Date: 20100120
Docket: A-173-07
Citation: 2010 FCA 23
CORAM: NADON
J.A.
EVANS
J.A.
TRUDEL
J.A.
BETWEEN:
IAN
GOODFELLOW
Appellant
and
HER MAJESTY
THE QUEEN
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE
COURT
(Delivered from the Bench at Toronto, Ontario, on January 20, 2010)
NADON J.A.
[1]
This
is an appeal from an Order of Sarchuk J. of the Tax Court of Canada, dated
February 23, 2007, which allowed the respondent’s motion for an Order quashing
the appellant’s appeals from tax assessments made by the Minister of National
Revenue (the “Minister”) in respect of his 1991 to 1999 taxation years.
[2]
In
concluding as he did, the Judge was satisfied that the matters raised by the
appellant’s appeals had been finally determined when the Tax Court of Canada
issued Judgments by consent on December 6, 2004 in dockets 2003-3785(IT) and
2003-844(IT). The Judgements, which are identical, read as follows:
UPON reading the
consent to judgement filed:
The appeals
from the assessments made under the “Income Tax Act” with respect to the 1991,
1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 and 1999 taxation years are allowed,
without costs, and the assessments are referred back to the Minister of
National Revenue for reconsideration and reassessment in accordance with the
attached Consent to Judgment.
The appellant
is entitled to no further relief.
[3]
Relying
on this Court’s decision in Canada v. Chevron Canada Resources Ltd.,
[1999] 1 FC 349, the Judge concluded that the respondent’s plea of res
judicata was well-founded.
[4]
We
are all agreed that the Judge made no error in allowing the respondent’s
motion. We are of the view, like the Judge, that the appellant is estopped from
relitigating the cause of action which the consent Judgments of the Tax Court
of Canada finally determined.
[5]
The
fact that these Judgments did not extend to all of the issues that were raised
or could have been raised in the earlier proceedings in connection with the
appellant’s cause of action, i.e. the Minister’s assessment of his tax
liability for the 1991 to 1999 taxation years, does not constitute a bar to the
application of the doctrine of res judicata. As Noël J.A. stated at
paragraph 36 of his Reasons in Chevron, supra:
[36] In
my view, the position of the respondent that the only issues that have been
"conclusively determined" are those that have been specifically
decided is untenable if the doctrine of res judicata, in so far as it bars
further litigation with respect to undecided but related matters, applies. The
law on this point is summarized by the decision of the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council in Thomas v. Trinidad and Tobago (Attorney
General)
[(1990) 115 N.R. 313 (P.C.), at pp. 316-317]:
The
principles applicable to a plea of res judicata are not in doubt and have been
considered in detail in the judgment of the Court of Appeal. It is in the
public interest that there should be finality to litigation and that no person
should be subjected to action at the instance of the same individual more than
once in relation to the same issue. The principle applies not only where the
remedy sought and the grounds therefore are the same in the second action as in
the first but also where, the subject matter of the two actions being the same,
it is sought to raise in the second action matters of fact or law directly
related to the subject matter which could have been but were not raised in the
first action. The classic statement on the subject is contained in the
following passage from the judgment of Wigram, V.C., in Henderson v.
Henderson (1843), 3 Hare 100, at page 115:
". . .
where a given matter becomes the subject of litigation in, and of adjudication
by, a court of competent jurisdiction, the Court requires the parties to
that litigation to bring forward their whole case, and will not (except
under special circumstances) permit the same parties to open the same
subject of litigation in respect of matter which might have been brought
forward as part of the subject in contest, but which was not brought forward,
only because they have, from negligence, inadvertence, or even accident,
omitted part of their case. The plea of res judicata applies, except in special
cases, not only to points upon which the court was actually required by the
parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which
properly belonged to the subject of litigation, and which the parties,
exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time."
[6]
Nor
is it a bar to the application of the doctrine that the Judgements on which the
respondent relies were rendered by consent. In Chevron, supra, the
appellant, successful on its appeal, also relied on a consent judgment rendered
by the Tax Court in support of its argument that that judgment had
“conclusively determined” the matters that gave rise to the reassessments which
the taxpayer sought to challenge.
[7]
For
these reasons, the appeal will be dismissed with costs.
"M. Nadon"
FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL
NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET: A-173-07
(APPEAL FROM AN ORDER OF THE HONOURABLE
A.A. SARCHUK, OF THE TAX COURT OF CANADA, DATED FEBRUARY 23, 2007, DOCKET NO. 2005-2805
(IT) I)
STYLE OF CAUSE: IAN
GOODFELLOW v.
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
PLACE OF HEARING: TORONTO, ONTARIO
DATE OF HEARING: JANUARY 20, 2010
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
OF THE COURT BY: (NADON,
EVANS & TRUDEL JJ.A.)
DELIVERED FROM THE BENCH BY: NADON J.A.
APPEARANCES:
|
Ian Goodfellow
|
FOR THE APPELLANT
(SELF-REPRESENTED)
|
|
Laurent
Bartleman
Franco Calabrese
|
FOR THE RESPONDENT
|
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
|
N/A
|
FOR THE
APPELLANT
(SELF-REPRESENTED)
|
|
John H. Sims,
Q.C.
Deputy Attorney General of Canada
Toronto, Ontario
|
FOR THE
RESPONDENT
|
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