|
Citation: 2003TCC307
|
|
Date: 20030502
|
|
Docket: 2002-1682(IT)I
|
|
BETWEEN:
|
|
DEBORAH CHAMBERLAIN,
|
|
Appellant,
|
|
and
|
|
|
|
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
|
|
Respondent.
|
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Bowman, A.C.J.
[1] This appeal is from an assessment
for the appellant's 2000 taxation year whereby the Minister
of National Revenue denied to the appellant a medical expense tax
credit for expenses of $28,574 claimed in respect of the
renovation of a house which she purchased.
[2] Subsection 118.2(1) of the
Income Tax Act permits a tax credit equal to a percentage
of the individual's medical expenses.
[3] Subsection 118.2(2) of the
Income Tax Act reads in part:
118.2(2)
For the purposes of subsection (1), a medical expense of an
individual is an amount paid
...
(l.2) for reasonable
expenses relating to renovations or alterations to a dwelling of
the patient who lacks normal physical development or has a severe
and prolonged mobility impairment, to enable the patient to gain
access to, or to be mobile or functional within, the
dwelling;
(l.21) for reasonable expenses,
relating to the construction of the principal place of residence
of the patient who lacks normal physical development or has a
severe and prolonged mobility impairment, that can reasonably be
considered to be incremental costs incurred to enable the patient
to gain access to, or to be mobile or functional within, the
patient's principal place of residence.
[4] Paragraph 118.4(1)(a)
reads:
118.4(1)
For the purposes of subsection 6(16), sections 118.2 and 118.3
and this subsection,
(a) an
impairment is prolonged where it has lasted, or can reasonably be
expected to last, for a continuous period of at least 12
months.
[5] The Crown does not dispute that
the amounts were spent. It does however dispute that the
appellant suffered from a severe and prolonged mobility
impairment and that the extensive renovations could reasonably be
regarded as necessary for her to gain access to the dwelling and
be mobile or functional in it.
[6] The appellant suffers from
arthritis in both knees and chronic sinusitis. Also she has a hip
fracture which she sustained in an accident in 1996. This also
causes her pain and makes walking somewhat more difficult.
However she works and is able to walk without the aid of a
crutch, cane or other device.
[7] She bought the house for $67,000
in 1999 from the Laurentian Bank under a power of sale. It was
advertised as a handyman's special. Although she made some
enquiries about the state of the house no formal professional
assessment was done. After she bought it she found that the
foundation was rotten, the roof had to be replaced, a new furnace
had to be installed, two of the walls were rotten and had to be
rebuilt and the house had to be raised 48". The major
structural repairs necessitated by the state of the house
required the substantial outlay in question.
[8] With respect to the
appellant's state of health I accept that her medical
problems are prolonged. They have lasted over twelve months.
Whether they are severe or not is to some degree a matter of
judgement. We have very little evidence on this question beyond
the appellant's own testimony. The only medical evidence we
have is a statement by her doctor as part of an application to
the Superintendent to withdraw money from a locked-in account.
The document is called "Statement of a Physician Regarding
Renovations Due to an Illness or Disability". The
doctor's statement reads
foundation repair
roof repair / eaves / drainage
heating installation
patient informs me that her arthritis/recurrent sinusitis/
pain ¹ hip from fracture in 1996 are exacerbated by water in
the home
[9] The statement is probably correct
as far as it goes. I do not, however, think that it goes far
enough to enable me to treat the cost of the extensive
renovations to the house as a medical expense for the purpose of
the tax credit. The evidence does not in my view establish that
the arthritis and hip fracture constitute a severe mobility
impairment. A severe impairment might be involved where a person
was in a wheelchair or required a walker.
[10] Even assuming however that her
arthritis and hip fracture could be said to result in a severe
mobility impairment I do not think that a major renovation of the
appellant's house of the type with which we are concerned
here can be seen as a "reasonable expense" to enable
the appellant to gain access to, or be mobile or functional
within, the dwelling. The work was undertaken to make the
building habitable. The repairs would undoubtedly have been
required even if the appellant did not have the health
problems.
[11] I was referred to a number of cases in
this court: Williams v. Canada,
[1997] T.C.J. No. 1346, and McGaugh v.
Canada, [1999] T.C.J. No. 954. Both involved
the cost of hardwood flooring for a person who suffered severe
respiratory problems as the result of exposure in a hospital to
chemical contaminants disseminated through the ventilation. One
needs only to read the two judgments to realize what a
devastating accident it was, how severely disabled the appellant
was and how necessary the installation of the hardwood flooring
was. This case is in no sense comparable to the Williams
and McGaugh cases.
[12] I have great sympathy for the appellant
with her medical condition and wish the fact that she bought an
extremely dilapidated house on the basis of bad advice. However I
do not think that the cost of repairing the house can reasonably
fall within the definition of medical expenses in
subsection 118.2(2)(l.2) of the Act.
[13] The appeal is therefore dismissed.
Signed at Toronto, Canada, this 2nd day of May 2003
A.C.J.
Email this Content