Citation: 2008 TCC 600
Date: 20081114
Docket: 2007-2603(EI)
BETWEEN:
ROD ROY SKI SCHOOLS LTD.,
Appellant,
and
THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL REVENUE,
Respondent.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
McArthur J.
[1]
This appeal is from a
decision of the Minister of National Revenue that 10 individual workers
were employed by the Appellant in insurable employment, for various periods from
January 1, 2004 to December 31, 2005. An officer of the Appellant, Douglas Roy, as well as four
others testified for the Appellant, and the auditor, Jean-Pierre Houle, along
with two others testified for the Respondent. Including the 10 individuals
referred to in this appeal, I believe that approximately 100 workers are affected
by the Minister’s decision. The workers are described as instructors
(monitors), supervisors, directors or chauffeurs, and this judgment applies to
them equally without regard to their designation. Further, the hearing in this
appeal was bilingual.
[2]
Douglas Roy, an
impressive witness, was the agent for the Appellant. His father, Rod Roy,
commenced a novel ski school in Québec some 25 years ago. At that time,
Rod Roy was a school teacher in Montréal or area and organized some of his
fellow teachers, college students and others, who were enthusiastic skiers, to teach
novists, particularly children. It was a business for Rod Roy and his
corporation. Also, the workers acknowledge that they were volunteers, being
paid at least for part of their expenses. I believe the Appellant made money
primarily on the bus and other travel arrangements. Over the years, it worked
very well for all concerned.
[3]
In 2006, the Appellant
filed an application with the Minister for a determination whether various
workers held insurable employment while working with the Appellant, and in
March 2007, the Minister provided its decision to the effect that the workers
did hold insurable employment during the disputed periods. The Appellant
appealed from that decision and both parties view the issue as being whether
the workers were employees or volunteers.
[4]
The Appellant’s business
offered travel and ski lessons at different ski centers in the Province of Québec and in the State of Vermont. The workers included six ski instructors, also
referred to as monitors, and four supervisors or directors. It operated primarily
on weekends and Tuesdays during the winter months. The workers taught, for the
most part, school children recruited by the Appellant. The students were bused
to the ski hills as arranged by the Appellant. The workers decided when and
where they would teach or supervise within the Appellant’s needs. They were all
highly qualified and needed very little direction although the Appellant’s supervisors
oversaw the entire operations, both on and off the ski hills. Without
exception, the Appellant’s witnesses stated that they had a passion for
skiing and were involved with the Appellant’s programs because they enjoyed it.
They took advantage of free skiing and the Appellant’s payments to them would offset
at least some of their skiing expenses. They did not consider themselves
employees.
[5]
The Appellant’s
position, taken from the Notice of Appeal, includes the following:
The Appellant determines work schedules and instructors decide their
own schedule choosing to give professional instruction for a maximum of four
hours a day on Saturdays, Sundays or Tuesdays.
The on-hill staff are not paid a salary. An expense allowance is
granted for the following reasonable expenses:
·
Travel to ski resorts
·
Meals
·
Ski or snowboard equipment depreciation
·
Equipment maintenance
·
Ski clothing & accessories (helmet, goggles,
gloves, etc.)
·
CSIA or CASI professional dues
The Appellant organized the students and
provided busing to any one of a number of locations known to skiers in Eastern Canada. These included Gray Rocks, Morin Heights, Mont Gabriel, Mont Blanc,
Tremblant, Saint‑Sauveur, Sainte‑Anne, Jay
Peak, Sutton, Sugar Bush and others. The instructors would be assigned a
class at the hill and would, by and large, be on their own with their ski
students.
[6]
In arriving at a decision,
the Minister relied on the assumptions of fact contained in the Reply to the
Notice of Appeal, which assumptions are set out in the attached Schedule “A”. Its position
is that the workers were working under a contract of service within
paragraph 5(1)(a) of the Employment Insurance Act and that their
employment was insurable, relying primarily on Article 2085 of the Civil Code
of Québec.
[7]
Each instructor
agreed to abide by a Statement of Position for Instructors prepared by the
Appellant. It included the following headings:
INTRODUCTION
RULES AND REGULATIONS
Preparation
Participation
Punctuality
Pre-teaching responsibilities
Teaching
Attendance
Report Cards
Patrol Duties
Afternoon Classes: (Ski Junior)
Accident Policy
Chain of Communication
Expense Allowance
Policy on Transportation
Dress
Tow Line Cutting
Deportment
[8]
Exhibit R-1 is a list
of individuals and periods worked with the Appellant. Also, the Appellant
referred to the payments made to the workers as Expense Allowances, as set
out in Exhibit R-3 as follows:
|
RR PLUS, RR MAX & SKI BOOMERS
4 hours of instruction per day plus attendance at mini clinics
plus paperwork such as attendance and report cards
|
|
Experience
|
Daily expense allowance
|
|
Assistant Instructor
|
$20
|
|
No Experience
|
$40
|
|
1 Year Experience
|
$45
|
|
2 Years Experience
|
$52
|
|
3 Years Experience
|
$55
|
|
CSIA – CASI Level II
|
$63
|
|
CSIA – CASI Level III
|
$65
|
|
SKI JUNIOR
Class of 3-1/2 hours, plus attendance at mini clinics plus
paperwork such as attendance and report cards
|
|
Experience
|
Daily expense allowance
|
|
Assistant Instructor
|
$20
|
|
No Experience
|
$40
|
|
1 Year Experience
|
$44
|
|
2 Years Experience
|
$50
|
|
CSIA – CASI Level II
|
$60
|
[9]
It is important to look
beyond the paperwork to understand the reality of the situation. A short summary
of the evidence given by witnesses on behalf of both the Appellant and the
Respondent follows.
Appellant’s witnesses
[10]Douglas Roy is a principal of the Appellant
corporation. He stated that payments from the Appellant to the workers were a
partial repayment of expenses they incurred, and not salaries. The workers were
closer to being volunteers than employees. All workers held other fulltime
employment or were fulltime university students. The workers’ endeavours were
motivated foremost by their passion for skiing and not by money. Most, if not
all, lost money in that their reasonable expenses exceeded their remuneration
from the Appellant. Many of the workers were school teachers and were skilled
at communicating with their ski class.
[11]Stephen Southern was a supervisor for the Appellant.
Over a period of 20 years, he had been a student of the Appellant, an
instructor and supervisor. He testified that he became involved with the
Appellant because he had a “huge passion for skiing – and enjoyed working with
kids …”. He spoke of having free ski runs
before and after classes. He replied to a question as follows:
Q. Do you consider the money that you receive
from Rod Roy to be a salary or a reimbursement of the expenses, for some of your
expenses, that you incurred?
A. Okay. So, when I look at the overall
expense of my Saturday, you know, at the end of the day, it’s a wash by the
time that I fill up the car with gas and I pay for lunch or a coffee in
the morning and a little bit of après-ski or dinner on the way home, it’s a
wash for me, I don’t, personally, I don’t ski or teach to make money, I ski
because…I do it because I have a passion for the sport and I really enjoy it.
So, I don’t really consider it a salary.
…
A.
I certainly wouldn’t consider it a job.
(Transcript,
pages 56 and 57)
[12]David Superstein, who is a retired high school
principal, was a standby chauffeur. He described his position:
As the accident chauffeur, I have to be at the hill before the buses
get there. If there is an accident and the injured person is transportable
by car, I would drive them to the nearest hospital and stay with them.
(Transcript, page 61)
He added that the money he received from the Appellant
was to compensate him for expenses he had to pay for gas and food.
[13]Glen Prunier was a former school teacher and director
of the Appellant. He explained that he and Douglas Roy’s father were
friends and high school teachers in the early 1980s. He continued:
A. … My children were five and three and I saw
this as an opportunity to get them involved in a sport which otherwise would be
very expensive for us and we wouldn’t be able to participate in. So, I sort of
saw myself back then as giving a little bit of time on week-ends in order for
my kids and my family to be able to go skiing and we enjoyed it so much that I
kept on my association with the Ski School doing many different tasks in the
Ski School sometimes an instructor, sometimes a supervisor, a section
director. Latterly, we would take charge of some trips sometimes, week‑end
trips, what have you, and we just kept on doing it for our love of skiing and I
think I retired in 2005 maybe, I’m not sure, 2006 so, we had a lengthy
association, it was a lot of fun.
…
A. On the trips, basically, I was the person
who coordinated the work of the other people at the ski hill and in between
trips, I would be the person responsible for filling in a report about what had
happened and make contact with staff and also the parents of the kids who were
the customers, write up a few memos to sort of make sure the day went properly
when we got to the ski hill, coordinate the bussing, trying to make sure that
we had enough instructors or bus supervisors available on any particular day. (Transcript,
pages 69 & 70)
He also added:
A. I never thought of this as a job so, the
money never looked to me as income. Each time that I performed the different
functions in the Ski School,
I did receive increasing amounts of money from the Ski School but it was
only because I was doing more things. So, if I didn’t, you know, the way I
saw it was that I had bought the computer, for example, and I had bought
the cell phone and I was paying for the monthly telephone bill and if the Ski
School was going to compensate me for its use, that to me, seemed fair and it
was part of the way I looked at it as a kind of a trade, my time and my
equipment in exchange for some functions that I agreed to do and as I said, it
was never a job to me, I did this, I never did this for money, that wasn’t the
purpose because I think it costs me more money than I received in … the things
I had to pay for, actually, cost more than what I received from you so I
wasn’t, no, it was not a salary.
…
A. …I did this voluntarily, I did this for
fun, like I said, it was not a job so I don’t see how I could be seen as
an employee,…
(Transcript,
pages 74 and 75)
[14]Edward Janiszewski was the accountant for the
Appellant for many years. Presently, he is the Mayor of Dollard des Ormeaux. He
testified that most of the Appellant’s profit comes from being a type of travel
agent and discounting tickets. He added that those people who helped with “the
kids” did so:
…basically for a partial recovery of expenses because we always
looked at them, had these expense sheets filled out and I always found them to
be much less than many of my corporate clients were paying to their employees.
They were totally, in my opinion, the expenses were totally reasonable and in
terms what was calculated and the reimbursement was totally less than what the
expenses could have been. We had been verified previously by Revenue Canada people who found them to be
reasonable.
…
I have friends whose children were involved with the Ski School and
it was more of a basis to go skiing rather than to make any money and it helped
pay for some of their expenses and they had a good time with kids and they were
able to ski a bit on their own so, that seems to be the motivation for this
friend of mine’s daughter and it always was the Ski School that operated that way
and very successfully.
…
…they were always justified by a reimbursement of partial expenses,
at least, they were considered to be a portion of the expenses but not the
total amount but they there were reimbursed a certain amount that could easily
be justified.
(Transcript,
pages 79 and 80)
Respondent’s witnesses:
[15]Robert Kunanec testified that he had been associated
with the Appellant from 1998 to 2004 inclusive, as a ski instructor. He testified
that each year, returning staff completed forms and paid $40 to $60 to the
Appellant for training sessions. Further, he paid the approximately $100 membership
fee to the Canadian Ski Instructors’ Alliance. He paid $500, I believe, for a five-day course and a level 2
certificate. He paid his own transportation to and from the ski hill and also
paid $300 for a ski suit displaying the Appellant’s logo. He described a
typical day:
A. A typical daily routine would be to arrive
at the hill, typically before eight thirty (8:30) in the morning, attend a
session, a training session in the morning followed by either or followed by approximately
four hours of teaching. After that, very minor paperwork and then the rest of
the day was yours to ski as long as the mountain remained opened.
…
A. Depending if the mountain was equipped for
night skiing, we could typically stay about three hours maybe four hours longer
and if it only had day skiing, we typically had about an hour and a half at the
end.
…
A. The Ski School would pay for the daily ski pass.
(Transcript,
page 92)
[16]In 2004, he was paid approximately $65 to $70 per day.
He gave the opinion that he was an employee because he received money in
exchange for services. He added that the payment he received covered expenses:
“…but not by
much. You were not in it to make money, you were in it for the passion of
skiing”.
[17]
Daniel Couture of the Audit
Division of the Canada Revenue Agency testified in French. Regarding Mr. Roy,
he stated that he was very good and that he had had no problem with him, and added
the following:
[TRANSLATION]
A. He told us that, in fact, apprentice instructors
receive a reimbursement of expenses of $20 per day and that instructors without
experience receive $40; with one year of experience instructors receive $45;
two years’ experience, $52; three years’ experience, $55; Level 2 instructors,
$63; and Level 3 instructors, $65; and there may even be a difference if instructors
work only with children….
(Transcript,
page 114)
He stated that he spent at least two weeks with the
Appellant. As a result of his audit, he came to the conclusion that the amounts
paid to the workers did not represent a reimbursement of expenses but rather, a
salary, and the employees could deduct certain amounts by completing and
submitting form T2200
with their income tax returns.
[18]
Jean‑Pierre Houle
was an appeals officer with CRA. In arriving at the decision that the workers
were in insurance employment, Mr. Houle took into account the three criteria
under the Civil Code of Québec. First, the Code requires that
there be a presentation of work. Mr. Houle found that these persons had carried
out work. Second, there must have been remuneration. The monitors confirmed
that they had received remuneration, and not merely a reimbursement of their
expenses. Mr. Houle continued with the third criterion, which he considered the
most important, namely, the relationship of subordination. He concluded that
there was a relationship of subordination. He found that Exhibit R-2, entitled
“Statement of Position for Instructors”, prepared by the Appellant, was very
important because the Appellant’s expectations were clearly set out in this
document. It was the code of conduct that the Appellant asked the monitors to
follow. He made the same decision with respect to the supervisors and the
directors, who are monitors but with more experience and additional tasks.
Analysis
[19] Counsel for the Respondent, I believe correctly,
narrows the issue to whether the workers involved with the Ski School were volunteers or employees. He relied primarily on
the decisions in 9041-6868 Québec Inc. v. Canada, D & J Driveway
Inc. v. Canada
and Comité des personnes assistées sociales de Pointe St‑Charles
v. Canada. He
cited the first two cases for the principle that the test to be applied to
determine if an endeavour in Québec is a contract of service or for service are
the tests contained in the Civil Code, stating that it is the Civil Code
of Québec that determines what rules to apply to a contract entered into in
Québec.
[20]Further Article
2085 of the Civil Code reads as follows:
2085 A contract
of employment is a contract by which a person, the employee, undertakes for a
limited period to do work for remuneration, according to the instructions and
under the direction or control of another person, the employer.
Mr. Houle applied the underlying criteria in this
Article to the present facts concluding the individuals worked (a) for
remuneration; (b) according to instructions; and (c) under control of
another person.
[21]In D
& J Driveway Inc., Letourneau J. stated:
9 A
contract of employment requires the existence of a relationship of
subordination between the payer and the employees. The concept of control is
the key test used in measuring the extent of the relationship.
[22]The question
of insurability of employment has been litigated extensively. With respect to
employment in Québec, some decisions are guided only by Article 2085 of
the Civil Code of Québec. Others use a combination of the common law and
civil law, while yet others refer only to the tests set out in Wiebe Door
Services Ltd. v. M.N.R.
and 671122 Ontario Ltd. v. Sagaz Industries Canada Inc. To be safe, a trial judge
must touch all bases,
although even with a finding that workers met the Civil Code and Wiebe
Door tests, this is negated by a finding that the workers were volunteers.
I find no need to apply the tests for the following reasons.
[23]Counsel for
the Respondent very fairly, referred to the decision in Comité. The
facts in that case are somewhat similar to this case and the decision of
Justice Lamarre Proulx applies equally to this appeal. The Appellant
offered work to people on social assistance and paid compensation, which was
considered to be reimbursement for meals, bus tickets and clothing. In her
decision, Justice Lamarre Proulx stated:
21 The
conditions of volunteer work are known by those who accept to be volunteers.
Normally, volunteer working conditions, including its supervision, are not the
same as those of a paid employee. Nevertheless, volunteers must accept the
specific conditions of the organization they offer to help. Volunteers must be
reliable and do the work they offered to do; otherwise, they are not useful to
the organization they are volunteering with. At times, volunteers may put more
energy into their work than paid employees.
22 To
understand the true nature of an agreement, it is important to refer to the
common intent. Here it is not clear at first glance. Mr. Tourigny made the
deduction required by law on the $50 payments he received each week, as if it
were wages. This indicates that he wanted to be considered an employee.
Moreover, the Chair of the Appellant mentioned that she was not aware of these
deductions and that she had not authorized them, as the Appellant never
intended to create an employment contract.
23 … He
knew that the Appellant operated with the help of volunteers and that these
agreements set out a description of duties, hours and a small compensation for
the costs incurred by someone working outside the home.
24 I am
of the opinion that, under the circumstances of the instant case, the Intervener
knew that the agreement between him and the Appellant involved the work of a
volunteer and not a paid employee and that the common intent of the parties was
to establish a volunteer agreement and not an employment contract.
[24]In this
appeal, most of the workers clearly considered themselves volunteers and not
employees, and worked for the pleasure of doing so, without remuneration for
their labour, except for being compensated for at least some of their expenses.
The fact situation is stronger in favour of the workers being volunteers
than the facts Justice Lamarre Proulx was faced with, where the only worker to
testify considered himself to be an employee.
[25]Considering
the evidence as a whole, I find that the workers were more volunteers than
employees. Mr. Houle applied the criteria in Article 2085 of the Code,
concluding that the workers were employees. While they may appear to be
employees using the legal tests in the Code and Wiebe Door, I
have no difficulty concluding they were volunteers. Their situation was not
unlike institutional volunteer workers who are told when to arrive and leave,
and have expenses such as parking and meals paid for.
[26]The Respondent’s
position is based primarily on the conclusion that the workers were paid for
their services. This conclusion fails by my finding of fact that the workers
were not paid for their services, but reimbursed for their out‑of‑pocket
expenses only. As in Comité, the workers followed specific conditions of
the organization. An institution that relies on volunteers, such as a hospital,
requires a structure to be followed and the workers are no less volunteers
if their parking, meals and other expenses are paid for. The fact that Comité
was a non-profit organization does not distinguish that case from this one, as
submitted by counsel for the Respondent. It is the nature of the relationship
of the two parties that must be determined. Whether the organization is
non-profit or for profit has nothing to do with the issue before me.
[27]As most
volunteers, they found their work satisfying and emotionally rewarding. They
enjoyed teaching skiers, young and old, although most students were,
predominantly, children. The only Respondent witness who perhaps did not
consider himself a volunteer was Robert Kunanec, although he was not adamant
one way or the other. In answer to the Respondent’s question, were you a
volunteer or independent contractor with Rod Roy School, he replied:
I think I was
an employee because I received money in exchange for services rendered although
I can say that in the beginning, when I started I would be more typical, I
would consider that more a volunteer status.
He
added that he believed the amounts paid to him covered expenses but stated:
I believe they
did but not by much. You were not in it to make money, you were in it for the
passion of skiing.
In any event, the conclusion as to his status is that
of the trial judge.
[28]The
Canadian Oxford Dictionary (1998 ed.) defines volunteer as:
a person who
voluntarily takes part in an enterprise or offers to undertake a task;
a person who works for an organization voluntarily and without pay. …
This
definition applies to this appeal since the workers volunteered to take part in
the Appellant’s enterprise, without pay, except for expenses.
[29]The parties
agree that all workers be considered in the same manner without respect to
their title such as monitor, chauffeur, director or supervisor. The Respondent
attached significant weight to the fact that the Appellant “had annual
business revenue of approximately $600,000 to $700,000”. I do not see how this
makes any difference. In any event, the amount is very misleading in that it is
gross revenue. We do not know if the Appellant made a profit or suffered
a loss, although it is of no consequence.
[30]Counsel for
the Respondent stated that no workers involved in this appeal were called by
the Appellant as witnesses. I accept Mr. Roy’s explanation as follows:
… we took people
at random who had received T4s because I don’t think there is a big distinction
between one of those ten (10) people or the other ninety (90) people that
received the T4s, in our opinion, they were all the same and maybe we were
wrong in that assumption but if the Court would like, we can submit the T4s
that were issued to people, you’ll find the names of the ten (10) people who
were on R‑1 but you’ll also find the names of the people who were
witnesses who testified today. And so that, as far as we were concerned,
they’re just as involved as those other ten (10) people so that’s why we call
those particular people.
(Transcript, pages 166 and 171)
Conclusion
[31]In
conclusion, I find that the Appellant did not make the deductions common to an
employer/employee relationship since it was the common intent of both the
Appellant and the workers that their relationships were as volunteers and
organizers. Also, the parties had a completed volunteer agreement and not
a contract of employment. The money paid to the workers was for their out‑of‑pocket
expenses only, and the workers gave of their time freely. The relationship
between the parties has worked for all concerned for over 25 years.
[32]The appeal
is allowed and the Minister’s decision is vacated on the basis that the workers
were volunteers, and not engaged in insurable employment pursuant to paragraph 5(1)(a)
of the Act.
Signed
at Ottawa, Canada, this 14th day of November, 2008.
“C.H. McArthur”
SCHEDULE “A”
Assumptions from the Reply to the
Notice of Appeal
5. …
a) the Appellant was incorporated on June 10,
1969;
b) the Appellant was offering travel and ski
lessons to different ski centres in Québec to his clients;
c)
the trips to ski centres could last from 1 to 8
days;
d)
the Appellant had an annual business revenue of
approximately $600,000 to $700,000;
e)
the Appellant hired monitors, supervisors and
directors for the ski season;
f)
the monitors had to sign an “Instructor’s
agreement” with the Appellant at the beginning of the season;
g)
the monitors were responsible to give ski
lessons to the Appellant’s clients;
h)
the monitors had to teach the specific ski
technique of the Appellant;
i)
the monitors gave courses of 2 hours in the
morning and 2 hours in the afternoon;
j)
the monitors had to follow the directives of the
supervisors and the directors of the Appellant;
k)
the monitors received directives from the
Appellant as to which Ski centre they had to work;
l)
the monitors received written guidelines
(“Statement of Position for Instructors”) from the Appellant concerning the ski
courses, reports and accident policy;
m)
all monitors received a fixed salary of $65 per
day indicated as “Expense allowance” in the “Instructor’s agreement”;
n)
the monitors received a fixed amount from the
Appellant regardless of their real expenses;
o)
the Appellant paid the ski-lift fees for the
monitors;
p)
the monitors had to inform the Appellant in case
of absence;
q)
the Appellant had an insurance policy covering
legal liability of the monitors;
r)
the monitors were supervised by the Appellant’s
supervisors;
s)
the monitors had to wear the Appellant’s ski
suit;
t)
the monitors worked with the Appellant’s client;
u)
the Appellant had a dismissal power over the
monitors according to the “Instructor’s agreement”;
v)
the monitors thought that they were employees of
the Appellant;
Robert Sénécal and Jesse Rubenovitch (the supervisors)
w)
the supervisors had to sign an “Instructor’s
agreement” with the Appellant at the beginning of the season;
x)
the supervisors were responsible to organise the
ski course, to classify students in the right course, to give daily clinics to
monitors, to evaluate monitors and to replace an absent monitor;
y)
the supervisors had to teach the specific ski
technique of the Appellant;
z)
the supervisors were in daily contact with the
Appellant or the directors of the Appellant;
aa)
the supervisors had to follow the directives of
the directors of the Appellant;
bb)
the supervisors received directives from the
Appellant as to which Ski centre they had to work;
cc)
the supervisors received written guidelines
(“Statement of Position for Instructors”) from the Appellant concerning the ski
courses, reports and accident policy;
dd)
all supervisors received a fixed salary of $105
per day indicated as “Expense allowance” in the “Instructor’s agreement”;
ee)
the supervisors received a fixed amount from the
Appellant regardless of their real expenses;
ff)
the Appellant paid the ski-lift fees for the
supervisors;
gg)
the supervisors had to inform the Appellant in
case of absence;
hh)
the Appellant had an insurance policy covering
legal liability of the supervisors;
ii)
the supervisors were supervised by the
Appellant’s directors;
jj)
the supervisors had to wear the Appellant’s ski
suit;
kk)
the supervisors worked with the Appellant’s
client;
ll)
the Appellant had a dismissal power over the
supervisors following the “Instructor’s agreement”;
mm)
the supervisors had no knowledge whether or not
they were employees of the Appellant;
Don Hirsch and Marie Rennie (the directors)
nn)
the directors had a verbal agreement with the Appellant;
oo)
the directors received written guidelines
(“Critical Path for Section Directors”) from the Appellant;
pp)
the directors were hired in September;
qq)
the directors had regular contact with the
Appellant from September through April;
rr)
the directors received directives from the
Appellant as to which Ski centre they had to work;
ss)
the directors supervised the supervisors and the
monitors at the ski centre;
tt)
the directors had to follow the directives of
the Appellant;
uu)
the Appellant paid the ski-lift fees for the
directors;
vv)
the directors received at the end of the season
an amount described as travel allowance, bus driver tips, meal allowance,
telephone, cell phone, office supplies, computer, internet, printer cartridges,
meeting allowance, uniform, equipment, entertainment and miscellaneous
expenses;
ww)
Don Hirsch received $3,078.00 from the Appellant
during the disputed period;
xx)
Marie Rennie received $4,284.00 from the
Appellant during the disputed period;
yy)
the directors had to inform the Appellant in
case of absence;
zz)
the Appellant had an insurance policy covering
legal liability of the directors;
aaa)
the directors had to wear the Appellant’s ski
suit;
bbb)
the directors worked with the Appellant’s
client; and
ccc)
the directors thought that they were not
employees of the Appellant.
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