THORSON,
P.:—This
is
an
appeal
from
the
decision
of
the
Income
Tax
Appeal
Board
(1952),
6
Tax
A.B.C.
155,
dated
March
5,
1952,
which
dismissed
the
appellant’s
appeal
from
its
income
tax
assessment
for
1949.
The
issue
is
whether
the
appellant
was
a
related
company
within
the
meaning
of
Section
36(4)
(b)
(i)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
Statutes
of
Canada,
1948,
chapter
52,
as
amended
by
Section
11
of
chapter
51
of
the
Statutes
of
1951,
assented
to
on
June
30,
1951,
and
made
applicable
to
1949
and
subsequent
taxation
years,
the
relevant
parts
of
which
read
as
follows:
“36.
(4)
For
the
purpose
of
this
section,
one
corporation
is
related
to
another
in
a
taxation
year
if,
at
any
time
in
the
year,
.
.
.
.
(b)
70%
or
more
of
all
the
issued
common
shares
of
the
capital
stock
of
each
of
them
is
owned
directly
or
indirectly
by
(i)
one
person
”
The
facts
of
the
case
are
simple
and
not
in
dispute.
The
appellant
was
incorporated
under
the
laws
of
Canada
and
has
its
head
office
at
North
Bay
in
Ontario.
Another
company
to
which
it
is
said
to
be
related,
namely,
Gamble
Robinson
Limited,
was
also
incorporated
under
the
laws
of
Canada
and
has
its
head
office
at
North
Bay.
All
the
issued
shares
of
each
of
these
companies
were
at
all
times
relevant
to
this
appeal
owned
by
Pacific
Gamble
Robinson
Company,
a
company
incorporated
under
the
laws
of
Delaware,
one
of
the
United
States
of
America,
and
having
its
head
office
at
Seattle
in
the
State
of
Washington.
On
these
facts
it
was
contended
for
the
respondent
that
the
appellant
was
a
related
company
within
the
meaning
of
Section
36(4)
(b)
(i)
of
the
Act
and
properly
assessed
accordingly.
The
submission
of
counsel
for
the
appellant,
put
shortly,
is
that
the
term
‘‘person’’
in
Section
36(4)
(b)
(i)
does
not
extend
to
a
corporation
or,
alternatively,
does
not
extend
to
a
foreign
corporation.
It
was
urged
that
if
it
was
read
as
extending
to
a
corporation
then
Section
36(5),
which
reads
as
follows:
“36.
(5)
When
two
corporations
are
related,
or
are
deemed
by
this
subsection
to
be
related,
to
the
same
corporation
at
the
same
time,
they
shall,
for
the
purpose
of
this
section,
be
deemed
to
be
related
to
each
other.’’
would
be
unnecessary
surplusage,
that
the
specific
reference
in
it
to
corporations
has
the
effect
of
excluding
a
corporation
from
the
meaning
of
the
term
‘‘person’’
in
Section
36(4)
(b)
(i),
that
this
creates
an
ambiguity
in
its
meaning
and
that
such
ambiguity
should
be
resolved
in
the
appellant’s
favour.
I
am
unable
to
agree.
It
is
not
a
proper
approach
to
the
construction
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
to
regard
it
as
necessarily
consistent
in
the
use
of
its
various
terms
throughout
the
Act
or
to
assume
that
inconsistency
in
their
use
necessarily
results
in
ambiguity
in
their
meaning.
In
my
judgment,
there
is
a
complete
answer
to
the
appellant’s
submission
in
the
definition
of
‘‘person’’
in
Section
127(1)
(ab)
which
reads
as
follows:
“127.
(1)
In
this
Act,
(ab)
‘person’
or
any
word
or
expression
descriptive
of
a
person,
includes
any
body
corporate
and
politic,
and
the
heirs,
executors,
administrators
or
other
legal
representatives
of
such
person,
according
to
the
law
of
that
part
of
Canada
to
which
the
context
extends
;
’
’
As
I
understand
this
definition
the
term
‘‘person’’
in
Section
36(4)
(b)
(
1)
of
the
Act
clearly
includes
a
corporation.
Indeed,
it
includes
‘‘any’’
corporation
and
there
is
no
reason
for
holding
that
it
does
not
extend
to
a
foreign
corporation
such
as
Pacific
Gamble
Robinson
Company.
I
am
unable
to
find
any
ambiguity
in
its
meaning
by
reason
of
the
use
of
the
term
“corporations”
in
Section
36(5).
Nor
can
the
appellant
derive
any
assistance
from
the
arm’s
length
provisions
of
Section
127(5).
In
my
opinion,
the
appellant
was
clearly
a
related
corporation
within
the
meaning
of
Section
36(4)
(b)
(i)
of
the
Act
and
properly
assessed
accordingly.
It
follows
that
its
appeal
must
be
dismissed
with
costs.
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