Citation: 2006TCC647
2006-1078(EI)
2006-1080(CPP)
BETWEEN:
MELANIE CHARLMERS,
Appellant,
and
THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL REVENUE,
Respondent.
CERTIFICATION OF TRANSCRIPT OF
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Let the attached
certified transcript of my Reasons for Judgment delivered orally from the Bench
at Hamilton, Ontario, on August 23, 2006, be filed, subject to corrections on
pages 3, 5, 8, 9.
“N. Weisman”
Signed in Toronto,
Ontario on this 2nd day of December 2006.
Citation:
2006TCC647
Court File Nos. 2006-1078(EI)
2006-1080(CPP)
TAX
COURT OF CANADA
IN
RE: the Income Tax Act
BETWEEN:
MELANIE
CHALMERS
Appellant
-
and -
HER
MAJESTY THE QUEEN
Respondent
HEARD BEFORE THE
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE WEISMAN
at
the John Sopinka Court House,
45
Main Street East,
Hamilton,
Ontario
on
Wednesday, August 23, 2006 at 3:45 p.m.
APPEARANCES:
Ms M. Chalmers for
the Appellant
Mr. P. Torchetti for
the Respondent
Also Present:
Mr. Colin Nethercut Court
Registrar
Ms Donna Sloan Court
Reporter
A.S.A.P.
Reporting Services Inc. © 2006
200 Elgin
Street, Suite 1004 130 King Street West, Suite 1800
Ottawa,
Ontario K2P 1L5 Toronto, Ontario M5X 1E3
(613)
564-2727 (416) 861-8720
Hamilton,
Ontario
---Upon commencing after submissions on
Wednesday, August 23, 2006 at 3:45 p.m.
JUSTICE WEISMAN: I have heard four appeals
today, two each by Melanie Chalmers and Gerald Smerdon against assessments by
the Ministry of National Revenue, of Canada Pension Plan contributions and
employment insurance premiums. Before proceeding further, having mentioned the
name Smerdon, I will amend the style of cause which incorrectly has his name
spelled S-M-E-R-D-E-N. We have heard in the evidence that it's to be
S-M-E-R-D-O-N.
Mr. Smerdon's assessments relate
to work he did for Melanie Chalmers in the years 2004 and 2005. His complaint
is that he was paid by the Workplace Safety and Insurance Board, hereinafter
called WSIB, and his understanding is that WSIB payments were exempt from source
deductions in his hands. Ms Chalmers' position is that the DHL pool of 14
runners that did the manual labour of loading and unloading her truck in the
years 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005 when she was injured were all either employees
of DHL or independent contractors and were therefore responsible for their own
source deductions.
For the record the 14 workers,
hereinafter called the runners, are Gerald Smerdon, Jack Bachensky, Elizabeth
Bashford, Brian W. J. Ensor, Frank Farago, James John Robert Forbes, Karen
Kearns, Elizabeth Kirchoefel, Donna M. Phillips, Sharon Ratzlaff, Dorothy M.
Smith, Devin Staples, Trevar Staples and Mark Vance.
It has been agreed by all parties
present that all four appeals would be heard on common evidence.
In order to resolve the issues
before the court the total relationship between the parties and the combined
force of the whole scheme of operations must be considered in order to resolve
the central or fundamental question as to whether the runners were performing
their services for Ms Chalmers on their own account or performing them in the
capacity of employees of hers. To this end, the evidence in this matter must
be subjected to the four-in-one test laid down as guidelines by the Federal
Court of Appeal in Wiebe Door Services Limited v. The Minister of National
Revenue which is cited at 87 Dominion Tax Cases, 5025 as confirmed in 671122
Ontario Limited v. Sagaz Industries Canada Incorporated, [2001] 2
Supreme Court Reports 983 in the Supreme Court of Canada, and Precision Gutters
Limited v. Canada, [2002] F.C.J., No. 771 in the Federal Court of
Appeal.
The four elements of the
guidelines originally set out in Wiebe Door Services are control, ownership of
tools, chance of profit and risk of loss. Adverting first to the control
element, I have heard viva voce evidence from witnesses which establishes that
Melanie Chalmers supervised the runners. She admits this on page three of her
notice of appeal dated April 10, 2006. This, however, is not always an
admission of control. The Federal Court of Appeal in Charbonneau v. The
Minister of National Revenue, [1996] F.C.J., No. 1337 says
"Monitoring the result must not be confused with controlling the
worker". And, again, "In terms of control the court should not
confuse control over the result or quality of the work with control over its
performance by the worker responsible for doing it".
In the matter before me, the
nature of the courier business and DHL's requirements imposed substantial
controls over Ms Chalmers and her runners. She had to pick up her freight by
7:30 or 8:00 in the morning, had to return it to the warehouse by 6:00 or 7:00
in the evening in order to catch the line haul truck that would take the
freight onward to the next step in its journey. In addition, there were
specific deliveries that had time constraints such as the Fonthill delivery
that required Ms Chalmers and the runner to be there by 10:30 in the morning.
In addition, all the runners were selected from the DHL pool, they were all
experienced, and there is no evidence that Ms Chalmers controlled the handling
and operation of the Orbit scanner. And, therefore, I am not satisfied that
control over these runners has been established on the evidence.
Another element of control
mentioned in the cases is subordination. Again, Charbonneau to which I have
already alluded, talks about there being a relationship of subordination
between an employer and an employee that is not characteristic of the
relationship between an independent contractor and one of his or her customers.
In the matter before me, the
runners work along with Ms Chalmers in her truck and were supervised by her.
There was no evidence that they were free to come and go as they pleased as
would an independent contractor. So, the subordination factor tends to
indicate that these 14 runners were employees. So, while there was no direct
control and the main control was by virtue of the requirements of the courier
industry itself, I do find there was a degree of subordination by these 14
runners to Ms Chalmers which would tend to point towards their being employees
rather than independent contractors.
Generally, I find that the runners
were subject to the same time constraints as was Ms Chalmers and she, in my
view, was clearly an independent contractor and my view was fortified by the
case put before us by the Minister, Mayne Nickless Transport v. The Minister of
National Revenue, [1999] T.C.J., No. 132 by my brother, Justice Porter.
She clearly had a chance of profit, risk of loss and a financial investment in
a vehicle despite the various controls imposed both by DHL and by the nature of
the courier industry.
So, generally, aside from the
subordination issue I don't find that the control factor indicates strongly one
way or another that these 14 runners were either employees or independent
contractors, and I conclude that the control factor is not probative.
Which brings me to the second
test, which is tools. It is clear that the Orbit scanner was provided by DHL
to Ms Chalmers and then to the runners, and that is a necessary tool of the
job. The runners wore DHL uniforms, and I have evidence that even the
workboots were provided in, I would say, most cases. Originally the evidence
was that the steel boots were provided only to those runners who were also
employees of DHL. But then we got the evidence of James Forbes who was a
runner, but was not someone who worked in the DHL warehouse and he was provided
with steel-toed boots. It wasn't clear to him who provided them, who paid for
them, but he didn't. The evidence is that the runners supplied no tools at
all, and therefore the tools factor indicates that they were employees.
The Minister, in passing, invited
me to find that the truck was a necessary tool provided by Ms Chalmers and I
decline to adopt that suggestion. It is true the truck was a necessary means
of transportation from site to site, but these runners were not
owner/operators; they were merely manual labourers in my view in the truck, and
I would analogize their position to workers who work in the DHL warehouse. It
cannot be said that the warehouse was a tool. And, similarly, I do not find
that the truck was a tool that was necessary for the worker; the worker was
working in the truck and the truck took him from site to site. But aside from
the truck the rest of the evidence with reference to tools indicates that the
runners were, indeed, employees.
Chance of profit. All the runners
were paid $130 per hour (sic) whether the day was short or the day was long.
The evidence is that they couldn't profit by selecting another runner from
DHL's pool and paying them $100 and keep the $30 because anyone in the pool
could do the same work for $130 a day. So, I do not see any chance for any of
the runners to profit by initiative, enterprise and good management; they would
still get the $130 whether they finished early or finished late. There was a
suggestion by the appellant that if they finished early they could take on
other work and thereby profit, but I find that there is no guarantee of
finishing early on a regular enough basis that they could commit themselves to
other employment, and in the second place the evidence of Mr. Kis was that if DHL
found that they were not getting their money's worth at $130 a day because
people were regularly finishing early, they would review the situation and make
any necessary changes to maximize efficiency.
So, I find that these runners had
no incentive for profit and no chance of profit, which indicates that they were
employees and not independent contractors.
So far as risk of loss is
concerned, they had no expenses, and even if some of them did provide their own
workboots that's a matter of something like, I believe the evidence was, $130
which is not a significant expense. More importantly, they had no
responsibility for any goods that they inadvertently damaged or any missed or
late deliveries and accordingly they had no risk of loss. And the evidence is
that an independent contractor is responsible for damages that he does, but an
employee normally gets his regular pay if he makes mistakes and he does not
have to fix on his own time and at his own expense. So, with there being no
risk of loss this factor also indicates that these 14 runners were employees.
The cases do talk about
integration but not in the sense, or it is not relevant in the sense as
discussed by counsel for the Minister. There is something that I call cultural
integration. In other words, the cases talk about integration in two ways, and
the case of Rousselle v. The Minister of National Revenue [1990], F.C.J., No.
990 in the Federal Court of Appeal, talks about "Their weeks of
work were not in any way integrated into or co-ordinated with the operations of
the company paying them". And, so, it is relevant as to whether or not
the worker was integrated in a cultural sense into the operations of the
business. And here we have these workers required to wear DHL uniforms, and
the strict time requirements, they have a DHL scanner. In my view, this is
cultural integration and they were employees.
Devin Staples was a witness and he
is in a slightly different situation from the other 13 because in the five
weeks that he worked for Ms Chalmers he actually drove her truck and he
received $160 a day rather than 130, and the question becomes was he an
independent contractor and not an employee. But his evidence is very clear
that he is an hourly paid employee of DHL to this very day. In the five weeks
that he performed Ms Chalmers' function, he was supplied with the main tool
which was the truck. So, in his case the truck is of great relevance. Also,
he had no expenses, even gas was reimbursed. So, receiving $160 a day to cover
Ms Chalmers' route, he clearly had no chance of profit or risk of loss. She
hired him at $160 a day to replace her, and I therefore find that he was an
employee just like all the 13 other people who were strictly runners.
And Mr. Smerdon himself was one of
the 14 runners, and he was an employee of Ms Chalmers just like the rest. The
four-in-one test applies to him equally as with the other ones, and therefore
he is responsible for Canada Pension contributions and Employment Insurance
premiums. Again, I do not find that he was an independent contractor in
business on his own account.
Ms Chalmers' notice of appeal
suggests that the 14 runners were employees of DHL, in addition to her
submission today that they were independent contractors, and that either DHL or
the WSIB used her as a conduit to pay the runners. This is of interest because
there is an argument to be made that these runners were employees of DHL. In
the first place, they were selected from a pool maintained and trained by DHL.
They were wearing DHL uniforms. They were mostly supplied with boots by DHL
and with the Orbit scanner. DHL set the rate of pay, and it was the source of
the funds to pay them. On the other hand, there is no evidence before the
court of any contract of service between DHL and the 14 runners in their
capacity as runners; they were certainly employees in the warehouse.
There is evidence of a contract of
service between these 14 runners and Melanie Chalmers: she was the one who
actually paid them; they worked under her supervision; the original source of
funds might have been DHL or WSIB but that is not determinative of the issue;
and of importance, if one peruses her April 10, 2006 notice of appeal in three
separate places she admits that she engaged the runners. On page two I quote
"I was required to engage the services of a runner". Same page,
"....so that I could afford to engage the services of a runner to assist
me". And on page six she says "If I decided to terminate my
relationship with a particular runner...." In my view the evidence is
clear that she was the employer of the 14 runners.
I certainly understand Ms
Chalmers' grievance, but it is all in the way that it has been arranged and
organized and imposed upon her by DHL. Generally, I find that the tools
factor, the chance of profit factor, the risk of loss factor and the
subordination factor indicate that the 14 runners were employees under
contracts of service with Melanie Chalmers, the appellant. Cases such as Sagaz
Industries and Precision Gutters require me to ask what business, if any, the
worker, and in this case workers, were in on their own account and the factors
to be considered are the degree of financial risks taken, whether they hire
their own helpers, the degree of responsibility for investment. All these
factors describe Ms Chalmers' situation and not the 14 runners in any way. I
can find no business that they were carrying on in their own right, and that is
fortified, as I have already said, by Justice Porter's conclusion in Mayne
Nickless Transport.
I find that the 14 runners were
employees of Ms Chalmers when they functioned as her runners.
The law is that the burden is on
the appellant, and in this case the appellants, to demolish the assumptions
contained in the Minister's reply to the notice of appeal. Both appellants
have failed to do so. In the result, I find that all four assessments were
objectively reasonable and accordingly the assessments will be confirmed and
the appeals will be dismissed.
I appreciate the assistance of
everybody here today. Thank you.
--- Whereupon the hearing concluded.
I HEREBY
CERTIFY THAT I have, to the best
of my
skill and ability, accurately recorded
by Shorthand
and transcribed therefrom, the
foregoing
proceeding.
Donna
Sloan