Citation: 2010TCC572
Date: 20101104
Docket: 2009-2184(IT)I
BETWEEN:
1390758 ONTARIO CORPORATION,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Appearances:
|
Agent for the Appellants:
|
Peter Tindall
|
|
Counsel for the
Respondent:
|
Ashleigh Akalehiywot and Jack Warren
|
REASONS FOR ORDER
(Delivered orally from the bench on October 28, 2010, at London, Ontario.)
Bowie J.
[1]
1390758 Ontario
Corporation appeals from two assessments for income tax under the Court’s
informal procedure. Before me is a motion brought by the respondent for an
order quashing those appeals.
[2]
The grounds for the
motion are expressed in the Notice of Motion as follows:
(a) The Court has no jurisdiction over
the subject matter of this appeal;
(b) The appellant’s appeal
2009-2184(IT)I is null and void;
(c) The Minister of
National Revenue issued a reassessment dated June 5, 2010 in regards
to the 2004 and 2005 taxation years of the appellant in accordance with
executed Minutes of Settlement dated March 5, 2010 pursuant to subsection
169(3) of the Income Tax Act;
(d) The assessment under
appeal has been replaced by the reassessment dated June 15, 2010 and is a
nullity;
(e) Where properly
instructed and informed parties enter into Minutes of Settlement, it would be
contrary to both court and public policy to foster secondary litigation to
overturn that settlement;
(f) Such further and
other grounds as counsel may submit.
[3]
Obviously the Court
does have jurisdiction over the subject matter, as it is an appeal, duly commenced,
from an assessment under the Income Tax Act (the "Act").
[4]
The substantive ground
for the motion lies in the fact that on March 5, 2010, Peter Tindall, president
and the owner of 100% of the issued shares of the appellant, and Jack Warren,
counsel for the respondent, executed minutes of settlement whereby the parties
agreed to settle these appeals on the terms expressed therein. Since that date
Peter Tindall has purported to resile from the settlement. The question I must
decide is whether he is free to do so. If he is, then the appeals will proceed
to a hearing on the merits; if he is not, then the appeals will be quashed.
[5]
As I have mentioned,
Peter Tindall owns all the issued shares of the appellant. Peter Tindall
personally was reassessed by the Minister
of National Revenue (the Minister) for the taxation years 2003, 2004 and 2005.
By these reassessments certain business expenses that he had claimed were
disallowed, and penalties were assessed in each of the years. His wife, Susan
Tindall, was in receipt of Child Tax Benefit (CTB) payments during those years.
As a result of the increases to her husband’s assessed income, her entitlements
to the CTB were redetermined to reduce them by $500.36 for 2003, $233.30 for
2004 and $348.52 for 2005.
[6]
1390758 Ontario
Corporation claimed non-capital losses for the taxation years 2004 and 2005. It
was originally assessed as filed. On June 15, 2007 it was reassessed for each
of these years on the basis that it had net income of $2,400 in each of the two
years. The appeals before me are from those reassessments.
[7]
Each of Peter Tindall, Susan
Tindall and the Corporation duly objected to these reassessments, and following
confirmation by the Minister they all filed notices of appeal.
[8]
An affidavit of Kevin
Williamson, the Minister’s assessor, was filed in support of the motion. Kevin
Williamson was cross-examined on that affidavit at the hearing of the motion.
Peter Tindall also gave evidence. There is no substantial disagreement as to
the facts.
[9]
On March 5, 2010, the
appeals were settled. Peter Tindall and Jack Warren executed a consent to
judgment in respect of Peter Tindall’s appeals. It provides for Peter Tindall
to be further reassessed for the years 2003, 2004 and 2005. By those
reassessments he is to be allowed additional business expenses in 2004 and
2005, and the penalties for all three years are to be cancelled.
[10]
On the same date, Susan
Tindall, Peter Tindall and Jack Warren signed Minutes of Settlement in the
appeal of Susan Tindall from the redetermination of CTB’s. Those Minutes of
Settlement provided that the CTB entitlements would be redetermined on the
basis of the revised income of Peter Tindall for 2004 and 2005 once he had been
reassessed to implement the settlement of his appeals.
[11]
Also on March 5, 2010,
Peter Tindall, on behalf of 1390758 Ontario Corporation and Jack Warren
executed Minutes of Settlement of the Corporation’s appeals. The only relief,
if it can be called that, for the Corporation in those Minutes of Settlement is
that the Minister is to reassess the appellant to carry forward its available
prior years’ non-capital losses and apply them to the 2004 and 2005 taxation
years.
[12]
Peter Tindall has now
been reassessed in accordance with the consent to judgment. I was told at the
hearing that Susan Tindall’s CTB entitlements will be redetermined shortly to
give effect to her settlement, and that she is content with this settlement.
[13]
On June 15, 2010, the
Minister reassessed the appellant to give effect to the Minutes of Settlement
by applying the prior years’ losses. As a result of so doing, the outstanding
tax and interest owing, and a failure to file penalty, were all eliminated.
[14]
However, Peter Tindall
now takes the position, on behalf of the Corporation, that he did not fully
appreciate the future ramifications of the settlement and that he, on behalf of
the Corporation, wishes to resile from the settlement and have the
Corporation’s appeals heard and decided on their merits. He does not allege any
fraud, undue influence or oppression of any kind. He simply says that he no
longer wishes to be bound by the Minutes of Settlement that he signed.
[15]
Counsel for the
respondent (applicant in the motion) takes the position that the appellant,
having voluntarily entered into Minutes of Settlement, and the Minister having
given effect to the settlement by reassessing, the appellant’s right to pursue
the appeal is at an end, and as he refuses to file a notice of discontinuance
the appeal should be quashed. In support of that position she referred me to
the decision of Lamarre-Proulx J. in Oberoi v. R..
She held there, on the authority of the Supreme Court of Canada’s judgment in Smerchanski
v. The Queen,
that the appellant, who wished to resile from a written agreement to settle,
was bound by the agreement.
[16]
The question whether
the Minister and a taxpayer may enter into a binding settlement agreement in
respect of the taxpayer’s liability for tax under the Act has arisen in
at least seven cases since 1972. As has been observed by others, some of the
decisions are difficult to reconcile.
[17]
Smerchanski came before Collier J. in the Federal
Court – Trial Division in 1972. The result of an audit revealed that Mr. Smerchanski
and his company, Eco Explorations (Eco), had failed to report a substantial
amount of income over a 15 year period. An agreement was entered into
between Mr. Smerchanski and the Department of National Revenue. Its essential
terms were that the Minister would reassess the two taxpayers for the amounts
that the audit revealed to be unreported income, together with interest and penalties.
Mr. Smerchanski, for himself and Eco, agreed to the amounts that were to be
assessed, without particulars of the manner of computing them, and agreed to
waive their rights of appeal from the reassessments. Mr. Smerchanski was
undoubtedly motivated in some degree to make this settlement by the definite
possibility that he might be prosecuted and convicted of tax evasion, but
Collier J. found specifically that no threat of prosecution, or promise not to
prosecute, was made during the negotiations.
[18]
After the time within
which the Minister could begin prosecution had expired, Mr. Smerchanski resiled
from the agreement by delivering notices of objection, and subsequently notices
of appeal.
[19]
After 23 days of trial
it was agreed among counsel and the trial judge to treat the validity of the
agreement as a preliminary matter to be decided, with rights of appeal. Collier
J. found that Mr. Smerchanski and Eco were bound by the agreement that they had
signed, and that their waiver of the right of appeal was effective. He found
that the revenue officials did not exercise duress or undue influence on Mr.
Smerchanski. Most significant for present purposes, Collier J. rejected
the contention that it would be contrary to public policy to give effect to an
agreement whereby the taxpayer waived his right to appeal. He held that the
right to appeal assessments is a private right and, therefore, could be
effectively waived.
[20]
In the Federal Court of
Appeal, Thurlow J.A. (for himself and MacKay D.J.) agreed that the right of
appeal is a private right, and one that may be waived. In the course of his
judgment he also said:
It appears to me that, as a general proposition, it is quite correct
to say that the Income Tax Act is not to be thwarted by the Minister and
the subject entering into a contract the tenor of which would be to reduce the
taxes properly payable by the subject under the statute. Taxation must indeed
be by the letter of the law and any attempt to contract out of it is
ineffective in law to reduce or avoid the subject’s liability. On the other
hand there must be a method of ascertaining and fixing the amount of such tax
liability and in the Income Tax Act that need is met by provisions which
cast upon the Minister the authority and the duty to assess the tax payable by
the subject. This he must do on the basis of such relevant information as he
has with respect to the subject’s income, whether such information is provided
by the subject in discharge of the obligation which the statute casts on him to
provide information or is obtained by other means. It is inherent in such a
system that even after all the pertinent information has been obtained there
will often be doubts as to whether particular amounts are properly subject to
tax and that there will be disputes, as well, as to whether particular amounts
ought to be included. In all such instances the Minister can but act on the
totality of such information as he has in determining whether to include or
exclude the doubtful or disputed amount. Avenues for objection to him and
subsequently for appeal to courts are provided which the taxpayer may follow if
he is not satisfied with the assessment so made. But nothing in the statute
required the taxpayer to exercise his right to object or to appeal.
[21]
In the Supreme Court of
Canada, the issue was expressed this way by Laskin C.J.C. in giving the
majority judgment:
Since it is not contested that a taxpayer may validly waive his
rights of appeal against a tax assessment and that no question of public policy
is involved to preclude such a waiver, the only issue of importance in this
appeal is whether the tax authorities, seriously contemplating prosecution, and
by indictment as in the present case, are entitled to exact a waiver of rights
of appeal as a binding term of settling a clear tax liability when overtures
for settlement are made by the taxpayer and, in consequence, to abandon their
intention to prosecute.
There could be no doubt in the present case of the taxpayer’s
liability to a large amount of tax even if there be some doubt in mind that he
owed all that the tax authorities claimed. There is no doubt of the
enforceability of compromise agreements on liability for disputed debt as an
escape from litigation, absent vitiating circumstances. I return then to the
one factor that is said to make the waiver agreements herein voidable, and that
is that the threat of prosecution lay behind them. I think that leading counsel
for the respondent could not have been more candid on this matter and it is
clear to me, on the record, that Smerchanski was in jeopardy of a prosecution,
of a conviction and of the likelihood of a gaol term unless he could persuade
the tax authorities to accept a settlement in full of their tax claim against
him, even if this meant a complete capitulation to the terms that were
proposed. He knew, and his advisers knew that he was in deep trouble in respect
of his tax obligations. The investigation had gone on for some time and,
according to the tax authorities, if there was going to be a settlement it would
have to be a final one without further recourse. I may note that a successful
tax prosecution would not itself have wiped out the tax liability, whatever be
the effect that it would have had on unassessed penalties at that time.
I am content to act on the view, which is perhaps somewhat in
between the positions taken on the facts by the respective parties, that the
tax authorities held the threat of prosecution over Smerchanski but with good
grounds and that the latter was aware of this and knowingly made a settlement,
however draconian it may look to him in restropect, which he was only too glad
to make to escape the prospect of a conviction and of a gaol term.
Given that the tax department had good grounds for proceeding
against Smerchanski and that Smerchanski himself knew it, and indeed
acknowledged a tax liability even before the letter of commitment was signed
and before the waiver agreement was executed, I cannot agree that the
settlement made on the terms of a waiver of rights of appeal is either illegal
or voidable. We deal here with a public authority which is under a duty to
collect taxes from persons under a duty to pay them and who are subject to
penalties for failure to pay and to criminal prosecution for wilful or
fraudulent tax evasion. The threat of prosecution underlies every tax return if
a false statement is knowingly made in it and, indeed, this is inscribed on the
face of the tax form. It cannot be that the tax authorities must proceed to
prosecution when faced with a dispute on whether there is a wilful tax evasion
rather than being amenable to a settlement, be it a compromise or an
uncompromising agreement for payment of what is claimed. Here there was not
even such a dispute but an acknowledgement of evasion and the taxpayer’s position
cannot be stronger when he is a confessed evader that when he has disputed
wilful evasion.
[22]
In concluding that the
waiver was indeed valid and enforceable against Smerchanski, Laskin C.J.C.
ended his judgment with this observation as to the legality of compromise
settlements of tax liability:
The result to which I would come in this case is encased in broad
statutory provisions in both England and the United States. Authorization for pecuniary settlements instead of instituting
criminal proceedings has been part of the tax law in England since 1944 and is
now found in the Taxes Management Act, 1970 (U.K.), c. 9, s. 105. In the
United States, ss. 7121 and
7122 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 authorize settlements and
compromises of tax liability as against civil or criminal proceedings prior to
reference to the Department of Justice for prosecution or defence. I do not
regard these provisions as necessarily pointing to the common law invalidity of
all contractual settlements made in the knowledge of probable prosecution and
in order to avoid it. Rather they represent an acknowledgment of practice by
seeking to put beyond dispute the power of the tax collector to settle or
compromise tax liability, even if there be wilful evasion leaving the taxpayer open
to possible or probable prosecution. (emphasis added)
[23]
The issue next arose
when the parties in Galway v. M.N.R.
arrived at a compromise settlement of their dispute after the appellant’s
income tax appeal had been dismissed by the Federal Court – Trial Division and
his appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal was pending. The dispute was as to
whether a payment of some $200,000 received by the taxpayer was on capital or
revenue account. Cattanach J. held that it was income subject to tax. Before the appeal
was heard the parties settled the matter and applied to the Court of Appeal to
give judgment on consent allowing the appeal and referring the assessment back
to the Minister "to reassess the appellant’s tax and interest in the total
amount of $100,000" in accordance with Minutes of Settlement.
[24]
The Court of Appeal
gave preliminary Reasons expressing a number of concerns with the proposed
consent judgment. Jackett C.J. expressed doubt as to the legality of the
settlement, and the proposed consent judgment. He suggested that the Minister
could not, under the Act, assess one lump sum for tax and interest, and
the more so when the period for which interest is being assessed is not
specified. As to the issue of the legality of a compromise settlement of the liability
for tax, he said:
This is clearly not a case where there should be a reduction in the
amount of the tax in dispute. It is a case where the whole $200,500 was taxable
or it was not. In those circumstances, we have grave doubt as to whether the Minister
is legally entitled to re-assess for a part of the amount of tax in question.
If he is not legally entitled to do so, the Court cannot require him to do so.
[25]
The matter was fully
argued before a different panel of the Federal Court of Appeal some six weeks
later. At that time Jackett C.J., for the Court, referred again to the
Minister’s statutory duty to assess "the amount of tax payable on the
facts as he finds them in accordance with the law as he understands it."
He then added:
Is the position any different where the parties consent to a
judgment? In ordinary litigation between private persons of full age and
mentally sound, the Court has not, in normal circumstances, any duty to
question a consent by the parties to judgment. We should have thought that the
same statement applies where the Crown, represented by its statutory legal
advisors, is one of the parties. There is, however, at least one exception to
the unquestioning granting of consent judgments, regardless of who the parties
are, namely, that the Court cannot grant a judgment on consent that it could
not grant after the trial of an action or the hearing of an appeal. It follows
that, as the Court cannot, after a trial or hearing, refer a matter back for
assessment except for assessment in the manner provided by the statute and
cannot therefore, at such a stage, refer a matter back for re‑assessment
to implement a compromise settlement, the Court cannot refer a matter back by
way of a consent judgment for re-assessment for such a purpose.
[26]
The application for
judgment on consent was dismissed.
[27]
The issue next arose in
Cohen v. The Queen.
The taxpayer was reassessed for the taxation years 1961 to 1965 on the basis
that gains on the sale of land were income from a business. He alleged that there
was an agreement between him and the Minister that he would not appeal the
reassessments for 1961 to 1964 and the Minister would treat the gain in 1965 as
a capital gain. The trial judge found the gain in 1965 to be profit from a
business, and he declined to give effect to the alleged agreement. This
decision was affirmed by the Federal Court of Appeal, relying on Galway.
It is not clear whether the trial judge found that there was such an agreement,
but Pratte J.A., for the Court, held that if there was such an agreement it was
an illegal one and, therefore, not binding on the Minister. He clearly reached
this result on the basis of his conclusion, and that of the trial judge, that
on the evidence the 1965 profit was a trading profit.
[28]
The issue came only
obliquely before Bowman J., as he then was, in Mindszenthy v. The Queen, but he noted
there that the decisions in Smerchanski and Cohen were "not
readily reconcilable".
[29]
The issue came before
him again four years later in Consoltex v. The Queen.
This time there was clearly an agreement entered into between the taxpayer and
the Crown, represented by the assessor, to settle an issue between them as to
the taxpayer’s entitlement to deductions for scientific research and
experimental development. The Minister issued assessments in the amounts agreed
upon, but the taxpayer subsequently filed notices of objection, and in due
course notices of appeal.
[30]
After discussing the Smerchanski
and Cohen cases, Bowman J. cited the following two paragraphs from Canadian
Income Tax Law:
The effect of the Smerchanski and Cohen cases is that
the taxpayer is bound by a settlement agreement, but the Minister is not. Of
course, a settlement of litigation that was implemented by a formal entry of
judgment would then have the force of a court judgment, which is binding on
both parties. However in Galway v. M.N.R. (1974), the Federal Court of
Appeal refused an application for a consent judgment to implement the terms of
a settlement agreement between the Minister and a taxpayer. According to the
Court, the Minister has no power to assess in accordance with a
"compromise settlement", and the Court should not sanctify an ultra
vires act. The Minister’s duty is to assess in accordance with the law, and
the only kind of settlement that the Court would be prepared to implement by a
consent judgment would be one in which the parties were agreed on the
application of the law to the facts.
The attitude of the Federal Court of Appeal in Cohen and Galway is far too rigid and
doctrinaire. If the Minister were really unable to make compromise settlements,
he or she would be denied an essential tool of enforcement. The Minister must
husband the Department’s limited resources, and it is not realistic to require
the Minister to insist on every last legal point, and to litigate every dispute
to the bitter end. Most disputes about tax are simply disputes about money
which are inherently capable of resolution by compromise. Presumably, the
Minister would agree to a compromise settlement only on the basis that it
offered a better net recovery than would probably be achieved by continuance of
the litigation. It seems foolish to require the Minister to incur the
unnecessary costs of avoidable litigation in the name of an abstract statutory
duty to apply the law.
Bowman J. went on to say:
In general, I agree with their observations, subject to one
qualification. I do not think that the Smerchanski and Cohen
cases, read together, can be taken to justify a conclusion that the taxpayer is
bound by a settlement agreement but the Minister is not. It is unconscionable
enough that the Minister should be able to renege on settlements that he or she
has made. It would be doubly indefensible that a taxpayer should be
unilaterally bound to honour agreements that the Minister is free to repudiate.
Neither the Minister nor the appellant is bound by the agreement of January 15,
1992. Of course the Minister acted on the agreement by assessing in accordance
with it, but this does not distinguish the case from Cohen, because Mr.
Cohen as well implemented the agreement by refraining from objecting to the
first assessment. There are three possible alternative and inconsistent results
of the Cohen, Galway and Smerchanski decisions: (a) the
taxpayer and the Minister are both bound by such agreements; (b) neither is
bound; and (c) the taxpayer is bound but the Minister is not. Assuming that Cohen
is correct in law, so that (a) cannot apply, the least unacceptable result of
the two remaining alternatives is (b).
[31]
In Garber v. The
Queen
the question came once more before then Chief Justice Bowman in the
context of an agreement to settle that had been negotiated over a long period
of time on behalf of a very large number of litigants. After an agreement had
been reached, counsel for the Attorney General of Canada repudiated the
settlement, apparently to avoid a perceived risk that it might jeopardize the
prosecution of the promoters of the O.C.G.C. partnerships. At paragraphs 23 and
24 of his Reasons for Judgment, Bowman C.J. said this:
23. In my view there was
nothing illegal in the settlement reached between Shibley Righton on behalf of
the investors and Wayne Lynn on behalf of the Department of National Revenue.
The Department of Justice counsel undoubtedly believed that on the basis of the
decision of Pratte J. in Cohen v. The Queen, 80 DTC 6250, he was
entitled to repudiate the settlement agreed to by the Department of National
Revenue at the level of Assistant Deputy Minister. Although I am bound by the Cohen
decision (Consoltex v. The Queen, 97 DTC 724) if it is taken as
meaning that the Crown (and therefore the taxpayer) is never bound by any
agreement to settle a case, whether legal or illegal, it runs counter to
fundamental precepts of commercial morality. Here a carefully constructed
settlement that is not contrary to the law and that took over two years of
intense negotiation to conclude is, with a snap of the fingers, nullified. If
it is the law that the Crown should never enter into agreements to settle tax
litigation and that if it does it can renege on all settlements so that all tax
disputes must be litigated in this Court, the system breaks down. Far more tax
disputes are settled at the pre-assessment, objection and appeal level than are
ever litigated.
[32]
He then referred to the
Judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal in The Queen v. Enterac
Property Corporation.
[33]
He concluded his
judgment saying that the Crown was legally, if not morally, entitled to
repudiate the agreement and that there was no remedy available in the context
of the proceeding before him, and suggested that:
If the appellants wanted to have the validity of the settlement
tested they might have moved for judgment on the basis of the agreement.
[34]
The judgment in Enterac
Properties is very brief. It affirmed the decision of a motions judge who
declined to strike out of a notice of appeal an allegation of an agreement to
settle, saying that the issue whether the Minister was bound by such an
agreement should be left for trial. In the concluding paragraph MacDonald J.A.,
for the Court, said this:
By proceeding to trial this would also give counsel an opportunity
to ask the Court to revisit the jurisprudence in Nathan Cohen, et al v. Her
Majesty the Queen, 80 DTC 6250 (F.C.A.), David Ludmer, et al. v. Her Majesty
the Queen, 95 DTC 5311 (F.C.A.) leave to appeal refused, [1995] 4 S.C.R.
vii, in light of the comments of Judge Bowman in Consoltex Inc. v. The Queen,
[1980] C.T.C. 318 (F.C.A.) and the statement of Chief Justice Laskin in Smerchanski
and Eco Exploration Co. Ltd. v. Minister of National Revenue, 76 DTC 6247
(S.C.C.)
[35]
I agree with Bowman
C.J. and the authors Hogg, Magee and Li that there are sound policy reasons to
uphold negotiated settlements of tax disputes freely arrived at between
taxpayers and the Minister’s representatives. The addition of subsection 169(3)
to the Act in 1994 is recognition by Parliament of that. It is not for
the Courts to purport to review the propriety of such settlements. That task
properly belongs to the Auditor General.
[36]
The reality is that tax
disputes are settled every day in this country. If they were not, and every
difference had to be litigated to judgment, unmanageable backlogs would quickly
accumulate and the system would break down.
[37]
The Crown settles tort
and contract claims brought by and against it on a regular basis. There is no
reason why it should not settle tax disputes as well. Both sides of a dispute
are entitled to know that if they invest the time and effort required to
negotiate a settlement, then their agreement will bind both parties.
[38]
I have come to the
conclusion, contrary to the views of Bowman C.J. and Professor Hogg to which I
have referred, that it is possible to reconcile the decision in Smerchanski
and Cohen.
[39]
The decisions in Galway and Cohen are grounded in the perceived
illegality of the assessments that the Minister would have to make in order to
consummate those settlements. In Smerchanski there was no suggestion
that the assessments were anything other than the result that flowed from the
application of the law to the facts that were revealed by the audit. It is
obvious, surely, that in the course of the litigation process additional facts may
come to light, and some facts that the Minister may have thought to be true
turn out not to be. It is even possible that the Minster may, in the course of
negotiations, be persuaded that his initial view of the law was not totally
correct.
[40]
In the present case, I
have no reason to believe that the reassessments that the Minister has already
made of both the corporation and Peter Tindall, or the redeterminations that
will be made of Susan Tindall’s CTB entitlements, are not justifiable on the
facts and the law. Put another way, the results agreed to are results that
could be arrived at following the trial of all three cases on their merits.
That being so, it is Smerchanksi, and not Cohen and Galway,
that applies.
[41]
A question arose during
the hearing of the motion before me as to whether there was consideration for
the settlement in this case. The appellant was entitled by subsection 111(1) of
the Act to carry forward its prior years’ losses. The elimination of the
interest and the failure to file penalty were, as I understand it, eliminated
by the application of those losses to the years under appeal.
[42]
However, it is clear
from the affidavit of Kevin Williamson that the appeals of Peter Tindall, Susan
Tindall and the Corporation were settled on an all‑or‑nothing
basis. It was a package deal, as is often the case. Although 1390758 Ontario
Corporation got nothing in the reassessments to which it was not already
entitled, there was consideration in the resolution of the other two cases which
satisfies the requirement: see Loranger v. Haines.
[43]
Had the Minister not
already reassessed the appellant in accordance with the Minutes of Settlement,
I would have allowed the appeals and referred the reassessments that are under
appeal back to the Minister for reconsideration and reassessment in accordance
with the Minutes of Settlement. As he has already made those reassessments the
proper remedy is an order quashing the appeals.
[44]
The motion is allowed.
The appeals herein of 1390758 Ontario Corporation from reassessments for the
2004 and 2005 taxation years issued on June 15, 2007 are hereby quashed.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 4th day of November 2010.
"E.A. Bowie"
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