Pinard,
J.:—This
is
an
appeal
by
the
plaintiff
from
the
reassessment
made
by
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue,
which
served
to
deny
International-
Import
Customs
Brokers
Inc.
the
right
to
deduct
pursuant
to
subparagraph
20(1)(c)(i)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
R.S.C.
1952,
c.
148
(am.
S.C.
1970-71-72,
c.
63)
(the
"Act")
the
full
amount
of
interest
paid
by
the
latter
in
respect
of
borrowed
money
in
computing
its
income
for
the
1983
taxation
year.
At
trial,
the
parties
filed
an
agreed
statement
of
facts,
supported
by
an
agreed
book
of
documents,
to
serve
as
the
whole
evidence
in
the
present
case.
The
agreed
statement
of
facts
states
as
follows:
1.
By
an
agreement
dated
July
31,
1979,
Jack
Lamont,
Joan
Lamont,
John
Stewart
and
Kenneth
Stephenson,
shareholders
of
Import
Customs
Brokers
Ltd.
(hereinafter
respectively
called
the
"Shareholders"
and
"Import")
agreed
with
Livingston
Industries
Ltd.
(hereinafter
called
"LIL")
that
Import
and
International
Customs
Brokers
Limited
(hereinafter
called
International”),
a
wholly
owned
subsidiary
of
LIL,
would
amalgamate
on
August
17,
1979.
2.
Prior
to
August
17,
1979:
(i)
Import,
which
had
been
operating
for
approximately
twenty
(20)
years,
and
International,
which
had
been
operating
for
approximately
thirty
(30)
years,
were
competitors
in
the
custom
house
brokerage
and
international
forwarding
business;
(ii)
International
had
been
a
wholly
owned
subsidiary
of
LIL
for
approximately
two
(2)
years.
3.
On
August
17,1979:
(i)
Import
amalgamated
with
International
under
the
laws
of
the
province
of
Ontario
to
form
International-Import
Customs
Brokers
Inc.
(hereinafter
called
the"
Inter-Import");
(ii)
the
Shareholders
received,
in
exchange
for
an
aggregate
100
common
shares
of
Import,
an
aggregate
of
100
first
preference
shares
of
Inter-Import
of
a
par
value
of
.25
cents
each
and
100,000
second
preference
shares
of
Inter-Import
of
a
par
value
of
0.00075;
(iii)
the
Inter-Import
shares
held
by
the
former
shareholders
were
transferred
under
subsection
85(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
to
three
separate
holding
companies,
two
of
which
were
incorporated
by
the
Shareholders
specifically
for
that
purpose;
(iv)
each
of
the
three
holding
companies
then
transferred
the
Inter-Import
shares
held
by
it
to
a
second
holding
company
called
422646
Ontario
Limited.
4.
On
August
20,
1979:
(i)
Inter-Import
borrowed
$6,000,000
from
LIL;
(ii)
the
proceeds
of
the
loan
were
then
used
to
redeem
on
that
same
date,
the
first
preference
shares
of
Inter-Import
held
by
422646
Ontario
Limited,
for
an
aggregate
amount
of
$6,000,000;
(iii)
at
that
time,
the
aggregate
paid-up
capital
of
the
issued
first
preference
shares
of
Inter-Import,
was
$25.00
and
the
retained
earnings
of
Inter-Import
were
$4,178,371,
that
is
an
aggregate
amount
of
$4,178,396;
(iv)
Inter-Import
borrowed
an
amount
of
$3,000,000
from
422646
Ontario
Limited
which
was
evidenced
by
interest-bearing
promissory
notes;
(v)
the
proceeds
of
the
$3,000,000
loan
from
422646
Ontario
Limited
were
used
by
Inter-Import
to
reduce
the
$6,000,000
outstanding
indebtedness
to
LIL
to
an
amount
of
$3,000,000.
5.
On
August
21,
1979,
the
second
preference
shares
of
Inter-Import
were
redeemed
for
an
aggregate
amount
of
$75.
6.
As
a
result
of
the
redemption
of
the
first
preference
shares,
422646
Ontario
Limited
reported
a
taxable
dividend
of
$5,999,975
which
it
deducted
under
subsection
112(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
in
computing
its
taxable
income.
7.
Interest
payments
were
made
by
Inter-Import
during
the
1980,
1981,
1982
and
1983
taxation
years
on
the
indebtednesses
as
follows:
|
422646
|
|
|
LIL
|
Ontario
|
Total
|
Lender
|
loan
|
Ltd,
loan
|
|
Amount
of
loan
|
3,000,000
|
3,000,000
|
6,000,000
|
Interest
paid
|
|
-1980
|
403,125
|
318,979
|
722,104
|
-1981
|
364,127
|
316,783
|
680,910
|
-1982
|
276,800
|
287,865
|
564,665
|
-1983
|
117,625
|
262,507
|
380,132
|
Total
|
1,161,677
|
1,186,134
|
2,347,811
|
8.
By
a
Notice
of
Determination
of
Loss
dated
February
28,
1986,
in
respect
of
ihe
1981
taxation
year,
and
by
Notices
of
Reassessment
dated
August
30,
1985,
in
respect
of
the
1980,
1981,
1982,
1983
and
1984
taxation
years,
the
Defendant
disallowed
the
following
amounts
claimed
by
Inter-Import
as
part
of
the
interest
expenses
incurred
by
it
in
respect
of
the
loans:
|
422646
|
|
|
LIL
|
Ontario
|
Total
|
|
loan
|
Ltd,
loan
|
|
Total
claimed
|
1,161,677
|
1,186,134
|
2,347,811
|
Total
disallowed
|
352,685
|
360,110
|
712,795
|
%
disallowed
|
30.36%
|
30.36%
|
30.36%
|
9.
The
basis
upon
which
the
Minister
proceeded
in
so
reassessing
the
plaintiff
is
that
the
interest
payable
on
the
portion
of
the
loans
which
exceeds
the
paid-up
capital
of
Inter-Import's
first
preference
shares
and
retained
earnings
at
August
20,
1979,
which
portion
represents
an
amount
of
$1,821,504
or
30.36%
of
the
borrowed
funds,
is
not
interest
the
deduction
of
which
is
permitted
under
paragraph
20(1)(c)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
10.
The
said
Notification
and
Reassessments
were
confirmed
by
Notification
of
Confirmation
dated
June
22,
1987.
11.
On
December
31,
1985,
the
plaintiff,
Border
Brokers
Inc.,
Livingston
On-Line
Brokerage
Service
Inc.,
Samson-Shaen
&
Co.
Ltd.,
Airspeed
Brokers
(1962)
Ltd.
and
Livingstonair
Inc.
were
amalgamated
under
the
laws
of
the
Province
of
Ontario
to
form
the
plaintiff,
Livingston
International
Inc.
This
litigation
thus
involves
Inter-Im
port's
right
to
deduct
the
full
amount
of
interest
paid
in
respect
of
the
said
borrowed
funds
in
computing
its
income
for
the
1983
taxation
year,
pursuant
to
subparagraph
20(1)(c)(i)
of
the
Act.
The
plaintiff's
view
is
that
the
entire
amount
of
interest
expense
deducted
by
Inter-Import
in
the
1983
taxation
year
was
incurred
for
the
purpose
of
gaining
or
producing
income
from
a
business
or
property
and
accordingly,
Inter-Import
was
entitled
to
deduct
the
full
amount
of
interest
paid
in
respect
of
the
borrowed
funds
in
computing
its
income
for
the
1983
taxation
year.
Subparagraph
20(1)(c)(i)
read
at
the
relevant
time
as
follows:
20.(1)
Notwithstanding
paragraphs
18(1)(a),
(b)
and
(h),
in
computing
a
taxpayer's
income
for
a
taxation
year
from
a
business
or
property,
there
may
be
deducted
such
of
the
following
amounts
as
are
wholly
applicable
to
that
source
or
such
part
of
the
following
amounts
as
may
reasonably
be
regarded
as
applicable
thereto:
(c)
Interest.—
an
amount
paid
in
the
year
or
payable
in
respect
of
the
year
(depending
upon
the
method
regularly
followed
by
the
taxpayer
in
computing
his
income),
pursuant
to
a
legal
obligation
to
pay
interest
on
(i)
borrowed
money
used
for
the
purpose
of
earning
income
from
a
business
or
property
(other
than
borrowed
money
used
to
acquire
property
the
income
from
which
would
be
exempt
or
to
acquire
a
life
insurance
policy),
This
legislative
provision
was
the
subject
of
consideration
by
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada,
in
Bronfman
Trust
v.
The
Queen,
[1987]
1
C.T.C.
117;
87
D.T.C.
5059,
where
Chief
Justice
Dickson
(as
he
then
was)
assessed
the
purpose
of
the
provision
as
follows,
at
124-25
(D.T.C.
5064):
It
is
perhaps
otiose
to
note
at
the
outset
that
in
the
absence
of
a
provision
such
as
paragraph
20(1)(c)
specifically
authorizing
the
deduction
from
income
of
interest
payments
in
certain
circumstances,
no
such
deductions
could
generally
be
taken
by
the
taxpayer..
.
.
I
agree
with
Marceau,
J.
as
to
the
purpose
of
the
interest
deduction
provision.
Parliament
created
subparagraph
20(1)(c)(i),
and
made
it
operate
notwithstanding
paragraph
18(1)(b),
in
order
to
encourage
the
accumulation
of
capital
which
would
produce
taxable
income..
.
.
The
statutory
deduction
thus
requires
a
characterization
of
the
use
of
borrowed
money
as
between
the
eligible
use
of
earning
non-exempt
income
from
a
business
or
property
and
a
variety
of
possible
ineligible
uses.
The
onus
is
on
the
taxpayer
to
trace
the
borrowed
funds
to
an
identifiable
use
which
triggers
the
deduction..
.
.
The
interest
deduction
provision
requires
not
only
a
characterization
of
the
use
of
borrowed
funds,
but
also
a
characterization
of
"purpose".
Eligibility
for
the
deduction
is
contingent
on
the
use
of
borrowed
money
for
the
purpose
of
earning
income.
It
is
well
established
in
the
jurisprudence,
however,
that
it
is
not
the
purpose
of
the
borrowing
itself
which
is
relevant.
What
is
relevant,
rather,
is
the
taxpayer's
purpose
in
using
the
borrowed
money
in
a
particular
manner:
Auld
v.
M.N.R.,
28
Tax
A.B.C.
236;
62
D.T.C.
27
(T.A.B.).
Consequently,
the
focus
of
the
inquiry
must
be
centered
on
the
use
to
which
the
taxpayer
put
the
borrowed
funds.
Chief
Justice
Dickson
went
on
to
emphasize
the
necessity
to
look
at
the
direct
use
to
which
a
taxpayer
puts
borrowed
money,
reaffirming
the
reluctance
of
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
to
overlook
a
clearly
ineligible
direct
use
of
borrowed
money
whenever
an
indirect
eligible
use
of
funds
can
be
found.
In
that
regard,
at
pages
126-28
(D.T.C.
5065-66),
he
stated
the
following:
In
my
view,
neither
the
Income
Tax
Act
nor
the
weight
of
judicial
authority
permits
the
courts
to
ignore
the
direct
use
to
which
a
taxpayer
puts
borrowed
money..
.
.
One
finds
in
the
Act
not
only
the
distinction
within
subparagraph
20(1)(c)(i)
between
eligible
and
ineligible
uses
of
funds,
but
other
provisions
which
also
require
the
tracing
of
funds
to
particular
uses
in
a
manner
inconsistent
with
the
argument
of
the
Trust.
Subsection
20(3)
(formerly
subsection
11
(3b))
stipulates,
for
example,
that
interest
on
money
borrowed
to
repay
an
existing
loan
shall
be
deemed
to
have
been
used
for
the
purpose
for
which
the
previous
borrowings
were
used.
This
provision
would,
of
course,
be
unnecessary
if
interest
on
borrowed
money
were
deductible
when
the
taxpayer
had
income-earning
properties
to
preserve.
On
the
contrary,
however,
for
taxation
years
prior
to
the
enactment
of
subsection
11(3b)
in
S.C.
1953-54,
c.
57,
s.
2(6),
it
had
been
held
that
such
interest
was
not
deductible
since
the
borrowings
were
used
to
repay
a
loan
and
not
to
earn
income:
Interior
Breweries
Ltd.
v.
M.N.R.,
[1955]
C.T.C.
143
at
148;
55
D.T.C.
1090
at
1093
(Exch.
Ct.).
It
is
not
surprising,
therefore,
that
the
cases
interpreting
subparagraph
20(1)(c)(i)
and
its
predecessor
provisions
have
not
favoured
the
view
that
a
direct
ineligible
use
of
borrowed
money
ought
to
be
overlooked
whenever
an
indirect
eligible
use
of
funds
can
be
found.
.
.
.
The
leading
case
from
this
Court
on
the
availability
of
the
interest
deduction,
Canada
Safeway
Ltd.
v.
M.N.R.,
also
demonstrates
a
reluctance
to
overlook
a
clearly
ineligible
direct
use
of
borrowed
money
in
order
to
favour
the
taxpayer
by
characterizing
the
transaction
on
the
basis
of
a
less
direct
eligible
use
of
borrowings.
.
.
.
Justice
Rand
stated,
at
726
(C.T.C.
343):
No
doubt
there
is
in
fact
a
causal
connection
between
the
purchase
of
the
stock
and
the
benefits
ultimately
received;
but
the
statutory
language
cannot
be
extended
to
such
a
remote
consequence;
it
could
be
carried
to
any
length
ina
chain
of
subsidiaries;
and
to
say
that
such
a
thing
was
envisaged
by
the
ordinary
expression
used
in
the
statute
is
to
speculate
and
to
interpret.
Referring
to
the
interest
expense
deduction
for
borrowed
money
used
for
the
purpose
of
earning
income
from
business,
Rand,
J.
concluded
at
727
(C.T.C.
345):
What
is
aimed
at
by
the
section
is
an
employment
of
the
borrowed
funds
immediately
within
the
company's
business
and
not
one
that
effects
its
purpose
in
such
an
indirect
and
remote
manner.
Proper
interpretation
of
subparagraph
20(1)(c)(i)
of
the
Act,
therefore,
requires
that
a
taxpayer,
before
he
or
she
can
deduct
interest
expenses:
(a)
trace
the
borrowed
funds
to
an
identifiable
use
which
triggers
the
deduction;
and
(b)
generally
demonstrate
that
the
borrowed
funds
were
used
directly
and
immediately
to
earn
income
from
a
business
or
property;
the
purpose
of
the
provision
being
to”
encourage
the
accumulation
of
capital
which
would
produce
taxable
income.”
In
the
case
at
bar,
in
spite
of
the
fact
that
the
borrowed
money
was
used
by
a
company
to
redeem
its
shares
and
thus,
was
not
directly
used
to
earn
income,
the
plaintiff
argued
that
the
interest
paid
on
the
relevant
loans
still
ought
to
be
deductible
based
on
Trans-Prairie
Pipelines
Ltd.
v.
M.N.R.,
[1970]
C.T.C.
537;
70
D.T.C.
6351,
a
decision
of
Jackett,
P.
in
the
Exchequer
Court,
which
was
also
referred
to
in
the
Bronfman
Trust
case,
supra,
and
summarized
as
follows,
at
page
122
(D.T.C.
5062):
In
that
case
the
taxpayer
corporation
wanted
to
raise
capital
byway
of
bond
issues
for
expansion
of
its
business.
It
discovered,
however,
that
it
was
impossible,
practically
speaking,
to
float
a
bond
issue
unless
it
first
redeemed
its
preferred
shares,
because
of
the
sinking
fund
requirements
of
its
preferred
share
issue.
Accordingly,
the
taxpayer
borrowed
$700,000,
used
$400,000
to
redeem
the
preferred
shares
and
the
remaining
$300,000
for
expansion
of
its
business.
Jackett
P.
held
the
interest
payments
on
the
entire
$700,000
loan
deductible.
He
saw
the
borrowed
funds
as
"fill[ing]
the
hole
left
by
the
redemption".
[Emphasis
added.]
Indeed,
in
Trans-Prairie,
supra,
the
relevant
view,
based
on
specific
and
particular
facts,
was
expressed
as
follows,
at
page
539
(D.T.C.
6353):
The
alternative
view
is
that,
prior
to
the
transactions
in
question,
the
capital
being
used
for
the
purpose
of
earning
income
from
the
appellant's
business
was
the
$700,000
subscribed
by
the
preferred
shareholders
and
the
$140,006
subscribed
by
the
common
shareholders,
and
that,
after
those
transactions,
the
money
subscribed
by
the
preferred
shareholders
had
been
withdrawn
and
what
the
appellant
was
using
in
its
business
to
earn
income
was
the
$440,006
subscribed
by
common
shareholders
and
the
$700,000
of
borrowed
money.
This,
in
my
view,
is
a
correct
appreciation
of
the
matter.
[Emphasis
added.]
In
its
consideration
of
the
Trans-Prairie
case,
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada,
in
Bronfman
Trust,
did
not
go
farther
than
to
agree
to
the
fact
that
in
that
case
"the
money
previously
subscribed
by
preferred
shareholders
had
been
used
by
the
company
for
the
purpose
of
earning
income
from
the
business”
(page
124
(D.T.C.
5063))
and
to
find
"perfectly
correct
in
so
far
as
it
goes"
the
proposition
"that
it
is
the
current
use
and
not
the
original
use
of
borrowed
money
that
determines
eligibility
for
a
deduction”
(page
128
(D.T.C.
5066)).
Finally,
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
only
referred
to
the
Trans-Prairie
case
to
state,
at
page
128
(D.T.C.
5066):
With
the
exception
of
Trans-Prairie,
then,
the
reasoning
of
which
is,
in
my
opinion,
inadequate
to
support
the
conclusion
sought
to
be
reached
by
the
respondent
trust,
the
jurisprudence
has
generally
been
hostile
to
claims
based
on
indirect,
eligible
uses
when
faced
with
direct
but
ineligible
uses
of
borrowed
money.
In
light
of
the
Bronfman
Trust
decision,
it
would
seem
to
me
that
one
cannot
infer
from
the
Trans-Prairie
case
that
interest
on
borrowed
money
used
to
redeem
shares
is
generally
deductible.
Here,
in
the
context
of
a
series
of
quasi-instantaneous
transactions
where
it
cannot
really
be
said
that
the
borrowed
funds
are
used
to
fill
a
hole
left
by
the
"withdrawal"
of
funds
previously
used
in
the
borrower's
business,
it
is
rather
doubtful
that
the
Trans-Prairie
reasoning
can
be
applied.
It
is
in
any
event
clear
that
the
excess
of
borrowed
funds
over
the
retained
earnings
and
the
paid-up
capital
of
the
plaintiff
as
of
August
20,
1979
cannot
constitute
within
the
reasoning
of
Trans-Prairie
a
replacement
of
capital
which
has
already
been
used
in
the
business.
I
consider,
therefore,
that
the
plaintiff
has
failed
to
show
that
such
excess
of
borrowed
funds
was
used
at
the
relevant
time
for
the
purpose
of
earning
income
from
a
business
or
property,
and
that
the
interest
paid
thereon
ought
not
to
be
deducted
pursuant
to
subparagraph
20(1)(c)(i)
of
the
Act.
Consequently,
the
plaintiff's
action
must
be
dismissed
with
costs.
Appeal
dismissed.