Strayer,
J.:—By
order
of
the
Associate
Chief
Justice
dated
May
28,
1985
these
two
matters
were
heard
together
on
common
evidence.
The
plaintiff
Boardman
appeals
with
respect
to
his
assessment
under
the
Income
Tax
Act
for
1977
and
the
plaintiff
Saskan
Investments
Ltd.
appeals
with
respect
to
its
assessment
for
1978.
Both
appeals
arise
out
of
the
same
facts
which
are
as
follows.
Facts
A
statement
of
agreed
facts
was
submitted
by
all
parties,
including
the
following
facts.
The
plaintiff
Saskan
Investments
Ltd.
was
incorporated
in
1968.
The
plaintiff
Barry
Boardman
has
been
president
of
the
company
since
its
incorporation.
He
has
also
been
the
principal
shareholder,
holding
all
but
one
or
two
shares.
His
former
wife,
Sylvia
Boardman
held
one
share
which
she
apparently
still
owns.
The
plaintiff
Barry
Boardman
was,
at
the
material
times,
a
dentist
in
Kindersley,
Saskatchewan.
Saskan
acquired
a
house
in
Saskatoon
for
$34,500
on
June
11,
1974.
It
acquired
a
house
in
Kindersley
on
October
1,
1976
for
$33,000.
Saskan
apparently
owned
other
property
and
the
plaintiff
Barry
Boardman
had
other
corporate
and
property
interests
in
Kindersley.
The
Boardmans
were
divorced
on
September
19,
1977.
At
that
time
Mr.
Justice
Hughes
of
the
Saskatchewan
Court
of
Queen's
Bench
made
an
order
pursuant
to
section
22
of
the
Married
Women's
Property
Act
of
Saskatchewan
directing
Sylvia
Boardman
to
surrender
her
share
in
Saskan
Investments
Ltd.
to
the
company
and
providing
for
the
transfer,
by
means
of
a
vesting
order
directed
to
the
Registrar
of
Land
Titles,
of
the
two
houses
referred
to
above
from
the
name
of
Saskan
Investments
Ltd.
to
that
of
Sylvia
Boardman.
It
should
be
noted
that
section
22
of
the
Married
Women's
Property
Act
then
allowed
a
husband
or
wife
to
apply
to
the
court
in
any
question
between
them
“as
to
the
title
to
or
possession
or
disposition
of
property"
and
where
such
an
application
was
made
the
judge
might
make
an
order
“with
respect
to
the
property
in
dispute"
which
he
considered
"fair
and
equitable"
including
"the
transfer
from
one
spouse
to
the
other
spouse
of
any
property
he
may
specify".
In
making
any
such
order
he
could
also
direct
the
Registrar
of
Land
Titles
to
cancel
or
issue
any
certificate
of
title
to
the
land.
In
applying
this
section
the
learned
judge
seems
to
have
found
no
problem
with
the
fact
that
the
houses
in
question
did
not
belong
to
either
spouse
but
instead
to
a
company,
albeit
that
the
company
was
controlled
by
the
husband.
There
was
nothing
to
indicate
that
either
the
husband
or
the
company
took
any
objection
on
this
basis
and
indeed
in
the
judgment
of
Hughes,
J.
of
July
18,
1977
he
notes
that
while
counsel
for
Dr.
Boardman
objected
to
any
order
for
transfer
of
property
he
had
asked
that
if
such
an
order
were
to
be
made
it
should
be
directed
to
the
Registrar
of
Land
Titles.
That
is,
title
to
the
land
would
pass
directly
from
the
company
to
Mrs.
Boardman.
As
the
result
of
the
order
directed
to
the
Registrar,
title
to
the
two
houses
issued
to
Sylvia
Boardman
on
October
5,
1977.
It
is
agreed
that
as
of
that
date
their
aggregate
fair
market
value
was
$79,500
as
compared
to
their
aggregate
cost
when
acquired
by
the
company
of
$67,500.
No
meeting
of
shareholders
or
directors
was
held,
and
no
resolution
was
passed,
by
Saskan
authorizing
the
transfer
of
these
properties
to
Sylvia
Boardman.
The
Saskatoon
house
was
subject
to
a
mortgage
in
the
amount
of
$18,409
which
remained
against
the
title
when
it
issued
in
the
name
of
Sylvia
Boardman.
The
plaintiff
Barry
Boardman
did
not
report
any
benefit
or
income
in
his
1977
income
tax
return
in
respect
of
the
disposition
of
these
properties.
In
its
1978
income
tax
return
(its
taxation
year
being
from
August
1
to
July
31)
Saskan
reported
on
the
Capital
Cost
Allowance
Schedule
the
disposal
of
these
two
properties
in
the
aggregate
amount
of
$65,672,
less
than
their
acquisition
cost.
Saskan
did
not
report
any
capital
gain
in
1978
in
respect
of
these
dispositions.
Any
further
facts
particular
to
one
or
other
of
the
two
appeals
herein
will
be
dealt
with
in
relation
to
that
appeal.
I
will
deal
with
the
two
appeals
separately
hereafter.
Barry
Board
man
The
Minister
reassessed
Dr.
Boardman’s
income
for
1977
by
adding
thereto
the
amount
of
$61,091
in
respect
of
the
vesting
of
these
houses,
formerly
the
property
of
Saskan,
in
the
name
of
his
former
wife.
This
figure
represents
the
fair
market
value
of
the
properties
at
date
of
transfer,
namely
$79,500
less
the
mortgage
of
$18,409
still
owing
on
the
Saskatoon
house.
The
Minister
asserts
that
this
net
benefit
to
Mrs.
Boardman
should
be
computed
as
part
of
the
income
of
Dr.
Boardman
pursuant
to
any
or
all
of
the
following
provisions
of
the
Income
Tax
Act:
15.
Appropriation
of
property
to
shareholder.
(1)
Where
in
a
taxation
year
.
.
.
(b)
funds
or
property
of
a
corporation
have
been
appropriated
in
any
manner
whatever
to,
or
for
the
benefit
of,
a
shareholder,
or
(c)
a
benefit
or
advantage
has
been
conferred
on
a
shareholder
by
a
corporation,
..
.
the
amount
or
value
thereof
shall,
except
to
the
extent
that
it
is
deemed
to
be
a
dividend
by
section
84,
be
included
in
computing
the
income
of
the
shareholder
for
the
year.
56.
(2)
Indirect
payments.
A
payment
or
transfer
of
property
made
pursuant
to
the
direction
of,
or
with
the
concurrence
of,
a
taxpayer
to
some
other
person
for
the
benefit
of
the
taxpayer
or
as
a
benefit
that
the
taxpayer
desired
to
have
conferred
on
the
other
person
shall
be
included
in
computing
the
taxpayer’s
income
to
the
extent
that
it
would
be
if
the
payment
or
transfer
had
been
made
to
him.
245.
(2)
Indirect
payments
or
transfers.
Where
the
result
of
one
or
more
sales,
exchanges,
declarations
of
trust,
or
other
transactions
of
any
kind
whatever
is
that
a
person
confers
a
benefit
on
a
taxpayer,
that
person
shall
be
deemed
to
have
made
a
payment
to
the
taxpayer
equal
to
the
amount
of
the
benefit
conferred
notwithstanding
the
form
or
legal
effect
of
the
transactions
or
that
one
or
more
other
persons
were
also
parties
thereto;
and,
whether
or
not
there
was
an
intention
to
avoid
or
evade
taxes
under
this
Act,
the
payment
shall,
depending
upon
the
circumstances,
be
(a)
included
in
computing
the
taxpayer's
income
.
.
.
I
am
satisfied
that
the
net
value
of
this
property
represented
a
benefit
to
Dr.
Boardman
within
the
meaning
of
subsection
56(2)
or
subsection
245(2).
I
therefore
think
it
unnecessary
to
consider
the
application
of
subsection
15(1)
but
should
not
be
understood
to
have
rejected
the
possibility
that
it
too
might
apply
to
the
situation.
A
requisite
for
the
application
of
both
subsection
56(2)
and
subsection
245(2)
is
that
there
be
a
benefit
to
the
taxpayer.
I
think
there
is
little
doubt
that
there
was
a
benefit
to
Dr.
Boardman
in
the
circumstances.
Property
standing
in
his
name,
including
the
shares
in
Saskan
Investments
Ltd.,
were
all
potentially
subject
to
an
order
of
the
Court
of
Queen's
Bench
under
section
22
of
the
Married
Women's
Property
Act
whereby
certain
of
them
could
be
transferred
to
Mrs.
Boardman
upon
dissolution
of
the
marriage.
In
effect
the
property
of
Saskan
Investments
was
allocated
by
the
judge,
in
lieu
of
property
actually
standing
in
Dr.
Boardman’s
name,
in
order
to
provide
for
a
"fair
and
equitable”
division
of
the
property
collectively
within
the
control
of
this
couple.
There
can
be
little
doubt
that
if
this
property
had
not
been
available
to
provide
a
certain
estate
for
Mrs.
Boardman,
other
property
of
Dr.
Boardman’s
would
have
been
transferred.
The
allocation
of
the
company's
property
served
to
meet
his
obligation
to
make
an
adequate
property
arrangement
for
his
wife
and
preserved
intact
the
property
held
in
his
own
name.
His
legal
obligation
was
thereby
met
and
it
is
irrelevant
that
in
economic
terms
he
was
worse
off
by
virtue
of
the
reduction
in
the
value
of
the
assets
of
the
company
of
which
he
owned
virtually
all
the
shares.
See
in
this
connection
Perrault
v.
The
Queen,
[1978]
C.T.C.
395;
78
D.T.C.
6272
(F.C.A.),
and
McMaster
v.
M.N.R.,
[1985]
1
C.T.C.
2279;
85
D.T.C.
278
(T.C.C.),
interpreting
what
is
a
"benefit"
within
paragraph
15(1)(c)
of
the
Act.
Was
there
then
a
"transfer"
of
property
within
the
meaning
of
subsection
56(2)?
It
has
been
held
in
Warren
Champ
v.
The
Queen,
[1983]
C.T.C.
1
at
3:
83
D.T.C.
5029
at
5031,
relying
in
turn
on
Estate
of
D.
Fasken
v.
M.N.R.,
[1948]
C.T.C.
265;
49
D.T.C.
491
(Ex.
Ct.)
that
the
word
"transfer"
should
not
be
confined
to
a
technical
meaning
normally
associated
with
the
change
of
ownership
of
property.
It
was
held
in
the
Champ
case
that
a
transfer
was
effected
by
the
taxpayer
to
his
wife
by
means
of
him
having
the
company
he
controlled
pay
an
amount
of
dividends
to
her
far
in
excess
of
what
would
be
her
entitlement
based
on
her
shareholding.
In
the
present
case
the
taxpayer
contends
that
there
was
no
"transfer"
because
he
did
not
convey
the
property
nor
did
his
company:
instead,
title
issued
in
his
former
wife's
name
by
virtue
of
a
court
order.
It
seems
to
me
that
the
property
was
nevertheless
transferred.
Subsection
56(2)
does
not
specify
that
the
previous
owner
of
the
property
must
have
willingly
and
actively
conveyed
title
to
the
property.
There
remains
the
question
of
whether
this
transfer
was
made
“‘pursuant
to
the
direction
of,
or
with
the
concurrence
of”
the
taxpayer.
It
would
be
stretching
reality
too
much
to
say
that
it
was
at
his
direction.
But
it
is
not
unrealistic
to
say
that
the
property
vested
in
his
wife
with
his
concurrence.
Naturally
he
would
have
preferred
not
to
have
any
such
property
transferred
to
her.
But
faced
with
the
probability
that
the
court
would
order
some
sharing
of
property
owned
by
him
or
within
his
control,
he
indicated
to
the
court
through
his
lawyer
the
wish
that
if
such
an
order
were
to
be
made,
it
would
be
by
way
of
a
directive
to
the
Registrar
of
Land
Titles
Office
under
S.C.C.
22(5)
of
the
Act.
It
should
also
be
noted
that,
although
Dr.
Boardman
had
complete
control
of
the
company
which
was
the
owner
of
these
houses,
he
apparently
made
no
effort
to
have
the
company
protect
its
property
from
being
taken
to
meet
the
personal
obligations
of
the
company's
principal
shareholder.
It
is
hard
to
believe
that
an
effective
objection
could
not
have
been
made
to
this
order
appropriating
property
not
legally
owned
by
the
husband,
had
the
husband
as
principal
shareholder
of
the
company
not
acquiesced
in
such
taking.
It
was
held
in
M.N.R.
v.
Bronfman,
[1965]
C.T.C.
378;
65
D.T.C.
5235
(Ex.
Ct.),
in
respect
of
the
predecessor
to
subsection
56(2)
that
where
shareholders
had
failed
to
exercise
their
voting
rights
to
prevent
a
transfer
of
the
company’s
property
in
the
form
of
gifts
they
would
be
deemed
to
have
concurred
in
such
transfers.
In
the
present
case
the
obvious
preference
of
the
taxpayer
and
principal
shareholder
of
the
company
to
have
the
property
taken
from
it
to
satisfy
his
wife's
claims,
and
his
failure
to
cause
the
company
to
protect
its
own
separate
interest
in
this
respect
must
be
seen
as
concurrence
in
that
transfer
by
court
order
of
the
property
from
the
company
to
his
wife.
I
therefore
conclude
that
subsection
56(2)
applies
to
the
situation
and
the
amount
of
$61,091
should
be
attributed
to
the
plaintiff
Barry
Boardman
as
income
for
1977.
It
appears
to
me
even
clearer
that
this
amount
should
be
included
in
Dr.
Boardman’s
income
for
1977
pursuant
to
subsection
245(2),
quoted
supra.
The
test
in
this
subsection
is
cast
very
broadly
to
cover
any
‘sales,
exchanges,
declarations
of
trust,
or
other
transactions
of
any
kind
whatever
.
.’
which
confer
a
benefit
on
a
taxpayer.
It
was
said
by
Jackett,
P.
in
M.N.R.
v.
Dufresne,
[1967]
C.T.C.
153
at
162;
67
D.T.C.
5105
at
5110
(Ex.
Ct.)
that
the
word
"transaction
.
.
.
is
used
in
the
widest
possible
sense
as
meaning
any
act
having
operative
effect
in
relation
to
a
business
or
property.
.
.
.”
While
the
vesting
by
court
order
of
a
company's
property
in
the
hands
of
the
former
wife
of
the
principal
shareholder
would
not,
perhaps,
in
a
narrow
sense
of
the
term,
be
considered
a
"transaction"
I
am
satisfied
that
the
term
as
used
in
subsection
245(2)
is
broad
enough
to
cover
this
situation.
One
must
look
at
the
realities.
At
the
time
of
the
divorce,
Dr.
Boardman
owned
a
good
deal
of
property
or
controlled
it
through
his
companies.
He
could
have
voluntarily
made
some
arrangement
to
transfer
property
he
owned
himself,
such
as
shares
in
Saskan,
or
he
could
have
arranged
for
one
of
his
companies
to
transfer
property
they
owned
to
her,
or
he
could
have
realized
some
cash
through
disposal
of
such
properties
and
could
have
conveyed
the
cash
to
her.
Failing
such
agreement,
it
was
obvious
that
there
was
a
strong
possibility
that
some
kind
of
order
would
be
made
under
the
Married
Women’s
Property
Act
by
which
Mrs.
Boardman
would
receive
some
of
Dr.
Boardman’s
property
or
the
proceeds
of
such
property.
While
Dr.
Boardman
naturaly
resisted
the
sharing
of
his
property
with
his
divorced
wife,
it
is
apparent
as
noted
above
that
he
acquiesced
in
the
solution
of
the
problem,
if
such
an
order
were
to
be
made,
by
resort
to
the
property
of
Saskan
Investments.
I
think
the
whole
process
must
be
viewed
as
a
“transaction”
in
which
Dr.
Boardman's
legal
obligations
to
his
wife
were
met
by
the
transfer
of
title
in
the
two
houses
from
the
company
to
Mrs.
Boardman,
an
order
to
which
neither
Dr.
Boardman
nor
the
company
took
any
objection
on
the
basis
that
the
houses
were
not
the
property
of
Dr.
Boardman
whose
personal
obligations
were
thus
being
met.
This
was,
in
the
words
of
Jackett,
P.,
an
“act
having
an
operative
effect
in
relation
to
.
..
property.”
It
should
be
noted
that
subsection
245(2)
is
subject
to
subsection
245(3)
which
provides
as
follows:
245
(3)
Arm's
Length.
Where
it
is
established
that
a
sale,
exchange
or
other
transaction
was
entered
into
by
persons
dealing
at
arm's
length,
bona
fide
and
not
pursuant
to,
or
as
part
of,
any
other
transaction
and
not
to
effect
payment,
in
whole
or
in
part,
of
an
existing
or
future
obligation,
no
party
thereto
shall
be
regarded,
for
the
purpose
of
this
section,
as
having
conferred
a
benefit
on
a
party
with
whom
he
was
so
dealing.
I
conclude
that
this
subsection
does
not
apply.
The
company
and
Dr.
Boardman
were
not
at
arm's
length
because
they
were
“related
persons”
within
the
meaning
of
subparagraph
251
(2)(b)(i).
Although
I
do
not
think
it
relevant
to
the
application
of
this
subsection,
it
would
appear
that
the
company
and
Mrs.
Boardman
were
not
at
arm's
length
either:
at
least,
the
plaintiff
Dr.
Boardman
has
so
admitted
in
subparagraph
5(a)
in
his
statement
of
claim.
I
am
therefore
satisfied
that
the
net
value
of
the
property
taken
from
the
company
and
placed
in
the
name
of
Mrs.
Boardman,
in
the
amount
of
$61,091,
was
properly
assessed
as
income
under
subsection
245(2)
as
well.
The
appeal
of
the
plaintiff
Barry
Boardman
must
therefore
fail.
Saskan
Investments
Ltd.
The
Minister
reassessed
the
income
of
Saskan
Investments
Ltd.
for
the
1978
taxation
year
by
adding
thereto
a
taxable
capital
gain
of
$6,914
in
respect
of
the
conveyance
of
the
two
houses
to
Mrs.
Boardman.
This
assessment
was
calculated
on
the
basis
that
the
fair
market
value
of
these
houses
was
$79,500
and
that
their
adjusted
cost
base
was
$65,672
leaving
a
difference
of
$13,828,
50
per
cent
of
which
would
be
taxable
capital
gain.
There
was
no
dispute
over
the
amounts
but
only
as
to
whether
any
capital
gain
should
be
attributed
to
the
company.
The.
Minister
now
asserts
that
pursuant
to
subsections
69(1)
and
(4)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
the
company
must
be
deemed
to
have
sold
the
property
at
its
fair
market
value
and
to
have
received
the
proceeds
thereof.
These
subsections
provide
as
follows:
69.
Inadequate
considerations.
(1)
Except
as
expressly
otherwise
provided
in
this
Act,
(a)
where
a
taxpayer
has
acquired
anything
from
a
person
with
whom
he
was
not
dealing
at
arm's
length
at
an
amount
in
excess
of
the
fair
market
value
thereof
at
the
time
he
so
acquired
it,
he
shall
be
deemed
to
have
acquired
it
at
that
fair
market
value;
(b)
where
a
taxpayer
has
disposed
of
anything
(i)
to
a
person
with
whom
he
was
not
dealing
at
arm's
length
for
no
proceeds
or
for
proceeds
less
than
the
fair
market
value
thereof
at
the
time
he
so
disposed
of
it,
or
(ii)
to
any
person
by
way
of
gift
inter
vivos,
he
shall
be
deemed
to
have
received
proceeds
of
disposition
therefor
equal
to
that
fair
market
value;
and
(c)
where
a
taxpayer
has
acquired
property
by
way
of
gift,
bequest
or
inheritance,
he
shall
be
deemed
to
have
acquired
the
property
at
its
fair
market
value
at
the
time
he
so
acquired
it.
(4)
Where
property
of
a
corporation
has
been
appropriated
in
any
manner
whatever
to,
or
for
the
benefit
of,
a
shareholder,
for
no
consideration
or
for
a
consideration
below
the
fair
market
value,
if
the
sale
thereof
at
the
fair
market
value
would
have
increased
the
corporation's
income
for
a
taxation
year,
for
the
purpose
of
determining
the
corporation’s
income
for
the
year,
it
shall
be
deemed
to
have
sold
the
property
during
the
year
and
to
have
received
therefor
the
fair
market
value
thereof.
While
I
think
it
may
be
more
fairly
debatable
whether
subparagraph
69(1
)(b)(i)
is
applicable
to
this
situation,
I
need
not
decide
that
as
I
conclude
that
subsection
69(4)
is
applicable.
This
latter
subsection
gives
rise
to
two
issues
argued
by
counsel
and
not
otherwise
dealt
with
in
my
reasons
above.
It
was
contended
by
counsel
for
the
taxpayer
corporation
that
the
property
was
not
“appropriated”
and
even
if
it
were
the
transaction
was
not
an
income
transaction,
the
company
not
being
in
the
business
of
buying
and
selling
houses,
and
therefore
could
not
be
said
to
have
increased
the
corporation's
“income.”
With
respect
to
the
first
point,
counsel
contended
that
the
word
“appropriate”
implies
action
by
the
owner
of
the
property
or
by
the
person
acquiring
it,
and
that
in
the
present
case
the
effective
action
transferring
the
property
was
that
of
a
third
party,
namely
the
Court
of
Queen's
Bench.
While
these
are
valid
meanings
of
the
terms
“appropriate”
when
used
as
an
active
verb,
there
are
other
meanings
provided
in
the
Oxford
English
Dictionary
cited
by
counsel,
such
as
“to
assign
or
attribute
specially
or
exclusively
to
.
.
.”
or
“to
make,
or
select
as,
appropriate
to
.
.
.”
These
would
embrace
the
action
of
a
third
party
as
well.
Apart
from
that,
it
must
be
noted
that
the
verb
is
used
in
subsection
69(4)
in
the
passive
voice
as
it
refers
to
property
that
“has
been
appropriated.”
It
does
not
say
that
the
property
must
have
been
appropriated
by
the
company
to
the
shareholder
or
for
the
benefit
of
the
shareholder
but
only
that
the
property
must
have
been
“appropriated
in
any
manner
whatever
to,
or
for
the
benefit
of,
a
shareholder.
...”
I
therefore
think
that
the
action
of
the
Court
of
Queen's
Bench
in
choosing
this
particular
property
to
be
used
for
satisfying
Dr.
Boardman’s
personal
obligations
to
his
wife
can
be
regarded
as
an
appropriation
within
the
meaning
of
subsection
69(4).
I
am
also
satisfied
that
this
appropriation,
if
sold
at
fair
market
value,
“would
have
increased
the
corporation's
income”
for
this
taxation
year.
I
must
assume
that
the
word
“income”
is
used
in
the
meaning
attributed
to
it
by
the
Income
Tax
Act.
It
is
clear
in
section
3
of
the
Act,
for
example,
that
taxable
capital
gains
are
to
be
calculated
as
part
of
income
for
the
purposes
of
the
Act.
It
appears
to
me
that
any
sensible
reading
of
subsection
69(4)
would
indicate
that
it
covers
capital
transactions
if,
had
there
been
a
real
sale
and
fair
market
value
received,
the
effect
would
have
been
to
increase
the
corporation's
income
as
calculated
under
the
Act.
That
surely
would
have
been
the
case
here.
I
am
satisfied
that
other
requirements
of
subsection
69(4)
are
met.
As
noted,
earlier,
this
whole
process
must
be
seen
as
for
the
benefit
of
the
principal
shareholder
of
the
company,
Dr.
Boardman
because
the
net
result
was
to
discharge
a
legal
obligation
which
the
court
could
impose
on
him
under
the
Married
Women's
Property
Act.
There
was
no
consideration
paid
to
the
company.
I
therefore
conclude
that
the
appeal
of
Saskan
Investments
Ltd.
must
also
fail.
General
Conclusions
If
the
results
herein
seem
somewhat
anomalous,
it
appears
to
me
that
they
arise
from
two
somewhat
conflicting
approaches
to
the
relationship
of
the
company
to
its
principal
shareholder.
The
Saskatchewan
Court
of
Queen's
Bench
seemingly
took
the
view
that
the
corporate
structure
was
irrelevant
to
the
exercise
of
its
powers
under
the
Married
Women's
Property
Act
to
make
a
“fair
and
equitable"
order
with
respect
to
property
owned
or
controlled
by
the
parties.
The
Income
Tax
Act,
on
the
other
hand,
has
numerous
provisions
reinforcing
the
juridical
distinction
between
the
assets
of
the
shareholder
and
the
assets
of
the
company.
As
these
two
categories
of
assets
are
accumulated
under
separate
taxation
regimes,
the
company's
assets
are
not
to
be
readily
intermixed
with
the
shareholder's
as
this
would
presumably
provide
a
means
for
the
shareholder
to
avoid
the
higher
rate
of
taxation
applicable
to
him.
Even
where
the
safeguards
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
are
not
directed
specifically
to
corporations
and
their
shareholders,
they
have
a
particular
application
in
this
area
because
of
the
possibilities
created
by
the
corporate
device
for
the
principal
shareholder
to
use
his
company
to
confer
benefits
on
himself
or
on
others
on
his
behalf.
Appeals
dismissed.
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