Dubé,
J:—Plaintiff
is
a
corporation
incorporated
under
the
laws
of
the
province
of
Quebec
carrying
on
the
business
of
manufacturing
and
selling
newsprint,
sulphite
and
groundwood
pulp.
In
its
declaration
plaintiff
alleges
that
in
its
1968
taxation
year
it
recorded
depreciation
and
depletion
against
fixed
assets
in
its
books
of
account
in
the
amount
of
$4,006,524,
and
that
it
added
$2,707,243
to
the
income
recorded
in
its
own
books
for
the
purposes
of
computing
its
income
tax
with
the
difference
of
$1,299,281
being
inventory
at
the
end
of
the
year
to
be
deducted
in
future
taxation
years.
By
reassessments
dated
May
5,
1971
and
May
4,
1973,
the
Minister
added
the
whole
of
$4,006,524
to
plaintiff's
reported
income
for
1958.
Plaintiff
appeals
that
decision
and
in
its
prayer
for
relief
requests
that
the
proper
adjustment
to
recorded
income
in
respect
of
depreciation
and
depletion
be
declared
to
be
the
adding
back
to
the
income
only
that
portion
of
depreciation
and
depletion
recorded
in
the
books
of
account
for
the
year.
In
its
defence
the
Minister
sets
out
two
alternative
positions.
Firstly,
that
the
plaintiff
having
included
as
part
of
the
cost
of
goods
manufactured
the
sum
of
$4,006,524
in
respect
of
the
depreciation
suffered
by
it
during
the
1968
taxation
year,
it
therefore
had
to
add
to
its
profit
the
full
amount
of
$4,006,524
in
accordance
with
paragraph
12(1)(b)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
RSC
1952,
c
148
as
amended.
Secondly,
that
if
the
plaintiff
is
entitled
to
prepare
its
accounts
on
the
basis
that
the
depreciation
suffered
during
the
taxation
year
may
be
allocated
between
the
cost
of
the
goods
sold
during
the
year
and
the
cost
of
the
closing
inventory,
then
by
virtue
of
paragraph
12(1)(b)
there
must
be
added
back
to
its
profit
not
only
the
depreciation
suffered
during
the
year
but
also
the
depreciation
suffered
in
previous
years
and
comprising
part
of
the
cost
of
the
opening
inventory.
At
the
commencement
of
the
hearing
counsel
for
the
defendant
abandoned
the
first
alternative.
As
a
result,
the
dispute
between
the
parties
is
now
reduced
to
the
question
of
whether
or
not
the
amount
of
$955,186
(the
depreciation
and
depletion
content
of
the
opening
inventory
as
of
January
1,
1968)
should
be
added
to
the
plaintiff’s
profit
in
order
to
arrive
at
income
for
tax
purposes
for
the
1968
taxation
year.
For
1968
and
prior
years
the
plaintiff
in
computing
its
profit
for
its
own
financial
statement
purposes
utilized
a
system
described
variously
as
“absorption”,
or
“full
absorption”,
or
“on
cost”
accounting.
Under
that
procedure
both
variable
costs,
such
as
the
costs
of
material
and
labour
as
well
as
certain
fixed
manufacturing
overhead
costs,
are
treated
as
costs
of
production.
That
is
to
say,
those
costs
are
included
in
inventory
and
cost
of
sales.
The
fixed
manufacturing
overhead
costs
in
question
include
depletion
of
the
plaintiff’s
wood
assets
and
depreciation
of
its
manufacturing
equipment.
Thus
the
plaintiff,
by
using
full
absorption
cost
accounting,
included
in
its
inventory
and
cost
of
sales
account
the
amount
of
depletion
and
depreciation
recorded
in
its
books.
As
a
result,
the
depletion
and
depreciation
costs
are
first
allocated
to
the
production
and
inventory
accounts
as
goods
are
produced.
When
a
sale
takes
place
these
depreciation
and
depletion
costs
form
part
of
the
cost
of
achieving
the
sale.
To
the
extent
that
products
remain
on
hand
at
the
end
of
the
year,
the
depreciation
and
depletion
costs
are
included
in
the
cost
of
closing
inventory.
The
same
figure
becomes
the
opening
inventory
at
the
commencement
of
the
following
year.
The
costs
of
goods
sold
by
the
plaintiff
for
the
1968
year
were
computed,
for
purposes
of
determining
the
profit
as
reported
in
its
financial
statement,
as
follows:
|
Depreciation
and
|
|
Total
Cost
|
Depletion
Content
|
Opening
Inventory—
|
$22,858,389
|
$
955,186
|
January
1,
1968
|
|
Cost
of
Goods
|
39,218,737
|
4,006,524
|
Manufactured
|
|
|
$62,077,126
|
$4,961,710
|
Deduct
|
|
Closing
Inventory—
|
$25,879,966
|
$1,299,281
|
December
31,
1968
|
|
|
$36,197,160
|
$3,662,429
|
It
bears
repeating
that
the
amount
in
issue
in
the
instant
appeal
becomes
the
depreciation
and
depletion
content
($955,186)
in
the
opening
inventory
of
January
1st,
1968.
For
each
year
prior
to
1968,
for
income
tax
purposes,
the
plaintiff
added
back
an
amount
equal
to
the
depreciation
and
depletion
re-
corded
in
its
books
of
account
for
the
year.
However
in
respect
of
the
1968
taxation
year
a
different
procedure
was
followed.
Counsel
for
the
plaintiff
admits
that
the
change
was
made
because
the
plaintiff
determined
the
prior
procedure
to
be
erroneous.
Referring
to
the
table
for
the
1968
taxation
year
supra
the
plaintiff
added
back
the
amount
of
$4,006,524
(depreciation
and
depletion
for
the
year)
and
then
subtracted
the
sum
of
$1,299,281
(depreciation
and
depletion
at
closing
inventory).
Plaintiff
affirms
that
it
thereby
eliminated
not
only
the
effects
of
having
included
depreciation
and
depletion
in
the
cost
of
goods
manufactured
during
the
year,
but
also
the
effects
of
having
included
depletion
and
depreciation
in
closing
inventory.
The
plaintiff
did
not
make
any
adjustment
for
depreciation
and
depletion
in
the
opening
inventory
($955,186)
and
the
Minister
claims
it
should
have
done
so.
That
is
the
gist
of
the
issue.
Plaintiff
called
two
chartered
accountants
in
support
of
its
position.
Ronald
Walter
Scott
in
his
affidavit
provided
this
answer
to
question
XI:
Question
XI:
If
a
company
treated
depreciation
on
manufacturing
facilities
as
a
product
cost,
and
in
adjusting
its
accounting
profits
to
ascertain
its
income
for
tax
purposes
it
added
back
the
depreciation
provided
in
the
year,
what
adjustment
would
it
have
to
make
in
a
particular
year
if
it
wished
to
remove
all
effects
of
accounting
depreciation
from
the
determination
of
income
for
tax
purposes?
Answer:
In
order
to
make
that
transition,
the
company
would
have
to
add
back
only
the
depreciation
provided
in
the
year
less
the
depreciation
allocated
to
closing
inventory.
It
would
not
add
back
the
depreciation
included
in
opening
inventory.
The
reason
for
this
is
historical.
Over
the
years
during
which
the
company
adjusted
its
accounting
profits
by
adding
back
the
depreciation
provided
in
each
year,
it
effectively
included
in
its
income
for
tax
purposes,
on
a
Cumulative
basis,
an
amount
equal
to
the
depreciation
in
the
opening
inventory
of
the
year
in
question.
That
is
to
say,
each
year
the
difference
between
depreciation
in
closing
inventory
and
depreciation
in
opening
inventory
has
been
included
in
computing
income.
The
net
effect
is
to
include
in
income
over
the
years
an
amount
equal
to
the
depreciation
in
the
closing
inventory
at
the
end
of
any
particular
year.
This
same
amount
is
reflected
in
the
opening
inventory
of
the
next
year.
Therefore,
by
not
adding
back
the
amount
of
depreciation
in
the
opening
inventory
for
the
transition
year,
the
company
would
offset
the
effects
of
the
inclusion
in
income
for
tax
purposes
in
prior
years
of
all
accounting
depreciation.
Seymour
Lyon
Wigle
in
his
affidavit
gave
these
answers
to
questions
IV,
V,
VI,
Vil,
VIII
and
IX:
Question
IV:
If,
in
computing
its
profits
for
the
1968
fiscal
year,
the
plaintiff:
(a)
included
the
said
$955,186
in
opening
inventory,
and
(b)
allocated
the
amount
of
$1,299,281
of
1968
depreciation
to
closing
inventory,
What,
in
your
opinion,
is
the
effect
upon
profit
of
this,
assuming
all
products
in
the
opening
inventory
were
sold
during
the
1968
fiscal
year?
Answer:
In
my
opinion,
the
$955,186
included
in
opening
inventory
would
give
rise
to
a
deduction
in
computing
profits
for
the
1968
fiscal
year
that
would,
in
effect,
offset
the
$955,186
included
in
profits
for
the
previous
fiscal
years.
However,
the
allocation
of
$1,299,281
would
increase
cumulative
profits
over
the
period
of
fiscal
years
commencing
with
incorporation
and
ending
with
the
1968
fiscal
year
by
the
amount
of
$1,299,281.
Question
V:
If,
in
computing
its
profits
for
its
1968
fiscal
year,
the
plaintiff
had:
(a)
included
the
said
$955,186
in
opening
inventory,
and
(b)
allocated
no
depreciation
cost
for
1968
to
closing
inventory,
what,
in
your
opinion,
would
the
result
have
been?
Answer:
In
my
opinion,
the
$955,186
included
in
opening
inventory
would
give
rise
to
a
deduction
in
computing
profits
for
the
1968
fiscal
year
that
would
offset
the
amount
of
$955,186
included
for
the
previous
fiscal
years.
Because
no
amount
of
depreciation
would
have
been
allocated
to
closing
inventory,
there
would
be
no
increase
in
profits
(ie,
no
amount
in
respect
of
depreciation
cost
would
be
added
to
profits)
by
virtue
of
an
allocation
of
depreciation
to
closing
inventory.
Question
VI:
If,
in
computing
its
profits
for
its
1968
fiscal
year,
the
plaintiff
had:
(a)
excluded
the
said
$955,186
from
opening
inventory,
and
(b)
allocated
no
depreciation
cost
for
1968
to
closing
inventory,
what,
in
your
opinion,
would
the
result
have
been?
Answer:
In
my
opinion,
since
no
amount
of
depreciation
cost
would
have
been
allocated
to
closing
inventory
for
the
1968
fiscal
year
there
would
be
no
increase
of
profits
for
that
year
in
the
amount
of
depreciation
cost
by
virtue
of
an
allocation
of
depreciation
to
closing
inventory.
However,
because
the
said
$955,186
would
have
been
excluded
from
opening
inventory,
there
would
be
no
offset
for
the
$955,186
of
depreciation
cost
that
had
been
cumulatively
included
in
profits
for
fiscal
periods
up
to
the
end
of
1967.
Question
VII:
On
the
understanding
that,
in
computing
its
profits
for
the
1967
and
previous
taxation
years,
the
plaintiff
included
$955,186
by
virtue
of
allocating
depreciation
to
closing
inventory,
in
your
opinion,
did
such
treatment
result
in
the
plaintiff’s
incomes
as
reported*
for
those
years
for
purposes
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
being
$955,186
higher
than
they
would
have
been
had
no
depreciation
been
allocated
to
closing
inventory?
Answer:
In
my
opinion,
the
plaintiff’s
incomes
for
purposes
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
for
taxation
years
up
to
the
end
of
1967
were
$955,186
higher
than
they
would
have
been
had
no
depreciation
been
allocated
to
closing
inventory.
Question
VIII:
If,
in
adjusting
its
profits
for
the
1968
taxation
year,
in
order
to
compute
income
for
purposes
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
the
plaintiff:
(a)
did
not
add
back
to
profits
the
amount
of
$955,186
of
depreciation
included
in
opening
inventory,
and
(b)
did
not
add
back
to
profits
the
$1,299,281
of
depreciation
allocated
to
closing
inventory,
what,
in
your
opinion,
would
be
the
effect
of
this?
Answer:
In
my
opinion,
the
effect
of
(a)
would
be
that
the
$955,186
was
included
in
opening
inventory
for
income
tax
purposes
and
thereby
was
deducted
in
computing
income
for
the
1968
fiscal
year,
so
that
there
was
an
offset
to
the
$955,186
of
depreciation
cost
that
had,
for
tax
purposes,
been
included
in
income
of
the
earlier
years.
The
effect
of
(b)
would
be
that
there
would
be
no
inclusion
in
the
plaintiff’s
income
for
tax
purposes
of
the
$1,299,281
of
depreciation
cost.
Question
IX:
If,
in
adjusting
its
profits
for
the
1968
taxation
year,
in
order
to
compute
income
for
purposes
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
the
plaintiff
had:
(a)
added
back
to
profits
the
$955,186
of
depreciation
cost
included
in
opening
inventory,
and
(b)
not
added
back
to
profits
the
$1,299,281
of
depreciation
allocated
to
closing
inventory,
What,
in
your
opinion,
would
have
been
the
result?
Answer:
The
effect
of
(b)
would
be
that
there
would
be
no
inclusion
in
the
plaintiff’s
income
for
tax
purposes
of
the
$1,299,281
of
depreciation
cost.
However,
the
effect
of
(a)
would
be
to
exclude
the
$955,186
from
opening
inventory
for
tax
purposes.
Consequently,
in
computing
the
plaintiff’s
income
for
the
1968
fiscal
year,
there
would
be
no
deduction
of
the
$955,186
depreciation
cost
that
had
previously
been
included
in
income
for
tax
purposes
up
to
the
end
of
1967.
The
effect
would
be
to
subject
the
plaintiff
to
income
tax
on
$955,186
of
depreciation
cost.
Learned
counsel
for
the
plaintiff
avers
therefore
that
in
order
to
remove
all
effects
of
accounting
depreciation
from
the
determination
of
income
for
tax
purposes
the
amount
of
$955,186
representing
the
depreciation
element
in
opening
inventory
for
1968
should
not
be
added
back
to
profit.
He
argues
that
if
the
amount
of
$955,186
were
to
be
added
back
the
effect
would
be
to
include
the
same
amount
twice
in
computing
plaintiff’s
income,
thus
double
taxation.
He
affirms
that
there
is
no
longer
any
dispute
between
the
parties
as
to
the
proper
method
of
excluding
all
effects
of
depreciation
for
the
taxation
years
after
1968.
If
the
cost
of
sales
is
determined
by
adding
the
opening
inventory
to
the
cost
of
goods
manufactured
and
subtracting
the
closing
inventory,
and
if
each
of
these
amounts
includes
an
element
of
depreciation,
then
in
order
to
reverse
the
effects
of
the
depreciation
it
will
not
be
sufficient
in
ensuing
years
to
make
an
adjustment
which
relates
solely
to
the
depreciation
recorded
during
the
year.
The
proper
method
of
adjusting
accounting
profits
to
arrive
at
income
for
tax
purposes
after
1968
will
be
to
add
back
in
each
year
an
amount
equal
to
the
depreciation
content
of
opening
inventory,
plus
the
depreciation
content
of
the
cost
of
goods
manufactured
in
the
year,
minus
the
depreciation
content
of
the
closing
inventory.
That
procedure
will
eliminate
entirely
the
effects
of
accounting
depreciation.
But
1968
is
a
transitional
year,
and
counsel
claims
that
in
order
to
pass
from
one
method
to
the
other,
the
depreciation
content
of
the
opening
inventory
should
not
be
added
back.
The
very
nature
of
inventory
involves
an
allocation
of
costs
between
different
fiscal
periods;
this
is
a
specific
requirement
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
Subsection
14(3)
provides
as
follows:
14.
(3)
Notwithstanding
subsection
(2),
for
the
purpose
of
computing
income
for
a
taxation
year
the
property
described
in
an
inventory
at
the
commencement
of
the
year
shall
be
valued
at
the
same
amount
as
the
amount
at
which
it
was
valued
at
the
end
of
the
immediately
preceding
year
for
the
purpose
of
computing
income
for
that
preceding
year.
On
the
other
hand,
counsel
for
the
defendant
argues
that
the
sole
issue
is
whether
or
not
the
provisions
of
paragraph
12(1)(b)
of
the
Act
preclude,
in
the
computation
of
income
under
the
Act,
the
deduction
of
any
amount
as
allowance
for
depreciation
which
has
found
its
way
into
the
cost
of
goods
sold
account.
Paragraph
12(1)(b)
reads:
12.
(1)
In
computing
income,
no
deduction
shall
be
made
in
respect
of
(b)
an
outlay,
loss
or
replacement
of
capital,
a
payment
on
account
of
capital
or
an
allowance
in
respect
of
depreciation,
obsolescence
or
depletion
except
as
expressly
permitted
by
this
Part.
Filed
in
exhibit
is
a
statement
of
the
Minister
which
outlines
the
acceptable
way
for
the
plaintiff
to
make
the
necessary
accounting
adjustments:
The
Minister
acknowledges,
that
in
those
cases
where
the
depreciation
'suffered
during
the
year
is
treated
on
the
on-cost
basis,
and
is
included
in
the
cost
of
goods
sold
an
acceptable
manner
of
excluding
from
the
computation
of
income
under
the
provisions
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
any
allowance
for
depreciation
is
to
reduce
the
expenses
(or
add
back
to
the
profit)
(a)
the
depreciation
element
contained
in
the
opening
inventory
plus
(b)
the
depreciation
recorded
during
the
fiscal
period
less
(d)
the
depreciation
content
of
the
closing
inventory.
Learned
counsel
for
the
defendant
does
not
accept,
of
course,
that
for
the
processus
of
transition
from
one
method
to
another
the
depreciation
element
contained
in
the
opening
inventory
should
not
be
added
back.
He
claims
that
under
paragraph
12(1
)(b)
no
deduction
whatsoever
should
be
made
for
any
allowance
in
respect
of
depreciation.
Under
the
Act,
in
lieu
of
depreciation,
the
taxpayer
may
deduct
capital
cost
allowance,
in
his
discretion
but
not
to
exceed
the
maximum
amount
prescribed
for
each
class
of
property.
He
argues
that
to
the
extent
that
an
accounting
principle
of
practice
is
inconsistent
with
any
statutory
direction
or
prohibition
in
the
Act,
it
must,
in
the
computation
of
income
for
the
purposes
of
the
Act,
give
way
to
the
express
statutory
provision*.
Counsel
alleges
that
the
consequence
of
the
inappropriate
adjustment
made
by
the
plaintiff
in
his
attempt
to
reconcile
his
accounting
with
the
provisions
of
the
Act
is
that
there.
was
deducted
in
computing
income
an
allowance
for
depreciation
which
is
prohibited.
He
quotes
Earl
Cairns
in
Coltness
Iron
Company
v
Black
(1875-1883)
1
TC
287
at
312:
It
is,
as
now
explained,
can
a
mine
owner
write
off
and
deduct
from
the
gross
earnings
of
his
mine
in
a
particular
year
a
sum
to
represent
that
year’s
depreciation
of
all
the
pits
in
the
mines
whenever
sunk.
I
am
clearly
of
opinion
that
this
cannot
be
done.
It
may
be
proper
for
a
trader
or
for
a
trading
company
to
perform
in
his
or
their
books
an
operation
of
this
kind
every
year
in
order
to
judge
of
the
sum
that
can
in
that
year
be
safely
taken
out
of
the
trade
and
spent
as
trade
profits.
But
I
am
clearly
of
opinion
that
the
owner
of
a
mine
cannot
qua
owner
thus
manipulate
his
accounts
when
the
question
is
under
section
60
of
the
principal
Act,
what
is
the
amount
of
profits
received
from
the
mine
in
each
of
the
five
years
upon
which
the
average
is
to
be
taken?
In
Addie
v
Solicitor
for
Inland
Revenue
(1875-1883),
1
TC
1,
the
taxpayer
in
computing
his
profit
sought
to
deduct
as
depreciation
expenses
part
of
the
cost
of
his
machinery
and
plant.
The
Lord
President
said
at
4:
As
soon
as
you
ascertain
that
this
is
an
expenditure
of
additional
capital,
there
is
an
end
to
any
proposal
to
deduct
anything
in
respect
of
it;
and
on
that
simple
ground
I
think
the
judgment
of
the
Commissioners
right.
In
BSC
Footwear
Ltd
v
Ridgway
(Inspector
of
Taxes),
[1972]
AC
544,
Lord
Reid
made
the
following
comments
at
555:
It
was
said
in
Duple
Motor
Bodies
Ltd
v
Inland
Revenue
Commissioners
[1961]
1
WLR
739
that
a
long-standing
practice
of
this
kind
ought
not
to
be
changed
without
good
reason.
If
a
practice
infringes
a
rule
of
law
that
would
be
a
good
reason.
But
it
is
admitted
that
this
matter
is
not
governed
by
any
rigid
rule
of
law.
It
depends
on
general
principles
which
have
been
elaborated
by
the
courts
for
the
purpose
of
ensuring
that
so
far
as
practicable
profits
shall
be
attributed
to
the
year
in
which
they
were
truly
earned.
There
is
one
strong
reason
for
not
imposing
this
different
system
of
valuation.
The
Crown
does
not
seek
to
reopen
the
appellant’s
accounts
for
tax
purposes
for
the
year
1958
where
the
stock-in-hand
on
December
31,
1958,
was
valued
by
the
appellant’s
method.
But
if
a
new
method
of
valuation
is
to
be
required
for
1959
admittedly
that
necessarily
involves
applying
the
new
method
in
valuing
the
stock-in-hand
at
January
1,
1959.
So
different
values
will
be
shown
for
the
same
stock,
and,
again
admittedly,
that
means,
according
to
which
way
the
difference
is,
that
a
sum
equal
to
that
difference
will
either
be
taxed
twice
or
will
escape
taxation
altogether.
It
is
a
fundamental
principle
of
income
tax
law
that
the
same
sum
shall
not
be
taxed
twice.
It
may
be
that
in
the
present
case
if
the
Crown
are
successful
the
appellants
will
escape
from
a
considerable
amount
of
tax
which
they
will
have
to
pay
if
they
succeed.
That
does
not
appear
to
affect
the
minds
of
either
party
to
this
case.
The
Crown
want
a
uniform
system
and
the
appellants
will
continue
to
present
their
accounts
to
their
shareholders
framed
by
their
existing
method
because
they
think
it
gives
a
better
picture
of
their
results.
But
in
my
judgment
this
House
ought
to
avoid
if
possible
a
decision
which
results
in
taxable
profits
escaping
taxation.
[The
underlining
is
mine]
In
my
view,
paragraph
12(1)(b)
of
the
Act
does
not
mean
that
a
taxation
year
must
be
assessed
in
total
isolation
and
without
regard
for
the
years
which
precede
and
follow
it.
The
Minister
himself
in
his
filed
statement
acknowledges
that,
where
the
depreciation
is
treated
on
the
on-cost
(absorption)
basis;
an
acceptable
manner
of
excluding
the
depreciation
is
to
add
back
the
depreciated
element
in
the
Opening
inventory,
plus
the
depreciation
recorded
in
the-year,
less
the
depreciation
content
in
the
closing
inventory.
So
he
does
consider
the
depreciation
elements
in
both
the
preceding
and
the
following
year.
His
learned
counsel
had
no
qualm
at
the
outset
of
the
trial
about
dropping
the
first
alternative
argument
in
his
statement
of
defence
which
resulted
in
the
plaintiff
not
having
to
add
back
to
profit
the
depreciation
content
of
the
closing
inventory.
Of
course,
the
aforementioned
subsection
14(3)
of
the
Act
provides
that
the
opening
inventory
of
a
taxation
year
shall
be
valued
at
the
same
amount
as
the
closing
inventory
of
the
preceding
year.
And
defendant’s
second
alternative
alleges
that
there
must
be
added
back
“‘the
portion
of
the
depreciation
and
depletion
suffered
in
previous
years".
I
accept
the
uncontradicted
expert
opinion
of
both
chartered
accountants
that
the
net
effect
of
adding
the
depreciation
content
of
$955,186
to
the
1968
profit
would
be
to
compute
the
same
amount
twice
for
income
tax
purposes.
The
fair
and
equitable
way
to
make
the
transition
would
be,
as
R
W
Scott
puts
it,
“to
add
back
only
the
depreciation
provided
in
the
year
less
the
depreciation
allocated
to
closing
inventory
.
.
.
not
add
back
the
depreciation
included
in
Opening
inventory’’.
Counsel
for
the
defendant
argued
at
the
end
of
the
trial
that
the
plaintiff
had
not
proved
that
the
sum
of
$955,186
represented
the
cumulative
effect
of
the
allocation
of
depreciation
in
closing
inventory
from
incorporation
to
the
end
of
the
1967
fiscal
year.
But
his
statement
of
defence
had
not
raised
that
particular
issue
and
had
not
put
the
plaintiff
to
the
strict
proof
of
all
its
accounts
from
the
start
of
its
operations
to
1968.
A
myriad
of
questions
have
been
asked
by
the
defendant
(and
answered
by
the
plaintiff)
pursuant
to
a
notice
to
admit
facts,
but
that
information
was
not
requested.
The
uncontradicted
evidence
of
Robert
Bryant,
treasurer
of
the
plaintiff
and
himself
a
chartered
accountant,
and
of
the
expert
witness
S
L
Wigle
who
is
personally
familiar
with
plaintiff’s
books,
leads
me
to
the
conclusion
that
the
amount
of
$955,186,
the
depreciation
content
in
the
opening
inventory
of
1968,
reflects
the
historical
depreciation
content
adjusted
over
the
years
up
to
the
closing
inventory
of
1967.
The
appeal,
therefore,
is
allowed
and
the
reassessments
appealed
from
are
referred
back
to
the
Minister
for
reconsideration
and
reassessment
accordingly,
the
whole
with
interest
and
costs.