Beaubier
T
.
C.J.:
This
appeal
pursuant
to
the
General
Procedure
was
heard
at
Calgary,
Alberta
on
December
7,
8
and
9,
1998.
The
Appellant
has
appealed
an
assessment
for
the
1987
taxation
year.
At
the
opening
of
the
hearing
the
par-
ties
filed
a
Statement
of
Agreed
Facts
which
sets
out
the
general
facts
and
the
matters
at
issue.
It
reads:
Statement
of
Agreed
Facts
I.
The
parties
admit
the
following
facts,
provided
that
such
admissions
are
made
for
the
purpose
of
this
Appeal
only
and
are
not
to
be
used
against
either
party,
on
any
other
occasion,
by
any
person.
The
following
is
a
list
of
abbreviations
used
in
this
document:
HOOL
|
Husky
Oil
Operations
Ltd.
|
HOML
|
Husky
Oil
Marketing
Ltd.
|
BVI
|
Bow
Valley
Industries
Ltd.
|
BVRS
|
Bow
Valley
Resource
Services
Ltd.
|
BVHODLP
|
Bow
Valley
Husky
Offshore
Drilling
Limited
Partnership
|
BVHODL
|
Bow
Valley
Husky
Offshore
Drilling
Ltd.
|
Bermuda
|
Bow
Valley
Husky
(Bermuda)
Ltd.
|
BVHOHL
|
Bow
Valley
Husky
Offshore
Holdings
Ltd.
|
NEP
|
National
Energy
Program
|
PIP
|
Petroleum
Incentive
Program
|
EDC
|
Export
Development
Corporation
|
Maersk
|
The
Maersk
Company
(Canada)
Ltd.
|
Texaco
|
Texaco
Canada
Enterprises
Ltd.
|
Facts
|
|
2.
At
all
material
times,
the
Appellant
was
a
corporation
resident
in
Canada
for
the
purposes
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
(the
“Act”).
3.
In
1980,
the
Appellant
was
a
public
corporation.
Its
principal
shareholder
was
Nova
Corporation
of
Alberta
(68%
approximately).
4.
In
1980,
the
Appellant
owned
all
of
the
issued
and
outstanding
shares
of
Husky
Oil
Operations
Ltd.
(“HOOL”)
and
Husky
Oil
Marketing
Ltd.
(“HOML”).
5.
HOOL
carried
on
an
oil
and
gas
exploration
and
development
business
in
Canada.
6.
Bow
Valley
Industries
Ltd.
(“BVI”)
and
Bow
Valley
Resource
Services
Ltd.
(“BVRS”)
were
public
corporations.
BVI
owned
78%
of
the
issued
and
outstanding
shares
of
BVRS.
7.
In
October
1980,
the
Canadian
government
announced
the
National
Energy
Program
(“NEP).
One
of
the
purposes
of
the
NEP
was
to
encourage
exploration
by
Canadian-controlled
companies
in
the
frontier
regions
of
Canada.
8.
Two
features
of
the
NEP
were
the
Petroleum
and
Gas
Revenue
Tax
(“PGRT”)
and
the
Petroleum
Incentive
Program
(“PIP”).
9.
In
1981,
Bob
Blair,
Chairman
of
the
Board
of
the
Appellant,
and
Doc
Seaman,
the
Chairman
and
CEO
of
BVI
and
a
director
of
BVRS,
entered
into
dis-
eussions
and
arranged
for
the
participation
of
the
Appellant,
HOOL,
BVI
and
BVRS
in
an
east
coast
offshore
land
acquisition
and
drilling
program
(the
“Husky
Group”
refers
to
corporations
controlled
by
Mr.
Blair’s
group
of
corporations,
the
“Bow
Valley
Group”
refers
to
corporations
controlled
by
Mr.
Seaman’s
group
of
corporations).
One
of
the
main
business
reasons
for
proceeding
was
to
take
advantage
of
the
available
PIP
payments
under
the
NEP.
10.
At
all
material
times
corporations
in
the
Husky
Group
were
in
no
way
related
to,
and
were
acting
at
arm’s
length
from,
corporations
in
the
Bow
Valley
Group.
11.
The
broad
strategy
objective
was
to
obtain
a
strong
offshore
east
coast
land
position
and
start
drilling
there
while
using
PIP
benefits.
Part
of
the
strategy
involved
the
construction
of
offshore
drilling
vessels
and
supply
ships.
Ultimately,
two
drilling
vessels
were
constructed
and
operated
-
Bow
Drill
2
and
Bow
Drill
3.
12.
One
drilling
vessel,
Bow
Drill
2,
was
built
in
Norway.
It
was
owned
by
a
limited
partnership,
Bow
Valley
Husky
Offshore
Drilling
Limited
Partnership
(“BVHODLP”).
HOML
and
BVRS
were
the
limited
partners
(34.965%
and
64.935%
respectively);
the
general
partner
was
Bow
Valley
Husky
Offshore
Drilling
Ltd.
(“BVHODL”)
(0.1%).
The
shares
of
BVHODL
were
held
by
the
HOML
(35%)
and
BVRS
(65%).
The
ownership
structure
for
Bow
Drill
2
is
set
out
in
Exhibit
A.
13.
The
second
drilling
vessel,
Bow
Drill
3
was
built
in
Canada
under
an
October
1981
agreement
between
BVRS
and
the
Saint
John
Shipbuilding
and
Dry
Dock
Co.
(the
“Construction
Contract”).
14.
In
October
1981,
BVRS
entered
into
separate
drilling
contracts
with
each
of
HOOL
and
BVI
whereby
HOOL
and
BVI
contracted
for
the
use
of
Bow
Drill
3
for
periods
aggregating
four
years
commencing
on
the
date
of
delivery
of
Bow
Drill
3
(the
“Drilling
Contracts”).
15.
Bow
Drill
3
was
delivered
in
March,
1984.
16.
HOOL
and
BVRS
sought
financing
for
the
construction
of
Bow
Drill
3
from
the
Export
Development
Corporation
(“EDC”),
a
Crown
corporation
created
under
the
Export
Development
Act.
17.
A
condition
of
obtaining
EDC
financing
was
that
the
drilling
vessel
which
was
being
built
with
the
funds
borrowed
from
the
EDC
be
exported
from
Canada.
18.
In
order
to
accommodate
the
export
requirement
of
the
EDC,
Bow
Valley
Husky
(Bermuda)
Ltd.
(“Bermuda”),
a
corporation
incorporated
in
Bermuda,
was
established
in
December,
1981
for
the
purpose
of
owning
Bow
Drill
3
and
obtaining
the
EDC
loan.
Bermuda
was
wholly
owned
by
a
Canadian
corporation,
Bow
Valley
Husky
Offshore
Holdings
Ltd.
(“BVHOHL”).
For
reasons
that
are
not
now
clear,
Messrs.
Seaman
and
Blair
determined
that
the
Bow
Valley
Group
would
own
65%
of
the
voting
shares
of
BVHOHL
and
the
Husky
Group
would
own
35%
of
the
voting
shares
of
BVHOHL.
The
corporate
structure
is
described
in
Exhibit
“B”.
19.
Bermuda
was
resident
in
Canada
for
the
purposes
of
the
Act
and
filed
a
Canadian
income
tax
return
on
that
basis.
20.
Bow
Drill
3
was
legally
and
beneficially
owned
by
Bermuda.
21.
The
Construction
Contract
and
the
Drilling
Contracts
were
assigned
to
Bermuda.
22.
By
agreement
dated
December
30,
1981,
the
EDC
loaned
Bermuda
the
sum
of
$
120,000,000
(US)
for
the
purpose
of
financing
the
construction
of
Bow
Drill
3
(the
“EDC
Loan’).
The
EDC
Loan
provided
for
80%
of
the
construction
financing;
the
remaining
20%
was
provided
through
loans
from
HOOL
and
BVRS
in
the
proportion
of
35%
and
65%,
respectively.
23.
The
primary
sources
of
revenue
used
by
Bermuda
for
servicing
and
repaying
the
EDC
Loan
were
the
Drilling
Contracts.
Under
the
NEP
program
HOOL
and
BVI
were
reimbursed
through
PIP
payments
from
the
Canadian
government
for
approximately
80%
of
the
costs
of
the
Drilling
Contracts.
24.
As
security
for
repayment
of
the
EDC
Loan,
EDC
took,
inter
alia,
guarantees
from
HOOL
and
BVRS.
HOOL
and
BVRS
guaranteed
payment
of
the
indebtedness
owing
from
time
to
time
by
Bermuda
to
the
EDC
“severally”,
in
the
proportions
of
35%
and
65%,
respectively
(the
“Direct
Guarantee”).
25.
The
Appellant
guaranteed
to
EDC
the
performance
by
HOOL
of
its
obligations
under
the
Direct
Guarantee.
26.
In
addition,
the
Appellant
and
BVI
entered
into
separate
take
or
pay
guarantees
(the
“Take
or
Pay
Guarantees”)
with
the
EDC.
The
obligations
under
these
guarantees
were
equal
as
between
the
Appellant
and
BVI.
The
Take
or
Pay
Guarantees
were
structured
around
the
number
of
days
HOOL
or
BVI
were
obligated
under
the
Drilling
Contracts
to
make
use
of
Bow
Drill
3.
27.
In
September,
1984,
the
Liberal
government
which
had
enacted
the
NEP
was
defeated
and
replaced
with
a
Progressive
Conservative
government.
In
March,
1985,
the
Canadian
government
announced
an
arrangement
to
terminate
the
NEP
and
with
it,
the
PIP,
subject
to
transitional
arrangements
to
extend
to
March
I,
1986,
28.
In
the
period
around
1985/1986,
there
was
a
dramatic
downturn
in
the
oil
and
gas
exploration
industry
worldwide.
In
early
1986,
the
Appellant
became
concerned
that
it
had
significant
financial
exposure
as
a
result
of
the
commitments
it
and
HOOL
had
made
in
connection
with
Bow
Drill
3.
The
Appellant’s
financial
exposure
was
compounded
by
the
financial
difficulties
being
experienced
by
BVRS
as
a
result
of
the
severe
downturn
in
its
contract
drilling
business.
29.
From
early
1986
until
the
end
of
September
1988,
the
Appellant
engaged
in
concerted
efforts
to
restrict
its
financial
exposure
in
connection
with
Bow
Drill
3.
Specifically:
a)
the
Husky
Group
considered
the
possibility
of
repudiating
the
corporate
structure
established
by
it
and
the
Bow
Valley
Group
to
own
and
operate
Bow
Drill
3;
b)
the
Husky
Group
actively
explored
the
possibility
of
repudiating
the
various
guarantees
provided
to
EDC;
C)
the
major
concession
that
the
Husky
Group
obtained
during
this
period
was
the
agreement
of
the
Bow
Valley
Group
to
“dam
up’’
revenue
from
Bow
Drill
3
in
Bermuda
and
BVHOHL
and
not
use
available
revenue
to
repay
shareholder
loans.
30.
Prior
to
October
14,
1988,
while
the
Husky
Group
had
attempted
on
several
occasions
to
obtain
EDC’s
permission
to
transfer
Bow
Drill
3
to
a
partnership,
EDC
had
always
refused
on
the
ground
that
such
a
transfer
might
undermine
the
vires
of
the
EDC
Loan.
31.
At
all
material
times
prior
to
October
14,
1988:
a)
the
Bow
Valley
Group,
and
not
the
Husky
Group,
had
both
de
jure
as
well
as
de
facto
control
of
both
Bermuda
and
BVHOHL;
b)
Bermuda
had
both
legal
and
beneficial
ownership
of
Bow
Drill
3
subject
to
the
fixed
security
interest
of
EDC:
C)
The
Husky
Group
had
no
legal,
beneficial
or
equitable
interest
in
Bow
Drill
3
except
as
minority
shareholder
of
BVHOHL.
32.
On
September
15,
1988,
Bermuda
defaulted
on
the
EDC
Loan.
33.
The
Husky
Group
did
not
know
what
EDC
would
do
as
a
result
of
the
default.
The
possibilities
included:
a)
EDC
calling
on
the
various
Husky
Guarantees
before
realizing
on
any
security;
b)
EDC
seizing
and
selling
Bow
Drill
3
itself;
C)
EDC
consenting
to
a
sale
of
Bow
Drill
3
by
Bermuda;
d)
The
Husky
Group
purchasing
the
EDC
Loan.
34.
Prior
to
October
14,
1988
all
the
possibilities
enumerated
in
paragraph
33
were
considered
by
EDC,
and
indeed,
on
October
14,
1988,
EDC
consented
to
Bermuda’s
sale
of
Bow
Drill
3
to
a
Chinese
group.
35.
As
of
October
6,
1988,
the
following
documents
were
executed,
a)
a
Partnership
Agreement
whereby
the
Appellant,
Bermuda,
and
384830
Alberta
Inc.
(a
corporation
wholly
owned
by
BVRS)
agreed
to
enter
into
a
partnership
called
the
Bow
Drill
3
Partnership
(the
“Partnership’’)
calling
for
the
following
capital
contributions:
i)
Bow
Drill
3
from
Bermuda;
ii)
$360,000
of
oil
and
gas
properties
from
the
Appellant;
and
111)
$10
from
384830;
b)
an
agreement
between
Texaco
and
the
Partnership
for
the
services
of
Bow
Drill
3.
36.
As
of
October
14,
1988,
the
following
documents
were
executed:
a)
an
option
agreement
in
respect
of
the
sale
and
purchase
of
Bow
Drill
3
with
the
Partnership
as
optionor
and
Maersk,
an
unrelated
Canadian
corporation,
as
optionee;
b)
an
assignment
agreement
among
the
Partnership,
Texaco
and
Maersk
dealing
with
the
assignment
of
the
Drilling
Contract
to
Maersk
in
the
event
Maersk
purchased
Bow
Drill
3;
c)
an
agreement
between
the
Appellant
and
EDC
whereby
the
Appellant
purchased
the
EDC
Loan
of
US
$35,329,053
owing
by
Bermuda
to
the
EDC
for
US
$34,497,889.
37.
As
of
October
15,
1988,
the
Partnership
executed
documents
with
384830
to
operate
Bow
Drill
3
pursuant
to
its
Drilling
Contract
with
Texaco.
38.
As
of
October
18,
1988:
a)
Bermuda
executed
a
document
transferring
Bow
Drill
3
to
the
Partnership;
b)
the
Appellant
executed
a
document
transferring
$360,000
of
oil
and
gas
properties
to
the
Partnership.
39.
As
of
November
21,
1988,
the
Appellant
executed
a
document
acquiring
Bermuda’s
interest
in
the
Partnership
in
partial
satisfaction
of
Bermuda’s
EDC
Loan
payable
to
the
Appellant.
40.
As
of
December
1,
1988,
Maersk
executed
a
document
exercising
its
option
to
purchase
Bow
Drill
3
for
$30,300,000
(US).
41.
On
December
16,
1988,
the
Appellant
acquired
the
shareholder
loan
of
BVRS
to
BVHOHL.
42.
On
December
21,1988,
HOOL
acquired
384830’s
interest
in
the
Partnership.
43.
For
its
fiscal
year
ended
December
31,
1988,
the
Partnership
had
net
earnings
of
$3,895
from
the
sale
of
oil
and
gas
production,
net
earnings
of
$655,974
from
its
Bow
Drill
3
drilling
activities
and
realized
a
non-capital
loss
of
$26,506,798
after
deducting
the
terminal
loss
of
$27,245,805
resulting
from
the
sale
of
Bow
Drill
3.
$26,568,798
of
the
non-capital
loss
was
allocated
to
the
Appellant
and
a
positive
amount
of
$61,247
to
HOOL.
The
Appellant
carried
back
$19,475,768
of
its
1988
non-capital
loss
to
its
1987
taxation
year.
44.
By
Notice
of
Reassessment
dated
October
5,
1995
in
respect
of
the
Appellant’s
1987
taxation
year
(the
“Reassessment”),
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
(the
“Minister”)
a)
reassessed
the
Appellant
to
reduce
to
nil
the
amount
of
its
1988
non-capital
loss
available
to
be
carried
back
to
its
1987
taxation
year
by
denying
its
share
of
the
Partnership
loss
of
$26,568,045;
and
b)
reassessed
the
Appellant’s
1987
taxation
year
after
applying
non-capital
losses
from
the
Appellant’s
1989
and
1990
taxation
years,
as
requested
by
the
Appellant
on
the
basis
that:
i)
the
Partnership
did
not
have
a
view
to
profit,
and
accordingly,
did
not
exist;
ii)
the
Partnership
was
a
sham;
111)
the
General
Anti-Avoidance
Rule
(“GAAR”)
in
section
245
of
the
Act
is
applicable;
and
c)
the
coming
into
force
provisions
for
the
application
of
the
GAAR
(“Grandfathering
Rules”)
do
not
apply
to
exclude
the
application
of
the
GAAR.
45.
On
December
18,
1995,
the
Appellant
filed
a
notice
of
objection
to
the
Reassessment
in
prescribed
form
and
within
the
time
stipulated
in
the
Act
for
doing
SO.
46.
The
Appellant
appealed
to
the
Tax
Court
pursuant
to
section
165
of
the
Act
by
Notice
of
Appeal
dated
March
26,
1997,
as
more
than
90
days
had
elapsed
after
the
service
of
the
notice
of
objection
and
the
Minister
had
not
notified
the
Appellant
that
the
Minister
had
vacated
or
confirmed
the
assessment
or
reassessed.
EXHIBIT
"A"
EXHIBIT
"B"
At
the
outset
of
the
hearing
Respondent’s
counsel
admitted,
for
the
record,
that
the
Partnership
described
in
paragraph
35
existed
in
law.
At
the
conclusion
of
Mr.
Miller’s
testimony
in
chief,
Respondent’s
counsel
made
the
following
admissions
and
summaries:
1.
The
subject
partnership
was
at
all
times
a
partnership
for
the
purposes
of
section
96
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
2.
The
Respondent
will
not
be
relying
on
the
Moldowan
common
law
reasonable
expectation
of
profit
test.
3.
The
Respondent
will
not
be
relying
on
any
source
of
income
requirements
arising
out
of
subsection
9(2),
section
96
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
or
paragraph
1102(1)(c)
of
the
Regulations.
Therefore,
what
was
left
in
issue
by
the
Respondent
respecting
this
appeal
were:
(1)
Sham.
(2)
GAAR.
(3)
If
GAAR
is
not
applicable
due
to
the
transitional
provisions
in
GAAR,
then
subsections
245(1)
and
55(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
for
the
year
in
question.
In
the
Appellant’s
examination
for
discovery
of
the
Respondent’s
officer,
J.S.
Lawless,
at
page
63,
lines
20
to
23
inclusive,
the
following
admission
was
made:
Q
Now,
when
you
were
raising
this
reassessment,
did
you
consider
what
’1]
refer
to
as
old
Section
245(1)
as
being
a
basis
of
assessment?
A
No,
I
didn’t.
The
Appellant
(“HOL”)
called
William
R.
Miller,
C.A.,
who
retired
from
HOL
in
1994
after
having
served
for
ten
years
as
its
Vice
President
and
Chief
Financial
Officer.
Mr.
Miller
was
a
credible
witness
throughout
his
entire
testimony.
HOL
is
an
integrated
oil
company
carrying
on
business
at
all
material
times
in
oil,
gas
and
hydrocarbon
exploration,
production,
marketing,
refining,
refracting
and
distribution.
To
compete
in
the
international
oil
business
each
company
which
survives
must
take
advantage
of
the
petroleum,
shipbuilding,
rig
building
and
the
financing
programmes
of
various
nations.
To
do
this
these
companies,
including
HOL
enter
into
deals,
guarantees
and
operate
through
partnerships,
wholly
and
partly
owned
corporations
in
various
countries
throughout
the
world.
All
of
this
happened
to
HOL
in
this
case.
It
is
the
way
that
HOL
does
business
and
all
of
it
is
for
the
purpose
of
earning
income
and
with
a
reasonable
expectation
of
profit.
Each
facet
has
to
be
utilized
to
its
optimum
in
order
that
HOL
can
compete
and
earn
a
profit.
Once
HOL
and
BVI
began
their
offshore
venture
under
the
NEP
they
realized
that
they
might
qualify
for
direct
grants
of
offshore
acreage
from
the
Government
of
Canada.
At
that
time
they
were
drilling
farm-outs
from
Mobil
so
that
they
could
qualify
for
a
percentage
of
oil
discovered
in
a
Mobil
offshore
acreage.
To
assist
in
their
effort
to
qualify
for
direct
acreage
grants
they
built
Bow
Drill
3
and
two
supply
vessels
in
Canada.
Bow
Drill
3
was
manufactured
in
Canada
at
the
behest
of
the
Canadian
government
despite
the
fact
that
it
was
inferior
to
Bow
Drill
2.
Bow
Drill
2
(a)
had
been
manufactured
in
Norway,
(b)
cost
20%
less
than
Bow
Drill
3,
and
(c)
was
financed
by
the
government
of
Norway’s
incentive
programme
at
an
interest
rate
which
was
approximately
4%
per
annum
less
than
Canada’s
EDC
programme
for
Bow
Drill
3.
Bow
Drill
3
also
had
cost
overruns
which
required
additional
funds
from
HOL
and
BVI.
Bow
Drill
3
had
to
be
owned
by
an
offshore
corporation
to
obtain
EDC
financing.
Bermuda
was
that
corporation
and
it
was
owned
by
BVHOHL.
BVHOHL
was
controlled
by
the
Bow
Valley
group
which
had
65%
of
the
shares.
HOL’s
subsidiary,
HOOL,
was
in
a
minority
with
35%
of
the
shares.
This
corporate
structure
enabled
Bermuda
to
pay
dividends
without
attracting
tax.
EDC’s
loan
for
the
construction
of
Bow
Drill
3
was
guaranteed
by
HOL
and
by
BVI
and
BVRS.
Oil
was
expected
to
rise
to
a
price
of
$100
per
barrel
when
the
construction
of
Bow
Drill
3
began.
In
1986
the
price
dropped
from
$20
per
barrel
into
the
single
digits.
The
entire
offshore
programme
became
uneconomic.
Drilling
rigs
and
supply
vessels’
prices
and
values
dropped
precipitously.
Upon
the
expiry
of
the
offshore
drilling
contracts,
any
new
drilling
contracts
were
at
much
lower
prices.
PIP
grants
were
terminated
in
March
of
1986.
These
occurrences
affected
HOL
in
a
number
of
ways
and
it
was
clearly
realized
by
HOL
in
1986
that
-
(a)
HOL’s
guarantee
of
EDC’s
loan
to
build
Bow
Drill
3
exceeded
any
interest
HOOL
had
in
Bermuda
and
this
was
serious
because
by
June
of
1986
it
was
clear
that
BVRS
was
approaching
insolvency.
Moreover,
the
BVRS
and
BVI
guarantees
to
EDC
were
limited,
but
HOL’s
was
not.
(b)
The
Mobil
farm-out
had
to
be
finished
so
that
the
percentage
interest
in
its
acreage
production
could
be
realized.
Bow
Drill
3’s
lucrative
drilling
contracts
expired
in
July,
1988.
(c)
As
the
lucrative
drilling
contracts
expired,
Bermuda
would
be
unable
to
make
the
EDC
payments.
In
fact
the
first
failure
to
pay
occurred
on
September
15,
1988.
EDC
then
was
entitled
to
declare
a
default,
but
did
not.
There
was
also
an
earlier
ex-
piry
date
which
arose
in
the
EDC
loan
agreement
when
the
drilling
contracts
expired
which
EDC
did
not
exercise.
(d)
HOOL
only
owned
35%
of
Bermuda
and
could
not
control
its
activities
or
cash
flow.
Thereupon,
HOL
-
(a)
Tried
to
extend
EDC’s
financing.
(July
17,
1986,
Exhibit
A-2,
Tab
88)
(b)
Had
its
solicitors
draft
a
Statement
of
Claim
to
sue
the
federal
government
for
damages
resulting
from
the
cancellation
of
PIP
and
its
effects
on
HOL.
(July
31,
1986
-
Exhibit
A-4,
Tab
94)
(c)
Tried
to
negotiate
with
BVRS
to
obtain
clear
title
to
Bow
Drill
3
if
it
paid
off
its
35%
interest.
(August
8,
1986
—
Exhibit
A-
1,
Tab
11
and
August
14,
1986
-
Exhibit
A-1,
Tab
9)
(d)
And
BVRS
sold
Bow
Drill
2
to
a
Republic
of
China
corporation
in
the
fall
of
1986
(Exhibit
A-1,
Tab
15).
Thereafter
BVRS
attempted
to
sell
Bow
Drill
3
to
Nanhai
West
Oil
Corporation,
a
Republic
of
China
corporation
which
the
parties
referred
to
from
time
to
time
as
the
“Chinese”.
HOL
consented
to
these
attempts
by
BVRS.
(e)
Began
negotiations
with
EDC
to
transfer
Bow
Drill
3
to
a
partnership
for
the
amount
of
the
EDC
loan
so
that
the
partners
could
deduct
the
capital
cost
allowance
against
their
liabilities
(August
12,
1986
-
Exhibit
A-2,
Tab
96).
These
negotiations
continued
but
were
never
successful.
(f)
Arranged
an
agreement
between
HOOL
and
BVRS
to
“dam”
the
cash
flowing
from
Bermuda’s
drilling
operations
so
as
to
service
EDC.
(September
5,
1986
-
Exhibit
A-2,
Tab
100)
(g)
Reviewed
its
tax
position
and
considered
the
use
of
a
partnership
respecting
its
35%.
(February
7,
1987
-
Exhibit
R-2,
Al
17)
(h)
Acquired
HOOL’s
BVHOHL
loan
respecting
Bermuda
on
April
14,
1988
by
document
Exhibit
A-3,
Tab
143.
(i)
Offered
to
pay
EDC
$2.9
million
and
transfer
its
35%
for
a
release
of
the
HOL
guarantee.
(October
7,
1988
-
Exhibit
A-4,
Tab
191)
By
mid-1988
BVRS’s
bankruptcy
became
a
probability
and
EDC
was
facing
the
publicity
that
would
result.
HOL
had
obtained
a
lawyer’s
opinion
on
June
3,
1986
that
it
might
not
be
liable
on
its
guarantee
to
EDC
(Exhibit
A-2,
Tab
77).
However,
costly
litigation
respecting
that
opinion
was
a
certainty
and
HOL
might
still
be
liable.
It
is
in
the
light
of
this
that
the
failure
by
Bermuda
to
pay
EDC
the
September
15,
1988
instalment
is
noteworthy.
Paragraph
32
of
the
Statement
of
Agreed
Facts
is
technically
incorrect.
Bermuda
failed
to
pay
EDC
on
September
15,
1988
because
it
could
not
afford
to
meet
that
payment.
The
guarantors
did
not
make
the
payment.
But
under
the
contract
EDC
had
to
declare
a
default.
EDC
never
did
declare
a
default,
although
it
could
have
done
so
at
any
time
after
September
15,
1988.
On
September
26,
1988
HOL
offered
to
buy
the
Bermuda
loan
for
Bow
Drill
3
from
EDC
at
a
discount
“subject
to
a
satisfactory
contract
...
with
...
(what
turned
out
to
be
Maersk)”
(September
26,
1988
—
Exhibit
A-3,
Tab
165).
The
offer
was
accepted
on
September
27,
1988
(Exhibit
A-3,
Tab
167).
After
a
public
bidding
process
Texaco
entered
into
an
agreement
to
drill
with
Bow
Drill
3
on
September
27,
1988
(Exhibit
A-3,
Tab
168).
Maersk
agreed
to
provide
the
drilling
services
on
September
27,
1988
(Exhibit
A-3,
Tab
169).
HOL
and
Maersk
began
to
deal
for
the
sale
of
Bow
Drill
3
at
the
end
of
September
1988
(Exhibit
A-3,
Tabs
170
and
171
and
Exhibit
A-4,
Tab
173).
Exhibit
A-7
dated
September
26,
1988
is
the
EDC
staff
memorandum
to
its
Board
of
Directors
respecting
the
sale
of
the
loan
to
HOL.
Page
9
describes
HOL’s
motives
for
this
as
seen
by
EDC’s
staff.
It
reads:
Husky’s
motivation
for
tabling
the
offer
is
assumed
to
be
based
primarily
on
their
desire
to
a)
reduce
their
potential
exposure
with
EDC;
b)
assure
the
availability
of
a
rig
that
they
are
comfortable
with
to
complete
their
drilling
programs;
c)
access
a
significant
potential
tax
base
(for
losses
and
loss
carry
forwards)
which
has
heretofore
been
available
only
in
Bermuda;
and
d)
capitalize
on
their
positive
assessment
of
the
medium-term
market
value
of
the
rig.
Mr.
Miller
stated
that
he
does
not
recall
stating
the
“d)”
portion
of
the
quotation.
He
stated
that
HOL
merely
wanted
to
get
out
of
the
offshore
drilling
business
with
a
minimum
loss.
When
HOL
obtained
EDC’s
agreement
to
sell
its
loan,
the
offshore
requirement
insisted
on
by
EDC
ended.
On
October
3,
1988
HOL
proposed,
and
BVRS
accepted,
a
series
of
actions
that,
roughly,
is
what
became
the
documentation
in
this
matter
(Exhibit
A-4,
Tab
175).
At
that
time
the
sale
of
Bow
Drill
3
to
the
Chinese
remained
a
possibility,
as
did
an
option
with
Maersk.
The
letter
of
October
3
followed
two
years
of
financial
difficulties
and
difficulties
between
BVRS
and
HOL
as
their
situations
deteriorated.
The
letter
of
agreement
between
the
parties
dated
October
3,
1988
is
a
result
of
these
difficulties
and
negotiations
extending
over
two
years.
It
reads
Husky
Oil
|
|
707
8
|
Avenue
S.W.
|
William
R.
Miller,
C.A.
|
Box
6525,
Station
D
|
Vice
President
|
Calgary,
Alberta,
Canada
|
Husky
Oil
Ltd.
|
T2P
3G7
|
(403)
298-7354
|
|
October
3,
1988
|
Bow
Valley
Resource
Services
Ltd.
|
|
1600,
321
—
6
Avenue
S.W.
|
|
Calgary,
Alberta
|
|
T2P
3R3
|
|
Attention:
Mr.
K.E.
Myers
Vice
President,
Finance
Dear
Sir:
Re:
Bow
Drill
3
(The
“Rig”)
Owing
to
the
present
state
of
affairs
in
respect
to
the
loan
(the
“Loan”)
to
Bow
Valley
Husky
(Bermuda)
Ltd.
(“Bermuda”)
from
Export
Development
Corporation
(“EDC”),
we
propose
the
course
of
action
as
described
below
for
your
consideration.
The
participation
of
Husky
Oil
Ltd.
(“HOL”)
and
its
affiliates
is
conditional
upon
the
unconditional
acceptance
by
EDC
of
the
offer
to
purchase
the
Loan
made
by
HOL
to
EDC
(which
shall
include
all
security
thereto)
and
the
arranging
of
a
satisfactory
contract
in
respect
of
the
Rig
between
the
partnership,
as
defined
below,
and
a
company
within
the
A.P.
Moller
Group
(“Maersk”).
Hereinafter
the
term
“EDC
loan”
shall
refer
to
the
Loan
as
acquired
by
HOL
or
any
of
its
affiliates.
The
participation
of
Bow
Valley
Resource
Services
Ltd.
(“BVRS”)
is
conditional
upon
notification
in
writing
by
HOL
to
BVRS
that
the
aforementioned
conditions
have
been
unconditionally
satisfied.
In
consideration
of
BVRS
complying
with
or
causing
compliance
with
the
proposal
and
those
matters
set
forth
under
the
heading
“Other
Matters”
below,
HOL
shall
release
BVRS
from
any
and
all
obligations
in
respect
of
the
EDC
loan
and
the
security
with
respect
thereto.
Proposal
I.
The
Bow
Drill
3
Partnership
(the
“New
Partnership”)
will
be
formed
under
the
laws
of
Alberta
between
Bermuda,
HOL,
Bow
Valley
Offshore
Drilling
Ltd.
(“BVOD)
or
some
other
company
within
the
BVRS
group
as
determined
by
BVRS
(such
company
to
be
hereinafter
referred
to
as
the
“Manager”).
The
partnership
agreement
will
contain
the
terms
as
more
fully
described
below.
2.
BVRS
will
assign
its
loan
receivable
from
B.V.H.
Offshore
Holdings
Ltd.
(“BVHOH”)
to
HOL
in
consideration
of
$1
payable
by
HOL
and
at
the
same
time
therewith
the
BVRS
guarantee
of
the
EDC
Loan
to
Bermuda
will
be
released.
BVRS
hereby
warrants
that
such
loan
receivable
will
be
free
of
any
encumbrance
at
the
time
of
this
transaction.
This
transaction
shall
be
concluded
immediately
following
the
completion
of
the
sale
resulting
from
the
exercise
of
either
option
provided
for
in
the
Option
Agreement
between
the
New
Partnership
and
Maersk
dated
on
or
about
October
4,
1988
(the
“Option
Agreement)
or
December
16,
1988,
whichever
shall
come
first.
Prior
to
the
date
of
release
of
the
BVRS
guarantee,
HOL
shall
not
demand
payment
thereunder
unless
BVRS
is
in
default
of
its
obligations
under
this
letter.
3.
HOL
will
release
the
mortgage
in
respect
of
the
EDC
loan
against
the
Rig
to
be
replaced
by
a
charge
upon
the
interest
acquired
by
Bermuda
in
the
New
Partnership.
4.
Bermuda
will
contribute
the
Rig
to
the
New
Partnership
free
of
the
security
in
respect
of
the
Loan
or
the
EDC
loan.
Bermuda’s
interest
in
the
New
Partnership
will
be
pledged
to
HOL
as
security
for
the
EDC
loan.
At
the
option
of
HOL,
the
New
Partnership
will
guarantee
the
EDC
loan
of
Bermuda
and
provide
a
mortgage
on
the
Rig
as
collateral
security
for
the
guarantee.
5.
At
the
option
of
HOL,
exercised
on
or
before
December
31,
1988,
Bermuda
will
transfer
its
interest
in
the
New
Partnership
to
HOL
for
consideration
of
U.S.$31.7
million
(the
“Consideration”).
Payment
of
the
Consideration
may
be
satisfied
by
reduction
of
the
amount
owing
by
Bermuda
to
HOL
in
respect
of
the
EDC
loan.
6.
On
or
before
December
31,
1988,
HOL
or
one
of
its
affiliates
may,
at
the
option
of
HOL,
acquire
the
interest
of
the
Manager
in
the
New
Partnership
for
an
amount
equal
to
a
predetermined
estimate
of
the
fair
market
value
of
such
interest.
7.
BVRS
will
agree
to
file
the
1987
and
1988
income
tax
returns
of
Bermuda
and
to
refile
tax
returns
for
years
prior
to
the
1987
tax
year,
as
directed
by
HOL.
Partnership
Terms
The
terms
of
the
agreement
governing
the
New
Partnership
will
include
the
following:
1.
The
Manager
will
be
entitled
to
a
priority
share
of
profits
of
the
New
Partnership
in
respect
of
management
services
to
be
agreed
upon.
2.
The
Manager
will
be
entitled
to
1%
of
the
operating
profits
of
the
New
Partnership
in
excess
of
the
priority
share
referred
to
in
paragraph
1.
3.
The
Manager
will
be
entitled
to
2%
of
any
gain
for
accounting
purposes
recognized
by
the
New
Partnership
on
a
disposition
of
any
assets
owned
by
the
New
Partnership.
4.
All
allocations
to
partners
as
required
by
the
Income
Tax
Act
(Canada)
will
be
made
to
those
persons
who
are
partners
at
the
fiscal
year-end
of
the
New
Partnership
(December
31)
provided
that
net
losses,
if
any,
for
the
fiscal
year
shall
be
for
the
account
of
the
majority
partner.
5.
After
distribution
of
the
priority
share
profits
which
are
to
be
distributed
monthly,
any
further
distribution
from
the
New
Partnership
shall
be
made
pro
rata
according
to
the
capital
accounts
of
the
partners
at
the
time
of
the
distribution.
6.
Voting
rights
in
respect
of
partnership
activities
shall
be
allocated
as
to
20%
to
the
Manager,
as
to
5%
to
HOL
and
as
to
75%
to
the
financing
partner
Bermuda.
Other
Matters
The
parties
hereto
also
agree
as
follows,
subject
to
the
conditions
outlined
in
the
opening
paragraph
of
this
letter:
1.
HOL
shall
advance
funds
to
Bermuda
to
the
extent
necessary
to
cover
Bermuda’s
obligations,
after
utilizing
existing
cash
resources
and
cash
flow
from
operations,
as
outlined
below:
(a)
The
cost
of
replacing
the
anodes
in
the
Rig
incurred
by
Bermuda
estimated
to
be
approximately
$400,000
and
such
other
similar
matters
requested
by
HOL.
(b)
Reasonable
and
usual
costs
associated
with
the
stacking
of
the
Rig
from
August
14,
1988
until
the
Rig
next
commences
work.
(c)
On
or
before
October
31,
1988
Bermuda
will
purchase
and
pay
U.S.
$500,000
to
Bow
Valley
Husky
Offshore
Drilling
Limited
Partnership
(“BVHOD”)
and
thereby
obtain
title
free
and
clear
of
all
encumbrances
to
the
5"
drill
pipe
(the
“Pipe”)
currently
owned
by
BVHOD.
In
addition,
on
or
before
October
31,
1988
Bermuda
will
purchase
and
BVHOD
will
sell
for
U.S.
$160,000
payable
at
time
of
purchase
and
sale
the
following
equipment:
Vetco
Hangoff
Toll
and
bodies
Heavy
duty
running
string
(30
joints)
Acoustic
BOP
Control
Unit
(d)
Bermuda
shall
pay
or
reimburse
Bow
Valley
Offshore
Drilling
Limited
Partnership
(“BVODLP”)
for
the
termination
costs
of
those
employees
of
BVODLP
who
participated
in
the
administration
and
operations
of
the
Rig,
provided
that
where
an
employee
has
been
involved
in
the
administration
and
operation
of
rigs
other
than
the
Rig
or
other
activities,
such
termination
costs
shall
be
reasonably
reduced
so
that
they
relate
only
to
his
service
in
respect
of
the
Rig;
BVOD
as
the
general
partner
of
BVODLP
shall
determine
the
termination
amounts
(including
outplacement
counseling)
and
other
applicable
termination
costs
of
the
BVODLP
employees;
however,
BVRS
covenants
that
such
termination
amounts
shall
be
reasonable
under
the
circumstances:
BVOD
shall
advise
Bermuda
of
the
amount
of
such
costs
and
Bermuda
will
promptly
pay
such
amounts
to
the
employee
or
to
BVODLP
at
the
time
such
payment
is
required
to
be
made
to
the
employee.
Such
costs
are
presently
estimated
to
be
$925,000
and
HOL
will
post
an
irrevocable
standby
letter
of
credit
in
favour
of
Bermuda
for
this
amount.
(e)
Bermuda
shall
promptly
reimburse
BVODLP
for
50%
of
the
reasonable
costs
(such
50%
is
presently
estimated
to
be
$35,000)
incurred
in
closing
the
Halifax
office,
and
100%
of
the
reasonable
costs
(presently
estimated
to
be
$20,000)
incurred
in
closing
the
St.
John’s
office,
of
the
BVODLP
as
more
particularly
contemplated
in
the
Management
Agreement
between
Bermuda
and
BVODLP
dated
May
27,
1983;
(f)
Bermuda
shall
reimburse
BVRS
for
all
reasonable
and
necessary
legal
fees
and
out-of-pocket
expenses
incurred
by
BVRS
with
respect
to
the
potential
sale
of
the
Rig
and
the
other
transactions
contemplated
herein;
(g)
Bermuda
will
incur
winding-down
costs
estimated
to
be
$250,000
through
April
30,
1989.
2.
Bermuda
will
make
no
payments
or
prepayments
on
account
of
its
debt
to
BVHOH
or
EDC
unless
approved
by
the
Board
of
Directors
of
Bermuda.
3.
BVRS
shall,
or
BVRS
shall
cause
the
relevant
subsidiaries
and
affiliates
including
BVOD
and
BVODLP,
to
cooperate
fully
with
the
New
Partnership
in
connection
with
the
possible
sale
of
the
Rig
to
Maersk
or
its
nominee
including,
without
limitation,
providing
Maersk
and
its
representatives
with
access
to
all
necessary
information
and
documentation
respecting
the
Rig,
excluding
personnel
and
financial
records,
prior
to
the
closing
date,
delivering
such
documentation
and
any
other
documentation
in
the
possession
of
BVOD
or
BVODLP
required
by
Schedule
A
to
the
Option
Agreement
to
Maersk
on
the
closing
date,
fully
cooperating
with
Maersk
in
connection
with
the
transfer
of
the
ownership
of
the
Rig
and
of
the
operational
responsibilities
for
the
Rig
on
or
before
the
closing
date
including,
without
limitation,
permitting
Maersk
to
make
use
of
BVOD’s
or
BVODLP’s
operations
and
procedures
manuals
for
the
Rig
for
a
period
not
to
exceed
9
months
after
the
closing
date
and
permitting
Maersk
to
make
employment
arrangements
with
BVODLP
personnel.
4.
BVRS
will
make
all
reasonable
efforts
to
provide
HOL
with
a
draft
of
any
press
release
or
other
public
disclosure
which
BVRS
proposes
to
release
in
respect
of,
or
referring
to,
Bow
Drill
3,
twenty-four
(24)
hours
prior
to
such
release
or
disclosure
so
that
HOL
may
provide
its
reasonable
comments
in
respect
thereof
with
a
view
that
any
such
press
release
or
other
disclosure
shall
be
reasonably
satisfactory
to
both
BVRS
and
HOL
acknowledging
the
requirements
of
BVRS
to
make
timely
disclosure
under
the
applicable
securities
regulation.
These
obligations
will
terminate
at
the
close
of
business
on
December
16,
1988.
5.
BVRS
and
HOL
will
jointly
work
out
a
suitable
response
to
Nanhai
West
Oil
Corporation.
6.
HOL
and
BVRS
shall
cause
Bermuda
to
assume
and
fulfill
its
obligations
described
hereunder.
7.
HOL
undertakes
to
cause
the
New
Partnership
to
change
its
name
on
or
before
December
31,
1988.
If
you
are
in
agreement
herewith,
please
sign
and
return
this
letter
to
HOL
at
the
above
address,
attention
W.
R.
Miller,
prior
to
5:00
p.m.
Calgary
time
October
3,
1988.
Yours
truly,
HUSKY
OIL
LTD.
“W.
R.
Miller”
W.R.
Miller
Vice
President
“R.L.
Phillips”
R.L.
Phillips
Vice
President
WRM:hjm
Agreed:
Bow
Valley
Resource
Services
Ltd.
"Kenneth
E.
Myers”
“Arnold
F.
Bathgate”
(Exhibit
A-4,
Tab
175)
On
October
7,
1988
HOL
advised
EDC
that
the
“Maersk”
condition
in
its
offer
of
September
26,
1988
to
purchase
the
EDC
loan
“will
not
be
satisfied”
and
that
it
will
not
be
purchasing
the
loan
(Exhibit
A-4,
Tab
189).
On
the
same
day
HOL
also
offered
to
sell
its
corporate
interest
in
Bow
Drill
3
to
EDC
and
to
pay
EDC
$2.9
million
if
EDC
would
discharge
HOL’s
guarantees
on
the
loan
(Exhibit
A-4,
Tab
191).
On
October
10,
1988
Mr.
Miller’s
notes
indicate
that
any
arrangement
with
Maersk
may
not
be
doable.
(Exhibit
A-4,
Tab
192).
And
on
October
13,
1988
Mr.
Miller’s
notes
refer
to
the
“Chinese
sale”
(Exhibit
A-4,
Tab
196).
On
October
14,
1988
BVRS
wrote
EDC
and:
(a)
stated
that
the
“Chinese”
sale
had
been
approved
by
its
Board
subject
to
EDC
or
another
party
paying
the
costs
of
sale,
and
(b)
raised
the
possibility
that
Bow
Drill
3
might
be
left
unmanned
in
view
of
continuing
expenses
which
could
not
be
paid
by
Bermuda
and
BVODLP.
It
is
a
letter
from
a
BVRS
that
is
clearly
in
desperate
financial
straits
(Exhibit
A-5,
Tab
198).
On
the
same
day
HOL
wrote
BVRS
to
the
effect
that
the
terms
of
the
October
3,
1988
agreement
between
them
had
been
met.
The
letter
(Exhibit
A-5,
Tab
197)
reads:
Re:
Bow
Drill
3
(The
“Rig’’)
Further
to
our
letter
agreement
of
October
3,
1988
(the
“Letter”)
we
wish
to
advise
that
Husky
Oil
Ltd.
(“HOL”)
and
Export
Development
Corporation
(“EDC”)
have
reached
agreement
pursuant
to
which
HOL
will
acquire
the
EDC
loan
to
Bow
Valley
Husky
(Bermuda)
Ltd.
and
related
security.
Also,
a
satisfactory
contract
has
been
entered
into
in
respect
of
Bow
Drill
3
between
the
partnership
and
Maersk,
each
as
defined
in
the
Letter.
HOL
shall
also
advance
funds
to
Bermuda,
in
the
same
manner
as
outlined
in
the
Letter
in
paragraph
I
under
the
heading
“Other
Matters”,
to
enable
Bermuda
to
reimburse
Bow
Valley
Resource
Services
Ltd.
for
retroactive
adjustments
of
approximately
U.S.
$120,000
to
previously
paid
insurance
premiums,
which
adjustments
are
now
properly
due
by
Bermuda
in
respect
of
Bow
Drill
3.
It
was
in
these
circumstances
that
the
Partnership
agreement
was
signed
“as
of
the
6
day
of
October,
1988”.
It
carried
out
the
agreement
of
October
3,
1988.
It
was
a
legal
general
partnership
agreement
which
was
registered
under
the
Alberta
Partnership
Act.
There
were
three
partners:
Bermuda
contributed
Bow
Drill
3,
HOL
contributed
operating
oil
and
gas
properties
and
384830
(which
was
wholly
owned
by
BVRS)
contributed
$10.00.
The
partnership
agreement
set
out
the
voting
rights
as
Bermuda
75%,
384830
20%
and
HOL
5%
(Exhibit
A-4,
Tab
187,
para.
11.1).
On
October
6,
1988
the
Partnership
leased
Bow
Drill
3
to
Texaco
(Exhibit
A-4,
Tab
188)
at
a
rate
of
$57,500
per
operating
day.
Mr.
Miller
testified,
and
the
Court
accepts
it
as
the
fact,
that
the
cause
of
the
formation
of
the
Partnership
and
HOL’s
purchase
of
the
EDC
loan
was
that
BVRS
was
verging
on
insolvency
in
1987
and
1988
as
a
result
of
the
Progressive
Conservative
government’s
cancellation
of
the
NEP
and
PIP.
Bermuda
failed
to
meet
its
payments
to
EDC
on
September
15,
1988
and
in
conjunction
with
this
the
Appellant
consented
to
a
sale
of
Bow
Drill
3
to
the
“Chinese”,
even
though
it
thought
that
the
possible
sale
to
Maersk
would
be
more
remunerative.
This
sale
did
not
occur.
Before
October
14,
1988
HOL
and
BVRS
had
Maersk
(which
had
a
group
of
people
in
Calgary
for
about
two
weeks
commencing
before
October
14)
and
the
Chinese
looking
at,
but
not
offering
an
acceptable
price
for,
Bow
Drill
3.
EDC
was
worried
and
(unknown
to
anyone
else)
ready
to
write
its
loan
down
by
$4
million.
Imminent
bankruptcies
and
actual
insolvencies
existed
among
the
Bow
Valley
group.
HOL
and
BVRS
faced
an
uncooperative
government,
a
reluctant
secured
creditor
in
EDC
and
a
bleak
economic
situation
in
the
offshore
drilling
business
for
Bow
Drill
3.
Respondent’s
counsel
raised
a
question
about
the
absence
of
documents
in
the
period
immediately
before
October
14
and
implied
that
their
absence
raised
questions
vis-a-vis
Revenue
Canada’s
interests.
The
obvious
answer
is
that
BVRS
was
then
on
the
precipice
of
bankruptcy.
Bankruptcy
would
tie
Bow
Drill
3
up
for
an
indeterminate
time
at
a
great
expense
to
HOL
with
little
possibility
of
recovery.
The
absence
of
paper
when
fending
off
creditors
in
insolvent
situations
is
a
common
phenomenon
which
accounts
for
its
absence
in
the
period
near
October
14,
1988.
It
was
in
both
BVRS’s
and
HOL’s
interest
to
avoid
a
bankruptcy
in
the
Bow
Valley
Group.
It
was
also
in
their
interests
to
keep
both
the
Chinese
and
Maersk
in
negotiations.
That
offered
a
chance
of
a
better
price
for
Bow
Drill
3
and
two
possibilities
for
a
sale.
There
is
no
evidence
that
the
Chinese
were
ever
sent
away
or
refused.
The
Chinese
always
remained
in
the
offing
as
a
possible
purchaser.
It
was
in
these
circumstances
that
the
documents
described
in
paragraphs
36
and
37
of
the
Statement
of
Agreed
Facts
were
signed.
In
particular,
the
Option
Agreement
between
the
Partnership
and
Maersk
(Exhibit
A-5,
Tab
202)
was
not
dated
“as
of”.
Rather,
it
was
dated
“This
agreement
made
the
14
day
of
October,
1988”.
In
paragraph
1,
the
Partnership
grants
Maersk
an
option
to
buy
Bow
Drill
3
for
$30.3
million
U.S.
which
expires
December
1,
1988.
Paragraph
4
gives
the
Partnership
the
right
to
require
Maersk
to
purchase
Bow
Drill
3
for
$30.8
million
U.S.
during
the
period
of
7
days
after,
in
effect,
December
1,
1988.
This
second
right
gave
the
Partnership
one
more
chance
at
the
Chinese
should
that
be
necessary.
The
remaining
documents
described
in
paragraph
36
are
with
strangers
-
Texaco,
Maersk
and
EDC
which
are
all
public
corporations.
They
evidence
deals
made
on
October
14,
1988.
The
same
is
true
of
the
Texaco
agreement
described
in
subparagraph
35(b)
and
paragraph
37.
The
agreements
de-
scribed
in
paragraph
37
merely
carry
out
the
Partnership
Agreement
of
October
6,
1988.
In
argument
Respondent’s
counsel
spent
some
time
on
the
fact
that
BVRS
and
HOL
were
willing
to
accept
$33
million
U.S.
from
Maersk
for
Bow
Drill
3
on
September
20,
but
signed
an
option
on
October
14
with
Maersk
for
$30.3
million
U.S.
The
difference
of
$2.7
million
in
his
view
was
accounted
for
by
the
time
that
the
Partnership
operated
Bow
Drill
3.
There
are
a
number
of
problems
with
this
proposition.
The
first
is
that
the
Respondent
had
no
evidence
to
this
effect
and
there
is
no
evidence
to
this
effect.
The
record
is
that
Maersk’s
people
were
in
Calgary
for
two
weeks
before
the
option
was
signed
to
investigate
the
possible
purchase.
They
would
have
learned
that
the
September
15,
1988
payment
to
EDC
was
not
paid.
The
financial
status
of
the
BVRS
companies
is
so
evident
that
it
would
have
been
common
knowledge
and
easily
discovered
in
Calgary
over
the
course
of
two
weeks.
Maersk
would
have
learned
that
it
had
a
very
anxious
seller.
As
a
result
it
would
have
dealt
harder
for
a
lower
price
which
it
got.
This
finding
is
confirmed
by
the
events
of
October
7
described
in
paragraph
[16],
by
the
paragraph
[17]
events
and
by
BVRS’s
letter
of
October
14
described
in
paragraph
[18].
The
reduction
varied
BVRS
and
HOL’s
agreement
of
October
3,
1988
and
was
confirmed
by
BVRS
on
October
26,
1988
(Exhibit
A-5,
Tab
220).
On
October
15,
1988
for
these
same
reasons,
and
the
consequent
Maersk
offer
of
$30.3
million,
Husky
proposed
to
EDC
a
reduction
of
its
September
26-27
purchase
price
for
the
EDC
loan
of
$1.5
million
U.S.
(Exhibit
A-5,
Tab
206).
EDC
accepted
this
reduction
by
its
letter
of
October
17,
1988
(Exhibit
A-5,
Tab
209).
Thus
EDC
independently
verified
BVRS
and
HOL’s
deteriorating
bargaining
positions
and
EDC’s
deteriorating
bargaining
position.
A
final
act
which
may
have
affected
Maersk’s
price
is
that,
as
described
in
paragraph
[13],
Texaco
accepted
a
bid
to
drill
with
Bow
Drill
3
on
September
27,
1988
(after
the
September
20
figure
was
arrived
at).
The
economics
of
Bow
Drill
3
changed
as
a
result
of
Texaco’s
acceptance.
This
would
have
affected
the
price
of
Bow
Drill
3
after
September
27,
1988.
The
transfer
of
Bermuda’s
Partnership
interest
to
HOL
by
an
agreement
as
of
November
21
was
acknowledged
by
384830
on
November
23,
1988.
It
terminated
the
assignment
of
Bermuda’s
Partnership
interest
which
Bermuda
gave
to
HOL
on
October
18,
1988
in
return
for
HOL
releasing
EDC’s
security
against
Bermuda
and
Bow
Drill
3
and
terminating
any
debt
or
security
against
Bow
Drill
3
itself
(Exhibit
A-5,
Tab
213).
This
recitation
of
the
background
evidence
respecting
the
bare
bones
in
the
Agreed
Statement
of
Facts
provides
the
business
reasons
that
the
Partnership
was
necessary
and
became
the
only
feasible
legal
route
by
which
to
proceed.
The
Bow
Valley
group
was
insolvent
and
faced
the
bankruptcy
of
some
corporations
which
would
have
jeopardized
them
all;
it
had
to
get
rid
of
Bow
Drill
3
and
the
EDC
loan
to
survive.
HOL
wanted
to
sever
its
relationship
with
Bow
Valley,
remove
the
EDC
guarantees
and
get
rid
of
Bow
Drill
3.
HOL
had
been
trying
to
do
these
things
for
over
two
years
without
paying
out
EDC,
but
EDC
would
not
agree.
BVRS
ultimately
had
control
over
negotiations
due
to
its
65%
control
of
the
corporation
that
owned
Bermuda,
so
it
had
a
veto.
But
BVRS’s
position
weakened
as
it
weakened
financially.
The
failure
to
pay
EDC
on
September
15,
1988
gave
HOL
an
equal
bargaining
position
in
respect
to
the
Bow
Valley
group.
It
also
left
EDC
in
a
weakened
position
since
EDC
then
faced
the
likelihood
of
acquiring
both
Bow
Drill
3
and
a
lawsuit
by
HOL.
HOL
had
the
money
to
pay
EDC,
but
it
did
not
want
to
be
in
the
offshore
drilling
business
and
it
did
not
need
a
lawsuit.
Thus,
the
three
parties
became
equals
on
September
15,
1988.
However,
Bow
Drill
3
and
its
debt
remained
a
liability
to
all
three.
There
was
no
sure
sale.
HOL
did
not
want
to
be
in
the
offshore
drilling
business
and
did
not
want
to
buy
Bow
Drill
3
itself.
Bermuda’s
ownership
of
Bow
Drill
3
gave
HOL
limited
liability
for
the
rig
itself.
By
creating
the
partnership,
having
Bermuda
contribute
Bow
Drill
3
to
it,
and
obtaining
a
security
over
Bermuda:
1.
BVRS
retained
control
of
Bermuda.
2.
HOL
had
to
pay
out
all
of
EDC
and,
in
return,
3.
HOL
got
(a)
clear
title
to
Bow
Drill
3
in
the
Partnership,
(b)
security
over
Bermuda,
(c)
the
opportunity
to
get
rid
of
BVRS
and
possible
problems
with
BVRS’s
creditors,
(d)
a
right
to
BVHOHL’s
loan
to
Bermuda
for
$1,
and
for
this,
(e)
direct
ownership
of
an
interest
in
Bow
Drill
3
and
liability
for
Bow
Drill
3
as
a
partner.
4.
BVRS
and
its
companies
got
rid
of
the
EDC
liability,
Bow
Drill
3,
and
an
additional
potential
loss
if
the
sale
was
completed.
5.
Bow
Drill
3,
without
debt,
became
economic.
All
of
the
items
described
in
3.
and
5.
occurred
to
the
commercial
advantage
of
HOL
because
of
the
creation
of
the
Partnership
and
the
transfer
of
Bow
Drill
3
into
it.
Once
Bow
Drill
3
was
out
of
Bermuda
and
HOL
held
security
over
Bermuda,
practical
control
had
moved
from
BVRS
to
HOL.
It
left
BVRS
with
the
leverage
to
extricate
itself
from
the
former
EDC
debt.
But
HOL
still
held
BVRS
liable
for
the
former
EDC
debt
if
Bow
Drill
3
did
not
sell.
Immediately
upon
being
formed
and
acquiring
Bow
Drill
3,
the
Partnership
began
the
business
of
operating
the
rig.
The
Texaco
contract
had
to
be
met
and
a
major
operating
problem,
the
Bergen
engines,
required
a
Partnership
repair
crew,
warranty
work
and
claims
and
keeping
Bow
Drill
3
in
operating
condition
at
the
same
time
(Exhibit
A-5,
Tab
240).
The
Partnership’s
first
fiscal
year
was
from
October
6
to
December
31,
1988.
It
earned
a
profit
before
depreciation
from
both
Bow
Drill
3
and
the
oil
and
gas
properties.
This
was
a
deal
involving
EDC,
BVRS
and
HOL
which
had
to
be
done
to
the
satisfaction
of
all
of
them.
It
was
fully
documented
and
legal
relations
occurred
at
each
interval
among
all
of
the
parties.
The
Partnership
was
formed,
Bow
Drill
3
was
transferred
to
it,
the
option
was
granted
to
Maersk
with
an
option
to
the
Partnership
(and
with
the
Chinese
deal
remaining
a
possibility
to
the
Partnership),
the
Bermuda
interest
was
transferred
to
HOL
for
valuable
consideration,
Bow
Drill
3
was
transferred
to
Maersk
for
valuable
consideration
and
the
Partnership
was
in
active
business
in
1988
and
1989.
As
Bowman,
J.T.C.C.
said
in
Continental
Bank
of
Canada
v.
R.
(1994),
94
D.T.C.
1858
(T.C.C.)
at
1868:
If
the
legal
relationships
are
binding
and
are
not
a
cloak
to
disguise
another
type
of
legal
relationship
they
are
not
a
sham,
however
much
the
tax
result
may
offend
the
Minister
or,
for
that
matter,
the
court,
and
whatever
may
be
the
overall
ulterior
economic
motive.
When
something
is
a
sham
the
necessary
corollary
is
that
there
is
behind
the
legal
facade
a
different
real
legal
relationship.
If
the
legal
reality
that
underlies
the
ostensible
legal
relationship
is
the
same
as
that
which
appears
on
the
surface,
there
is
no
sham.
The
legal
facade
describes
the
legal
reality
in
this
case.
There
is
no
sham.
The
evidence
is
that
HOL
did
not
want
to
do
the
series
of
transactions
in
which
it
ultimately
participated.
It
wanted
EDC
to
consent
to
a
domestic
loan
to
carry
out
the
sale
of
Bow
Drill
3
and
tried
to
get
that
consent
for
two
years.
It
did
not
want
to
have
the
entire
loan
respecting
Bow
Drill
3,
rather
it
wanted
to
confine
its
liability
to
its
indirect
35%
interest
in
Bermuda
and
to
replace
that
with
the
ownership
of
35%
of
Bow
Drill
3
itself.
But
neither
BVRS
nor
EDC
would
allow
HOL
to
achieve
that
purpose.
Nor
is
there
evidence
that
HOL
wanted
a
partnership.
That
was
reviewed
in
February,
1987,
but
HOL
offered
to
transfer
Bow
Drill
3
and
pay
$2.9
million
to
EDC
on
October
7,
1988,
for
a
discharge.
The
tax
aspect
of
the
partnership
and
transfer
followed
from
the
commercial
negotiations
and
deals.
The
letter
of
October
3,
1988
evidences
a
contract
between
HOL
and
BVRS
that
was
the
result
of
two
years
of
difficulties
which
they
suffered.
In
fact,
they
formally
amended
the
price
described
in
that
agreement
by
a
letter
between
the
two
dated
October
26,
1988
in
which
it
was
agreed
that
the
Maersk
option
price
would
be
reduced
from
$31.7
million
to
$30.3
million
(U.S.)
(Exhibit
A-5,
Tab
220).
The
difficulties
were
caused
by
the
federal
government
creating
the
NEP
and
PIP;
BVRS
and
HOL
as
Canadian
public
corporations
acting
upon
it
with
the
intention
of
benefiting
their
shareholders;
an
offshore
endeavour
that
was
not
economic
without
PIP;
and
the
termination
of
PIP
by
the
federal
government.
Its
advantages
were
the
possibilities
of
ultimately
owning
offshore
drilling
acreage
and
a
depreciated
but
operative
Bow
Drill
3.
Both
of
these
were
in
jeopardy
the
moment
that
PIP
was
cancelled.
There
is
no
evidence
that
BVRS
and
HOL
obtained
any
offshore
acreage
or
if
they
could
have
afforded
it
if
it
became
available.
The
evidence
is
that
Bow
Drill
3
itself
was
a
bad
investment.
It
very
nearly
broke
BVRS.
It
became
the
subject
of
a
standoff
among
EDC,
BVRS
and
HOL.
It
was
finally
determined
by
them
based
upon
the
proposal
and
terms
agreed
to
by
HOL
and
BVRS
on
October
3,
1988.
By
October
3,
1988,
as
confirmed
on
October
7,
it
was
clear
that
EDC
would
require
a
complete
payment
out
with
a
discount
and
that
HOL
was
the
only
party
that
could
pay.
However,
BVRS
had
65%
of
Bow
Drill
3
and
therefore
was
in
control.
It
was
also
liable
on
the
EDC
loan.
It
had
an
additional
loan
into
Bow
Drill
3
and
it
was
for
all
practical
purposes
insolvent,
in
part
because
of
the
Bow
Drill
3
debacle
and
loans.
Getting
rid
of
these
liabilities
for
millions
of
dollars
would
solve
many
of
BVRS’s
problems
and
it
had
a
lever
—
control
of
the
65%.
EDC’s
lever
was
the
security
on
Bow
Drill
3
which
made
it
uneconomic.
HOL
had
the
money,
liability
for
35%
and
more
and
had
made
offers
to
buy
its
way
out
which
were
not
accepted.
It
had
to
send
good
money
after
bad
money
and
it
had
to
remove
BVRS
from
its
liability
in
order
to
obtain
control.
The
result
was
not
an
arrangement
by
one
controlling
hand.
It
was
a
negotiated
deal
between
two
public
corporations
and
EDC
which
had
to
satisfy
the
commercial
requirements
of
all
the
parties,
each
of
which
faced
major
repercussions
if
the
negotiations
were
not
successful.
In
these
circumstances
the
concepts
described
by
Linden,
J.A.
on
behalf
of
the
entire
panel
of
the
Federal
Court
of
Appeal
in
Tonn
v.
R.
(1995),
96
D.T.C.
6001
(Fed.
C.A.)
respecting
businessmen’s
right
to
make
business
decisions
without
interference
have
a
place.
In
this
case,
EDC,
BVRS
and
HOL,
which
were
at
arm’s
length
from
each
other,
engaged
themselves
in
a
business
enterprise
and
their
expectations
of
profit
were
reasonable.
Bow
Drill
3
was
launched
after
a
careful
market
analysis
based
upon
NEP
and
PIP.
Soon
after
the
federal
government
withdrew
NEP
and
PIP.
Bow
Drill
3’s
situation
became
precarious.
BVRS
and
its
corporations
became
insolvent
as
a
result.
EDC
accepted
the
fact
that
it
was
going
to
lose
money.
HOL
accepted
the
fact
that
it
was
going
to
lose
money.
Each
tried
to
minimize
its
loss
within
the
provisions
of
the
law.
Each
had
made
an
honest
error
in
judgment
and
lost
money
instead
of
earning
it.
This
reassessment
arose
as
a
result
of
these
parties,
together,
taking
measures
to
counteract
the
unexpected
losses
which
the
venture
presented.
Moreover,
they
did
so
while
a
possible
deal
might
be
struck
with
either
Maersk
or
the
Chinese.
Together
BVRS
and
HOL
negotiated
the
Partnership.
Together
they
negotiated
a
deal
that
transferred
Bow
Drill
3
to
the
Partnership.
As
a
result
subsection
85(5.1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
transferred
Bow
Drill
3’s
undepreciated
capital
cost
to
the
Partnership.
Together
they
agreed
that
HOL
would
pay
out
EDC
at
what
they
both
knew
would
be
a
loss
on
the
sale
of
Bow
Drill
3
based
upon
the
prices
then
proposed
by
the
Chinese
and
Maersk.
Both
suffered
losses
as
did
EDC.
All
of
them
survived.
They
were
commercial
transactions
for
commercial
purposes
from
beginning
to
end.
The
Partnership
was
in
the
interest
of
both
HOL
and
BVRS.
HOL
retained
security
over
BVRS
until
BVRS
had
done
everything
HOL
wanted
including
the
sale
of
its
BVHOHL
loan
for
$1
—
a
direct
loss
for
BVRS.
HOL
retained
BVRS’s
guarantee
until
Bow
Drill
3
was
sold
or
until
December
16,
1988
whichever
occurred
first
(Exhibit
A-4,
Tab
-
175,
page
2,
paragraph
2).
BVRS
retained
legal
control
over
Bermuda.
Bow
Drill
3
was
sold
on
December
I,
1988
and
HOL
bought
the
BVHOHL
loan
on
December
16,
1988.
Under
section
245
a
tax
benefit
must
occur
within
the
definition
of
subsection
(1)
as
a
consequence
of
an
avoidance
transaction
within
the
meaning
of
subsection
(3).
For
1988
subsections
245(1),
(2)
and
(3)
read:
245:
Definitions.
(1)
In
this
section
and
in
subsection
152(1.11),
“tax
benefit”.
—
“tax
benefit”
means
a
reduction,
avoidance
or
deferral
of
tax
or
other
amount
payable
under
this
Act
or
an
increase
in
a
refund
of
tax
or
other
amount
under
this
Act;
“tax
consequences”.
—
“tax
consequences”
to
a
person
means
the
amount
of
income,
taxable
income,
or
taxable
income
earned
in
Canada
of,
tax
or
other
amount
payable
by,
or
refundable
to
the
person
under
this
Act,
or
any
other
amount
that
is
relevant
for
the
purposes
of
computing
that
amount;
“transaction”.
—
“transaction”
includes
an
arrangement
or
event.
(2)
General
anti-avoidance
provision.
-
Where
a
transaction
is
an
avoidance
transaction,
the
tax
consequences
to
a
person
shall
be
determined
as
is
reasonable
in
the
circumstances
in
order
to
deny
a
tax
benefit
that,
but
for
this
section,
would
result,
directly
or
indirectly,
from
that
transaction
or
from
a
series
of
transactions
that
includes
that
transaction.
(3)
Avoidance
transaction.
-
An
avoidance
transaction
means
any
transaction
(a)
that,
but
for
this
section,
would
result,
directly
or
indirectly,
in
a
tax
benefit,
unless
the
transaction
may
reasonably
be
considered
to
have
been
undertaken
or
arranged
primarily
for
bona
fide
purposes
other
than
to
obtain
the
tax
benefit;
or
(b)
that
is
part
of
a
series
of
transactions,
which
series,
but
for
this
section,
would
result,
directly
or
indirectly,
in
a
tax
benefit,
unless
the
transaction
may
reasonably
be
considered
to
have
been
undertaken
or
arranged
primarily
for
bona
fide
purposes
other
than
to
obtain
the
tax
benefit.
The
primary
and
bona
fide
purposes
to
form
the
Partnership
and
to
transfer
Bow
Drill
3
to
it
were
so
that
HOL
could
remove
the
EDC
security
from
Bow
Drill
3
and
at
the
same
time
maintain
BVRS
as
liable.
Then
Bow
Drill
3
became
economic
and
could
be
sold
at
HOL’s
discretion
in
return
for
releasing
BVRS.
The
Partnership
and
its
collateral
contracts
gave
them
equal
legal
leverage,
whereas
Bermuda
as
controlled
by
BVHOHL
gave
the
insolvent
BVRS
control.
BVRS
retained
sufficient
control
to
negotiate
with
the
Chinese
despite
the
fact
that
HOL
felt
that
was
less
advantageous
than
a
possible
sale
to
Maersk.
These
were
legal
transactions
with
a
commercial
purpose
for
all
of
the
parties.
They
were
undertaken
or
arranged
primarily
for
bona
fide
purposes
other
than
to
obtain
a
tax
benefit.
Thus
they
fall
into
the
exception
set
out
in
paragraph
245(3)(«).
When
these
transactions
were
accomplished
subsection
85(5.1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
required
the
undepreciated
capital
cost
of
Bow
Drill
3
to
become
the
Partnership’s
since
the
fair
market
value
of
Bow
Drill
3
had
fallen
below
its
undepreciated
capital
cost.
That
fall
in
value
can
in
small
measure
be
blamed
on
the
world
decline
in
the
price
of
oil.
But
the
main
reason
for
the
fall
in
the
value
of
Bow
Drill
3
is
the
removal
of
PIP
by
the
Government
of
Canada
which
created
PIP
and
encouraged
BVRS
and
HOL
to
build
Bow
Drill
3
and
to
engage
in
offshore
drilling
which
was
not
economical
without
PIP.
These
reasons
for
judgment
are
not
based
upon
the
transitional
provisions
in
GAAR
and
therefore
it
is
not
necessary
to
deal
with
issue
(3)
described
by
the
Respondent
in
paragraph
[2]
of
these
Reasons.
The
appeal
is
allowed.
The
Appellant
is
awarded
party
and
party
costs.
Appeal
allowed.