Date: 20010612
Docket: 98-2524-IT-G
BETWEEN:
GRANITE BAY CHARTERS LTD.,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Reasons for Judgment
Bowie J.
[1]
This appeal is from an assessment under the Income Tax Act
(the Act) for the taxation year 1994. The issue it raises
is a narrow one. The Appellant is deemed by section 84 of
the Act to have received a dividend upon the redemption of
certain shares of Greenstone Creek Logging Ltd. (Greenstone)
which it owned. Subsequently, Mr. and Mrs. Cox, who owned all the
shares of both the Appellant and Greenstone, sold their
Greenstone shares at arms length. The Minister of National
Revenue has assessed the Appellant on the basis that
subsection 55(2) of the Act applies to deem the
proceeds of the redemption to be proceeds of disposition giving
rise to a taxable capital gain, rather than a tax-free
intercorporate dividend. The Appellant contends that subsection
55(2) does not apply, because the transaction is saved by
paragraph 55(3)(a) of the Act, as the redemption by
Greenstone of its shares was not part of a series of transactions
or events that resulted in the sale by Mr. and Mrs. Cox of their
Greenstone shares.
[2]
The parties have agreed to the following facts for the purposes
of this appeal:
1.
The Appellant is a corporation resident in Canada and has a
mailing address at 1855 Perkins Road, Campbell River, British
Columbia, V9W 4S2.
2.
At all material times, all of the issued and outstanding shares
of the Appellant were owned by Donald Cox and Anna Cox.
3.
Greenstone Creek Logging Ltd. ("Greenstone") is a
taxable Canadian corporation which at all material times carried
on a contract logging business.
4.
Prior to April 8, 1994, all of the issued and outstanding shares
of Greenstone were owned by Donald Cox and Anna Cox. [sic]
5.
At all material times, Mr. and Mrs. Cox were the sole directors
of both Greenstone and the Appellant.
6.
At all material times, the accountant to Mr. and Mrs. Cox,
Greenstone and the Appellant was Mr. William Huxham, Chartered
Accountant.
The Hayes Group Inquiry
7.
In late 1993, Mr. Donald Hayes, on behalf of a group of companies
referred to as the Hayes Group, became interested in purchasing
Greenstone. Information was gathered by agents for the Hayes
Group in this regard.
8.
On November 10, 1993, one of the companies in the Hayes Group,
Pat Carson Bulldozing Limited, issued a letter of intent to Mr.
and Mrs. Cox in connection with a proposed purchase of the shares
of Greenstone .
9.
The purchase price proposed by Pat Carson Bulldozing Limited was
considered grossly inadequate by Mr. and Mrs. Cox and they
rejected the letter of intent and the proposal terminated.
The Dougan Offer
10.
In or about November, 1993, Mr. Cox received an unsolicited
expression of interest regarding the purchase of the shares of
Greenstone from Mr. Greg Dougan, the owner of Dougan Logging
Ltd.
11.
In late November and the first part of December 1993, financial
information regarding Greenstone was provided to Dougan Logging
Ltd. By a letter dated December 10, 1993 agents for Dougan
Logging Ltd. wrote to Mr. Huxham informing him that Dougan
Logging Ltd. wished to purchase the shares of Greenstone.
12.
On December 14, 1993, Dougan Logging Ltd. made an offer to
purchase the shares of Greenstone, which offer was accepted by
the Coxes hereto. A $50,000 deposit was made to secure the
offer.
13.
Subsequent discussions with Dougan Logging Ltd. revealed that it
did not have the financial wherewithal to complete the purchase
and discussions were terminated. The initial deposit was returned
on January 28, 1994.
The Reorganization
14.
By a letter dated December 10, 1993, Mr. Huxham, on behalf
of Mr. Cox, informed Greenstone's solicitor, Mr. Brian
Stamp, that a reorganization of Greenstone was to proceed.
15.
One of the steps in the reorganization outlined in Mr.
Huxham's letter (Tab E) was the redemption of certain
shares in Greenstone held by the Appellant. The Appellant
received certain assets of Greenstone as in specie
proceeds of redemption on these shares. As a result of this
redemption of the Greenstone shares, the intended result was that
the Appellant would be deemed by section 84(3) of the
Income Tax Act (the "Act") to have
received a dividend in the amount of $756,525 (the
"Dividend"), being the difference between the amount of
the in specie proceeds of redemption and the paid-up
capital of the shares redeemed.
16.
Further, it was intended that the Dividend would be received by
the Appellant free of tax as an intercorporate dividend
deductible under subsection 112(1) of the Act.
17.
Mr. Huxham was aware of the possible implications of subsection
55(2) of the Act, which, in certain circumstances, will
recharacterize an intercorporate dividend as proceeds of
disposition of a share giving rise to a capital gain.
18.
Mr. Huxham concluded that subsection 55(2) of the Act
would not apply to that portion of the Dividend paid to the
Appellant which was paid out of "income earned or realized
by [Greenstone] after 1971" (the so called, "safe
income" of Greestone). Mr. Huxham concluded that because the
total safe income of Greenstone was greater than the Dividend,
subsection 55(2) would not apply to recharacterize any portion of
the Dividend as proceeds of disposition of the Greenstone
shares.
19.
Mr. Cox was sufficiently concerned about the magnitude of the
dollars involved in the reorganization that he asked Mr. Huxham
to obtain a second opinion on the tax efficacy of the
transaction.
20.
Mr. Huxham consulted a tax lawyer, Mr. William Ruskin of Clark,
Wilson Barristers & Solicitors to seek confirmation of his
advice. In a letter dated December 21, 1993, Mr. Ruskin confirmed
Mr. Huxham's advice that because the amount of the Dividend
was less than the total amount of Greenstone's safe income,
subsection 55(2) of the Act would not apply to
recharacterize the Dividend as proceeds of disposition of the
Greenstone shares.
21.
Mr. Huxham revised his instructions to Mr. Stamp in a letter
dated December 23, 1993. The revision related solely to the fair
market value of the Greenstone shares. Mr. Huxham concluded that
the fair market value determined by the arm's length offer
from Dougan Loggins Ltd. was a better gauge of fair market value
than his previous estimate.
22.
Based on the instruction letter of December 10, 1993 (Tab E), as
modified by the letter of December 23, 1993 (Tab G), Mr. Stamp
prepared the necessary corporate documents to complete the
reorganization.
23.
All documents were drafted by Mr. Stamp prior to December 31,
1993 in accordance with the instructions provided by Mr. Huxham
with effect from December 30 and 31, 1993.
24.
Certain documents, including special resolutions of the Appellant
and Greenstone filed with the British Columbia Registrar of
Companies on December 15, 1993 and December 17, 1993 respectively
were signed in December, 1993. Other documents were not actually
signed until January 11, 1994 when Mr. and Mrs. Cox returned
from vacation.
The Olsen Sale
25. A
letter of intent from the Olsen Group proposing to purchase the
shares of Greenstone was issued to the shareholders of Greenstone
on February 10, 1994.
26.
After a period of due diligence, a Memorandum of Understanding
dated February 21, 1994 was executed among T. Olsen, K. Olsen, D.
Cox and A. Cox.
27.
Under a share purchase agreement made the 8th day of April, 1994,
all of the issued and outstanding shares of Greenstone were sold
by Mr. and Mrs. Cox to 392896 B.C. Ltd. The shareholders of
392896 B.C. Ltd. were, directly or indirectly, Thomas G. Olsen
and I. Keith Olsen, all of whom dealt at arm's length with
Mr. and Mrs. Cox, Greenstone and the Appellant.
The Reassessments
28.
Based on the advice provided by Mr. Huxham and Mr. Ruskin, the
Appellant filed its 1994 T2 corporate income tax return
indicating that the Dividend was an intercorporate dividend
includable in income under subsections 82(1) and 84(3) of the
Act but deductible under subsection 112(1) of the
Act.
29.
By a Notice of Reassessment dated July 27, 1998, the Minister of
National Revenue reassessed the Appellant to tax by adding
$323,245 to the income of the Appellant. This amount was
calculated as:
Deemed
Dividend
$756,525
Less: pro rata safe income attributable to
the Greenstone shares transferred to the
Appellant $325,532
Deemed proceeds of disposition per s.
55(2)
$430,993
Taxable capital gain
(75%)
$323,245
30.
The Appellant accepts for purposes of this litigation that the
safe income of Greenstone is attributable pro rata to each
Greenstone share. Hence, only $325,532 of the Dividend is
attributable to safe income in respect of the Greenstone shares
acquired by the Appellant and redeemed by Greenstone.
In addition, Mr. Cox and Mr. Donald Hayes gave evidence for
the Appellant, and both counsel read in parts of the examinations
for discovery.
[3]
The following provisions of the Act are relevant:
55(2) Where a corporation
resident in Canada has after April 21, 1980 received a taxable
dividend in respect of which it is entitled to a deduction under
subsection 112(1) or 138(6) as part of a transaction or event or
a series of transactions or events (other than as part of a
series of transactions or events that commenced before April 22,
1980), one of the purposes of which (or, in the case of a
dividend under subsection 84(3), one of the results of
which) was to effect a significant reduction in the portion of
the capital gain that, but for the dividend, would have been
realized on a disposition at fair market value of any share of
capital stock immediately before the dividend and that could
reasonably be considered to be attributable to anything other
than income earned or realized by any corporation after 1971 and
before the transaction or event or the commencement of the series
of transactions or events referred to in paragraph (3)(a),
notwithstanding any other section of this Act, the amount
of the dividend (other than the portion thereof, if any, subject
to tax under Part IV that is not refunded as a consequence of the
payment of a dividend to a corporation where the payment is part
of the series of transactions or events)
(a)
shall be deemed not to be a dividend received by the
corporation;
(b)
where a corporation has disposed of the share, shall be deemed to
be proceeds of disposition of the share except to the extent that
it is otherwise included in computing such proceeds; and
(c)
where a corporation has not disposed of the share, shall be
deemed to be a gain of the corporation for the year in which the
dividend was received from the disposition of a capital
property.
55(3) Subsection (2) does
not apply to any dividend received by a corporation,
(a)
unless such dividend was received as part of a transaction or
event or a series of transactions or events that resulted in
(i) a disposition of any property to a person with whom that
corporation was dealing at arm's length, or
(ii) a significant increase in the interest in any corporation of
any person with whom the corporation that received the dividend
was dealing at arm's length; or
...
248(10) For the purposes of this Act, where
there is a reference to a series of transactions or events, the
series shall be deemed to include hany related transactions or
events completed in contemplation of the series.
[4]
In written argument filed at the hearing, counsel for the
Appellant framed the issue this way:
The Appellant agrees that if the dividend it was deemed by
subsection 84(3) of the Act to have received on the
redemption of the Greenstone shares is "part of a
transaction or event or series of transactions or events"
that includes the disposition of the Greenstone shares by Mr. and
Mrs. Cox to 392896 B.C. Ltd., then subsection 55(2) of the
Act applies and this appeal fails.
Counsel for the Appellant has stated his position succinctly
in paragraph 12 of his written argument:
The Appellant's argument is simple. The December 31, 1993
reorganization giving rise to the deemed dividend cannot be part
of a series of transactions or events resulting in the sale of
the shares of Greenstone to 392896 B.C. Ltd. because the Coxes
could not possibly have contemplated that particular sale of
shares. They were not actively selling the company, they did not
know with any degree of certainty there would be a sale, they did
not know of the purchaser's existence, the purchase price or
anything concrete to do with a potential sale. All the Coxes knew
is that if a potential purchaser did appear, they would be
willing to discuss a sale with that party. The transaction lacked
the degree of interconnection and interdependence required by the
relevant jurisprudence to be considered a series of
transactions.
[5]
In 454538 Ontario Limited and 454539 Ontario Limited v.
M.N.R.,[1]
Sarchuk J. had to consider the meaning of the expression
"series of transactions or events" as it appears in
subsection 55(2) of the Act. The Appellant, attempting to
bring itself within the grandfather provision in the subsection,
took the position that disagreements and hostility among three
shareholders occurring in the period between 1975 and 1979 formed
part of a series of events which culminated in a reorganization
and sale of the business in 1980. Sarchuk J. noted the lack of a
nexus between the events of the 1970s and the later
reorganization and sale of shares, and held that they were not a
series of transactions or events beginning prior to April 1980.
In reaching this conclusion, he said:[2]
The evidence adduced on behalf of the appellant fails to
establish a reasonable nexus between the impugned transaction and
any event or transaction which took place prior to April 22,
1980. There was no serious intention on the part of the Mazzoccas
to dispose of their interests in Tri-M prior to late summer and
fall of 1980. Romantino's testimony made it clear that he and
his brother were bent on retaining their interest and this is
confirmed by D'Angela's understanding of what Romantino
and Mauro were endeavouring to obtain from Brunner. He described
his instructions in September 1980 as:
I think the first was to see whether - the Mazzoccas did
not really want to sell their interest. They would have preferred
to find someone that would have just taken over Manley's
interest and eliminate the problem, the animosity and the
mistrust that had existed. They just wanted to change
partners.
Counsel for the appellant contended that Robertson's
comments, and thus the Department's position, were premised
on the assumption that, where the transactions giving rise to the
reduction in capital gains were contemplated then the
transactions or events occurring at that preliminary stage would
form part of the series of transactions or events. He argued that
the appellant met this test. I do not agree. The transaction
contemplated by subsection 55(2) is the disposition at fair
market value of a share of capital stock as a result of which the
corporation received a taxable dividend in respect of which it
was entitled to a deduction under subsection 112(1) or subsection
138(6) of the Act. It is difficult if not impossible to
point to one single item of evidence which supports the existence
in the minds of the Mazzoccas or their corporations of such
"contemplation" prior to April 22, 1980. A generalized
desire to rid oneself of a problem is an insufficient base upon
which one can make the quantum leap to the conclusion sought.
The phrase "series of transactions or events" must be
read in its grammatical and ordinary sense reflecting the context
in which it is found, the scheme and object of the Act and
the intention of Parliament. Bearing this stricture in mind it
seems reasonable to conclude that in order for the events to form
part of a series they must follow each other in time and must
somehow be logically or reasonably connected to one another.
Furthermore the appellant and 539 themselves must intend that the
series of transactions be linked together to achieve the specific
result in this case being the disposition of the shares of
Tri-M to 461 in the circumstances and in the manner
previously described. This approach is consistent with the
dictionary definitions of the words, "series",
"transaction" and "event".
This passage has since been quoted with approval by Cullen J.
in C.P.L. Holdings Ltd. v. Canada,[3] and by Archambault J. in
Industries S.L.M. Inc. v. M.N.R.[4]
[6]
In Industries S.L.M., Archambault J. examined dictionary
definitions in both French and English, as well as the academic
literature, in his consideration of the meaning of the expression
"series of transactions or events". He also considered
the purpose of the legislation, and said:[5]
... This subsection is an anti-avoidance provision
designed to prevent an artificial or undue reduction of the
capital gain that a taxpayer would have realized if he had simply
sold his shares at their fair market value. ...
Having regard to these objectives of subsection 55(2), what scope
can be given to the expression "series of transactions"
and when did this series of transactions commence? In my view,
the expression series of transactions must have a meaning that is
sufficiently broad to enable tax authorities to prevent an
artificial or undue reduction, but that, at the same time, is as
narrow as possible so as not to penalize a taxpayer needlessly.
...
[7]
Counsel for the Appellant placed great reliance on the judgment
of this Court in Meager Creek Holdings Limited v. The
Queen.[6] In
that case the Crown argued that a dividend declared in February
1990 and a sale of shares which took place the following December
were a series of transactions or events for the purposes of
subsection 55(2) of the Act. In rejecting this contention
O'Connor J. said:[7]
[29] I accept the credibility of the witnesses for the
Appellant. All but Proctor were subjected to rigorous
cross-examinations and although certain inconsistencies were
shown, these were not in my opinion crucial. Witnesses Burridge,
Pickering and Harris were consistent in their position that it
was the budget which provoked the declaration of the dividends
and not any possibility of a sale with the resultant reduction in
the capital gain. The fact that 26 other companies in similar
situations as Meager, Tyee Pemberton and CRB, were advised by
Burridge immediately before the budget to declare dividends is a
strong indication that the purpose behind the declaration of
dividends was to avoid any distribution tax that the budget might
have contained rather than a desire to effect a reduction in a
capital gain on a disposition of shares.
[30] Moreover, I do not agree that a series of transactions or
events occurred. The dividends were declared in February, 1990
but the sale discussions only began in August, 1990 with the sale
of one-third of the shares of Tyee and Pemberton occurring
December 31, 1990. Admittedly Pickering in October, 1989
offered to sell his shares to Turner. However, this was related
to Pickering's health problems and was not indicative of a
contemplated sale of the business in whole or in part to any
prospective purchaser. Further, in my view, the French versions
of the subsections in question do not alter these
conclusions.
[31] Also, I cannot accept Respondent's argument that any
possible future sale can suffice to bring subsection 55(2)
into play. There must be a series of transactions or events
contemplated. To accept Respondent's argument could open the
door to the subsection being applied to almost any declaration of
inter-corporate dividends.
Meager Creekwas not a case in which the dividend arose
under subsection 84(3), and so the purpose of the series of
transactions or events, if there was a series, was crucial to the
result. O'Connor J.'s conclusion, in the passage that I
have quoted above, was that the evidence before him established
that the purpose behind the declaration of the dividend was to
pre-empt a possible taxing provision that might have been
included in a forthcoming budget, and not to reduce a possible
capital gain on a future disposition of shares. Having reached
that conclusion, it followed that there was no nexus to be found
between the dividend and the disposition some 10 months later. In
fact, there was no sale in contemplation until August, about six
months after the dividend was declared.
[8]
These authorities establish that for transactions or events to
comprise a series require that there be some nexus between them.
The determination must be driven largely by the facts of each
case, but it is relevant to consider proximity in time, as well
as purpose and result. However, as the present case deals with a
subsection 84(3) deemed dividend, it is not necessary that the
purpose include minimization of a capital gain, if that is the
result of the dividend. I agree with Archambault J. that while
care must be taken not to cast too wide a net, it is also
important to give the legislation a construction that will permit
it to achieve its anti-avoidance purpose.
[9]
Mr. Cox said in his evidence that by the summer of 1993
Greenstone, after some 20 years in the logging business, was
having a difficult time. Payments for equipment were causing cash
flow problems. The company's business was cutting timber for
MacMillan Bloedel on limits owned by MacMillan Bloedel, and that
company was becoming increasingly difficult to deal with. That
summer he was looking to refinance the Greenstone operation. Mr.
William Huxham updated the financial reports of the company and
in connection with that the company's equipment was appraised
by Mr. John Lloyd, a local logging equipment dealer.
[10] As well
as selling logging equipment, Mr. Lloyd also was involved in
brokering logging companies. Mr. Cox testified that he did not
make Mr. Lloyd his agent for the purpose of selling Greenstone.
However, they did discuss a sale of the company in the summer of
1993, and Mr. Lloyd introduced the Hayes Group to Mr. Cox at that
time. The negotiation with the Hayes Group broke down in November
1993, and in the same month Greg Dougan began negotiating with
Mr. Cox, and a deal was struck on December 14, or within a day or
two thereafter. There was a binding agreement for sale from
mid-December 1993 until late January 1994. On January 28, Mr. and
Mrs. Cox exercised their right to return the deposit and
terminate the contract, as Dougan Logging had been unable to
finance the purchase.
[11] Mr. Cox
testified that Mr. Huxham had advised him in either 1992 or early
1993, that the non-logging assets should be removed from
Greenstone, and that he had procrastinated in giving instructions
to do so. That procrastination ended in either late November or
early December, while the negotiations with Mr. Dougan were
taking place, and only a few days before a contract was signed.
Mr. Cox knew that there were tax-related reasons behind Mr.
Huxham's advice. In mid-December they sought advice from a
tax lawyer. The preparation and execution of the documents giving
effect to the reorganization took place between December 10, 1993
and January 11, 1994. There is no question that a sale of the
shares of Greenstone was in contemplation by Mr. and Mrs. Cox at
that time. Indeed, it must have been in the forefront of their
minds.
[12] When the
Dougan deal fell through in January, it was not long before
Mr. Lloyd contacted Mr. Cox to tell him of the interest of
Thomas and Keith Olsen, who in fact, through a corporation,
became the purchasers. The Olsens visited Mr. Cox within three or
four days of the return of the Dougan deposit, and they delivered
a letter of intent by February 10, less than a month after the
execution of the last of the reorganization documents.
[13] Although
Mr. Cox denied having contracted with Mr. Lloyd to find a buyer
for Greenstone, he admitted that Greenstone paid Mr. Lloyd a fee
of about $35,000, the amount of which he and Lloyd negotiated. It
is significant that Mr. Lloyd did not testify. I draw the
inference that Mr. and Mrs. Cox had decided to sell Greenstone in
the summer of 1993, if not earlier, that Mr. Lloyd knew that, and
that he was at least informally acting on their behalf to find a
buyer. A sale of Greenstone was undoubtedly within the
contemplation of Mr. and Mrs. Cox from July 1993 until the actual
sale took place in April 1994.
[14] The
actual transactions which gave rise to the subsection 84(3)
deemed dividend were a sale by Mr. and Mrs. Cox of shares in
Greenstone to Granite Bay, and the redemption of those shares by
Greenstone for a conveyance to Granite Bay of its non-logging
assets. The agreements to sell the shares and the corporate
resolutions are all dated December 31, 1993; they may have been
executed as late as January 11, 1994. In either event, there was
an agreement in place at the time between Mr. and Mrs. Cox and
Dougan Logging for the sale of all the outstanding shares of
Greenstone. The dividend had prepared Greenstone for sale by
removing from it the non-logging assets. There can be no doubt
that if the Dougan sale had been completed, it would have been
the culmination of a series of events within subsection 55(2). If
Dougan Logging had assigned its rights under the December 1993
agreement to another purchaser and it had completed the sale, it
would have come within subsection 55(2). In my view, a change in
the identity of the purchaser, where the intention to sell
remained intact throughout and the hiatus is as short as this
one, cannot divorce the share redemption from the subsequent sale
of the Cox shares.
[15] Counsel
for the Appellant placed great emphasis on the passage which I
have quoted from the judgment of O'Connor J. in the Meager
Creek case, and, in particular, his rejection of the
proposition that " ... any possible future sale can
suffice to bring subsection 55(2) into play."[8] However, it is clear
from the latter part of that pararaph that O'Connor J. was
only concerned not to give subsection 55(2) an
interpretation so expansive that it would embrace future sales
not yet in contemplation. In this he echoed the concern expressed
earlier by Sarchuk J. in 454538 Ontario Ltd., and by
Archambault J. in Industries S.L.M. Inc. However, the
facts of this case are at the other end of the spectrum; to
conclude that no nexus existed between the corporate
reorganization and the redemption of the Greenstone shares in
December or January and the sale of the Cox shares in February
would be to ignore the obvious tax-avoidance purpose of
subsection 55(2), as well as the words of subsection
248(10).
[16] Counsel
also argued that the decisions of the House of Lords[9] in the step transaction
cases support the notion that the transactions should not be
considered to be a series unless the identity of the final
purchaser was known throughout. The step transaction doctrine was
developed in England as a common law remedy to counter tax
avoidance schemes which were developed in a legislative vacuum.
It is not surprising that the House of Lords limited the doctrine
to those situations where the transactions were pre-ordained. I
do not think that their reasoning in doing so should be applied
to limit unduly the efficacy of specific anti-avoidance
legislation.
[17] The
appeal is dismissed. The Respondent is entitled to costs.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 12th day of June, 2001.
"E.A. Bowie"
J.T.C.C.
COURT FILE
NO.:
98-2524(IT)G
STYLE OF
CAUSE:
Granite Bay Charters Ltd. and
Her Majesty the Queen
PLACE OF
HEARING:
Vancouver, British Columbia
DATE OF
HEARING:
July 4 and 5, 2000
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY: The
Honourable Judge E.A Bowie
DATE OF
JUDGMENT:
June 12, 2001
APPEARANCES:
Counsel for the Appellant: Douglas H. Mathew
Counsel for the
Respondent:
Robert Carvalho
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For the
Appellant:
Name:
Douglas H. Mathew
Firm:
Thorsteinssons
For the
Respondent:
Morris Rosenberg
Deputy Attorney General of Canada
Ottawa, Canada
98-2524(IT)G
BETWEEN:
GRANITE BAY CHARTERS LTD.,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Appeal heard on July 4 and 5, 2000, at
Vancouver, British Columbia, by
the Honourable Judge E.A. Bowie
Appearances
Counsel for the
Appellant:
Douglas H. Mathew
Counsel for the Respondent: Robert
Carvalho
JUDGMENT
The
appeal from the assessment of tax made under the Income Tax
Act for the 1994 taxation year is dismissed, with costs.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 12th day of June, 2001.
J.T.C.C.
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