustee, while declaring said assessment valid under the provisions
of the Excise Tax Act, the whole as appears from the objection decision
and the new Notice of Assessment which will be produced and filed at the
hearing of this appeal;
16. The APPELLANT
intends to show that Mtre. Nathalie Lachance manifestly erred in fact
and in law by not feeling bound in any way by the decision of the Canada
Customs and Revenue Agency not to assess the Appellant in respect of the
transfers of immovables in her favour by Mr. Parent, the whole as will be more
fully demonstrated at the hearing of this appeal;
[3] In his reply to the
Notice of Appeal, the Deputy Attorney General of Canada stated that he made the
following assumptions of fact:
[TRANSLATION]
a) On July 8,
1999, André Parent, who was indebted to Her Majesty in right of Canada for the sum of $5,977.92 under the Excise Tax
Act, transferred gratuitously the building and land located at 66 du Pont Avenue West in Saint-Martin, Beauce county, province of Quebec, to the Appellant, otherwise than at arm’s
length.
b) On February 17,
2000, André Parent transferred gratuitously to the Appellant vacant land
described as follows:
“a parcel of land located in the municipality
of Saint-Martin, Beauce South, known and designated as being a PART of lot NINE
B (P.9B) range one (rg.1) in the plan and book of reference for the cadastre of
Shenley North Township, Beauce county and registration division.”
c) According to the
Respondent’s appraiser, at the time of the gratuitous assignment of July 8,
1999, the building located at 66 du Pont Avenue West
in Saint-Martin, Beauce county, had a fair market value of $49,000.00 and the land,
$11,000.00, for a total amount of $60,000.00.
d) In addition,
according to the Respondent’s appraiser, at the time of the gratuitous assignment
of February 17, 2000, the assigned lot described as follows:
“a parcel of land located in the
municipality of Saint-Martin, Beauce South, known and designated as being a
PART of lot NINE B (P.9B) range one (rg.1) in the plan and book of reference
for the cadastre of Shenley North Township, Beauce county and
registration division.”
had a fair
market value of $11,000.00.
e) The Respondent
therefore determined that the Appellant, at the time of the transfer, had been
unduly benefited for the sum of $71,000.00
f) On November
27, 2002, the Respondent assessed the Appellant for a sum of $2,924.33 under
section 325 of the Excise Tax Act so that she would become jointly and
severally liable for André Parent’s debt to the extent of the benefit received.
g) Said amount was
established by considering the benefit received by the Appellant in proportion
to the debts owed by André Parent at the time of the transfer under the tax
laws of Quebec and under the Excise Tax Act.
[4] The Deputy Attorney
General finally maintained that:
[TRANSLATION]
a) The Appellant
is the spouse of Mr. André Parent as admitted and is a person dealing otherwise
than at arm’s length with the tax debtor.
b) The land as
well as the building transferred to the Appellant had a fair market value of
$71,000.00 at the time of the transfers.
c) The Appellant
acquired a building and land from André Parent for a consideration less than
their fair market value, thereby deriving a benefit to the detriment of the Respondent’s
rights.
d) The
transactions of February 9, 2001 and July 19, 2001 entered into between the
trustee and the Appellant to settle the trustee’s claims as part of the
bankruptcy of Appellant’s spouse do not nullify the Appellant’s liability under
section 325 of the Excise Tax Act.
e) In addition, the
Respondent never intervened in the negotiations of the transactions of February
9, 2001 and July 19, 2001 with the trustee and the Appellant.
[5] The Respondent
formulated the issue as follows:
a) What
was the fair market value of the building and land transferred by the tax
debtor, André Parent, to the Appellant at the time of the assignments of July
8, 1999 and July 17, 2000?
b) Was
there a consideration given by Appellant at the time of the assignments?
c) Is
the Respondent bound by the transactions of February 9, 2001 and July 19, 2001
made by the trustee in the bankruptcy of André Parent and the Appellant?
[6] First, I will
answer the question as to whether the gift provided in the marriage contract
entered into on October 11, 1991 by the Appellant and her spouse,
André Parent, constitutes an estoppel as to the assessment. In other
words, is the Appellant justified in asserting to the Respondent that the immovables
of which she became the owner at the time of the transfers of February 9, 2001
and July 19, 2001 were assigned to her in accordance with the gift provided in
the marriage contract and therefore maintaining that an equal if not greater
consideration was given?
[7] The Respondent
maintains that such a gift may not be set up against her and that,
consequently, it cannot be taken into account as valuable consideration at the
time of the transfers of February 9, 2001 and July 19, 2001.
[8] It is therefore
important to analyze the clause provided in the marriage contract concerning
the gift so as to determine its effects on the transfers that are the basis for
the assessment under appeal.
[9] The Appellant
maintains that the gift provided in the marriage contract is such that she did
not enjoy any enrichment as a result of the transfers of February 9, 2001 and
July 19, 2001 because it was essentially a transaction made in accordance with
the gift provided in the marriage contract.
[10] According to the Appellant,
the gift was essentially the performance of the obligation that her spouse had
contracted as part of the marriage many years earlier, i.e. on October 11,
1991; she claims that the gift may be set up against the Respondent in that it
establishes good and valuable consideration for the property obtained at the
time of the two transfers. Consequently, according to the Appellant, the
assessment is erroneous in fact and in law.
[11] The issue of whether
a gift provided in a marriage contract may be set up and of the consequences of
such gift was considered in Furfaro-Siconolfi
v. Her Majesty The Queen, 89 DTC 5519. In this decision,
the Honourable Judge Pinard of the Federal Court of Canada made a highly pertinent
analysis of the issue.
[12] As a result of his
analysis, the Honourable Judge Pinard held that such a gift, if it was a genuine gift, had to be taken into
consideration. Following that decision, the courts have since taken into
consideration transfers of property made pursuant to a gift when they had to
examine an assessment based on section 160 of the Income Tax Act.
[13] The Honourable Judge Pinard thus concluded
that a gift inter vivos in the amount of $30,000 provided in the
marriage contract entered into between the Appellant and her spouse made said
sum exempt from the application of section 160 of the Income Tax Act. In
other words, it was a consideration that had to be taken into account.
[14] In Furfaro-Siconolfi, the marriage contract was signed on
September 2, 1977 and the transfer of the sum in dispute took place on October
10, 1980, while the appellant’s spouse owed the respondent a sum of $18,349.47.
The clause of the marriage contract in question read as follows:
“The First Party shall … and furthermore donates unto his said
future wife hereto present and accepting:
a)
the sum of THIRTY THOUSAND DOLLARS ($30,000) to
be paid at any time during the said marriage as he sees fit, the First Party
hereby constituting himself debtor of the Second Party to the extent of the
said sum. The donor, however, reserves the right at any time, to pay the
whole or any part of the said sum either in cash or by the transfer or
property, moveable or immoveable. Should the said sum not have been paid during
the existence of the marriage, and he predeceases her, she shall have the right
to demand payment of this sum or the part thereof unpaid or unsatisfied from
his succession.”
[My emphasis.]
[15] The issue, then, was
to determine the time of the transfer of the property that was the subject of
the gift provided in the marriage contract, in order to establish when the
transfer of ownership took place.
[16] In paragraph 14 of his decision, Pinard J.
wrote:
“In light of the foregoing definitions, I consider that
the transfer of ownership contemplated by s. 160 of the Act is a simple
transfer of ownership, without it being necessary for the recipient to have
possession of the thing or object the ownership of which is thus transferred.
In a precise definition, the Income Tax Act recognizes that “property”
includes a right of any kind whatever, and consequently the right of ownership
of a thing. In legal terms, it is established that transferring the right of
ownership of a thing, as for example in a sale or gift, does not necessarily
imply immediate surrender of that thing.”
[17] On the basis of article 777 of the Civil Code of Lower
Canada, which governed gifts inter vivos, Pinard J. held that “there
is no doubt that Eligio Siconolfi irrevocably undertook to be a debtor.
There was divestiture within the meaning of art. 777 of the Civil Code of Lower Canada.”
[18] According to Pinard J., there was a gift of present
property and not a gift of future property. He concluded by affirming that
“there was a genuine transfer of ownership, and so a transfer of property
within the meaning of s. 160 of the Income Tax Act on the date the
marriage contract was signed, namely September 2, 1977.” He therefore held that
“[s]ection 160 of the Act […] cannot have any effect against the plaintiff with
respect to any tax debt of the late Eligio Siconolfi on September 2,
1977.”
[19] Does the principle
developed by Pinard J. in Furfaro-Siconolfi
apply to this case? To answer this question, we must analyze the nature of the
gift provided in the Appellant’s marriage contract. Was it a genuine gift? Did
the gift have all the necessary characteristics to constitute a genuine gift?
[20] The marriage
contract between the Appellant
and her spouse contains the following clause:
[translation]
“In consideration of the collaboration of the future
wife in the convenience and petroleum products store operated by the future
husband in Saint-Martin in the years previous to the marriage, when the future
wife did not have a salary proportional to her work, the future husband makes a
gift inter vivos and in full ownership, as of the wedding, to the future
wife, who accepts, of a sum of FORTY THOUSAND DOLLARS ($40,000.00), and said
sum shall become exigible immediately if a judgment of separation from bed and
board or of divorce is pronounced between the spouses by a court of competent
jurisdiction.
The future husband reserves the right, however, to pay said sum, in
whole or in part, at any time during the marriage, either in money or by surender
to the future spouse of movable or immovable property.
In the event that the future wife predeceases the future husband,
the aforementioned gift shall be revoked. Consequently, the representatives of
the future wife will not be able to demand the performance thereof.”
[My emphasis.]
[21] Given the reserve at
the end of the clause that provides for the gift, there is a fundamental
difference between the gift in the case at hand and the gift in Furfaro‑Siconolfi. Indeed, the reserve creates a suspensive
condition; the divestiture required by article 777 C.C.L.C. did not
take place.
[22] The Court therefore
cannot take Furfaro‑Siconolfi into consideration in the present case
because the gifts involved are not similar.
[23] What about the
distinction between the two gifts? The Civil Code of Lower Canada provided
as follows:
777. It is essential to gifts intented [sic] to
take effect inter vivos that the donor should actually divest himself of
his ownership in the thing given. […]
[24] It is useful to cite
here an excerpt from a book written by Jean Pineau, Danielle Burman and Serge Gaudet. They wrote
the following concerning suspensive conditions:
[translation]
“A suspensive condition suspends not only the performance
of the obligation, but also its formation. The now classic example we
find in Mazeau is the following: “I will buy your horse if he wins the race.”
[…]
[25] Upon reading the
clause, one notes that there is no genuine obligation or irrevocable divestiture on the part of the
donor; indeed, the gift provided in the marriage contract on October 11, 1991
cannot be regarded as a gift inter vivos because there was a suspensive
condition.
[26] Since irrevocable
divestiture is an imperative condition of the gift inter vivos provided
in article 777 C.C.L.C., the
clause of the marriage contract of which the Appellant was the beneficiary is
void against the assessment under appeal, given the absence of such essential
condition.
[27] Furfaro-Siconolfi therefore does not apply to the present
case. I conclude that the Appellant’s right provided in the marriage contract
does not constitute a consideration as part of the transfer of property at the
time of the transactions of February 9, 2001 and July 19, 2001.
[28] For these reasons, the
Appellant cannot claim that the transfers of property of which she was the
beneficiary were part of the performance of the obligation provided in her
marriage contract and thus claim that the transfers were performed in
consideration of property whose value was equal to, if not greater than, the
value of the property transferred on July 8, 1999 and February 17, 2000.
[29] As for the second
issue, it consists in determining the FMV at the time of the transfers. Each
party submitted the testimony of an expert witness, who came to very different
conclusions.
[30] The Appellant’s
expert maintained that the fair market value (“FMV”) of the two immovables that
were transferred on July 8, 1999 and February 17, 2000 was as follows:
FMV of the land: $10,000
FMV of the building
(residence) $36,000
Total: $46,000
[31] The Respondent’s
expert made the following appraisal of the same properties:
FMV of the land
(Lot 9B-2, 9B-part): $22,000
FMV of the
building (residence) $49,000
Total: $71,000
[32] The Appellant’s
expert said that he spent 6 to 8 hours, including a visit to the sites, on the
preparation of his report. Despite the fact that few hours were spent on the
appraisal, it appeared from the testimony of the Appellant’s expert that he had
used an impressive amount of data, particularly as regards relevant comparable
sales.
[33] The Appellant’s
expert also said that as part of his appraisal, he consulted a contractor who
had to do some work on the residence that the expert had to appraise.
[34] The Appellant’s
expert also consulted a real estate agent who had knowledge of the value of the
residences located in the area.
[35] Said consultations
with the building contractor did not reveal the exact nature and details of the
work to be done. Was the work major and essential? Was the work done and at
what cost? All these questions remained unanswered.
[36] Three problems
affecting the FMV of the residence were mentioned: a crack in the foundation,
an access door to the residence and the roof of the car shelter. Although these
were relatively major deficiencies, the evidence in this regard was rather
summary and incomplete, to the point where I find it impossible to draw
reasonable conclusions as to how much said deficiencies decreased the overall
value of the property.
[37] After discussing at
length the three problems requiring major repairs, whose cost was not
established, the expert depreciated the building significantly because of
obsolescence, thus giving the impression that he had made a double depreciation.
[38] As for the land, the
Appellant’s expert took a peculiar approach. There was in fact a comparable
sale in the immediate vicinity of the residence transferred but, despite the
obvious relevance of that sale, Mr. Robert Plante did not take it into
account.
[39] The Appellant’s
expert used a comparable sale of average quality and then lowered the value on
the grounds that the lot being appraised is located on a street with heavy
traffic.
[40] However, one of the
lots, adjoining the lot on said street, was located on an ordinary street. The Appellant’s
expert lowered the value of this second lot as well, considering both lots as a
whole.
[41] To arrive at an
amount per square foot, the Appellant’s expert again used a series of
considerations without justification which, for the most part, were essentially
arbitrary.
[42] His work appearing
to be more elaborate because of a multitude of figures and details, the Appellant’s
expert, Mr. Robert Plante, indicated to the Court that he had spent 6 to 8
hours visiting the sites, consulting with persons who had definite knowledge
(contractor and real estate agent) and preparing the report.
[43] Mr. Plante clearly
could not present to the Court that which the time spent certainly did not
allow him to do. He did his job according to professional standards, but there
were certain shortcomings as regards their application. I found it very
surprising, for example, that the Appellant’s expert did not use certain
comparable sales, including a sale of land whose relevance was obvious.
[44] The main problem
with Mr. Plante’s appraisal is all the adjustments and all the weightings whose
relevance was not demonstrated.
[45] The usefulness and
quality of a comparable sale lies in its comparability. If numerous adjustments
and weightings are applied to a comparable sale, it is no longer a true
comparable sale but rather artificial data that are of no use. Such comparable
sales give the impression that the expert made a series of convoluted
calculations to make relevant that which, at the outset, was not.
[46] Comparables
requiring so many adjustments or weightings to qualify as relevant comparable
sales become useless benchmarks because they are not true comparable sales.
Consequently, the comparable sales that the Appellant’s expert includes in his
report must be disregarded.
[47] I cannot accept the
conclusions of Appellant’s expert, who made a whole series of adjustments whose
relevance was not clear and which were not adequately justified; what’s more,
some of the percentages used were essentially arbitrary.
[48] The percentages and
the different amounts used as part of the weighting seem to have served only to
reduce as much as possible the FMV of the property that Mr. Plante was given
the mandate to appraise.
[49] I conclude that the
expert expended most of his energies identifying all the factors that would
enable him to come up with the lowest possible FMV. The efforts made to achieve
this goal were such that the conclusion arrived at is simply unreasonable. For
these reasons, I cannot accept the value ascertained by the Appellant’s expert.
[50] As far as the Respondent’s
expert, Gilles Vézina, is concerned, he did a good job appraising the
property using highly relevant comparable sales: three transactions involving land
located nearby, two of which were transferred relatively recently.
[51] The quality of the
comparable sales, particularly as regards the appraisal of vacant land, is a
crucial factor. When the land in question is in proximity to the land being
appraised and when two or three comparable sales are available, the results
obtained are very meaningful and practically unassailable, especially if the
transactions involving said land took place at a date quite close to the date
of the property appraisal.
[52] I therefore accept
the appraisal of the lots made by the Respondent’s expert and I conclude that
the land had a FMV of $22,000 at the time of the transfer.
Residence
[53] As far as the
residence is concerned, both experts came to almost identical conclusions as to
the replacement cost, namely $95,500 for the Appellant’s expert and $92,400 for
the Respondent’s expert. The big difference in the final result is essentially
due to the approach used to calculate depreciation.
[54] After calculating
the depreciation, the Appellant’s expert, Robert Plante, established the value
of the building at $36,559 and the Respondent’s expert, Gilles Vézina,
determined it to be $49,000.
[55] Generally speaking, the
Respondent’s expert used the same approaches as Appellant’s expert, the
comparable sales approach and the replacement cost approach, weighted by
certain factors, including the condition of the building at the time of the
transaction, specifically its obsolescence due to the fact that it was built in
1974.
[56] Although the methods
were the same, the results were substantially different. The Respondent’s
expert used a very simple and clear approach while producing a result that can
be called reasonable.
[57] He simply did the
following equation: replacement cost, $92,400 (amount very close to the one
used by the Appellant’s expert), which he reduced by 50%, representing the
percentage of obsolescence established according to the age of the building.
[58] The residence was
built in 1974. The life of such a building was established, according to
standard practices, at 75 years. Using these data, the Respondent’s expert
arrived at an obsolescence percentage of 50%, which he applied to the
replacement cost.
[59] Although Mr.
Vézina’s work had the merit of being simple, it was incomplete because he did
not visit the inside of the residence that is the subject of the dispute,
although he knew that the Appellant or her representatives maintained that a
major crack affected the foundation of the residence.
[60] Mr. Vézina was
refused the right to visit the inside of the building and was limited to
examining the outside.
[61] At the hearing, the Appellant
mentioned the fact that Mr. Vézina’s work was incomplete. This is
definitely a valid grievance. However, in its assessment of the facts, the
Court must take into account the behaviour of the Appellant and her husband,
who refused to allow Mr. Vézina to visit the premises. The refusal to allow Mr.
Vézina access to the premises may be due to the fact that the crack in question
was not as significant as alleged or did not affect the solidity of the
building as much as was claimed.
[62] On the other hand,
given the situation, the Respondent could have very well obtained a court order
enjoining the Appellant to allow the premises to be visited and examined.
[63] In light of the
evidence, I am allowing for additional depreciation of $5,000 over and above
the depreciation calculated by Mr. Vézina, which brings the value of the
building to $44,000, i.e. $49,000 minus $5,000, to which is added the value of
the land, i.e. $22,000. Consequently, I hold that the FMV of the transferred property
was $66,000.
[64] Appraising is not an
exact science. It is an exercise governed by certain rules, and appraisers
generally know very well that different appraisals of the same property are
primarily due to appraisers’ use of comparables, to which they apply various
weighting and adjustments that enable them to influence the result
considerably.
[65] In this regard, I
fully agree that a comparable sale is no longer a comparable sale if many
adjustments must be made to use it as a comparable sale.
[66] It is difficult to
begin with to assess the quality of an appraisal done by an expert, since the
various approaches that can be taken allow for the use of different data, hence
the importance of avoiding arbitrariness as much as possible.
[67] This is also true
for the comparable sales that an expert does or does not take into account.
Because of possible shortcomings in this regard, the quality of an appraisal
must be based not only on the use of generally accepted appraisal practices,
but also on reasonability and common sense.
[68] Consequently, I hold
that the appraisal done by the Appellant’s expert, Mr. Plante, was tainted by
the manifest desire to obtain the lowest possible FMV. The fact that his
appraisal was conducted with this goal in mind discredits the work he did.
[69] I therefore accept
the FMV established by the Respondent’s expert, Mr. Vézina, from which I am
arbitrarily deducting an amount $5,000 because he did not visit the inside of
the building to ascertain the condition of the premises and to verify the
seriousness of the much-discussed crack in the foundation.
[70] It would have been
desirable for the parties concerned to authorize the Respondent’s expert to
visit the premises if the inside of the building needed many costly repairs.
[71] The burden of proof
was on the Appellant and the evidence submitted as to the seriousness of the
interior defects did not allow me to draw solid conclusions. I therefore
establish the applicable amount at $5,000, bringing the value of the property
transferred on July 8, 1999 and February 17, 2000 to $66,000.
[72] For all of these
reasons, I hold that the assessment was well-founded in fact and in law and I
dismiss the appeal, with costs in favour of the Respondent.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this
8th day of November 2005.
“Alain Tardif”
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