TAX COURT OF CANADA
Citation: 2008 TCC 622
2007-3364(EI)
BETWEEN:
CHON LE,
Appellant;
- and -
THE MINISTER OF
NATIONAL REVENUE,
Respondent.
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Held before Mr. Justice Paris in Courtroom No. 305, 35 Front
Street, Nanaimo, B.C., on Wednesday, August 13, 2008.
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APPEARANCES:
Mr. C. Le, Appearing on his own behalf;
Mr. M. Canzer, For the Respondent.
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THE REGISTRAR: F.
Richard
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Allwest
Reporting Ltd.
#302-814
Richards Street
Vancouver,
B.C.
V6B
3A7
Per: K. Bemister
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Delivered Orally in Nanaimo, B.C. on August 13th, 2008)
JUSTICE: These are the reasons for judgment in Chon Le
versus The Queen, 2007-3364(EI).
The issue in this appeal is
whether the appellant was in insurable employment with Max Oysters Ltd. between
May 9th and August 15th, 2003, July 8th and
September 4th, 2004, and July 7th and September 5th,
2005.
During the periods in issue the
appellant had a clam-farming licence issued by the Department of Fisheries. He
seeded clams each year and harvested clams that had reached the age of three to
four years. He apparently had this licence for many years.
He also took clams and oysters
from outside the area covered by his clam-farming licence under a different
licence issued by Fisheries. This was referred to as an “open catch”. The areas
for collecting the clams and oysters were opened to licence holders only about
six or seven days per year. The appellant sold all of the oysters and clams he
collected under both licences to Max Oysters. At the end of each season he was
issued a Record of Employment by Max Oysters that showed he was a self-employed
fisher.
The appellant claimed and was
paid Employment Insurance benefits each winter following the periods in issue. The
Minister of National Revenue later determined that he was not entitled to the
benefits and that he would be required to repay them, because the Minister
found that he was not a “fisher” as defined in Section 1 of the Employment
Insurance Fishing Regulations.
The assumptions made by the
Minister in making the determination are set out in paragraph 6 of the Reply
and shall form part of these reasons, these assumptions read as follow:
a)
the Appellant was involved in clam farming and harvesting;
b)
the Appellant was not a “Fisher” as defined in the Employment
Insurance (Fishing) Regulations;
c)
the Appellant was in possession of his own clam farming license;
d)
the Appellant was required to submit a management plan to the Province
of British Columbia each year indicating how much he would seed and harvest
during the year;
e)
the Appellant sold his harvested clams to the Payor;
f)
the Appellant was responsible for finding his own clients;
g)
the Appellant was responsible for most tools and equipment necessary for
the harvesting of his product;
h)
the Appellant was responsible for all expenses associated with running
his operation;
i)
the Appellant was not required to report to the Payor;
j)
the Appellant did not take direction from the Payor;
k)
the Appellant was not required to sell his harvest to the Payor;
l)
the Appellant was remunerated for each load delivered to the Payor;
m)
the Appellant was free to hire his own helpers;
n)
the Appellant had the opportunity for profits from his decisions with
respect to operations and could incur substantial loss due to a poor harvest
season;
o)
the Appellant claimed business expenses on his tax returns for the
Periods;
p)
the Appellant and the Payor considered their relationship to be one of
independent contractor, i.e., a contract for services; and
q)
the Appellant was in business for himself.
The appellant was
self-represented at the hearing. He felt it was unfair for the Minister to
require him to repay the benefits he had received because he was given the
Records of Employment by Max and relied on those forms. He said he received
assistance in filling out the application for benefits in the Employment
Insurance office and felt that he should have been told in the first year that
he was not eligible. The repayment of the benefits will cause him substantial
hardship. He did not make any submissions on any substantive issue.
The respondent took the position
that the appellant was not in insurable employment under Section 5(1) of the Employment
Insurance Act because he was not employed by Max Oysters under a contract
of service. There was no evidence led to show that such a contract existed
between the appellants and Max, and I agree with the respondent that the
appellant operated as an independent contractor. The respondent also said that
the appellant did not fall within Section 2 of the Employment Insurance
Fishing Regulations, which includes self-employed fishers as insured
persons under the Employment Insurance Act.
The respondent said that the
appellant did not meet the definition of "fisher" set out in Section
1 of the Regulations, the relevant parts of which read:
"Fisher means a self-employed
person engaged in fishing and includes a person engaged other than under a
contract of service or for their own or another person's sport in making a catch."
The respondent
argues that the appellant was neither engaged in fishing nor in making a catch.
Although the word "fishing" is not defined in the Regulations or Act,
counsel said that it requires that the thing being fished has the chance to
escape and cited a passage from the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Gerring
v. The Queen, (1897), 27 S.C.R. 271, to this effect. Counsel said that the
clams or oysters taken by the appellant could not escape and therefore the
activity of collecting them did not amount to fishing.
It
was also argued that the appellant was not making a catch when taking the clams
from his leased area because the definition of "catch" (also in
section 1 of the Regulations) only applies to catching or taking of
natural products of the sea or other body of water. Since the clams on the
leased area were sown by the appellant, it was contended that the clams were
not a natural product.
I will deal firstly with the submission regarding the
definition of the word "catch" in the Regulations. It reads:
“catch” means any natural product or by-product of the sea, or of any
other body of water, caught or taken by a crew and includes fresh fish, cured
fish, Irish moss, kelp and whales, but does not include fish scales or seals,
and
(a) where only a portion of a catch is delivered to a buyer, means the
portion delivered; and
(b) where more than one catch or portion of a catch is delivered to a
buyer at one time, means the catches or portions that are delivered.
I agree with the respondent that
the clams taken from the appellant's lease area would not be a catch because
the clams had been seeded by the appellant and therefore would not be an actual
product of the sea.
The word "natural"
connotes something that exists or occurs without human intervention and the
definition found in the Concise Oxford Dictionary includes the
following:
"Existing in or by nature; not
artificial; innate; inherent; self-sown; uncultivated."
The French version of the
definition of "catch" uses the phrase "produit naturel"
which is identical to the English version. There is no apparent ambiguity in
the relevant wording and the ordinary definition would exclude the clams farmed
by the appellant.
There does not appear to be any
reason not to give the term "fishing" in the definition of “fisher”
which I referred to earlier its ordinary meaning of taking fish from the water.
The Oxford Concise English
Dictionary, 10th Edition, defines the verb "to fish"
as follows:
"to catch fish with a net or hook and line."
I can see no
ambiguity in the wording of the definition of the term fisher in the Regulations
and that definition would not cover the activities of the appellant in
harvesting farmed clams.
To his credit, respondent's
counsel brought to my attention a decision of Deputy Judge Leger of this Court
in Blanchard v. MNR,[1993] T.C.J. No. 187, in which the court concluded
that harvesting cultivated oysters constituted making a catch. Unfortunately
the court reached that conclusion without setting out its analysis of the
definition of "catch" and so its persuasive value is extremely
limited.
The respondent has conceded that
the open harvesting of clams and oysters by the appellant would be within the
definition of "catch", and I agree. Those clams and oysters would be
a natural product of the sea. There is some evidence from the appellant that
the amount of those harvests was about $400 to $500 a day for five to six days
a year. I am satisfied that he would have earned $2,500 each year from that
activity.
I would therefore allow the
appeal in part on the basis that the appellant earned $2,500 a year from
insurable employment with Max Oysters in each of the periods under appeal.
I am aware that the appellant
faces great difficulties with respect to the collection of the overpayment of
benefits. Unfortunately I do not have the power to vary the amounts of the
repayments. However, I would urge the Minister to consider granting the
appellant whatever relief is possible in the circumstances.
Thank you.