Cattanach,
J:—The
plaintiff
is
a
man
of
homely
philosophy
and
elemental
ethics
and
principles,
who
has
appealed
decisions
of
the
Tax
Review
Board
whereby
his
appeals
from
assessments
to
income
tax
for
his
1976
and
1977
taxation
years
were
disallowed.
The
system
which
the
plaintiff
formed
for
the
conduct
of
life
was
dictated
by
his
disadvantages
which
were
overcome
by
his
philosophies.
The
plaintiff
did
not
go
beyond
grade
IV
in
school
but
despite
that
handicap
he
achieved
success
by
energetic
application
to
hard
work.
He
entered
into
a
modest
business
of
the
supply
of
bearings
which
he
developed
into
some
fourteen
retail
outlets
in
the
Ottawa
Valley
and
adjacent
to
Quebec.
He
is
no
longer
young
but
his
ambition
is
undiminished.
He
hopes
to
extend
his
business
from
coast
to
coast
in
Canada.
That
he
achieved
the
success
he
has
results
from
his
continuing
devotion
to
his
business
and
giving
the
utmost
service
and
satisfaction
to
his
customers.
He
is
available
to
them
twenty-four
hours
in
every
day
of
the
week.
When
the
business
premises
are
closed
the
telephone
is
switched
over
to
the
plaintiff's
home
telephone
where
he,
the
president
of
the
company,
receives
the
telephone
calls
from
customers
and
immediately
undertakes
to
give
them
satisfaction.
That
is
the
service
provided
to
the
customers
of
the
plaintiff’s
company,
by
the
plaintiff
himself,
to
which
he
no
doubt
requires
that
his
employees
shall
likewise
conform.
While
this
may
be
old
fashioned
it
is
refreshing
to
realize
that
some
instances
of
business
conducted
on
this
base
still
survive
and
prosper.
The
plaintiff’s
philosophy
is
simply
that
nothing
is
acquired
without
working
for
it.
He
has
sought
to
inculcate
the
like
attributes
in
his
family
of
seven.
This
he
has
done
by
withholding
of
largesse.
If
one
of
his
children
wanted
something
the
request
did
not
automatically
result
in
bountiful
bestowal.
Rather
the
suppliant
was
required
to
work
for
what
was
wanted.
Nothing
was
freely
given.
It
must
be
earned.
Working
to
earn,
in
the
plaintiff’s
philosophy,
builds
character,
self-discipline,
moral
strength,
perseverance
and
self-confidence
—
a
commendable
objective.
This
the
plaintiff
did
with
all
his
children
without
discrimination.
The
plaintiff
is
also
averse
to
endorsing
promissory
notes
as
guarantor
or
acting
as
a
guarantor
“in
any
respect”.
He
was
stuck
once
by
such
an
endorsement
and
resolved
that
the
experience
would
never
be
repeated.
If
he
guarantees
nothing
he
cannot
be
found
liable
as
a
guarantor
—
a
simply
straightforward
solution.
That
the
plaintiff
is
opinionated
and
holds
strong
views
cannot
be
disputed
but
neither
can
it
be
disputed
that
he
is
entitled
to
hold
such
views.
The
plaintiff
resents
being
put
upon
contrary
to
what
he
considers
to
be
his
just
rights.
In
the
furtherance
of
that
view
he
does
not
meekly
submit
to
what
he
considers
to
be
unjust
assessments
to
income
tax
because
it
is
easier
to
do
so
than
to
buck
the
system
bolstered
as
it
is
by
a
statute
designed
by
the
tax
collectors
to
make
their
basic
task
easier
and
supported
by
the
judgment
of
an
inflexible
bureaucracy.
Rather
if
the
plaintiff
conceives
an
injustice
to
be
wrought
upon
him
he
resists.
He
does
not
bare
his
neck
to
the
guillotine
of
the
arrogance
of
office.
That
is
his
right.
Naturally
he
does
not
hold
the
tax
collector
in
high
regard,
a
widespread
attitude
which
has
existed
since
the
payment
of
taxes
became
the
penalty
for
living
in
an
organized
society.
He
does
not
accept
the
plaintive
wail
of
the
tax
collector
who
meets
with
opposition
that
he
is
merely
doing
his
job.
On
the
contrary
he
feels
it
is
obvious
that
the
tax
collector
takes
a
sadistic
delight
in
exacting
the
maximum
from
the
unwary
taxpayer
in
that
they
are
more
competent
in
filching
nickels
and
dimes
from
waitresses
while
incapable
of
attacking
multinational
corporations
secure
behind
the
ramparts
of
their
tax
havens.
But
more
vehemently
the
plaintiff
resents
what
he
considers]
to
be
the
unwarranted
intrusion
into
purely
a
family
affair
and
transaction.
It
was
just
such
a
family
transaction
which
gave
rise
to
the
reassessment
by
the
Minister
of
the
plaintiff
for
his
1976
taxation
year.
The
explanation
anonymously
proferred
is
reproduced:
Capital
Gain
on
Sale
of
84
Range
Rd
Fair
Market
Value
|
$62,500
|
Less:
Value
at
Dec
31,
1971
|
40,230
|
Capital
gain
|
$22,270
|
Taxable
portion
of
capital
|
|
gain—one
half
|
$11,135
|
There
are
further
reassessments
for
the
plaintiff’s
1976
and
1977
years,
giving
rise
to
another
issue
which
will
be
considered
later
and
separately.
Of
course
the
transaction
which
gave
rise
to
the
1976
reassessment
was
most
certainly
an
exclusively
family
transaction
but
the
issue
which
will
arise
from
the
facts
to
be
found
and
the
law
applicable
thereto
is
whether
that
family
transaction
is
such
as
attracts
income
tax.
Should
that
be
so
or
is
susceptible
of
being
so
then
the
tax
collector
would
have
been
justified
in
his
unwelcomed
intrusion.
In
1963
the
plaintiff’s
son,
Claude,
who
was
married
and
had
a
family
of
two
little
girls,
was
walking
with
his
wife
in
the
fall
of
the
year
in
Strathcona
Park,
bordering
on
the
Rideau
River
as
it
flows
through
the
City
of
Ottawa,
Ontario
and
Range
Road.
They
met
a
friend,
then
a
young
lawyer
but
who
is
now
a
Provincial
Court
Judge,
who
knew
that
the
young
couple
were
anxious
to
purchase
a
home
that
was
within
their
means,
and
who
told
them
that
84
Range
Road
was
for
sale.
Mrs
Mary
Elizabeth
Unger,
who
was
the
owner
of
84
Range
Road,
had
recently
become
a
widow
and
was
willing
to
sell
her
home.
In
fact
there
was
a
real
estate
agent’s
For
Sale
sign
on
the
premises.
Claude
Bouchard
and
his
wife,
Pauline,
forthwith
presented
themselves
at
the
door
of
84
Range
Road
which
was
close
by,
and
were
shown
through
the
house
by
Mrs
Unger.
Pauline
Bouchard
was
greatly
impressed
with
the
house.
It
fulfilled
all
her
expectations
as
her
“dream
home”.
Claude,
conscious
of
his
financial
circumstances,
as
he
still
had
two
more
years
at
university
before
he
embarked
upon
the
career
for
which
he
was
preparing,
ascertained
that
the
price
acceptable
to
Mrs
Unger
for
the
house
was
$23,000.
He
suggested
to
Mrs
Linger
a
down
payment
of
$3,000
and
a
twenty-year
mortgage
for
the
balance
of
$20,000.
Such
an
arrangement
was
agreeable
to
Mrs
Unger
but
she
was
dubious
of
Claude’s
ability
to
pay
because
of
his
youth
and
not
being
engaged
in
a
paying
occupation
as
yet.
Accordingly
she
would
be
willing
to
sell
the
property
to
the
young
couple
if
the
husband
came
forward
with
a
guarantor
of
sound
financial
worth.
The
next
day,
a
Sunday,
the
young
couple
were
attending
a
family
dinner
with
the
plaintiff,
his
father,
and
other
members
of
the
family.
The
subject
of
the
purchase
of
84
Range
Road
was
raised
and
discussed
at
length
in
family
conference.
True
to
his
principles
of
endorsing
a
loan
for
no
one,
not
even
his
son,
the
plaintiff
countered
with
the
proposal
that
he
and
his
wife,
Eva,
would
purchase
the
house
from
Mrs
Unger
for
their
son,
Claude,
and
their
daughter-
in-law,
Pauline,
for
their
immediate
occupancy
and
that
the
plaintiff
and
his
wife
would
transfer
the
house
to
them
when
they
were
able
to
pay
or
had
paid
the
purchase
price
of
$23,000.
The
plaintiff’s
wife
was
in
full
agreement.
The
plaintiff,
in
company
with
his
son,
attended
upon
Mrs
Unger
and
completed
the
sale
from
Mrs
Unger
to
the
plaintiff
and
his
wife,
(as
joint
tenants
as
the
printed
form
relates)
at
the
price
of
$23,000.
By
instrument
dated
November
20,
1963
Mrs
Unger
conveyed
title
to
84
Range
Road
to
the
plaintiff
and
his
wife
as
joint
tenants
and
not
as
tenants
in
common
in
accordance
with
the
printed
short
form
of
conveyance
used
to
do
so
(see
Exhibit
D2).
As
recited
in
the
affidavit
appended
thereto
the
total
consideration
was
$23,000
of
which
$3,000
was
the
down
payment
and
the
balance
of
$20,000
was
secured
by
a
mortgage
back
from
the
plaintiff
and
his
wife,
as
mortgagors,
to
Mrs
Unger,
as
mortgagee,
with
interest
at
6
/2
per
cent
per
annum
payable
in
monthly
instalments
of
$133.97
beginning
on
January
1,
1964
and
ending
December
1,
1973.
The
balance
of
the
principal
sum
became
due
and
payable
on
December
1,
1973
(see
Exhibit
D
7).
This
was
the
arrangement
negotiated
by
Claude
with
Mrs
Unger
except
that
the
mortgage
back
for
$20,000
was
to
be
for
a
period
of
25
years
not
10
years.
However
in
all
likelihood
upon
the
expiry
of
the
period
a
new
mortgage
could
be
negotiated
at
the
then
prevailing
interest
rate.
Mrs
Unger
testified
at
trial
to
the
above
effect
but
she
specifically
added
that
the
plaintiff
stated
to
her
unequivocably
that
he
and
his
wife
were
purchasing
the
house
for
their
son
and
daughter-in-law
and
that
it
would
be
transferred
to
them
immediately
upon
the
parents
being
reimbursed
for
the
purchase
price.
The
down
payment
of
$3,000
was
paid
to
Mrs
Unger
by
Claude.
The
plaintiff
loaned
his
son
that
amount
to
make
the
down
payment
but
of
course
it
was
included
in
the
amount
of
$23,000
the
son
was
obliged
to
repay
his
father,
the
plaintiff.
This
was
a
somewhat
unusual
gesture
by
the
plaintiff.
Thus
the
plaintiff
and
his
wife
became
the
registered
or
legal
owners
of
84
Range
Road
on
December
2,
1963
pursuant
to
the
conveyance
(Exhibit
D
2)
dated
November
20,
1963.
Claude
and
Pauline
Bouchard,
with
their
two
children
moved
into
84
Range
Road
the
same
month,
that
is
December,
1963.
But
in
accordance
with
his
principles
the
plaintiff
did
not
lay
out
$23,000
without
the
prospect
of
his
son
paying
therefor.
The
plaintiff
got
out
an
amortization
book
of
tables
and
computed
thereby
that
a
monthly
payment
of
$210
would
cover
interest
and
principal
on
the
amount
of
$23,000
over
a
twenty-year
period.
The
amount
applicable
to
principal
began
at
$76
per
month
but
that
would
increase
in
each
month
corresponding
to
the
decrease
in
the
amount
first
attributable
to
interest.
The
amount
of
$76
was
also
the
excess
in
each
month
of
what
the
plaintiff
received
from
his
son
over
that
he
paid
to
Mrs
Unger.
The
plaintiff
described
the
monthly
amount
as
rent
and
included
it
as
income
in
his
tax
returns
throughout
the
relevant
taxation
years.
He
also
claimed
therein
capital
cost
allowance
on
the
premises.
When
the
couple
moved
into
84
Range
Road
they
immediately
assumed
the
mantle
of
ownership.
Their
friends
and
neighbours
were
so
informed
and
considered
the
couple
as
owners.
Certainly
Claude
and
Pauline
Bouchard
considered
themselves
as
the
owners
from
the
outset
and
both
so
testified.
In
the
latter
part
of
the
decade
of
1960
the
couple
made
extensive
improvements
to
the
house
when
they
were
in
the
financial
position
to
do
so.
The
initial
project
was
to
remodel
and
modernize
the
kitchen
at
a
cost
in
excess
of
$2,500
followed
by
the
construction
of
a
playroom
in
the
basement
at
a
cost
of
$6,000.
Shortly
thereafter
a
retaining
wall
had
to
be
built
at
the
driveway
and
incidentally,
in
addition
to
that
necessary
work,
the
single
car
garage
was
demolished
to
give
a
larger
back
garden
and
play
area
at
a
cost
of
a
further
$6,000.
In
addition
to
these
expenditures
which
total
$14,500
all
made
in
the
late
60s,
ie,
1968-69
the
interior
of
the
house
had
been
twice
redecorated
previously.
At
the
same
time
the
son
began
to
make
substantial
cash
payments
to
his
father,
the
plaintiff,
to
reduce
the
principal.
He
made
payments
in
cash
to
his
father
in
the
amounts
of
$3,000
(that
was
the
initial
cash
loan)
plus
other
payments
of
$5,000
and
$6,000
for
a
total
of
$14,000
although
he
was
not
specific
when
those
payments
were
made
nor
the
exact
amount.
He
left
it
to
his
father
to
do
the
accounting.
Claude
testified
that
there
was
no
agreement
reduced
to
writing
to
record
this
understanding.
He
was
adamant
that
the
house
was
theirs
from
December
1963
forward
and
that
his
father
was
helping
them
but
it
was
mutually
agreed
and
understood
that
when
the
principal
of
$23,000
had
been
paid
in
full
a
deed
of
transfer
would
be
executed
transferring
the
title
to
them.
This
was
done
on
December
1,
1976
free
and
clear
of
all
encumbrances
(see
Exhibit
D1).
The
affidavit
appended
thereto
indicates
that
the
amount
of
$23,000
had
been
paid
in
full.
In
the
meantime
the
young
couple
prospered
to
the
extent
that
after
expending
a
substantial
sum
in
excess
of
$14,500
upon
remodelling,
improving
and
maintaining
84
Range
Road
and
making
cash
payments
on
account
of
principal
of
at
least
$14,000,
they
were
able
to
take
a
holiday
in
Paris,
France.
Mrs
Pauline
Bouchard
testified
that
this
holiday
was
taken
in
the
spring
of
1971.
While
she
was
well
aware
of
the
verbal
agreement
made
by
herself
and
her
husband
with
the
plaintiff
and
her
mother-in-law
in
both
of
whom
she
had
implicit
confidence,
nevertheless
she
was
concerned
for
the
welfare
of
her
two
infant
daughters
if,
during
their
impending
vacation,
she
and
her
husband
should
meet
with
a
common
disaster
or
the
unanticipated
demise
of
the
plaintiff.
The
equity
in
the
home
at
84
Range
Road
was
their
major
asset
and
she
wished
to
ensure
that
in
the
event
of
such
possible
tragedies
as
concerned
her,
the
children
would
succeed
to
that
asset.
Accordingly,
while
she
fully
understood
the
verbal
arrangement,
she
wished
something
to
be
placed
in
writing
indicative
of
their
ownership
or
right
to
ownership
of
84
Range
Road.
The
plaintiff
and
his
wife
were
understandably
prepared
to
relieve
the
anxieties
of
their
daughter-in-law.
This
resulted
in
the
preparation
and
execution
of
an
agreement
of
sale
and
purchase
prepared
by
St
Jacques
and
St
Jacques,
Barristers
and
Solicitors
of
Ottawa,
Ontario
on
the
instructions
of
the
plaintiff,
to
achieve
that
end
(Exhibit
P
1).
This
instrument
was
dated
April
1,
1970
whereas
the
date
of
actual
execution
was
April
1,
1971
just
prior
to
the
couple
leaving
for
their
vacation
in
France.
That
event
fixed
the
date
in
Pauline
Bouchard’s
mind
which
she
sought
to
relieve
by
the
execution
of
some
document
in
writing
indicative
of
their
ownership
of
an
interest
in
the
property.
Thus
the
salient
facts
which
came
to
the
attention
of
the
employees
of
the
Department
of
National
Revenue
were
that
in
the
fall
of
1963
the
plaintiff
and
his
wife
purchased
84
Range
Road
from
the
owner,
Mrs
Unger,
for
the
purchase
price
of
$23,000
and
became
the
registered
owners
of
that
property.
That
on
April
1,
1971
(not
April
1,
1970)
the
plaintiff
and
his
wife
entered
into
an
agreement
of
purchase
and
sale
with
their
son
and
daughter-in-law,
Claude
and
Pauline
Bouchard
for
that
same
property
at
the
same
purchase
price
of
$23,000.
On
December
1,
1976
in
consideration
of
the
payment
of
$23,000
the
property
at
84
Range
Road
was
conveyed
by
the
plaintiff
and
his
wife
as
grantors
to
their
son
and
daughter-in-law,
Claude
and
Pauline
Bouchard,
as
transferees
and
the
deed
was
registered.
On
the
acceptance
of
those
stark
and
unadorned
facts
the
Minister
assessed
the
plaintiff
as
he
did
on
the
basis
of
the
explanation
previously
quoted
by
the
addition
of
$11,350
as
a
capital
gain
realized
in
the
plaintiff's
1976
taxation
year
by
application
of
subparagraph
69(1
)(b)(i)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
That
paragraph
reads:
69.
(1)
Except
as
otherwise
expressly
provided
in
this
Act.
(b)
where
a
taxpayer
has
disposed
of
anything
(i)
to
a
person
with
whom
he
was
not
dealing
at
arm’s
length
for
the
proceeds
or
for
proceeds
or
for
proceeds
less
than
the
fair
market
value
thereof
at
the
time
he
so
disposed
of
it,
he
shall
be
deemed
to
have
received
proceeds
of
disposition
therefor
equal
to
that
fair
market
value;
The
object
of
subsection
69(1)
is
that
where
anything
changes
hands
between
persons
not
dealing
with
each
other
at
arm’s
length
it
shall
be
deemed
to
be
at
a
consideration
equal
to
the
full
fair
market
value
of
the
thing
transferred.
But
by
the
transitional
provisions
69(1
)(b)
does
not
apply
to
deem
a
taxpayer
by
whom
anything
was
disposed
of
at
any
time
before
the
1972
taxation
year
to
have
received
the
proceeds
of
disposition
therefor
equal
to
its
fair
market
value
at
that
time.
Thus
the
market
value
was
fixed,
probably
by
an
assessor
or
a
like
employee
in
the
Department,
at
$62,500
in
1976
and
at
December
31,
1971
(the
cut-off
date)
as
at
$40,230.
The
subtraction
of
$40,230
from
$62,500
gave
the
result
of
a
capital
gain
of
$22,270
and
a
capital
gain
of
one-half
of
that
amount
was
added
to
the
plaintiff’s
income
in
1976.
The
computation
of
the
amounts
is
not
in
issue
between
the
parties,
only
the
taxability
thereof
is
in
issue.
Simply
put,
the
position
taking
the
Minister
is
that:
(1)
the
plaintiff
purchased
84
Range
Road
from
the
owner
on
December
2,
1963
for
$23,000.00;
(2)
the
plaintiff
sold
the
property
approximate
to
December
31,
1971
for
$23,000.00;
(3)
the
plaintiff
received
the
purchase
price
of
$23,000.00
in
full
and
transferred
the
property
on
December
31,
1976;
(4)
by
operation
of
subparagraph
69(1
)(b)(i)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
the
plaintiff
is
deemed
to
have
received
the
fair
market
value
at
the
time
of
disposition;
(5)
the
fair
market
value
at
that
time
was
in
excess
of
the
purchase
price
received,
and
(6)
as
a
consequence
the
plaintiff
realized
a
taxable
capital
gain.
The
first
two
premises
accepted
by
the
Minister
are
the
salient
facts
upon
which
the
remainder
follow
as
a
consequence
thereof
by
operation
of
the
Statute.
In
contradiction
thereof
it
is
contended
on
behalf
of
the
plaintiff
that
there
had
been
no
such
disposition
of
the
property
but
that
it
was
held
on
December
1,
1963
by
the
plaintiff
and
his
wife
in
trust
for
their
son
and
daughter-in-law.
It
is
true
that
at
that
time
there
was
no
mention
of
the
word
“trust”
in
discussions
among
the
four
principals
to
the
transaction
but
a
trust
can
be
created
without
the
use
of
the
word
“trust”.
Equity
looks
to
the
intent
rather
than
the
form
and
if
an
intention
to
create
a
trust
can
be
unmistakably
inferred
the
court
will
give
effect
to
that
intention.
Despite
the
difficulty
in
giving
an
all-embracing
definition
of
a
trust
the
concept
thereof
is
easy
enough
to
grasp.
The
general
idea
of
a
trust
is
that
one
person
in
whom
property
is
vested
is
compelled
in
equity
to
hold
the
property
for
the
benefit
of
another.
Lord
Lindley
said
in
Hardoon
v
Belilios,
[1901]
AC
118
at
123:
All
that
is
necessary
to
establish
the
relationship
of
trustee
and
cestui
que
trust
is
to
prove
that
legal
title
was
in
the
plaintiff
and
equitable
title
was
in
the
defendant.
Perhaps
it
might
be
simpler
to
say
that
the
trustee
is
the
nominal
owner,
while
the
cestui
que
trust
is
the
beneficial
owner,
of
the
property.
In
his
statement
of
claim
the
plaintiff
alleges
in
paragraph
3(i),
(ii)
and
(iv)
as
follows:
(i)
In
1963
the
Plaintiff’s
son
Claude
Bouchard
and
his
wife
Pauline
became
interested
in
purchasing
a
house
at
84
Range
Road
in
the
City
of
Ottawa.
The
couple
sought
to
have
the
Plaintiff
endorse
a
loan
of
$23,000.
for
the
purchase
of
the
property
but
he
refused
since,
as
a
matter
of
business
policy,
the
Plaintiff
does
not
endorse
loans
for
anyone
not
even
members
of
his
immediate
family.
(ii)
The
Plaintiff,
however,
did
agree
to
purchase
the
property
and
hold
same
for
his
son
and
daughter-in-law.
The
agreement
between
the
parties
was
that
the
Plaintiff
would
advance
the
funds
and
have
the
property
registered
jointly
in
his
name
and
that
of
his
wife
until
his
son
and
daughter-in-law
were
able
to
repay
the
$23,000.
which
he
had
advanced
on
their
behalf.
In
the
interim
rent
would
be
charged
to
the
Plaintiff’s
son
and
daughter-in-law
in
order
to
provide
the
Plaintiff
with
some
return
on
the
money
which
he
had
advanced.
In
addition
to
receiving
rent
the
plaintiff
deducted
capital
cost
allowances
and
charged
operational
expenses.
(iv)
The
property
was
held
by
the
Plaintiff
and
his
wife
until
the
beneficial
owners
thereof
should
repay
the
debt.
The
son
and
daughter-in-law
treated
the
property
as
their
own
making
substantial
repairs
thereto,
prior
to
having
it
formally
deeded
to
them,
on
the
understanding
that
they
were
the
beneficial
owners
thereof.
These
allegations
of
facts,
if
susceptible
of
being
proven
and
are
proven,
are
sufficient
to
establish
the
creation
of
an
express
trust
by
the
plaintiff
and
his
wife
as
trustees
in
favour
of
their
son
and
daughter-in-law
as
beneficiaries
subject
only
to
the
repayment
of
the
amount
of
$23,000
expended
by
the
plaintiff
and
his
wife
to
purchase
the
property.
There
is
no
question
in
my
mind
that
the
plaintiff
being
the
initiator
of
the
manner
in
which
the
property
would
be
purchased
is
a
person
entitled
to
declare
the
trust.
He
is
the
person
entitled
to
say
that
there
is
a
trust
and
what
that
trust
is.
Section
9
of
the
Statute
of
Frauds,
RSO
1980,
c
481
reads:
9.
Subject
to
section
10,
all
declarations
or
creations
of
trusts
or
confidences
of
any
lands,
tenements
or
hereditaments
shall
be
manifested
and
proved
by
a
writing
signed
by
the
party
who
is
by
law
enabled
to
declare
such
trust,
or
by
his
last
will
in
writing,
or
else
they
are
utterly
void
and
of
no
effect.
Section
10
provides
an
exception
for
trusts
arising,
transferred
or
extinguished
by
implication
of
law.
If
the
plaintiff
had
reduced
the
trust
to
writing
the
difficulties
he
now
faces
may
not
have
arisen.
But
in
the
light
of
his
concept
that
family
transactions
remain
transactions
within
the
family
it
is
not
surprising
that
he
did
not
seek
legal
advice.
In
this
modern
age
in
business
and
otherwise
caution
dictates
that
the
income
tax
implications
of
transactions
should
not
be
overlooked.
The
defendant
in
her
defence
to
the
allegations
in
the
statement
of
claim
quoted
above,
through
the
Deputy
Attorney
General,
replied
as
follows:
4.
He
denies
paragraph
3(i)
of
the
Statement
of
Claim
and
puts
the
Plaintiff
to
the
strict
proof
thereof.
5.
With
respect
to
paragraph
3(ii)
and
3(iv)
of
the
Statement
of
Claim,
he
admits
that
the
Plaintiff
purchased
the
property,
rented
it
to
his
son
and
daughter-in-law,
deducted
capital
cost
allowances
and
charged
operational
expenses
thereon
but,
otherwise,
denies
said
paragraphs.
As
I
appreciate
the
contention
on
behalf
of
the
defendant
in
this
respect
it
is
that
upon
the
principle
that
the
plaintiff
herein
pleaded
that
he
had
agreed
to
purchase
the
property
and
to
hold
the
same
for
his
son
and
daughter-in-
law
it
is
incumbent
upon
him
to
prove
the
special
trust
which
he
alleges.
In
paragraph
3(ii)
the
plaintiff
pleads
a
parol
agreement
or
declaration
in
the
initial
sentence.
In
paragraph
5
of
the
defence
the
defendant
denies
this
allegation.
Where
a
parol
agreement
is
pleaded
the
adverse
party
can
deny
its
existence.
This
is
what
was
done.
Then
it
is
open
to
the
defendant
to
plead,
in
the
alternative,
that
if
such
an
agreement
exists
it
is
invalid
by
reason
of
the
Statute
of
Frauds.
This
was
not
done.
Rule
409
of
the
Federal
Court
Rules
provides:
Rule
409.
A
party
shall
plead
specifically
any
matter
(for
example,
performance,
release,
a
statute
of
limitation,
prescription,
fraud
or
any
fact
showing
illegality)
(a)
that
he
alleges
makes
a
claim
or
defence
of
the
opposite
party
not
maintainable,
(b)
that,
if
not
specifically
pleaded,
might
take
the
opposite
party
by
surprise,
or
(c)
that
raises
issues
of
fact
not
arising
out
of
the
preceding
pleading.
The
omission
to
plead
the
Statute
of
Frauds
precludes
the
defendant
from
placing
reliance
on
the
Statute
(see
Wilson,
J
in
Bjorklund
v
Gillott,
[1955]
5
DLR
466
at
469.
The
questions
that
remain,
however,
are
whether
the
plaintiff
is
entitled
to
prove
a
parol
trust
in
favour
of
his
son
and
daughter-in-law
and
if
so
has
he
done
so.
The
law,
prior
to
Rochefoucauld
v
Boustead,
[1897]
1
Ch
207,
was
as
set
out
when
Lord
St
Leonards
wrote
in
his
book
on
vendors
and
purchasers,
Synder’s
Vendors
and
Purchasers,
14th
Ed
p
703
pl
15,
viz:
Where
a
man
merely
employs
another
person
by
parol,
as
an
agent
to
buy
an
estate,
who
buys
it
for
himself
and
denies
the
trust
and
no
part
of
the
money
is
paid
by
the
principal
and
there
is
no
written
agreement,
he
cannot
compel
the
agent
to
convey
the
estate
to
him,
as
that
would
be
directly
in
the
teeth
of
the
Statute
of
Frauds.
This
statement
was
relied
upon
and
applied
by
Kekewich,
J
in
James
v
Smith,
[1891]
1
Ch
384
as
was
Bartlett
v
Pickersgill,
1
Eden
515.
In
Hull
v
Allen,
[1902]
1
OWN
782,
Boyd,
C
speaking
on
the
question
of
parol
evidence
to
establish
a
trust
said:
.
.
.the
parol
evidence
was
insufficient
to
establish
a
case
in
the
acquisition
of
land
held
by
the
defendant
so
as
to
give
relief
to
the
plaintiff
notwithstanding
the
Statute
of
Frauds.
Doubtless
the
law
as
set
forth
in
James
v
Smith,
(1891)
1
Ch
388,
(384
is
the
correct
page)
is
modified
and
perhaps
changed
entirely
by
Rochefoucauld
v
Boustead
(1897)
1
Ch
207;
but
it
is
essential
that
the
evidence
of
such
alleged
trust
be
clear
and
complete
to
the
satisfaction
of
the
Court.
In
Rochefoucauld
v
Boustead
(supra)
there
had
been
a
conveyance
to
the
defendant
absolutely
but
the
plaintiff
insisted
that
the
estates
were
conveyed
to
the
defendant
as
trustee
for
the
plaintiff
subject
to
the
repayment
of
the
amount
the
defendant
had
paid
for
them.
(This
is
a
like
condition
which
the
plaintiff
in
the
present
appeal
alleges
that
he
had
imposed
upon
his
son
and
daughter-in-law.)
The
Court
of
Appeal
came
to
the
conclusion
that
the
plaintiff
had
proved
that
the
estates
in
question
were
conveyed
to
the
defendant
upon
trust
for
her
subject
to
the
charge
mentioned.
That
conclusion
rendered
it
necessary
to
consider
whether
the
Statute
of
Frauds
affords
a
defence
to
the
plaintiff's
claim.
Lindley,
LJ
speaking
for
the
Court
referred
to
prior
decisions
interpreting
the
Statute
of
Frauds
as
requiring
the
proof
of
some
evidence
or
writings
signed
by
the
defendant
not
only
that
the
conveyance
to
him
was
subject
to
some
trust
but
also
what
that
trust
was.
Consequent
upon
such
proposition
Lord
Lindley
then
made
the
statements
which
have
been
cited
and
followed
in
the
United
Kingdom
and
the
Courts
in
the
Provinces
of
Canada.
He
said
at
206:
But
it
is
not
necessary
that
the
trust
should
have
been
declared
by
such
a
writing
in
the
first
instance;
it
is
sufficient
if
the
trust
can
be
proved
by
some
writing
signed
by
the
defendant,
and
the
date
of
the
writing
is
immaterial.
The
statements
by
authoritative
authors
on
trusts
to
the
effect
that
a
trust
operates
from
the
time
of
its
creation,
however
late
the
proof,
are
consistent
with
this
statement
by
Lindley,
LJ
who
continued
to
add:
It
is
further
established
by
a
series
of
cases,
the
propriety
of
which
cannot
now
be
questioned,
that
the
Statute
of
Frauds
does
not
prevent
the
proof
of
a
fraud;
and
that
it
is
a
fraud
on
the
part
of
a
person
to
whom
land
is
conveyed
as
a
trustee,
and
who
knows
it
was
so
conveyed,
to
deny
the
trust
and
claim
the
land
himself.
Consequently,
notwithstanding
the
statute,
it
is
competent
for
a
person
claiming
land
conveyed
to
another
to
prove
by
parol
evidence
that
it
was
so
conveyed
upon
trust
for
the
claimant,
and
that
the
grantee,
knowing
the
facts,
is
denying
the
trust
and
relying
upon
the
form
of
conveyance
and
the
statute,
in
order
to
keep
the
land
himself.
This
doctrine
was
not
established
until
some
time
after
the
statute
was
passed.
In
Bartlett
v
Pickersgill
the
trust
was
proved,
and
the
defendant,
who
denied
it,
was
tried
for
perjury
and
convicted,
and
yet
it
was
held
that
the
statute
prevented
the
Court
from
affording
relief
to
the
plaintiff.
But
this
case
cannot
be
regarded
as
law
at
the
present
day.
The
case
was
referred
to
in
James
v
Smith
(2),
and
was
treated
as
still
law
by
Kekewich
J;
but
his
attention
does
not
appear
to
have
been
called
to
Booth
v
Turle
(3),
nor
to
Davies
v
Otty
(No
2)
(4),
both
of
which
are
quite
opposed
to
Bartlett
v
Pickersgill.
(1)
So
is
Haigh
v
Kaye.
(5)
The
late
Giffard
LJ,
one
of
the
best
lawyers
of
modern
times,
speaking
of
Barlett
c
Pickersgill
(1),
said:
“It
seems
to
be
inconsistent
with
all
the
authorities
of
this
Court
which
proceed
on
the
footing
that
it
will
not
allow
the
Statute
of
Frauds
to
be
made
an
instrument
of
fraud”:
see
Heard
v
Pilley.
(6)
The
case
not
only
seems
to
be,
but
is,
inconsistent
with
all
modern
decisions
on
the
subject.
The
plaintiff,
Comtesse
de
la
Rochefoucauld,
met
the
defence
based
upon
the
Statute
of
Frauds.
First
she
said
documents
signed
by
the
defendant
proved
the
existence
of
the
trust.
Second,
if
the
documents
do
not
prove
the
trust
with
sufficient
fulness
and
precision,
then
the
case
is
one
of
fraud
which
lets
in
parol
evidence
with
the
aid
of
which
the
plaintiff’s
case
was
established.
The
Court
agreed.
While
the
Court
were
by
no
means
satisfied
that
the
letter
signed
by
the
defendant
did
not
contain
sufficient
to
satisfy
the
Statute
of
Frauds
the
other
evidence
admissible
to
prevent
the
Statute
from
being
used
to
commit
a
fraud
proved
the
plaintiff's
case
completely.
The
question
naturally
arises
as
to
who
may
invoke
the
Statute
of
Frauds.
In
Hodgson
v
Marks,
[1970]
3
All
ER
513,
Ungoed-Thomas,
J
said
at
521
that:
Whoever
relies
on
the
statutory
requirement
of
writing
is
himself
using
the
statute
as
an
instrument
to
avoid
cognisance
being
taken
as
a
trust.
This
might
occur
in
circumstances
in
which
the
establishment
of
a
trust
would
establish
fraud.
.
.
.
No
other
defence
is
in
the
least
affected
by
thus
dispensing
with
the
statutory
requirement
of
writing.
.
.
.
The
statute
is
thus
only
a
material
defence
where
there
is
no
other
effective
defence.
So
if
there
is
another
effective
defence
the
defendant
is
not
defeated:
and
if
there
is
none,
then
if
he
succeeds
by
relying
on
the
statute,
he
succeeds
only
by
excluding
the
evidence
of
the
trust
and
thus
of
fraud.
In
the
light
of
those
remarks
I
am
of
the
view
that
the
principle
stated
in
Rochefoucauld
v
Boustead
(supra)
is
not
limited
to
the
person
who
has
accepted
land
as
trustee
and
who
nevertheless
claims
the
land
free
of
trust
or
persons
to
whom
the
land
was
transferred
in
breach
of
the
trust.
The
principle
is
to
be
understood
to
be
more
widely
applicable.
In
the
present
instance
there
is
no
doubt
whatsoever
that
the
plaintiff's
son
and
daughter-in-law
may
adduce
parol
evidence
to
establish
a
trust
in
the
event
that
the
plaintiff
should
claim
the
property
as
his
own,
which
of
course
he
does
not.
But
may
the
plaintiff
adduce
oral
evidence
to
establish
that
he
holds
the
land
merely
as
nominal
owner
for
a
beneficial
owner.
Assuming
that
the
defendant
had
invoked
the
Statute
of
Frauds,
which,
for
the
reason
previously
expressed,
it
is
doubtful
if
the
defendant,
in
the
ab-
sence
of
pleading,
has
done,
then
the
plaintiff
would
be
at
liberty
to
introduce
parol
evidence
because
to
do
so
would
be
a
use
of
the
Statute
to
avoid
cognizance
being
taken
of
the
trust.
That
would
deprive
the
plaintiff
from
establishing
what
he
conceived
to
be
the
true
nature
of
the
transaction
and
that
would
be
contrary
to
the
public
interest.
Further
the
defence
pleaded
by
the
defendant
is
not
defeated.
Accordingly,
I
accept
the
premise
that
the
transaction
which
the
plaintiff
puts
forward
as
one
created
a
trust
in
respect
of
the
land
and
in
circumstances
such
as
may
be
proved
by
parol
the
question
next
arises
as
to
the
degree
of
proof
sufficient
to
do
so.
In
so
concluding
I
have
not
overlooked
the
remarks
of
Arnup,
JA
in
Winter
v
Winter
(1974),
3
OR
(2d)
425
at
434
to
which
I
was
referred
by
counsel
for
the
defendant,
where
he
said:
Section
9
of
the
Statute
of
Frauds,
now
RSO
1970,
c
444,
is
a
complete
bar,
since
the
alleged
trust
is
entirely
oral.
Those
remarks
were
directed
to
the
rights
of
children
to
a
marriage
to
an
interest
in
a
house
purchased
by
a
husband
as
a
matrimonial
home
and
placed
in
the
wife’s
name.
The
children
were
not
entitled
to
an
interest
under
the
doctrine
of
a
resulting
trust
where
they
had
not
contributed
to
the
purchase
price,
nor
under
an
express
trust,
the
existence
of
which
is
doubtful
as
is
evident
from
the
next
paragraph
on
page
434
which
would
be
oral
and
not
in
writing
so
void
under
the
Statute.
The
necessity
for
the
writing
was
to
identify
the
children
as
beneficiaries
because
in
no
way
could
they
so
qualify.
When
a
trust
may
be
established
by
parol
despite
the
Statute
of
Frauds
as
I
accept
as
a
premise
in
this
appeal
sound
policy
demands
that
its
existence
must
be
brought
within
reasonable
certainty
and
not
left
within
the
realm
of
conjecture.
In
such
cases
the
Court
should
ask
itself:
(1)
is
the
claim
supported
by
probability:
(2)
is
it
supported
by
writing
in
any
form:
(3)
is
it
supported
by
any
indisputable
facts?
(4)
is
it
supported
by
disinterested
testimony?
(5)
is
the
parol
evidence
quite
satisfactory
and
convincing?
These
five
questions
were
posed
for
answer
by
Meredith,
J
A,
in
McKinnon
v
Harris,
[1909]
14
OWR
876
at
878
and
could
not
be
intended
as
all
inclusive
but
as
guides
because
each
case
must
be
decided
upon
its
own
facts.
The
first
question
posed
is
whether
the
claim
is
supported
by
probability.
The
plaintiff
is
a
most
unusual
person,
highly
opinionated
and
perhaps
domineering
in
his
relationships
with
his
children
but,
I
am
convinced,
he
feels
for
their
own
good.
It
is
conceded
by
counsel
for
the
parties
that
had
the
plaintiff
simply
loaned
his
son
$23,000
to
purchase
the
property
and
taken
a
mortgage
for
the
security
of
his
loan
the
present
issue
would
not
have
arisen.
Counsel
for
the
defendant
suggests
that
most
fathers
would
have
done
so
but
the
plaintiff
was
a
very
unusual
person
and
a
very
astute
business
man
averse
to
co-signing
with
anyone,
even
the
members
of
his
own
family.
Therefore
it
is
in
character
that
the
plaintiff
should
purchase
the
property
outright
and
to
sell
it
to
his
son
when
the
son’s
finances
would
permit.
In
the
meantime
the
son
would
be
paying
rent.
Frankly
I
can
see
no
substantial
difference
in
the
end
result
between
the
plaintiff
lending
his
son
the
purchase
price
and
taking
a
mortgage
back
with
interest
at
the
going
rate
as
security
and
the
plaintiff
purchasing
the
property
outright
in
his
own
name
as
nominal
owner
subject
to
a
written
trust
agreement
providing
for
monthly
payments
in
a
sum
sufficient
to
cover
the
carrying
charges
for
interest
and
the
like
as
well
as
a
payment
on
account
of
principal.
Had
the
trust
agreement
been
in
writing
likewise
there
would
have
been
no
dispute
between
the
parties
to
this
appeal.
It
does
not
follow
that
the
plaintiff
was
devoid
of
paternalistic
affection.
He
devised
a
procedure
which
to
him
gave
his
son
the
financial
help
he
needed
but
by
a
different
method,
obviating
the
plaintiff
from
becoming
a
guarantor
to
which
he
had
an
aversion.
The
second
possible
course
was
not
followed
by
the
plaintiff
because,
in
his
view,
it
was
an
exclusively
family
transaction
not
subject
to
scrutiny
by
strangers
including
the
tax
collector.
In
the
unlikely
event
that
the
plaintiff
and
his
wife
denied
a
verbal
trust
agreement
then
their
son
and
daughter-in-law
could
assert
the
trust
agreement
by
the
same
parol
evidence
as
is
presently
adduced
less
the
plaintiff’s
admission,
and
for
the
purposes
of
this
appeal
his
contention,
that
an
oral
trust
agreement
existed.
One
incident
stands
out
as
inconsistent
with
the
plaintiff’s
assumed
role
of
a
dispassionate
father
who
placed
his
own
interests
above
those
of
his
children.
When
the
sale
of
84
Range
Road
was
being
consummated
with
Mrs
Unger
it
was
the
son,
Claude,
who
made
the
down
payment
of
$3,000
to
Mrs
Unger.
It
was
made
with
money
advanced
by
the
plaintiff
to
his
son,
not
for
payment
as
agent
for
him,
but
as
a
token
illustrative
of
the
son’s
independence
and
his
interest
in
the
property
being
purchased.
It
became
part
of
the
son’s
indebtedness
to
his
father.
This
was
the
testimony
of
the
son.
It
is
a
straw
in
the
wind
showing
the
way
the
wind
blew.
In
contradiction
of
the
plaintiff’s
testimony
that
his
avowed
purpose
was
to
hold
legal
title
for
the
benefit
of
his
son
and
wife
as
equitable
owners
counsel
for
the
defendant
points
to
four
matters.
First,
in
the
conveyance
dated
November
20,
1963
(Exhibit
D2)
from
Mrs
Unger
to
the
plaintiff
and
his
wife,
they
are
described
as
‘joint
tenants
and
not
as
tenants
in
common”
and
not
as
trustees.
No
doubt
this
instrument
was
prepared
by
Mrs
Unger’s
solicitors.
This
form
was
printed
by
legal
stationers
for
use
as
a
short
form
of
deed
to
joint
tenants
under
the
Conveyances
Act.
It
was
treated
as
a
routine
conveyance
and
the
plaintiff,
who
was
without
legal
training,
was
not
likely
to
protest
nor
attempt
to
explain
the
details
of
a
family
transaction
to
the
solicitor
for
the
vendor.
Secondly,
the
plaintiff
reported
the
monthly
payments
of
$210
received
from
his
son
as
rental
income
in
his
tax
returns.
Thirdly,
the
plaintiff
claimed
capital
cost
and
maintenance
expenses.
The
plaintiff
has
admitted
both
the
second
and
third
circumstances
in
paragraph
5
of
the
statement
of
claim.
The
plaintiff’s
income
tax
returns
were
prepared
by
chartered
accountants
retained
by
him.
The
monthly
income
received
was
income
to
which
the
adjective
“rental”
was
applied
as
was
logical
to
do
rather
than
embark
upon
an
explanation,
as
the
chartered
accountant
sought
to
do
later
after
the
fact
of
assessment
without
a-full
appreciation
of
the
legal
implications
involved
in
reaching
the
result
they
did
(see
Exhibit
DS).
With
respect
to
the
claim
for
capital
cost
allowance
it
is
logical
that
such
should
be
claimed
by
the
plaintiff
in
his
income
tax
returns.
He
(with
his
wife)
was
the
registered
and
legal
owner
of
the
property
and
entitled
to
claim
capital
cost
allowance
as
such.
That
does
not
detract
from
the
possibility
that
as
legal
owner
he
held
the
property
in
trust
for
the
equitable
owner.
The
fourth
circumstance
is
that
in
the
instrument
of
conveyance
dated
December
1,
1976
from
the
plaintiff
and
his
wife
to
his
son
and
daughter-in-
law
(see
Exhibit
D
1)
the
plaintiff
is
described
as
a
“joint
tenant”
with
his
wife
and
not
as
a
tenant
in
common
or
trustee
and
that
in
a
supporting
affidavit
as
to
age
and
marital
status
in
the
printed
allegation,
“We
held
the
land
as
Joint
tenants/Trustees/Partnership
Property”
the
words
“Trustees/Partner-
ship
Property
were
crossed
out.
That
is
understandable
and
is
draftsmanship
consistent
with
the
preceding
documents
(eg,
Exhibit
DZ)
whereby
the
conveyance
to
the
plaintiff
and
his
wife
was
as
joint
tenants.
For
the
reasons
previously
stated
no
particular
significance
can
be
attributed
to
the
obliteration
of
the
word
“Trustee”
in
this
instance
(Exhibit
D1).
There
is
no
doubt
that
the
arrangement
was
communicated
to
the
plaintiff’s
son
and
daughter-in-law
and
that
it
was
understood
and
accepted
by
them.
Likewise
the
plaintiff
and
his
wife
accepted
their
responsibilities
of
the
agreement.
Upon
the
basis
of
that
agreement
the
son
and
daughter-in-law
expended
substantial
moneys
to
permanently
improve
the
property.
That
is
not
consistent
with
the
relationship
of
tenant
and
landlord
between
the
plaintiff’s
son
and
the
plaintiff.
Rather
it
is
more
consistent
with
the
relationship
of
beneficiary
of
a
trust
and
the
trustee.
It
is
a
principle
of
equity
that
a
beneficiary
who
is
induced
to
change
his
position
in
reliance
on
a
trust
as
reason
for
incurring
an
expense
may
well
be
entitled
to
a
lien
for
compensation
on
the
property
or
a
right
to
the
conveyance
of
the
legal
title.
This
is
particularly
so
if
the
person
in
the
position
of
beneficiary
did
so
in
the
belief
that
he
owned
the
property,
that
he
was
encouraged
in
that
belief
by
the
person
in
the
position
of
nominal
owner,
or
such
owner
stood
by
and
let
such
beneficiary
make
the
expenditure
without
disabusing
his
mind.
This
may
well
result
in
an
equitable
interest
arising
where
none
was
present
before.
The
plaintiff
did
not
enlighten
his
son
before
the
expenditures
were
made
or
after
he
became
aware
of
the
first
of
three
substantial
expenditures
being
made.
That
he
did
not
do
so
is
consistent
with
the
plaintiff’s
belief
that
an
equitable
interest
already
existed
as
the
son’s
action
is
inconsistent
with
him
being
merely
a
tenant
of
his
father.
Thus
the
response
to
the
first
question
posed
by
Meredith,
JA
whether
the
Claim
is
supported
by
probability
must
be
in
the
affirmative.
The
second
question
posed
by
Meredith,
JA
in
the
McKinnon
case
(supra)
is
whether
the
existence
of
a
trust
is
supported
by
writing
in
any
form.
There
is
in
existence
an
agreement
for
sale
and
purchase
from
the
plaintiff
and
his
wife
to
his
son
and
his
wife
executed
and
sealed
by
the
parties
which
instrument
bears
the
date
of
April
1,
1970
whereas
the
actual
execution
took
place
April
1,
1971.
This
instrument
came
into
being
at
the
behest
of
Pauline
Bouchard
prior
to
the
departure
on
a
European
holiday
in
the
circumstances
to
which
she
testified
and
which
have
already
been
related.
I
appreciate
that
this
instrument
is
precisely
what
on
its
face
it
is.
The
general
rule
is
clear
that
extrinsic
parol
testimony
is
inadmissible
to
contradict,
vary,
add
to
or
subtract
from
the
terms
of
a
valid
written
instrument,
subject
to
five
well
known
exceptions,
one
of
which
is
the
existence
of
any
separate
oral
agreement
as
to
any
matter
on
which
the
document
is
silent
and
which
is
not
inconsistent
with
its
terms
if
it
can
be
inferred
from
the
circumstances
of
the
case
that
the
parties
did
not
intend
the
document
to
be
the
complete
and
final
statement
of
the
whole
of
the
transaction
between
them.
I
received
the
evidence
of
Mrs
Bouchard
because
first
it
did
not
contradict,
vary,
add
to
or
subtract
from
the
written
instrument.
It
explained
the
reason
why
the
written
instrument
came
into
being
on
her
insistence
and
secondly
it
is
the
next
to
final
instrument
in
the
implementation
of
the
oral
agreement
between
the
plaintiff
and
his
wife
and
his
son
and
his
wife
of
which
both
were
well
cognizant
as
well.
Thus
in
the
circumstances
Pauline
Bouchard’s
testimony
was
admissible
also
as
to
the
separate
oral
agreement
in
the
form
of
an
express
trust
and
the
agreement
for
purchase
and
sale
was
the
second
final
implementation
of
that
trust,
the
final
implementation
being
the
deed
of
conveyance
dated
December
1,
1976.
The
agreement
of
sale
and
purchase
is
therefore
part
of
the
overall
transaction
and
bearing
in
mind
the
broad
language
in
which
the
second
question
is
framed,
ie,
“evidence
in
writing
in
any
form”
it
follows
that
the
agreement
dated
April
1,
1970
so
qualifies.
The
fact
that
the
agreement
of
purchase
and
sale
is
antedated
to
April
1,
1970
whereas
it
was
actually
executed
about
a
year
later
triggered
the
suspicious
instincts
of
the
tax
collectors
who
read
into
that
fact
sinister
implications.
The
learned
Chairman
of
the
Tax
Review
Board
considered
that
the
incorrect
dating
of
the
agreement
seriously
affected
the
credibility
of
the
plaintiff
and
declined
to
accept
the
plaintiff’s
testimony
that
the
property
was
purchased
in
trust
for
his
son
and
daughter-in-law.
Rather
he
concluded
that
it
was
an
outright
purchase
in
the
names
of
the
plaintiff
and
his
wife
followed
by
a
subsequent
sale
to
his
son
and
his
wife
as
was
contended
before
me.
I
do
not
read
out
the
fact
of
antedating
these
sinister
implications.
The
document
was
prepared
by
a
reputable
firm
of
solicitors.
It
would
be
contrary
to
the
standards
and
integrity
of
a
member
of
the
profession
to
misstate
a
material
fact
for
an
ulterior
or
dishonest
purpose.
It
may
have
been
a
typographical
error
but
no
other
dates
appear
in
the
instrument
to
check
against.
Had
it
been
antedated
deliberately
even
then
I
find
nothing
reprehensible
in
this
but
if
it
had
been
deliberately
antedated
it
should
have
been
antedated
to
November
20,
1963
or
thereabouts.
Neither
would
it
have
been
reprehensible
in
the
circumstances
as
I
conceive
them
to
have
been,
to
have
executed
the
agreement
of
purchase
and
sale
in
1976
had
it
not
been
that
Pauline
Bouchard
was
anxious
to
have
some
written
indication
of
her
interest
in
the
property
before
leaving
on
a
long
journey
in
1971.
I
say
this
because
of
the
statement
in
Lewin
on
Trusts
(16th
Ed
at
page
25)
that,
“The
trust,
however
late
the
proof,
operated
retrospectively
from
the
time
of
its
creation”,
and
the
remarks
of
Lindley,
LJ
in
Rochefoucauld
v
Boustead
(Supra)
already
quoted
but
here
repeated
that
“it
is
sufficient
if
the
trust
can
be
proved
by
some
writing
signed
by
the
defendant,
and
the
date
of
the
writing
is
immaterial”.
The
Chairman
placed
reliance
on
the
circumstance
that
“trust”
was
not
mentioned
by
the
plaintiff
until
the
assessment
was
contested.
I
attach
no
particular
significance
to
the
plaintiff’s
failure
to
do
so.
There
is
ample
authority
for
the
proposition
that
equity
looks
at
the
intent
rather
than
at
the
form.
It
is
quite
clear
that
a
trust
can
be
created
without
the
use
of
the
word
“trust”.
Intention
is
a
question
of
fact
to
be
proven
as
any
other
fact
is
to
be
proven.
If
from
the
facts
the
interest
that
the
plaintiff
intended
to
give
to
his
son
is
clear
then
that
is
the
interest
he
gave.
Even
if
the
agreement
for
purchase
and
sale,
dated
April
1,
1970,
supplemented
as
it
is
by
the
testimony
of
Pauline
Bouchard
does
not
prove
the
trust
with
sufficient
fulness
and
precision
then
the
parol
evidence
does
so
completely.
The
third
question
posed
to
be
answered
is
whether
the
claim
is
supported
by
any
indisputable
facts.
The
facts
as
outlined
at
the
outset
are
not
in
dispute
between
the
parties.
The
dispute
lies
in
the
inference
to
be
drawn
from
those
facts,
whether
there
was
a
trust
created
as
contended
on
behalf
of
the
plaintiff
or
whether
there
was
a
purchase
and
subsequent
sale
by
the
plaintiff
as
contended
on
behalf
of
the
Minister.
The
fourth
question
posed
for
answer
is
whether
the
claim
of
the
existence
of
the
trust
is
established
despite
the
Statute
of
Frauds,
and
if
so,
is
it
supported
by
disinterested
testimony.
The
Chairman
of
the
Tax
Review
Board
characterized
Mrs
Pauline
Bouchard
as
an
“impartial”
witness.
The
word
“disinterested”,
used
by
Meredith,
JA
together
with
such
other
adjectives
as
“independent”
and
“credible”
modifying
the
noun
“witness”
all
have
like
overtones
of
indicating
that
such
witnesses
are
readily
worthy
of
belief.
A
“disinterested
witness”,
in
my
concept
of
the
meaning
of
those
words,
is
one
who
has
no
interest
in
relation
to
the
matter
in
question
and
an
“independent
witness”
is
one
who
is
not
subject
to
control.
I
would
characterize
Mrs
Pauline
Bouchard
as
an
impartial,
disinterested,
independent
and
credible
witness.
So
too
would
I
characterize
Claude
Bouchard
as
a
disinterested,
independent
and
credible
witness.
He
is
not
under
the
“control”
of
his
father
in
relation
to
the
assessment
of
his
father
to
income
tax.
The
property
transaction
between
them
has
ended.
The
question
in
issue
here
is
between
the
plaintiff
and
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
to
which
the
son
is
not
a
party.
Therefore,
he
is
disinterested.
However
I
do
not
overlook
that
he
is
the
son
of
his
father
with
whom
his
sympathies
lie
but
that
does
not
destroy
his
competence,
compellability,
nor
his
credibility.
Both
Claude
and
Pauline
Bouchard
testified
as
to
facts
concerning
the
transaction
which
are
compatible
with
the
creation
of
a
trust
with
themselves
as
beneficiaries
and
the
plaintiff
and
his
wife
as
the
nominal
owners,
holding
the
title
to
the
property
as
trustees
for
their
benefit
—
all
the
essential
elements
of
a
trust.
Added
to
this
before
me
Mrs
Mary
Elizabeth
Unger
testified.
She
has
the
attributes
of
impartiality,
disinterest,
independence
and
creditiblity,
added
to
which
she
has
as
well
the
atribute
of
courage.
She
attended
to
give
evidence
under
difficult
and
trying
personal
circumstances.
She
was
the
owner
of
the
property
to
whom
Claude
Bouchard
spoke
about
its
sale
to
him.
The
sale
price
was
agreeable
to
both
purchaser
and
vendor
but
Mrs
Unger
asked
for
a
guarantor
of
financial
stability
to
the
buyer.
The
plaintiff
undertook
to
buy
the
property
in
the
names
of
himself
and
his
wife
for
his
son
and
his
wife.
That
is
precisely
what
the
plaintiff
told
Mrs
Unger
and
Mrs
Unger
so
testified.
That
is
a
repetition
of
the
evidence
given
by
the
plaintiff,
Claude
Bouchard
and
Pauline
Bouchard
by
a
witness
whose
credibility
is
unimpeachable.
There
was
disinterested
testimony.
From
this
point
I
go
fifth
and
last
to
the
question
posed
by
Meredith,
JA,
ie,
is
the
claim
that
a
trust
should
be
considered
as
established
and
enforced
notwithstanding
the
Statute
of
Frauds,
supported
by
parol
evidence
that
is
satisfactory
and
convincing.
In
my
view
that
evidence
is
overwhelming
to
that
effect.
I
believe
the
plaintiff.
I
acknowledge
his
aggressive
and
pugnacious
attitude
to
those
charged
with
the
collection
of
taxes
no
doubt
inspired
by
the
unrelenting
stance
of
the
tax
collector.
His
testimony
was
given
in
an
unrestrained
and
opinionated
manner
but
it
had
the
ring
of
veracity.
That
testimony
is
supported
by
that
of
his
son,
Claude,
and
daughter-in-
law,
Pauline,
but
it
is
climaxed
by
the
testimony
of
Mrs
Unger.
It
is
fatal
as
it
was
wrong
for
the
officers
of
the
Department
of
National
Revenue
to
blink
facts
because
they
were
not
to
their
liking.
None
is
so
blind
as
those
who
will
not
see.
None
is
so
deaf
as
those
who
will
not
hear.
In
exculpation
of
those
employees
it
may
be
that
the
satisfactory
and
convincing
testimony
before
me
was
not
presented
to
them
so
they
did
not
hear
it
for
that
reason
but
the
letter
dated
March
26,
1979
from
the
plaintiff’s
accountants
to
the
Department
of
National
Revenue
(Exhibit
DB)
while
not
presented
with
the
full
legal
implications
as
were
presented
to
me
nevertheless
bore
the
germ
of
the
existence
of
a
trust
in
the
first
two
paragraphs
but
not
developed
and
obviously
not
investigated
or
considered
by
the
taxing
officers
or
if
it
was
it
was
disregarded
in
favour
of
an
interpretation
consistent
with
tax
liability.
Since
the
trust,
which
I
find
to
have
existed,
came
into
being
in
1963
the
plaintiff
was
merely
the
nominal
owner
for
his
son
and
daughter-in-law
as
beneficial
owners
so
that
there
was
no
disposition
of
the
property
to
which
paragraph
69(1
)(b)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
invoked
by
the
Minister,
can
apply.
For
the
foregoing
reasons
the
plaintiff's
appeal
from
that
portion
of
the
assessment
for
the
year
1976
is
allowed.
There
remains
for
consideration
the
additional
issue
in
the
plaintiff’s
appeal
from
his
assessment
to
income
tax
for
his
1976
taxation
year
and
the
like
issue
as
the
sole
basis
in
his
appeal
from
his
assessment
for
his
1977
taxation
year.
The
Minister
added
to
the
plaintiff’s
income
in
his
1976
taxation
year
an
amount
of
$1,930
and
in
the
1977
taxation
year
an
amount
of
$7,158,
in
each
instance
as
a
standby
charge
of
1%
per
month
of
the
capital
cost
of
a
Rolls
Royce
automobile
pursuant
to
paragraph
6(1
)(e)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
The
benefit
that
an
employee
derives
from
the
private
use
of
an
automobile
made
available
to
him
by
his
employer
may
be
brought
into
the
computation
of
the
employee’s
income
under
paragraph
6(1
)(a)
as
a
benefit
received
or
enjoyed
by
the
employee
in
respect
of,
in
the
course
of
or
by
virtue
of
an
office
or
employment.
As
was
to
be
expected
the
valuation
of
such
a
benefit
to
the
taxpayer
was
a
constant
source
of
dispute
between
him
and
the
tax
collector.
Paragraph
6(1
)(e)
is
designed
to
ease
the
task
of
the
tax
collector
by
providing
a
simplified
statutory
formula
to
determine
an
amount
which
would
be
a
reasonable
standby
charge
for
the
automobile
for
the
number
of
days
in
the
year
during
which
it
was
made
available
to
the
employee.
The
minimum
standby
charge
for
an
automobile
owned
by
the
employer
is
determined
by
the
cost
of
the
automobile
to
the
employer
multiplied
by
1%
per
month
for
the
number
of
months
it
was
made
available
to
the
employee
in
accordance
with
subsection
6(2),
paragraph
(a).
But
if
a
standby
charge
so
computed
exceeds
the
amount
of
a
benefit
in
this
respect
brought
into
the
employee’s
income
under
paragraph
6(1
)(a)
as
a
benefit
then
only
the
excess
is
added
to
the
employee’s
income.
This
to
me
provides
for
an
incongruity
which
should
not
arise.
It
has
been
laid
down
as
a
rule
for
the
construction
of
statutes
that
where
a
special
provision
and
a
general
provision
are
inserted
which
cover
the
same
subject
matter
falling
within
the
words
of
the
special
provision
then
the
matter
or
case
must
be
governed
thereby,
and
not
by
the
terms
of
the
general
provision.
The
converse
may
be
so.
If
a
case
does
not
fall
within
the
special
provision,
ie,
if
the
plaintiff
in
this
instance
is
not
within
the
four
corners
of
paragraph
6(1
)(e)
then
it
may
be
that
the
case
is
to
be
governed
by
paragraph
6(1)(a).
I
am
absolved
by
the
pleadings
from
the
necessity
of
deciding
that,
if
the
facts
do
not
bring
the
plaintiff
within
the
precise
operation
of
paragraph
6(1
)(e),
the
appeals
must
be
dismissed.
In
assessing
the
plaintiff
as
he
did
the
Minister
“assumed
that
General
Bearing
Service
Ltd
made
a
Rolls
Royce
available
to
him
(the
plaintiff)
in
the
years
in
question
for
his
personal
use”.
The
defendant
relies
on
section
6
of
the
Statute
for
the
contention
that
the
standby
charges
were
properly
included
in
the
plaintiff’s
income
as
benefits
received
or
enjoyed
by
him
“in
respect
of,
in
the
course
of
or
by
virtue
of
an
office
or
employment”.
The
plaintiff
does
not
deny
that
the
Minister
made
the
assumptions
that
he
alleges
he
did.
In
paragraph
7
of
the
statemen
tof
claim
the
plaintiff
submits
paragraph
6(1
)(e)
is
not
applicable
because
the
plaintiff
used
the
automobile
for
business
purposes
with
minimal
personal
use.
In
the
claims
for
relief
sought
the
plaintiff
prays
that
the
appeals
be
allowed
and
the
reassessments
be
referred
back
to
the
Minister
for
“reassessment
in
accordance
with
the
declaration
of
this
Honourable
Court”.
The
entire
thrust
of
the
plaintiff's
contention
in
this
respect
has
been
the
standby
charges
were
not
properly
imposed
under
paragraph
6(1
)(e)
but
rather
should
have
been
assessed
as
a
benefit
under
paragraph
6(1
)(a)
which,
in
accordance
with
the
departmental
practice,
is
predicated
upon
the
proportion
of
the
operating
cost
the
employee’s
personal
use
bears
to
the
total
use.
That
being
so,
should
the
contention
by
the
plaintiff
on
this
issue
be
successful,
section
177
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
dictates
that
the
disposition
of
the
appeals
in
such
circumstance,
shall
be
that
they
are
“allowed
and
referred
back
to
the
Minister
for
reconsideration
and
reassessment”
of
the
benefits
received
by
the
plaintiff
in
accordance
with
paragraph
6(1
)(a)
of
the
Act
as
the
plaintiff
claims.
The
issue
in
these
two
present
appeals,
(1)
that
against
the
assessment
for
the
plaintiff’s
1976
taxation
year
and
(2)
that
against
the
assessment
for
his
1977
taxation
year,
is
whether
paragraph
6(1
)(e),
the
special
provision,
is
to
be
applied
in
computing
the
plaintiff’s
income
for
each
taxation
year
as
contended
by
the
Minister
or
whether
the
benefit
of
the
automobile
is
to
be
calculated
by
resort
to
the
general
provision,
paragraph
6(1
)(a).
Paragraphs
6(1
)(a)
and
6(1
)(e)
and
subsection
6(2)
read:
6.
(1)
There
shall
be
included
in
computing
the
income
of
a
taxpayer
for
a
taxation
year
as
income
from
an
office
or
employment
such
of
the
following
amounts
as
are
applicable:
(a)
the
value
of
board,
lodging
and
other
benefits
of
any
kind
whatever
(except
the
benefit
he
derives
from
his
employer’s
contributions
to
or
under
a
registered
pension
fund
or
plan,
group
sickness
or
accidence
insurance
plan,
supplementary
unemployment
benefit
plan,
deferred
profit
sharing
plan
or
group
term
life
insurance
policy)
received
or
enjoyed
by
him
in
the
year
in
respet
of,
in
the
course
of,
or
by
virtue
of
an
office
or
employment;
(e)
where
his
employer
made
an
automobile
available
to
him
in
the
year
for
his
personal
use
(whether
for
his
exclusive
personal
use
or
otherwise),
the
amount,
if
any,
by
which
an
amount
that
would
be
a
reasonable
standby
charge
for
the
automobile
for
the
aggregate
number
of
days
in
the
year
during
which
it
was
made
so
available
(whether
or
not
it
was
used
by
the
taxpayer)
exceeds
the
aggregate
of
(i)
the
amount
paid
by
him
in
the
year
to
his
employer
for
the
use
of
the
automobile,
and,
(ii)
any
amount
included
in
computing
his
income
for
the
year
by
virtue
of
paragraph
(a)
in
respect
of
the
use
by
him
of
the
automobile
in
the
year;
and
(2)
For
the
purposes
of
paragraph
(1)(e)
“an
amount
that
would
be
a
reasonable
standby
charge
for
the
automobile”
for
the
aggregate
number
of
days
in
a
taxation
year
during
which
it
was
made
available
by
an
employer
shall
be
deemed
not
to
be
less
than,
(a)
where
the
employer
owned
the
automobile
at
any
time
in
the
year,
an
amount
in
respect
of
its
capital
cost
to
the
employer
equal
to
the
percentage
thereof
obtained
when
1%
is
multiplied
by
the
quotient
obtained
when
such
of
the
aggregate
number
of
days
hereinbefore
referred
to
as..
.were
days
during
which
the
employer
owned
the
automobile
is
divided
by
30
(except
that
if
the
quotient
so
obtained
is
not
a
full
number
it
shall
be
taken
to
be
the
nearest
full
number,
then
to
the
full
number
next
below
it),
and
(b)
where
the
employer
leased
the
automobile
from
a
lessor
at
any
time
in
the
year,
an
amount
equal
to
/
of
the
cost
incurred
by
the
employer
for
the
purpose
of
leasing
the
automobile
for
the
aggregate
number
of
days
hereinbefore
referred
to.
There
does
not
appear
to
be
agreement
between
the
parties
as
to
the
facts.
In
paragraph
4(i)
of
the
statement
of
claim
the
plaintiff
alleges:
(i)
The
Vehicle
in
question,
a
Rolls
Royce
whose
capital
cost
was
$59,650.56,
was
made
available
to
the
Plaintiff
for
business
purposes.
The
Plaintiff
is
president
of
General
Bearing
Service
Ltd
a
company
which
has
numerous
outlets
in
Ontario
and
Quebec
that
he
personally
visits
on
a
regular
basis
utilizing
the
vehicle
in
question.
In
addition
the
Plaintiff
during
the
period
in
question
regularly
visited
customers
and
made
emergency
deliveries
utilizing
the
said
vehicle.
The
only
after
hours
telephone
number
listed
in
the
Ottawa
telephone
book
is
the
Plaintiff's
home
number.
The
Plaintiff
had
another
vehicle
at
his
residence
which
he
used
during
the
period
in
question
for
personal
purposes.
In
paragraph
9
of
the
statement
of
defence
the
defendant
alleges:
9.
With
respect
to
paragraph
4
of
the
Statement
of
Claim,
he
admits
that
the
Plaintiff
is
President
of
General
Bearing
Service
Ltd
and
that
a
Rolls
Royce,
whose
capital
cost
was
$59,650.56,
was
made
available
to
him
but,
otherwise,
denies
said
paragraph.
In
paragraph
10,
already
referred
to,
the
Minister
assumed
that
General
Bearing
Service
Ltd
made
a
Rolls
Royce
available
to
the
plaintiff
during
the
taxation
years
in
question
“for
his
personal
use”.
The
phrase,
“for
his
personal
use”
is
susceptible,
by
virute
of
the
maxim,
expressio
unius
est
exclusio
alterius
of
the
meaning
that
the
automobile
was
made
available
to
the
plaintiff
“for
his
personal
use”
to
the
exclusion
of
business
use
in
which
even,
in
accordance
with
the
jurisprudence
with
which
counsel
for
both
parties
are
familiar
as
is
the
Minister
and
his
employees
that
the
principle
outlined
in
paragraph
6(1
)(e)
is
not
applicable
by
reason
of
the
decisions
in
Queen
v
Harman
culminating
in
the
decision
of
the
Appeal
division
reported
in
[1980]
CTC
83;
80
DTC
6052.
Following
the
decision
of
the
Court
of
Appeal
dated
January
31,
1980
confirming
the
decision
of
my
borth
Walsh,
the
Minister
issued
a
special
release
dated
April
14,
1980
to
the
effect
that
a
prior
information
bulletin
no
longer
reflects
the
application
of
paragraph
6(1
)(e)
concerning
the
treatment
of
standby
charges
for
automobiles.
Where
automobiles
are
made
available
to
an
employee
predominantly
for
business
purposes
and
only
incidentally
for
personal
use,
the
Department
will
not
consider
that
a
benefit
arises
under
paragraph
6(1
)(e).
However
a
benefit
may
arise
under
paragraph
6(1
)(a).
This
bulletin
is
merely
a
discretion
to
the
employees
of
the
Department
to
disregard
a
prior
policy
and
implement
that
in
the
special
release.
This
is
no
magnanimous
gesture
on
the
part
of
the
Department
but
is
its
understanding
of
the
decision
in
Queen
v
Harman
which
will
be
considered
later.
The
unwritten
constitution
of
Canada
provides
for
the
supremacy
of
the
law
and
the
Department
is
obeying
the
law
as
stated
in
the
Harman
case
as
it
is
obliged
to
do.
The
question
which
will
arise
is
whether
the
facts
of
the
present
appeals
are
within
the
law
as
laid
down
in
the
Harman
case.
Apparently
it
is
not
agreed
by
the
defendant
that
the
automobile
is
used
for
business
purposes.
That
is
implicit
in
the
contention
by
counsel
for
the
defendant
that
the
test
laid
down
by
the
Court
of
Appeal
in
that
the
Rolls
Royce
falls
within
paragraph
6(1
)(e)
and
the
example
put
forward
by
Walsh,
J
of
the
use
by
an
executive
of
a
one-man
company
provided
for
personal
use
with
some
busness
use
as
resulting
in
inequities.
The
learned
Chairman
of
the
Tax
Review
Board
pointed
out
in
his
reasons
for
judgement
that
the
plaintiff
was
the
president
and
principal
shareholder
of
General
Bearing
Service
Ltd.
He
was
uncertain
whether
the
automobile
was
made
available
to
the
plaintiff
as
a
principal
shareholder
or
as
an
officer
of
the
company.
I
fail
to
appreciate
what
difference
would
result.
A
principal
shareholder
is
a
shareholder
and
the
standby
charges
with
respect
to
an
automobile
made
available
to
a
shareholder
are
identical
as
too
are
the
statutory
provisions
giving
rise
thereto.
Subsection
15(5)
must
only
apply
to
a
shareholder
who
is
not
an
officer
or
an
employee
otherwise
there
is
no
difference
between
the
provisions.
In
any
event
before
the
evidence
left
no
doubt
that
the
Rolls
Royce
was
made
available
to
the
plaintiff
as
the
President,
an
officer
of
the
company,
and
as
General
Manager,
a
post
he
also
held,
and
so
is
an
employee
of
the
company.
He
is
both
an
officer
and
an
employee
of
the
company.
The
Chairman
of
the
Tax
Review
Board
made
specific
reference
to
the
plaintiff’s
testimony
before
the
Tax
Review
Board,
“that
he
had
ordered
the
company
to
purchase
the
Rolls
Royce
for
business
use”.
That
evidence,
unexplained,
could
mean
that
the
automobile
was
for
use
by
the
company
through
use
by
any
officer
or
employee
and
not
exclusively
by
the
plaintiff
for
company
use.
The
next
sentence
states
that
the
automobile
was
made
available
to
the
plaintiff
“for
that
purpose”,
ie,
corporate
business
use
and
“was
used
95%
of
the
time
for
business”.
What
is
lacking
in
the
quoted
language
used
by
the
Chairman
was
that
it
was
used
by
the
plaintiff
for
95%
of
the
whole
100%
business
use
to
which
the
Rolls
Royce
was
put
and
that
5%
was
personal
use
by
the
plaintiff
and
not
business
use
by
other
employees.
Before
me
there
was
no
doubt
that
it
was
the
plaintiff
who
made
the
business
use
for
90%
of
the
time
and
the
10%
remaining
was
the
plaintiff’s
personal
use.
The
business
use
was
reduced
by
5%
and
there
was
no
business
use
by
other
officers
or
employees.
The
plaintiff
did
not
“order”
the
company
to
purchase
the
automobile.
In
response
to
a
question
from
myself
the
plaintiff
testified
that
there
was
a
board
of
directors
and
the
corporate
decision
to
purchase
the
Rolls
Royce
was
that
made
by
the
board.
The
Chairman
could
not
accept
that
the
plaintiff,
a
successful
business
man
in
a
company
with
22
salesmen
and
some
71
employees,
“would
personally
and
regularly
deliver
bearings
to
his
customers
in
a
Rolls
Royce”.
He
added,
“It
is
not
logical,
reasonable
or
within
the
bounds
of
common
sense
to
suggest
that
the
Rolls
Royce
was
acquired
by
the
company
and
was
made
available
to
the
appellant,
its
President
and
principal
shareholder,
for
that
purpose
and
I
place
no
credence
on
the
evidence
given
by
the
appellant.”
The
same
thought
was
echoed
in
the
submission
on
behalf
of
the
defendant
when
it
was
said:
In
the
case
at
hand
General
Bearing
Services
provided
a
luxury
car
to
its
general
manager
and
major
shareholder.
It
is
submitted
that
the
car
was
provided
for
the
personal
enjoyment
and
prestige
of
the
Plaintiff
and
not
to
carry
bearings.
The
evidence
before
me
must
have
differed
from
that
adduced
before
the
Tax
Review
Board.
The
plaintiff
testified
before
me
that
the
Rolls
Royce
was
purchased
to
be
utilized
in
the
company’s
business
and
had
been
made
available
to
him
for
that
purpose.
In
his
capacity
as
President
and
General
Manager
of
the
company
he
was
in
constant
supervision
of
the
fourteen
retail
outlets
throughout
the
Ottawa
Valley
and
Eastern
Quebec
and
to
do
so
he
drove
the
Rolls
Royce
to
make
those
visits
which
were
time
consuming.
This,
I
should
think,
was
the
business
use
contemplated
by
the
Board
for
which
the
Rolls
Royce
was
bought
and
not
to
regularly
deliver
bearings
to
customers.
Paragraph
4(i)
of
the
statement
of
claim
does
not
allege
that
the
Rolls
Royce
was
“regularly”
used
to
deliver
bearings
to
customers.
It
is
alleged
that
it
was
used
by
the
plaintiff
to
visit
the
numerous
outlets
on
a
regular
basis
and
to
visit
customers
on
a
regular
basis
but
goes
on
to
say
“and
made
deliveries”
which
words
are
not
modified
by
the
word
“regularly”.
The
plaintiff
made
himself
available
to
the
conduct
of
business
twenty-
four
hours
in
every
day
of
the
week.
After
normal
business
hours
the
telephone
calls
to
the
business
premises
were
transferred
to
the
plaintiff’s
home
number
by
mechanical
device.
The
after-hours
telephone
number
listed
in
the
telephone
directory
was
that
of
the
plaintiff’s
home.
Having
observed
and
heard
the
plaintiff
testify
it
does
not
surprise
me
in
the
least
that,
if
he
had
received
a
telephone
call
at
his
home
that
a
customer’s
machine
had
broken
down
for
need
of
a
bearing,
the
plaintiff
would
forthwith
personally
deliver
the
replacement
bearing
in
the
Rolls
Royce
but
I
do
not
accept
that
this
was
a
regular
occurrence.
I
also
accept,
as
stated
by
counsel
for
the
defendant,
that
the
use
of
the
Rolls
Royce
by
the
plaintiff
was
designed
to
enhance
his
prestige
but
it
does
not
follow
from
that
fact
that
the
use
made
of
the
automobile
was
personal
use
and
not
business
use.
It
is
not
the
function
of
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
nor
any
employees
authorized
by
him
to
be
engaged
to
administer
the
Income
Tax
Act
to
dictate
to
a
taxpayer
that
he
shall
conduct
his
business
more
efficiently
to
generate
more
income
and
consequently
more
tax.
Therefore
if
the
management
of
General
Bearing
Service
Ltd
sees
fit
to
deliver
bearings
in
Rolls
Royce
automobiles
that
is
its
business
uneconomic
though
it
may
be.
The
use
of
the
Rolls
Royce
by
the
plaintiff
as
he
described
it,
that
is
for
the
inspection
and
supervision
of
the
fourteen
retail
outlets,
to
visit
customers
and
deliver
a
bearing
in
emergency
situations
is
not
so
illogical,
unreasonable
and
beyond
common
sense
as
it
may
appear
to
be.
The
plaintiff
has
dedicated
his
life
to
the
business
he
has
created
and
its
success
is
based
upon
service
to
its
customers.
Doubtless
the
plaintiff
expects
and
demands
the
employees
to
give
the
high
standard
of
service
as
he
does
himself.
Thus,
like
an
Inspector-General,
when
the
plaintiff
appears
on
his
tours
of
inspection
in
a
Rolls
Royce,
indicative
of
the
prestige
following
on
success,
the
troops
snap
to
attention.
They
are
alert
and
anxious
to
please.
So
too
a
customer,
if
he
calls
at
a
late
hour
and
a
bearing
is
delivered
expeditiously
by
the
President
and
General
Manager
of
the
Company
in
a
Rolls
Royce,
cannot
be
other
than
impressed
by
the
calibre
of
service
given
to
him.
He
will
likely
continue
his
custom
and
advise
others
to
deal
with
the
Company.
The
plaintiff
explained
that
the
inspection
trips
he
took
each
week
were
long
and
tiring.
When
he
returned
home
he
wished
to
rest
and
if
he
was
obligated
to
go
out
he
did
not
drive
the
Rolls
Royce.
Rather
he
and
his
wife
drive
in
a
Cadillac
which
the
plaintiff
had
bought
for
his
wife’s
private
and
personal
use
as
well
as
his
own
when
need
arose.
After
the
taxation
years
in
question
the
plaintiff
added
another
Cadillac
for
his
exclusive
personal
use
so
not
to
appropriate
his
wife’s
car
or
the
Rolls
Royce.
During
and
after
the
taxation
years
in
question
the
plaintiff
had
little
need
for
the
Rolls
Royce
for
personal
use
since
another
less
expensive
car,
but
still
a
prestigious
one,
was
available
for
that
use.
Accordingly
I
accept
the
plaintiff’s
testimony
that
the
Rolls
Royce
was
used
by
him
predominantly
for
business
purposes
and
he
has
successfully
demolished
the
assumption
by
the
Minister
that
General
Bearing
Service
Ltd
made
the
Rolls
Royce
available
to
the
plaintiff
for
his
personal
use
by
the
plaintiff
as
may
be
the
case.
I
accept
the
plaintiff's
testimony
as
establishing
that
the
Rolls
Royce
was
made
available
to
the
plaintiff
and
was
used
primarily
and
predominantly
for
business
purposes
and
with
a
minimum
of
personal
use
as
was
the
intention
of
the
company,
the
intention
of
the
Board
being
that
of
the
company.
Counsel
for
the
defendant
submitted
that
the
conditions
precedent
to
the
applicability
of
paragraph
6(1
)(e)
were
present,
that
is:
(1
)
the
automobile
was
made
available
to
the
plaintiff
as
employee
or
officer
by
his
employer,
and
(2)
the
automobile
could
be
used
for
the
plaintiff’s
personal
use
should
he
so
desire
since
the
employer
placed
no
restrictions
on
its
use.
He
argued
further
that
paragraph
6(1
)(e)
provides
a
scheme
of
taxation
whereby
the
actual
use
of
the
automobile
is
to
be
disregarded
in
favour
of
the
more
convenient
approach
namely
the
“availability”
of
the
automobile
for
personal
use.
This
is
the
precise
argument
which
was
advanced
before
my
brother
Walsh
in
The
Queen
v
Harman
(supra)
and
on
appeal
before
the
Appeal
Division
also
cited
previously.
After
careful
analysis
Walsh,
J
rejected
that
interpretation
of
paragraph
6(1
)(e)
advanced
by
the
Minister.
He
pointed
to
extraordinary
inequities
which
could
result
which
Parliament
could
not
have
intended.
He
concluded
that
the
wording
of
the
paragraph
was
ambiguous
at
best
and
ought
to
be
limited
to
the
case
of
an
employee
whose
company
makes
a
car
available
to
him
primarily
for
personal
use.
However
he
concluded
that
the
words
“or
otherwise”
in
the
language
in
parentheses
reading:
“(whether
for
his
exclusive
personaluse
or
otherwise)”
following
on
the
initial
words
“where
the
employer
made
an
automobile
available
to
him
in
the
year
for
his
personal
use”
do
not
mean
business
use
and
he
reached
that
conclusion
by
a
comparison
of
the
identical
English
words
in
paragraph
6(1
)(e)
and
subsection
15(5)
with
the
French
translations
thereof.
On
the
basis
that
personal
use
was
identical
and
business
use
was
not
included
in
the
words
“or
otherwise”
Walsh,
J
concluded
that
the
automobile
was
not
“an
automobile
available
to
him
in
the
year
for
his
personal
use”
and
accordingly
paragraph
6(1
)(e)
was
not
applicable
when
availability
was
for
business
use
as
well.
The
finding
of
Walsh,
J
was
confirmed
by
the
Appeal
Division
of
this
Court.
Kerr,
DJ,
speaking
for
the
Court
concurred
with
Walsh,
J
that
the
language
of
subsection
6(1)
paragraph
(e)
was
arguable
and
I
therefore
conclude
not
clear.
He
also
rejected
the
contention
advanced
by
the
Minister
that
the
“availability”
was
the
key
element
regardless
of
the
use
when
he
said:
“In
my
opinion,
availability
of
an
automobile
is
not
the
sole
or
determining
consideration
in
this
section
or
in
the
comparable
section
15(5).”
He
added:
“The
purpose
for
which
the
employer
provides
the
automobile
is
a
relevant
consideration
also.”
In
the
Harman
case
the
employer
provided
an
automobile
for
the
employee
which
was
necessarily
used
predominantly
in
the
employer’s
business
but
personal
use
was
perfmitted
if
opportunity
arose.
On
such
facts
Kerr,
DJ
concluded
by
saying:
Thus
I
doubt
that
section
6(1
)(e),
properly
construed,
applies
to
the
automobile
here
under
consideration
and
I
believe
that
section
6(1)(a)
more
aptly
applies
to
the
circumstances
of
this
case.
The
material
facts
in
the
present
appeals
do
not
differ
from
those
in
the
Harman
case.
In
each
instance
an
automobile
was
made
available
by
an
employer
to
an
officer
or
an
employee
for
business
use
with
personal
use
ancillary
thereto.
Accordingly
the
appeal
for
the
plaintiff’s
1967
taxation
year
with
respect
to
the
issue
involving
benefit
from
use
of
an
automobile
and
his
appeal
from
the
assessment
for
his
1977
taxation
year
in
which
the
like
use
of
the
automobile
was
the
only
issue
are
both
allowed
and
are
referred
back
to
the
Minister
for
reconsideration
and
reassessment
on
the
basis
that
paragraph
6(1
)(e)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
is
not
applicable
and
the
benefit
received
by
the
plaintiff
falls
to
be
assessed
under
paragraph
6(1
)(e)
thereof
on
the
proportion
of
the
operating
cost
the
personal
use
bears
to
the
total
use
of
the
automobile.
With
respect
to
the
assessment
for
the
plaintiff’s
1976
taxation
year
whereby
an
amount
of
$11,135
was
deemed
to
be
a
capital
gain
pursuant
to
subparagraph
69(1
)(b)(i)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
and
taxed
accordingly
is
allowed
for
the
reasons
outlined
above.
The
plaintiff
shall
be
entitled
to
his
costs
on
the
appeals
from
the
assessments
for
both
his
1976
and
1977
taxation
years.