lacobucci,
C.J.:
—
This
is
an
appeal
by
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
("Minister")
from
the
judgment
of
the
Federal
Court-Trial
Division,
which
dismissed
with
costs
an
appeal
by
the
Minister
from
a
judgment
of
the
Tax
Review
Board.
The
effect
of
both
the
judgment
of
the
Trial
Division
and
of
the
Tax
Review
Board
was
to
permit
each
of
MerBan
Capital
Corporation
Limited
("MerBan"),
George
H.
Montague
("Montague"),
and
Michael
F.K.
Carter
("Carter")
to
deduct
in
computing
their
income
for
tax
purposes
certain
amounts
paid
to
the
Toronto-Dominion
Bank
(the
"Bank").
The
appeals
before
the
Federal
Court-Trial
Division
were
heard
on
common
evidence
and
it
is
agreed
that
the
result
in
this
appeal
with
respect
to
MerBan
will
also
determine
the
result
of
the
appeals
with
respect
to
Montague
and
Carter
(MerBan,
Montague
and
Carter
are
sometimes
referred
to
herein
as
the
"Respondents").
Facts
The
facts
are
somewhat
complicated
but
are
of
considerable
importance.
MerBan,
during
the
relevant
years
in
question,
was
engaged
in
the
business
of
merchant
banking
which
was
conceded
at
trial
by
the
Minister
and
found
as
a
fact
by
the
learned
trial
judge.
MerBan
invested
in
corporations
and
made
certain
services
available
to
them.
Its
objects
included,
among
other
things,
making
active
equity
investments
for
the
purposes
of
acquiring
control
in
growing
companies,
making
its
resources
otherwise
available
to
prospective
clients,
arranging
or
providing
financing,
and
providing
financial
and
management
expertise
for
the
employment
of
a
variety
of
experts
and
consultants.
MerBan
did
not
trade
in
company
shares
but
invested
in
them
and
when
it
disposed
of
an
investment
in
shares,
it
reported
the
disposition
as
being
on
account
of
capital
on
its
income
tax
returns.
Fees
earned
from
the
provision
of
services
to
companies
in
which
MerBan
had
invested
were
received
by
MerBan
Securities
Ltd.,
a
subsidiary
of
MerBan.
Name
|
Taxation
Year
|
Amount
|
MerBan
Capital
|
1974
|
$405,000.00
|
Corporation
Limited
|
|
George
H.
Montague
|
1974
|
$5,570.20
|
|
1973
|
$8,027.80
|
Michael
F.K.
Carter
|
1974
|
$1,823.40
|
|
1973
|
$2,676.60
|
Carter
and
Montague
were
officers
of
MerBan.
As
officers,
they
along
with
other
officers
of
MerBan
were
beneficiaries
of
a
trust
with
a
company
named
Casamont
Ltd.
as
trustee,
which
generally
participated
with
MerBan
to
the
extent
of
ten
per
cent
in
any
investment
which
MerBan
undertook.
In
the
late
summer
of
1972,
MerBan
had
become
interested
in
participating
in
investments
surrounding
the
Mackenzie
River
Pipeline
Project
which,
at
the
time,
were
among
attractive
business
opportunities
in
Canada.
As
a
result,
MerBan
became
interested
in
making
an
investment
in
a
public
company
called
Kaps
Transport
Ltd.
("Kaps")
that
operated
out
of
Western
Canada
and
the
Northwest
Territories.
MerBan
hoped
that
by
making
a
significant
equity
investment
in
Kaps,
it
could
introduce
more
efficient
management
techniques
and
thereby
increase
the
earnings
of
Kaps
and
provide
dividend
income.
MerBan
also
hoped
to
enhance
its
reputation
as
an
institutional
merchant
banker
and
to
generate
financing
and
consulting
fees
directly
to
MerBan
and
its
associated
companies.
On
September
21,
1972,
MerBan
acquired
options
to
purchase
450,000
common
shares
of
Kaps
at
$10
per
share
from
its
controlling
shareholders,
the
three
Kapchinsky
brothers.
It
was
also
agreed
that
if
MerBan
exercised
the
options,
the
Kapchinsky
brothers
would
place
the
balance
of
their
shares
of
Kaps,
in
respect
of
which
MerBan
did
not
have
an
option
to
acquire,
in
a
voting
trust
over
which
MerBan
would
have
absolute
control.
In
order
to
limit
its
liability
and
to
obtain
financing,
MerBan
decided
not
to
purchase
the
Kaps
shares
itself,
but
to
incorporate
a
subsidiary
and
have
the
subsidiary
purchase
the
shares
and
borrow
the
majority
of
the
funds
necessary
to
purchase
the
shares.
The
purchase
of
the
450,000
shares
under
the
option
at
an
agreed
price
of
$10
per
share
represented
a
$4.5
million
investment
to
MerBan
of
which
it
was
able
to
commit
only
$1,250,000
of
its
own
funds
such
that
the
balance
required
financing.
MerBan
thus
caused
to
be
incorporated
two
subsidiary
corporations,
one
called
1216825
Investments
Ltd.,
which
name
was
subsequently
changed
to
MKH
Investments
Ltd.
("MKH"),
and
MerBan-Kaps
Holdings
Ltd.
("Holdings").
The
subsidiary
corporations,
MKH
and
Holdings,
had
the
same
head
office,
auditors
and
law
firm
as
MerBan,
and
generally
the
same
offices.
The
subsidiaries
did
not
engage
in
any
transaction
other
than
those
relating
to
the
acquisition
of
the
Kaps
shares.
The
shares
of
MKH
were
owned
in
the
following
proportions:
MerBan
|
81%
|
Casamont
Ltd.
as
Trustee
|
|
for
the
MerBan
officers
|
9%
|
Reinhold
Kapchinsky
|
10%
|
Reinhold
Kapchinsky
acquired
ten
per
cent
of
the
shares
of
MKH
because
he
was
the
President
of
Kaps
and
MerBan
felt
that
it
was
important
that
he
continue
to
have
an
interest
in
Kaps.
Shares
of
MKH
were
purchased
by
the
shareholders
for
an
aggregate
price
of
$1.25
million.
The
shares
of
Holdings
were
owned
100
per
cent
by
MKH,
which
purchased
the
shares
of
Holdings
for
a
purchase
price
of
$4.
Although
MerBan
did
not
own
all
the
outstanding
shares
of
MKH,
and
MKH
in
turn
was
the
sole
owner
of
the
shares
of
Holdings,
I
refer
to
both
MKH
and
Holdings
as
subsidiaries
of
MerBan.
Holdings
purchased
the
450,000
Kaps
shares
for
an
aggregate
purchase
price
of
$4.5
million
dollars.
It
obtained
the
necessary
purchase
funds
through
a
loan
of
$1
million
from
the
Bank
under
the
terms
of
a
6
per
cent
income
debenture,
$4
from
the
sale
of
its
shares
to
MKH
and
the
balance
of
$3.5
million
less
$4
through
an
interest-free
loan
from
MKH.
MKH
in
turn
obtained
the
$3.5
million,
which
was
transferred
to
Holdings,
in
the
following
manner.
MKH
borrowed
$2.25
million
from
the
Bank
on
a
term
loan
at
a
rate
of
prime
plus
one
per
cent.
The
remaining
$1.25
million
was
obtained
from
the
sale
of
MKH's
shares
to
its
shareholders:
MerBan,
Casamont
Ltd.
and
Reinhold
Kapchinsky
(the
“MerBan
Group”).
To
obtain
the
above-mentioned
loans
from
the
Bank,
Holdings,
MKH
and
the
MerBan
Group,
were
required
to
do
the
following:
(i)
Holdings
agreed
to
repay
the
$1
million
loan
in
accordance
with
the
terms
of
the
income
debenture
and
to
pay
interest
at
6
per
cent
when
required
under
the
debenture;
(ii)
Holdings
was
required
to
give
MKH
a
promissory
note
for
the
approximately
$3.5
million
it
had
borrowed
from
MKH;
(iii)
Holdings
was
required
to
guarantee
to
the
Bank
that
MKH
would
pay
to
it
the
principal
and
interest
on
the
$2.25
million
loan
borrowed
by
MKH
from
the
bank;
(iv)
Holdings
was
required
to
give
to
the
Bank
an
option
to
purchase
150,000
Kaps
shares
at
a
purchase
price
of
$10
per
share;
(v)
Holdings
was
required
to
pledge
to
the
Bank
the
450,000
Kaps
shares
purchased
by
it
as
security
for
the
$1
million
income
debenture
of
Holdings
and
the
$2.25
million
loan
of
MKH;
(vi)
In
turn,
MKH
agreed
to
repay
the
$2.25
million
borrowed
by
MKH
from
the
Bank
together
with
interest
at
prime
plus
one
per
cent,
and
MKH
was
required
to
pledge
to
the
Bank
the
shares
of
Holdings
and
the
promissory
note
of
Holdings
in
the
amount
of
approximately
$3.5
million
as
security
for
the
$2.25
million
loan
from
the
Bank
to
MKH;
(vii)
The
MerBan
Group,
in
a
document
referred
to
as
the
"deficiency
agreement"
and
in
which
they
were
collectively
referred
to
as
guarantors,
were
required
to
“unconditionally
guarantee
to
and
covenant
and
agree
with
the
Bank”
that
they
will
pay
or
cause
the
borrower
[MKH]
to
pay
all
interest
up
to
$500,000
on
the
loan
as
and
when
the
same
shall
from
time
to
time
become
due
and
payable
in
accordance
with
the
terms
of
the
loan
agreement
relating
to
the
$2.25
million
loan
from
the
Bank
to
MKH.
In
the
same
deficiency
agreement,
the
MerBan
Group
also
agreed
"that
[t]hey
will
pay
or
cause
to
be
paid
to
the
Bank”
the
interest
on
the
$1
million
6
per
cent
income
debenture
which
Holdings
issued
to
the
Bank.
The
Bank
required
the
MerBan
Group
to
be
liable
for
the
payment
of
interest
on
MKH's
loan
as
it
was
believed
that
MKH
would
not
have
sufficient
cash
flow
to
pay
the
interest
on
its
loan.
However,
the
liability
was
limited
to
$500,000
as
this
would
approximate
the
total
interest
owing
for
the
term
of
the
loan,
and
the
MerBan
Group's
liability
was
limited
to
interest
only
and
did
not
extend
to
the
principal
of
the
loan.
In
furtherance
of
the
above-mentioned
transactions,
the
MerBan
Group
had
its
subsidiary
corporation,
Holdings,
purchase
the
Kaps
shares
for
$4.5
million
on
or
about
October
16,
1972.
As
stated,
the
MerBan
Group
was
required
to
invest
only
$1.25
million
and
to
“guarantee”
the
payment
of
$500,000
of
interest.
The
results
of
the
investment
in
and
business
prospects
of
Kaps
did
not
materialize
as
the
parties
had
hoped
for
or
expected.
As
interest
became
due
on
the
loan
owing
by
MKH
to
the
Bank,
the
Bank
would
debit
the
account
of
MKH
for
the
interest
owing.
This
would
place
MKH's
Bank
account
in
an
overdraft
position
and
the
Bank
would
notify
MerBan
of
this
and
MerBan
would
write
a
cheque
to
MKH
for
the
interest.
On
some
occasions
the
cheque
for
interest
went
directly
to
the
Bank
instead
of
to
MKH.
In
preparing
its
financial
statements
and
filing
its
income
tax
returns
for
the
1972,
1973,
and
1974
taxation
years,
MKH
treated
the
amounts
paid
by
the
MerBan
Group
on
account
of
the
MKH
loan
from
the
Bank
as
loans
made
to
it
by
its
shareholders.
In
filing
its
income
tax
returns
for
the
1972,
1973,
and
1974
taxation
years,
MKH
deducted
the
interest
payments
made
on
account
of
its
loan
from
the
Bank
as
an
expense,
and
consequently
reported
a
loss
in
each
year.
In
its
financial
statements
for
1975
and
its
tax
return
for
the
1975
taxation
year,
MKH
revised
the
entries
for
the
previous
years
by
removing
the
accumulated
loss
and
removing
the
shareholder
liability.
This
was
done
because
it
was
decided
that
MerBan
would
file
its
1974
return
of
income
claiming
the
interest
payments
on
the
MKH
loan
as
an
expense
in
computing
MerBan's
income.
MerBan,
Montague,
and
Carter
in
filing
their
income
tax
returns
sought
to
deduct,
in
computing
their
income
for
tax
purposes,
the
amounts
paid
on
account
of
the
interest
owing
on
the
MKH
loan.
The
Minister
of
National
Revenue
in
reassessing
the
taxes
payable
by
them
disallowed
the
deduction
of
these
amounts
which
they
claimed.
Judgments
(a)
Tax
Review
Board
In
stating
the
issue
as
to
whether
or
not
MerBan
could
claim
the
amount
of
$405,000
as
interest
expense
such
that
its
non-capital
loss
for
the
taxation
year
in
question
would
be
$627,457
(or
$222,457,
if
the
claim
were
disallowed),
the
Chairman
of
the
Tax
Review
Board
concluded:
The
evidence
established
that
all
concerned,
including
the
Toronto
Dominion
Bank,
accepted
that
M.K.H.,
Merban-Kaps
Holdings
Limited
and
Merban
were
in
fact
the
same
interest
group
all
of
whom,
albeit
indirectly
in
some
instances
stood
to
benefit
from
the
acquisition
of
Kaps
Transport
Limited
and
all
were
willing
to
pay
the
interest
on
the
loan
which
made
the
acquisition
possible
and
which
was
reflected
in
the
wording
of
the
loan
agreement,
not
as
a
guarantee
payment,
but
as
a
direct
liability.
I
must
conclude
that
the
payment
made
in
the
1974
taxation
year
by
the
appellant
Merban
of
$405,000.00
as
interest
due
on
the
loan
of
$2,250,000.00,
was
a
deductible
expense,
as
were
the
payments
made
by
the
appellant’s
Carter
and
Montague
(who
had
a
beneficial
interest
in
Casamont
Trust)
for
the
taxation
years
1973
and
1974.
.
.
.
(b)
Federal
Court-Trial
Division
The
Minister
appealed
the
decision
of
the
Tax
Review
Board
to
the
Federal
Court—Trial
Division.
In
his
judgment
dismissing
the
appeal,
the
trial
judge
made
the
following
findings
on
the
evidence:
(1)
I
find
that
the
whole
venture
was
MerBan's,
that
Merban's
[sic]
risk
was
exclusive
and
that
MerBan
alone
stood
to
gain
or
lose
from
it;
(2)
As
corollary,
I
find
that
the
intervening
companies
namely
MKH
Investments
Ltd.
and
MerBan-Kaps
Holdings
Ltd.,
could
neither
profit
nor
lose
from
their
participation.
They
may
be
called
paper
companies
created
for
a
single
and
individual
purpose.
Once
that
purpose
had
been
achieved,
they
were
functus,
They
[sic]
were
clones
of
MerBan
and
nothing
more.
(3)
I
find
that
the
creation
of
the
intermediate
companies
was
for
technical
purposes
and
to
satisfy
the
requirements
of
both
parties.
As
the
memorandum
of
September
28,1972
clearly
indicates,
the
Bank
had
to
find
some
justification
for
its
participation
along
the
lines
of
the
proposal
made
to
it
by
MerBan.
The
Bank
through
its
equity
group
wanted
an
option
on
future
participation
in
Kaps
shares.
It
was
also
keenly
interested
in
securing
Kaps
banking
business
and
it
relied
on
MerBan's
representation
to
it
in
this
respect.
The
deal
between
the
parties
was
a
quid
pro
quo
and
without
being
able
to
distinguish
between
the
quid
and
the
quo,
there
was
mutual
agreement
that
providing
every
block
in
the
financing
deal
was
in
place,
the
Bank
was
prepared
to
waive
recourse
against
MerBan
and
limit
liability
for
the
loan
interest
to
the
sum
of
$500,000.
(4)
I
find
that
the
Bank
could
not
conceivably
look
to
either
of
the
intervening
companies
for
any
interest
payments.
Apart
from
the
possibility
of
dividend
payments
to
Holdings
from
Kaps,
the
two
companies
had
no
operations
which
might
have
generated
income
to
service
the
debt
nor
did
they
have
any
assets
which
had
not
already
been
pledged
directly
or
indirectly
to
the
Bank
and
which
the
Bank
could
have
seized
in
satisfaction.
(5)
I
find
on
the
evidence
that
there
was
never
any
pretense
on
the
part
of
the
parties
involved
to
look
otherwise
on
the
intervening
companies
as
being
essentially
artificialities.
The
charging
and
collecting
of
outstanding
interest
by
the
Bank
were
from
MerBan
and
MerBan
alone.
The
process,
which
as
I
understood
it,
was
a
call
by
the
Bank
to
MerBan
to
pay
overdraft
in
the
intermediary's
account
which
overdraft
had
been
incurred
by
a
bank
entry
representing
an
interest
payout
to
the
Bank,
was
itself
artificial
and
constituted
mere
bookkeeping
entries
bereft
of
any
substance.
(6)
I
find
that
the
technical
arrangements
which
were
made
were
not
for
the
exclusive
benefit
of
MerBan.
I
find
that:
(a)
the
importance
of
the
non-recourse
feature
on
the
bank
loan
must
be
limited,
in
my
view,
by
the
realities
of
the
situation
then
existing.
The
evidence
is
clear
that
the
Bank
enjoyed
excellent
coverage
on
its
accommodation.
Furthermore,
under
the
terms
of
the
hypothecation
instrument
the
Bank
could
sell
the
Kaps
shares
"without
notice
whenever
it
should
think
proper
to
do
so."
Further,
the
Bank
did
sell
the
shares
when
their
value
dropped
to
$7.50,
a
level
where
MerBan's
equity
of
$1,250,000
had
been
effectively
consumed.
(b)
the
limitation
on
loan
interest
of
$500,000
must
also
be
viewed
with
the
same
sense
of
the
realities.
The
loan
agreement
was
for
a
relatively
short-term
of
thirty
months.
At
the
rate
charged
by
the
Bank,
at
that
time,
the
commitment
by
MerBan
amounted
to
some
18
months
of
interest
payment.
The
trial
judge
concluded
that
MerBan's
obligation
to
the
Bank
was
not
one
of
guarantee,
the
essence
of
which
involved
a
contingent
liability
which
is
triggered
on
the
prime
debtor's
default;
but
rather
that
MerBan
was
a
prime
obligor.
The
trial
judge
then
went
on
to
discuss
a
number
of
authorities
dealing
with
the
deductibility
of
interest
and
re-emphasized
the
“one
on
one"
relationship
between
the
Bank
and
MerBan,
notwithstanding
the
arrangements
involving
intermediate
subsidiaries.
He
then
concluded:
Having
made
the
foregoing
findings,
I
need
not
engage
in
a
detailed
analysis
as
to
whether
the
amount
paid
by
MerBan
to
the
Bank
is
deductible
under
Section
18
or
Section
20
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
Whether
that
payment
is
categorized
as
interest
in
the
true
sense,
or
a
cost
of
doing
business,
or
a
flat-rate
charge,
or
rent
for
the
lease
of
the
Bank's
money,
the
amount
constitutes
an
allowable
deduction.
Legislation
The
major
sections
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
(the
"Act")
which
are
germane
to
this
appeal
are
the
following:
18.(1)
In
computing
the
income
of
a
taxpayer
from
a
business
or
property
no
deduction
shall
be
made
in
respect
of
(a)
an
outlay
or
expense
except
to
the
extent
that
it
was
made
or
incurred
by
the
taxpayer
for
the
purpose
of
gaining
or
producing
income
from
the
business
or
property;
(b)
an
outlay,
loss
or
replacement
of
capital,
a
payment
on
account
of
capital
or
an
allowance
in
respect
of
depreciation,
obsolescence
or
depletion
except
as
expressly
permitted
by
this
Part;
20.(1)
Notwithstanding
paragraphs
18(1)(a),
(b)and
(h),
in
computing
a
taxpayer's
income
for
a
taxation
year
from
a
business
or
property,
there
may
be
deducted
such
of
the
following
amounts
as
are
wholly
applicable
to
that
source
or
such
part
of
the
following
amounts
as
may
reasonably
be
regarded
as
applicable
thereto:
(c)
an
amount
paid
in
the
year
or
payable
in
respect
of
the
year
(depending
upon
the
method
regularly
followed
by
the
taxpayer
in
computing
his
income),
pursuant
to
a
legal
obligation
to
pay
interest
on
(i)
borrowed
money
used
for
the
purpose
of
earning
income
from
a
business
or
property
(other
than
borrowed
money
used
to
acquire
property
the
income
from
which
would
be
exempt
or
to
acquire
a
life
insurance
policy),
(ii)
an
amount
payable
for
property
acquired
for
the
purpose
of
gaining
or
producing
income
therefrom
or
for
the
purpose
of
gaining
or
producing
income
from
a
business
(other
than
property
the
income
from
which
would
be
exempt
or
property
that
is
an
interest
in
a
life
insurance
policy),
or
or
a
reasonable
amount
in
respect
thereof,
whichever
is
the
lesser;
(e)
an
expense
incurred
in
the
year,
(i)
in
the
course
of
issuing
or
selling
shares
of
the
capital
stock
of
the
taxpayer,
or
(ii)
in
the
course
of
borrowing
money
used
by
the
taxpayer
for
the
purpose
of
earning
income
from
a
business
or
property
(other
than
money
used
by
the
taxpayer
for
the
purpose
of
acquiring
property
the
income
from
which
would
be
exempt),
but
not
including
any
amount
in
respect
of
(iii)
a
commission
or
bonus
paid
or
payable
to
a
person
to
whom
the
shares
were
issued
or
sold
or
from
whom
the
money
was
borrowed,
or
for
or
on
account
of
services
rendered
by
a
person
as
a
salesman,
agent
or
dealer
in
securities
in
the
course
of
issuing
or
selling
the
shares
or
borrowing
the
money,
or
(iv)
an
amount
paid
or
payable
as
or
on
account
of
the
principal
amount
of
the
indebtedness
incurred
in
the
course
of
borrowing
the
money,
or
as
or
on
account
of
interest;
Issues
Although
the
major
issue
in
this
appeal
centres
on
the
deductibility
for
income
tax
purposes
of
the
amounts
paid
by
MerBan
on
the
loan
from
the
Bank
to
MKH
pursuant
to
the
deficiency
agreement,
that
issue
in
turn
raises
the
following
questions:
1.
Whether
the
learned
trial
judge
erred
in
ignoring
the
separate
existence
of
MerBan
from
its
subsidiaries,
MKH
and
Holdings,
in
the
transactions
undertaken
by
them?
2.
Whether
the
trial
judge
erred
in
holding
that
the
disputed
payments
were
incurred
for
a
business
purpose
and
that
he
did
not
have
to
determine
which
section
of
the
Act
permitted
the
deduction
of
the
amounts?
3.
Apart
from
the
holding
of
the
trial
judge,
were
the
disputed
payments
nonetheless
deductible
under:
(1)
paragraph
18(1)(a)
of
the
Act
and
not
prohibited
under
paragraph
18(1)(b)
of
the
Act;
or
under
(2)
paragraph
20(1)(c)
or
20(1)(e)
of
the
Act?
For
reasons
that
follow,
I
respectfully
disagree
with
the
decision
of
the
trial
judge
and
would
allow
the
appeal
with
costs.
I
should
like
to
discuss
each
of
the
above-stated
issues
in
turn.
Separate
Existence
The
issue
of
separate
existence
of
MerBan
from
its
subsidiaries
is
important
because
of
the
basic
rule
that
a
taxpayer
can
deduct
only
expenses
that
it
incurred
to
earn
its
income.
If,
as
counsel
for
the
Minister
contends,
MerBan
is
to
be
treated
as
a
separate
legal
entity
from
its
subsidiaries,
then
MerBan
has
considerable
difficulty
in
arguing
that
the
payment
to
the
Bank
was
incurred
to
earn
MerBan's
income
because
the
source
of
the
income
—
primarily
dividends
to
be
paid
on
the
Kaps
shares
held
by
Holdings
—
was
that
of
its
subsidiary,
Holdings.
Moreover,
if
the
separate
existence
of
the
corporations
is
recognized,
then
it
is
also
more
difficult,
as
will
be
discussed
later,
for
MerBan
to
maintain
it
can
deduct
the
payments
made
to
the
Bank
under
paragraph
20(1)(c)
of
the
Act
because
the
payments
to
the
Bank
were
not
interest
in
respect
of
indebtedness
incurred
by
MerBan
in
that
the
money
borrowed
was
effected
by
MKH
not
by
MerBan.
I
do
not
agree
that
the
separate
existence
of
the
parent
and
subsidiary
corporations
involved
in
this
matter
should
be
disregarded.
In
my
view,
each
of
the
corporations:
MerBan,
MKH,
Holdings,
played
specific
roles
and
for
income
tax
purposes
were
not
"clones"
or
"artificialities"
as
described
by
the
trial
judge.
MerBan
was
no
doubt
the
driving
force
behind
and
ultimate
beneficiary
of
the
subsidiaries’
activities,
restricted
as
they
were.
It
may
be
that
the
trial
judge
believed
that
the
subsidiaries
as
mere
instrumentalities
served
no
business
purpose.
But
it
has
been
held
that,
even
when
there
is
a
lack
of
business
purpose,
courts
will
recognize
otherwise
legally
valid
and
complete
transactions
or
legally
created
relationships
which
are
clearly
enforceable.
In
this
case,
MerBan
wanted
to
limit
its
liability
and
to
employ
the
financing
device
of
an
income
debenture
and
accordingly
used
two
subsidiaries
to
accomplish
these
specific,
highly
important
and
legitimate
purposes.
Accordingly,
I
do
not
see
why
the
separate
legal
existence
should
be
ignored
when
matters
have
not
turned
out
as
the
parties
may
have
intended
such
that
MerBan
is
entitled
in
effect
to
treat
itself
and
its
subsidiaries
as
one
entity
for
tax
purposes.
There
was
no
"sham",
"agency"
or
"nominee"
relationship
as
has
been
interpreted
by
the
cases
for
a
court
to
conclude
in
the
case
at
bar
that
separate
corporate
existence
should
be
disregarded.
Consequently,
the
normal
rule
of
a
corporation
being
a
separate
and
distinct
legal
entity
from
its
shareholders
applies.
I
should
add
that
counsel
for
the
respondents
argued
that
the
finding
of
the
trial
judge
on
ignoring
the
separate
existence
of
the
corporations
is
one
that
should
not
be
disturbed
by
an
appellate
court.
However,
even
assuming
that
the
finding
is
one
of
fact
or
inference
from
fact,
it
is
not
one
which
precludes
this
Court
from
overturning
it.
In
this
connection,
I
adopt
what
Urie,
J.A.
said
in
The
Queen
v.
Gurd's
Products
Company
Limited:
The
first
question
for
this
Court,
then,
must
be
whether
or
not
an
intermediate
appellate
court
ought
to
disturb
this
finding.
The
short
answer
to
that
question,
as
I
see
it,
is
that
if
this
is
a
proper
case
the
Court
may
do
so.
What
is
a
proper
case?
In
Bemax
[sic]
v.
Austin
Motor
Co,
Ltd,
1
All
ER
326
at
329,
it
was
said
that
"Where
the
point
in
dispute
is
the
proper
inference
to
be
drawn
from
proved
facts"
and
where
there
is
no
question
of
the
credibility
or
reliability
of
any
witness,
as
here,
an
appeal
court
is
in
as
good
a
position
to
evaluate
the
evidence
as
the
trial
judge
"and
ought
not
to
shrink
from
that
task,
though
it
ought,
of
course,
to
give
weight
to
his
opinion.
This
view
of
the
role
of
an
appellate
court
was
affirmed
by
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
in
Lessard
v.
Paquin
et
al,
[1975]
1
SCR
665
at
675.
Since
neither
of
the
parties
dispute
the
findings
of
fact
made
by
the
trial
judge,
I
have
no
difficulty
in
concluding
that
this
Court
is
entitled
to
disagree
with
the
trial
judge
on
the
inferences
to
be
drawn
from
such
facts
if
the
Court
is
of
the
opinion
that
these
inferences
cannot,
in
the
circumstances,
be
supported.
I
am
of
the
opinion
that
the
inferences
drawn
by
the
trial
judge
on
the
question
of
separate
existence
cannot
be
supported.
Deductibility
of
Disputed
Payments
(1)
General
Principles
As
noted,
the
trial
judge
held
that
the
disputed
payments
were
incurred
for
a
business
purpose
and
that
he
need
not
specify
whether
a
deduction
was
permissible
under
either
section
18
or
20
of
the
Act.
With
respect,
I
do
not
agree
with
that
approach.
The
scheme
of
the
Act
relating
to
allowable
deductions
puts
considerable
emphasis
on
the
nature
of
the
deductions
and,
in
my
view,
it
is
most
important
to
specify
quite
clearly
the
statutory
basis
of
a
proposed
deduction.
Subject
to
the
statutory
qualifications
and
exceptions
in
the
Act,
an
expense
to
be
currently
deductible
from
business
or
property
income
must:
1.
be
deductible
in
computing
“profit”
in
accordance
with
ordinary
commercial
practice;
2.
have
been
incurred
for
the
purpose
of
earning
income;
3.
be
reasonable
in
amount;
and
4.
not
be
(i)
a
“capital
outlay"
or
“capital
expenditure",
viz,
not
incurred
to
acquire
a
long-term
asset
or
advantage;
(ii)
artificial
in
nature;
(iii)
a
personal
expenditure;
(iv)
otherwise
expressly
prohibited
by
the
Act.
Thus
the
payments
made
by
MerBan
might
well
be
deductible
under
(1),
(2)
and
(3)
above,
but
be
disqualified
from
deductibility
under
an
item
in
(4)
above.
In
other
words
and
as
will
be
discussed
below,
the
payments
may
have
been
made
for
the
purpose
of
earning
income
(paragraph
18(1)(a))
but
if
they
could
be
characterized
as
capital
outlays
(paragraph
18(1)(b))
they
would
be
non-deductible.
All
this
is
to
say
that
I
believe
it
is
very
important
to
specify
the
provisions
of
the
Act
pursuant
to
which
a
deduction
can
be
made.
However,
these
comments
do
not
dispose
of
the
matter
because
it
must
be
determined
whether
MerBan
is
entitled
to
claim
a
deduction
by
reference
to
a
specific
provision
of
the
Act.
In
this
respect,
the
major
sections
of
the
Act
applicable
to
the
facts
are
sections
18
and
20
to
which
I
now
turn.
(2)
Section
18
At
the
outset,
I
believe
it
worthwhile
to
comment
on
the
nature
of
paragraph
18(1)(a)
of
the
Act
upon
which
counsel
for
the
respondents
placed
great
emphasis
in
argument.
Paragraph
18(1)(a)
is
not,
as
counsel
for
the
respondents
appeared
to
argue,
a
provision
which
entitles
a
taxpayer
to
deduct
an
amount
paid.
Rather
paragraph
18(1)(a),
expressed
in
negative
terms,
limits
the
right
to
claim
deductions;
it
does
not
authorize
the
right
to
deduct
an
amount
since,
as
has
been
pointed
out,
such
right
must
be
found
elsewhere
in
the
Act.
Paragraph
18(1)(a)
is
one
of
the
hurdles
that
an
outlay
has
to
go
through
to
enjoy
the
status
of
deductibility
under
the
Act;
the
paragraph
does
not
confer
the
status
of
deductibility
if
its
test
is
met.
In
that
connection,
counsel
for
the
Minister
did
not
argue
very
strongly
that
the
payments
of
MerBan
did
not
meet
the
test
of
paragraph
18(1)(a).
Counsel
did
argue
that
paragraph
18(1)(a)
of
the
Act
requires
an
outlay
to
be
incurred
for
the
purpose
of
gaining
or
producing
income
from
its
business
and
MerBan's
payments
to
the
Bank
were
made
to
enable
a
subsidiary,
Holdings,
to
acquire
property
(the
Kaps
shares)
to
enable
Holdings,
in
turn,
to
earn
income.
Consequently,
a
payment
made
to
allow
a
subsidiary
to
earn
income
is
a
payment
made
in
respect
of
another
taxpayer's
business
and
arguably
does
not
meet
the
requirements
of
paragraph
18(1)(a).
On
the
other
hand,
it
should
be
noted
that
paragraph
18(1)(a)
speaks
of
an
outlay
or
expense
incurred
for
the
purpose
of
gaining
or
producing
income
from
the
business
or
property.
MerBan's
property
in
this
connection
was
its
shares
in
MKH,
and
through
MKH,
its
shares
in
Holdings.
So
MerBan's
payments
to
the
Bank
were
arguably
made
for
the
purpose
of
gaining
income
through
the
eventual
flow-through
to
MerBan
of
dividends
on
the
Kaps
shares
owned
by
Holdings.
However,
I
do
not
find
it
necessary
to
comment
further
on
whether
the
requirements
of
paragraph
18(1)(a)
are
met
because
even
if
they
are,
I
am
of
the
view
that
the
MerBan
payments
come
within
the
provisions
of
paragraph
18(1)(b)
as
capital
outlays
or
expenditures
and
are
therefore
not
deductible.
There
was
much
argument
before
us
as
to
the
nature
of
the
undertaking
which
gave
rise
to
the
payments
made
by
MerBan.
Counsel
for
the
Minister,
pointing
to
the
terminology
used
in
the
agreement
and
authority,
argued
that
the
so-called
deficiency
agreement
amounted
to
a
guarantee
by
MerBan
of
the
interest
owing
by
MKH
on
its
loan
from
the
Bank.
As
a
guarantee,
it
was
in
the
nature
of
a
capital
outlay
and
therefore
not
deductible
by
operation
of
paragraph
18(1)(b)
of
the
Act.
In
the
alternative,
counsel
for
the
Minister
argued
that,
even
if
the
undertaking
were
not
one
of
guarantee
but
an
agreement
of
indemnity,
it
was
nonetheless
still
of
a
capital
nature
and
prohibited
by
paragraph
18(1)(b).
On
the
other
hand,
counsel
for
the
respondents
argued
that
MerBan's
undertaking
in
the
deficiency
agreement
made
it
a
prime
obligor
and
this
was
the
conclusion
arrived
at
by
the
trial
judge
who
said
the
obligation
of
MerBan
was
direct
and
not
contingent
as
is
the
case
with
guarantees.
Admittedly,
the
language
used
by
the
parties
in
the
deficiency
agreement
is
ambiguous
as
to
whether
the
undertaking
amounted
to
a
guarantee.
But
whether
the
undertaking
is
a
guarantee
or
indemnity
or
even
a
hybrid,
I
am
of
the
opinion
that
in
any
case
the
amounts
paid
were
capital
in
nature.
The
classic
statement
of
the
capital
expenditure
or
outlay
rule
was
given
by
Viscount
Cave,
L.C.
in
British
Insulated
&
Helsby
Cables
Ltd.
v.
Atherton:
But
when
an
expenditure
is
made,
not
only
once
and
for
all,
but
with
a
view
to
bringing
into
existence
an
asset
or
an
advantage
for
the
enduring
benefit
of
a
trade,
I
think
there
is
very
good
reason
.
.
.
for
treating
such
an
expenditure
as
properly
attributable
not
to
revenue
but
to
capital.
Here
the
payments
made
by
the
MerBan
Group
were
originally
treated
by
MKH
in
its
financial
statements
as
loans
made
to
it
by
its
shareholders.
It
seems
to
me
that
such
treatment
accorded
with
their
income
tax
character,
namely,
they
were
payments
to
enable
subsidiaries
MKH
and
Holdings
to
make
related
loans
and
investments
—
in
this
context
assets
or
advantages
for
an
enduring
benefit
—
and
so
represented
costs
of
financing
such
subsidiaries
which
in
a
number
of
cases
have
been
held
to
be
capital
in
nature.
Accordingly,
the
respondents
are
prohibited
from
deducting
their
payments
to
the
Bank
under
the
provisions
of
paragraph
18(1)(b).
However,
this
now
takes
us
to
section
20
because
if
the
respondents
can
come
within
that
section
they
will
be
successful
since
the
terms
of
the
introductory
language
of
section
20
expressly
override
the
prohibitions
stipulated
in
paragraphs
18(1)(a)
and
(b).
(3)
Section
20
Under
subparagraph
20(1)(c)(i)
of
the
Act,
a
taxpayer
may
deduct,
with
respect
to
business
or
property
income,
an
amount
paid
pursuant
to
a
legal
obligation
to
pay
interest
on
borrowed
money
used
for
the
purpose
of
earning
income
from
a
business
or
property.
Counsel
for
the
respondents
argues
that
the
payments
made
by
MerBan
come
within
these
provisions
whereas
counsel
for
the
Minister
contends
they
do
not.
As
was
Said
by
Chief
Justice
Dickson
in
The
Queen
v.
Bronfman,
in
the
absence
of
a
provision
like
paragraph
20(1)(c)
of
the
Act,
interest
payments
could
not
be
deductible
as
they
would
fall
within
payments
on
account
of
capital
within
the
prohibition
language
of
paragraph
18(1)(b)
discussed
above.
But
there
are
several
requirements
to
be
met
before
interest
may
be
deducted
by
a
taxpayer
pursuant
to
paragraph
20(1)(c).
In
general
terms,
(i)
the
interest
must
be
paid
or
payable
pursuant
to
a
legal
obligation
with
respect
to
borrowed
money;
(ii)
the
borrowed
money
must
be
used
for
the
purpose
of
gaining
income
from
a
business
or
property;
and
(iii)
the
borrowed
money
cannot
be
used
for
property,
the
income
from
which
would
be
exempt
or
to
acquire
a
life
insurance
policy.
What
is
fatal
to
the
respondents'
case
in
my
view
is
that
paragraph
20(1)(c)
requires
that
for
interest
to
be
deductible
it
must
be
paid
pursuant
to
money
borrowed
by
the
taxpayer
and
not
by
someone
else.
The
taxpayer
must
have
created
a
borrower-lender
relationship
which
gives
rise
to
interest
being
paid.
I
conclude
this
from
the
wording
of
section
20
which
in
subsection
20(1)
speaks
of
the
taxpayer's
income
from
a
business
or
property
and
there
being
deducted
from
these
sources
certain
amounts
of
which
interest
on
borrowed
money
is
one.
If
the
taxpayer
is
calculating
income
from
a
source,
it
flies
in
the
face
of
the
intent
and
language
of
the
Act
to
allow
the
taxpayer
to
deduct
interest
with
respect
to
the
income
source
of
another
taxpayer.
In
the
instant
case,
MerBan
was
not
obligated
to
pay
anything
in
respect
of
the
principal
of
the
loan.
The
Bank,
apart
from
collateral
undertakings,
could
look
only
to
MKH
and
Holdings
for
payment
on
the
loans
and
income
debenture
and
to
the
MerBan
Group
for
up
to
$500,000
for
interest
on
the
loan.
To
say
that
MerBan
can
deduct
the
payments
as
interest
would
mean
that
MerBan
was
the
borrower
of
the
money
from
the
Bank,
which
it
was
not.
Accordingly,
I
conclude
that
the
payments
made
by
MerBan
do
not
qualify
as
interest
deductions
under
the
provisions
of
paragraph
20(1)(c)
of
the
Act.
Counsel
for
the
respondents
also
argued
in
the
alternative
that
the
payments
made
by
MerBan
were
deductible
under
subparagraph
20(1)(e)(ii)
as
an
expense
incurred
in
the
course
of
borrowing
money
used
by
the
taxpayer
for
the
purpose
of
earning
income
from
a
business
or
property.
However,
again
fundamentally
important
to
the
availability
of
this
deduction
is
that
the
taxpayer
borrow
the
money
to
which
the
expense
relates.
As
already
mentioned,
MerBan
did
not
borrow
any
money
from
the
Bank,
its
subsidiaries
MKH
and
Holdings
did,
and
therefore
a
deduction
under
subparagraph
20(1)(e)(ii)
is
not
available
to
MerBan.
Conclusion
For
the
foregoing
reasons,
I
would
allow
the
appeal
with
costs
here
and
in
the
Federal
Court—Trial
Division,
set
aside
the
judgment
of
the
Trial
Division
and
restore
the
reassessments
of
tax
issued
by
the
Minister
for
the
1974
taxation
year
of
MerBan
and
for
the
1973
and
1974
taxation
years
of
Montague
and
Carter.
Appeal
allowed.