Neutral citation: 2001 FCA 264
CORAM: DESJARDINS J.A.
COMMISSION SCOLAIRE DES CHÊNES
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
Hearing held at Montréal, Quebec, on September 12, 2001
Judgment delivered at Ottawa, Ontario, on October 17, 2001.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF: NOËL J.A.
CONCURRED IN BY: DESJARDINS J.A.
Neutral citation: 2001 FCA 264
CORAM: DESJARDINS J.A.
COMMISSION SCOLAIRE DES CHÊNES
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
 This is an appeal from a decision of Judge Lamarre Proulx (reported at  T.C.J. No. 71 (Q.L.)) in which she confirmed a notice of assessment that was issued by the Minister of National Revenue (the "Minister"), under Part IX of the Excise Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15 (the "Act") for the period from May 1, 1992 to May 31, 1996. In that notice of assessment, the Minister denied the input tax credits ("ITCs") claimed by the appellant for the goods and services tax ("GST") paid in relation to its student transportation services.
 The relevant facts are set out in the agreed statement of facts filed before Judge Lamarre Proulx and reproduced in her reasons. In short, the appellant, along with a number of other school boards, provides school bus transportation under contracts that are negotiated with independent carriers. The funds used to pay the consideration set out in the transportation contracts come from a subsidy paid to the appellant by the Minister of Transport of Quebec, and the students do not pay anything for the regular service.
 That subsidy is granted under statutory authority pursuant to the "Règles budgétaires des transports concernant le transport des élèves" [student transportation budgetary rules] (the "Budgetary Rules"), which provide for the Minister of Transportation to establish a resource envelope for a three-year period. The resource envelopes are communicated to the appellant who then signs contracts with the school bus operators.
 Any surplus or deficit resulting from the difference between the amount of the subsidy and the amount of the consideration stipulated in the transportation contract is retained or covered, as the case may be, by the appellant, except for the period preceding the 1994-1995 fiscal year during which surpluses were to be shared with the Minister of Transportation in accordance with a predetermined formula. Where a surplus is realized, the appellant is free to transfer the money to other budget items.
 The appellant paid the GST payable under the Act, on the payments it made to the school bus companies. Since July 1, 1992, it has claimed and received, as a public body, a partial rebate of the GST paid to the independent carriers. In its GST return for the period ending May 31, 1996, the appellant claimed ITCs of $505,273.42 representing the difference between the GST paid to the carriers since July 1, 1992, and the amounts that were refunded to it as a public body under section 259 of the Act.
 The Minister refused to pay the additional ITCs claimed by the appellant on the ground that it is the appellant that provides the school bus service and that its own students are the recipients of that service within the meaning of section 123, which makes the supply an "exempt supply" under section 5 of Part III of Schedule V to the Act.
 Those provisions read as follows:
Excise Tax Act
123(1) "recipient" of a supply of property or a service means
(a) where consideration for the supply is payable under an agreement for the supply, the person who is liable under the agreement to pay that consideration,
(b) where paragraph (a) does not apply and consideration is payable for the supply, the person who is liable to pay that consideration, and
a) Personne qui est tenue, aux termes d'une convention portant sur une fourniture, de payer la contrepartie de la fourniture;
b) personne qui est tenue, autrement qu'aux termes d'une convention portant sur une fourniture, de payer la contrepartie de la fourniture;
(c) where no consideration is payable for the supply,
(i) in the case of a supply of property by way of sale, the person to whom the property is delivered or made available,
(ii) in the case of a supply of property otherwise than by way of sale, the person to whom made available, and
(iii) in the case of a supply of a service, the person to whom the service is rendered, and any reference to a person to whom a supply is made shall be read as a reference to the recipient of the supply.
c) si nulle contrepartie n'est payable pour une fourniture:
(i) personne à qui un bien, fourni par vente, est livré ou mis à sa disposition,
(ii) personne à qui la possession ou l'utilisation d'un bien, fourni autrement que par vente, est transférée ou à la disposition de qui le bien est mis,
(iii) personne à qui un service est rendu
Par ailleurs, la mention d'une personne au profit de laquelle une fourniture est effectuée vaut mention de l'acquéreur de la fourniture.
123(1) "Exempt supply" means a supply included in Schedule V.
123(1) "Fourniture exonérée". - Fourniture figurant à l'annexe V.
Schedule V. Annexe V.
5. A supply made by a school authority to elementary or secondary school students of a service of transporting the students to or from a school that is operated by a school authority.
5. La fourniture, effectuée par une administration scolaire au profit d'un élève du primaire ou du secondaire, d'un service consistant à assurer le transport de l'élève entre un point donné et une école administrée par une administration scolaire.
 The following definitions should also be noted:
123(1) "Consideration" includes any amount that is payable for a supply by operation of law;
123(1) "Contrepartie" Est assimilé à une contrepartie tout montant qui, par effet de la loi, est payable pour une fourniture.
123(1) "Taxable supply" means a supply that is made in the course of a commercial activity;
123(1) "Fourniture taxable" fourniture effectuée dans le cadre d'une activité commerciale.
123(1) "Commercial activity" of a person means
(a) a business carried on by the person (other than a business carried on without a reasonable expectation of profit by an individual, a personal trust or a partnership, all of the members of which are individuals), except to the extent to which the business involves the making of exempt supplies by the person,
(b) an adventure or concern of the person in the nature of trade (other than an adventure or concern engaged in without a reasonable expectation of profit by an individual, a personal trust or a partnership, all of the members of which are individuals), except to the extent to which the adventure or concern involves the making of exempt supplies by the person, and
123 (1) "Activité commerciale" constitue des activités commerciales exercées par une personne :
a) l'exploitation d'une entreprise (à l'exception d'une entreprise exploitée sans attente raisonnable de profit par un particulier, une fiducie personnelle ou une société de personnes dont l'ensemble des associés sont des particuliers), sauf dans la mesure ou l'entreprise comporte la réalisation par la personne de fournitures exonérées;
b) les projets à risque et les affaires de caractère commercial (à l'exception de quelque projet ou affaire qu'entreprend, sans attente raisonnable de profit, un particulier, une fiducie personnelle ou une société de personnes dont l'ensemble des associés sont des particuliers), sauf dans la mesure ou le projet ou l'affaire comporte la réalisation par la personne de fournitures exonérées;
Decision under appeal
 The judge of the Tax Court of Canada concluded that the subsidy paid to the appellant for student transportation did not constitute consideration for that service since there was no direct link between the payment of the subsidy and the supply of the transportation service. The students are therefore the recipients of that service within the meaning of subsection 123(1) of the Act since they are the ones for whom the service is rendered and no consideration is payable for the supply of that service.
 The crux of the reasons of the decision under appeal is found at paragraph 32:
The consideration for the supply of services is the price the customer is required to pay. (In this respect, we come back to what is stated in the Vat Monitor article cited above.) The evidence did not show that the subsidy provided by the Department of Education was linked to the price of the transportation service. On the contrary, the evidence revealed that the Department had no obligation with respect to the actual cost of the student transportation service, that the school boards had broad latitude with respect to the use of the funds allocated for such transportation and that there was no link between the payment of the subsidy and the actual cost of the service. The subsidy is in the nature of financial assistance made available to the school board to enable it to perform one of its tasks, that is, to provide a student transportation service. It is not in the nature of a payment of the price of a service. Therefore no consideration is paid for this service. The recipient of the supply of the service is thus the elementary or secondary school student for whom the service is rendered as described in section 5, Part III, Schedule V of the Act.
 Both parties agreed that if the subsidy does not constitute consideration within the meaning of the Act, the students are the recipients of the transportation service, under subparagraph 123(1)(c)(iii), and the supply is therefore exempt under section 5 of Schedule V to the Act. Since an exempt supply is excluded from the definition of commercial activity, and only a supply made in the course of a commercial activity can entitle the supplier to an ITC, the appellant would not be entitled to the ITCs claimed.
 However, if the subsidy constitutes consideration, it is the Minister of Transportation who is the recipient of the transportation service within the meaning of paragraph 123(1)(b), and so the supply of that service falls within the commercial activities of the appellant and it would be entitled to the ITCs. We might note that apart from the exclusion regarding exempt supplies on which she relies, the respondent did not question the fact that the supply of the transportation service by the appellant falls within its commercial activities.
 The issue is therefore limited to whether the Tax Court judge could have concluded that the subsidy was not consideration within the meaning of the Act.
Positions of the parties
 The appellant argued that the evidence established that the Minister of Transportation had an obligation to pay the subsidy and that the appellant, in return, was required to provide the student transportation service. In light of that evidence, the trial judge could not have concluded otherwise than that there was consideration, and she was wrong to have required a direct link between the actual cost of the student transportation and the amount of the subsidy. That requirement is nowhere to be found in the Act..
 The respondent pointed out that services supplied in the public interest, like the services in this case, do not generally involve consideration. In this case, the Minister of Transportation did not receive anything in return for the subsidy and does not benefit from it in any way. Moreover, the subsidy may be used for purposes other than student transportation. The respondent submits that the trial judge instructed herself correctly on the law when she concluded that the subsidy does not constitute consideration within the meaning of the Act.
Analysis and decision
 Before proceeding with the actual analysis, two comments must be made. First, the evidence before the Tax Court of Canada established that the student transportation funding was transferred from the ministère des Transports to the ministère de l'Éducation some unspecified time (transcripts, Volume IV, page 59). The trial judge concluded, as may be seen in paragraph 32 of her reasons, that it was the Minister of Education who had paid the subsidy. The relevant statutory provisions establish that only the Minister of Transportation had the authority to pay subsidies for transportation and to administer the student transportation funding during the period in issue. For some reason that I cannot explain, counsel did not see fit to place before the trial judge the legislation as it read between May 1992 and May 1996.
 Second, at paragraph 16 of her reasons and without disposing of the question, the trial judge referred to the testimony of an employee with the ministère de l'Éducation, which might suggest that the appellant, as a school board, was not required to comply with the requirements governing the granting of the subsidy. In response to a specific question on that point, counsel for the respondent told this Court that the issue here had to be analyzed on the assumption that the statutory and regulatory requirements had to be complied with. That is what I propose to do.
 Consideration under the Act is easily discernable when the obligation to pay arises under a contract. It is more difficult to identify when the obligation to pay arises from a source other than a contract, as contemplated in paragraph (b) of the definition of the term "recipient" in section 123. It is that difficulty that lead to the requirement of a "direct link" recommended by Technical Interpretation Bulletin B-067 regarding the "goods and services tax treatment of grants and subsidies" ("Bulletin B-067"). In this case, the judge below concluded that there was no such link.
 Under the Act, in order for a payment to constitute consideration, it must have been made pursuant to a legal obligation (contractual or otherwise) and must be closely enough linked to a supply that it may be regarded as having been made "for" that supply (see the definition of the term "consideration" in section 123). That is why a direct link is required.
 A payment made under a contract will inevitably meet that requirement since the very existence of the obligation to pay is conditional on the co-contracting party fulfilling the corresponding obligation that rests on him or her. However, when the payment is made otherwise than under a contract, the purpose of the payment and the circumstances in which it is made must be carefully analyzed to determine whether there is a direct link with the supply; a payment will constitute consideration only where it is made "for" or in return for that supply.
 In the case at bar, that analysis must be made having regard, most importantly, to the relevant statutory provisions, since the subsidy was paid and the student transportation provided under statutory authority. The relevant provisions that were applicable at that time are reproduced below:
Transport Act, R.S.Q. 1977, c. T-12 (hereinafter the "Transport Act")
4. The Minister may grant subsidies for transport purposes.
He may also cause a person designated by him to examine the use made of the subsidies he pays and the nature of the expenses connected with those subsidies.
He may withhold, cancel or reduce the amount of all or part of the subsidies of a recipient who does not comply with a requirement or a condition established for the granting of subsidies. 1972, c. 55, s. 4.;1981, c. 26, s. 1.;1986, c. 67, s. 2.; 1989, c. 20, s. 6.
4. Le ministre peut accorder des subventions pour fins de transport.
Il peut aussi faire vérifier par une personne qu'il désigne l'utilisation des subventions qu'il verse et la nature des dépenses reliées à ces subventions.
Il peut retenir, annuler ou diminuer le montant de tout ou partie des subventions d'un bénéficiaire qui ne respecte pas une condition ou une modalité établie pour l'attribution d'une subvention. 1972, c. 55, a. 4.;1981, c. 26, a. 1.;1986, c. 67, a. 2.;1989, c. 20, a. 6.
Education Act, R.S.Q. 1977, c. I-14 (hereinafter the "Education Act")
291. A school board may, with the authorization of the Minister of Transport, provide transportation for all or part of its students. 1988, c. 84, s. 291
292. Student transportation provided by a school board before the beginning of classes and after the end of classes each day is free of charge.1988, c. 84, s. 292.;1990, c. 78, s. 9.
291. Une commission scolaire peut, avec l'autorisation du ministre des Transports, organiser le transport de tout ou partie de ses élèves. 1988, c. 84, a. 291.
292. Le transport des élèves organisé par une commission scolaire, pour l'entrée et la sortie quotidienne des classes, est gratuit. 1988, c. 84, a. 292.;1990, c. 78, a. 9.
300. Each year, the Minister of Transport shall establish, after consultation with the Minister of Education, and submit to the Conseil du trésor, for approval, budgetary rules to determine the amount of subsidies granted to school boards providing student transportation.
The budgetary rules may provide that subsidies may be granted on the basis of general standards applicable to all students using student transportation or on the basis of special rules applicable to certain students.
300. Le ministre des Transports établit annuellement, après consultation du ministre de l'Éducation, et soumet à l'approbation du Conseil du trésor des règles budgétaires pour déterminer les montants des subventions allouées aux commissions scolaires qui organisent le transport des élèves.
Les règles budgétaires peuvent prévoir que l'allocation d'une subvention peut être faite sur la base de normes générales visant tous les élèves transportés ou sur la base de normes particulières ne visant que certains d'entre eux.
The budgetary rules may provide that the grant of a subsidy may be subject to general conditions applicable to all school boards or to special conditions applicable to one school board or to certain school boards.
The budgetary rules may also provide that the grant of a subsidy may be subject to authorization by the Minister of Transport or that it can only be made to one school board or to certain school boards.
Les règles budgétaires peuvent prévoir que l'allocation d'une subvention peut être assujettie à des conditions générales applicables à toutes les commissions scolaires ou à des conditions particulières applicables à une ou à certaines d'entre elles.
Les règles budgétaires peuvent aussi prévoir que l'allocation d'une subvention peut être assujettie à l'autorisation du ministre des Transports ou qu'elle peut n'être faite qu'à une ou à certaines commissions scolaires.
Every school board shall provide the Minister of Transport with any information he may request for purposes of subsidies at such time and in such form as he prescribes.
A school board which entrusts the transportation of its students to another school board is not deemed to provide student transportation for the purposes of this section. 1988, c. 84, s. 300.;1990, c. 78, s. 10.;1991, c. 27, s. 8.;1993, c. 51, s. 72.;1994, c. 16, s. 50.
La commission scolaire fournit au ministre des Transports les renseignements qu'il demande aux fins des subventions, à l'époque et dans la forme qu'il détermine.
La commission scolaire qui confie le transport de ses élèves à une autre commission scolaire n'est pas réputée organiser le transport de ces élèves aux fins du présent article. 1988, c. 84, a. 300.;1990, c. 78, a. 10.;1991, c. 27, a. 8.;1993, c. 51, a. 72.;1994, c. 16, a. 50
301. The Minister of Transport may withhold or cancel all or part of a subsidy for student transportation where a provision of this Act or of the regulation under section 453 or 454 is not complied with. 1988, c. 84, s. 301.
301. Le ministre des Transports peut retenir ou annuler tout ou partie du montant de toute subvention au transport des élèves lorsque l'une des dispositions de la présente loi relativement au transport des élèves ou d'un règlement pris en vertu de l'article 453 ou 454 n'est pas respectée. 1988, c. 84, a. 301.
 It is also worth referring to the Budgetary Rules established under section 300 of the Education Act. Those rules read in part as follows:
1.2.1 Base allocation
The purpose of the base allocation is to cover the following transportation costs:
- daily transportation of students, that is, one return trip for students, before the beginning and after the end of classes;
Subject to the recurring or non-recurring adjustments under these budgetary rules, and more particularly the non-recurring adjustment provided in subsection 5.4.3, the base allocation and supplementary allocation paid by the Minister of Transport to an authorized board shall be transferable among themselves and to budgetary items other than student transportation.
5.2.3 Interruption of service attributable to the school board or subsidized institution
Where school transportation is interrupted, in whole or in part, as a result of a cause attributable to an authorized commission or subsidized institution, the Minister of Transport shall make an adjustment.
The adjustment shall be for the total amount of the base allocation of the authorized board or subsidized institution, except with respect to the portion of that allocation that is attributable to the integrated transportation service.
Moreover, in the event of a partial interruption of services, the Minister of Transport shall make an adjustment, based on the same principles, proportionate to the services interrupted.
However, the Minister of Transport shall cancel an adjustment in whole or in part if the authorized board or subsidized institution makes up its classroom days in whole or in part.
 To constitute consideration, a payment must first have been made pursuant to an obligation. That is what is stated in the definition of the term "consideration", which refers to "... any amount that is payable ... by operation of law", and the definition of the term "recipient", which refers to "... the person who is liable under the agreement [or otherwise] to pay that consideration."
 In my view, there is no doubt as to the duty of the Minister of Transport to pay the subsidy. Under the Education Act, the appellant, as a school board, was entitled to provide transportation for its students (section 291), with the approval of the Minister of Transport, in which case it had to provide student transportation before the beginning of classes and after the end of classes each day free of charge (section 292). In this case, the evidence established that the appellant provided such transportation, and it therefore had to ensure that it was provided free of charge.
 Furthermore, since the Minister of Transport, by virtue of his authority to grant subsidies (section 4 of the Transport Act) and to determine the amounts to be used for student transportation (section 300 of the Education Act), authorized the student transportation and determined the resource envelope needed for that purpose, he obviously had an obligation to pay the subsidy. (Compare with the decision of the Quebec Superior Court in Conseil scolaire de l'Ile de Montréal v. P.G. du Québec et al., S.C.M. 500-05-013489-800 at page 35.) Counsel for the respondent, moreover, conceded that there was such an obligation at the hearing.
 As to the purpose of the subsidy, the Minister of Transportat has the authority to grant subsidies for transportation purposes only (section 4 of the Transport Act). The Minister of Transport therefore could not grant a subsidy for a purpose other than to enable the appellant to provide transportation for its students. Section 1.2.1 of the Budgetary Rules, moreover, specifies that the subsidy [TRANSLATION] "is intended to cover the costs of the daily transportation of the students, . . .". There can be no doubt as to either the purpose of the subsidy or the obligation to pay it.
 With respect to the link between the payment of the subsidy and the supply of the student transportation service by the appellant, section 4 of the Transport Act provides, first, that the Minister of Transport may examine the use made of the subsidy by the school board and cancel or reduce it in whole or in part if the school board does not comply with the conditions for the granting of the subsidy. Section 301 of the Education Act adds that the Minister of Transport may "withhold" or "cancel" all or part of a subsidy where the provisions of that Act or the regulations thereunder are not complied with. Furthermore, section 5.2.3 of the Budgetary Rules provides: [TRANSLATION] "When student transportation is interrupted, in whole or in part, for a cause attributable to an authorized board..., the Minister shall make an adjustment." That adjustment will be the total amount of the subsidy if the interruption is complete, or part of that amount if the interruption is partial.
 It is therefore apparent that the purpose of the subsidy is unequivocal and that the link with the supply in question is equally unequivocal; the service must be provided, failing which the subsidy may be cancelled. Given that this situation is outside the realm of contracts, it is difficult to imagine a more direct link between the payment and the supply of the student transportation service.
 The evidence before the Tax Court of Canada supported this conclusion. It established, for example, that the subsidy is payed according to a schedule of instalments that corresponds, by and large, with the times when the appellant is required to pay its carriers (see section 4.1 of the Budgetary Rules and the final portion of clause 25 of the model contract, Appeal Book, volume I, page 282). The evidence also established that the appellant accounts for the money by submitting copies of the contracts it signs with its carriers, as well as an annual report that provides an exhaustive statement of how the subsidy was used, to the Minister of Transport (transcripts, volume IV, pages 32-33 and TE-104 report, volume I, page 39). The respondent admitted, moreover, that at all material times, the appellant used the subsidy to provide the student transportation service. (Respondent's memorandum, paragraph 5).
 The trial judge seems to have placed undue weight on the fact that the subsidy constitutes a type of financial assistance paid in the public interest. Even though subsidies paid in the public interest are not generally associated with a corresponding obligation, that is not always the case. Regardless of the interest in question, a payment will be regarded as consideration if it is directly linked to the supply of a good or a service by the person who received the payment (on this point, see Bulletin B-067 at page 3). The respondent did not contest that statement (Respondent's memorandum, paragraph 40).
 The trial judge seems also to have found that the fact that the subsidy did not correspond to the actual cost of the service provided by the appellant. That dichotomy is not surprising since the subsidy was determined before the expenses that the appellant was seeking to cover were incurred. Nonetheless, consideration need not be equal to the cost of the good or service for which it is given, and in fact this is rarely the case. It is more important that the subsidy was determined based on the experience in previous years in order for the appellant to be able to fulfill its current obligations in relation to student transportation.
 Nor does the right to reallocate a surplus to other budgetary items, where there is a surplus, negate either the purpose of the subsidy or its link with the supply contemplated. First, the subsidy could have been paid for purposes other than transportation and it is only in relation to the difference between the amounts paid to the independent carriers and the amount of the subsidy that this reallocation could have occurred (paragraph 7 of the trial judge's reasons). Furthermore, the evidence established that this difference did not exceed five percent of the subsidy during the period in issue (transcripts, volume IV, pages 145-150). Consideration obviously does not stop being consideration simply because it exceeds the cost of the service it provides by five percent.
 Finally, it is incorrect to say that the Minister of Transport did not receive anything in return for the subsidy. Even though someone who pays a consideration is more often than not seeking a personal benefit, he or she may also be seeking to benefit someone else. In that case, the payment is just as much consideration (Bulletin B-067 at pages 3 and 4). In this case, what the Minister of Transport obtained from the appellant was that it would provide its students with the free transportation service. That is sufficient to make the subsidy consideration within the meaning of the Act.
 Before concluding, I note that after finding that the subsidy did not constitute consideration, the trial judge considered whether the supply could nonetheless have been exempt under section 5 of Schedule V (reasons for judgment, paragraph 33). Acknowledging that she was speaking obiter dictum, she answered that question in the negative essentially because the expression "a supply made by a school authority to ... students" (emphasis added) in section 5 of Schedule V relates only to the "recipient" of a supply as defined in subsection 123(1). I mention this additional conclusion by the trial judge only to point out that it was not contested by the respondent in this appeal.
 For these reasons, I would allow the appeal with costs in this Court and in the Tax Court of Canada, I would set aside the decision under appeal and I would refer the assessment back to the Minister of National Revenue for reassessment on the basis that the subsidy constituted the consideration for the supply of the student transportation service, subject to paragraph 18 of the agreed statement of facts filed with the Tax Court of Canada that reserves the right of the Minister of National Revenue to audit the amounts claimed for accuracy.
Alice Desjardins J.A.
Robert Décary J.A.
Certified True Translation
Sophie Debbané, LL.B.
Ottawa, Ontario, October 17, 2001
Coram: Desjardins J.A.
COMMISSION SCOLAIRE DES CHÊNES
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
The appeal is allowed with costs here and in the Tax Court of Canada, the decision under appeal is set aside and the assessment is referred back to the Minister of National Revenue for reassessment on the basis that the subsidy paid by the Minister of Transportation to the appellant constitutes the consideration for the supply of the student transportation service, subject to the right to audit that was reserved by the respondent pursuant to paragraph 18 of the agreed statement of facts filed with the Tax Court of Canada.
Certified True Translation
Sophie Debbané, LL.B.
FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL
NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD
COURT FILE NO.: A-139-00
STYLE OF CAUSE:
COMMISSION SCOLAIRE DES CHÊNES
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
PLACE OF HEARING: MONTRÉAL, QUEBEC
DATE OF HEARING: SEPTEMBER 12, 2001
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF: Noël J.A.
CONCURRED IN BY: Desjardins J.A.
DATED: OCTOBER 17, 2001
Yves St-Cyr FOR THE APPELLANT
Benoît Denis FOR THE RESPONDENT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
Lavery, de Billy
Montréal, Quebec FOR THE APPELLANT
Veillette & Associés
Montréal, Quebec FOR THE RESPONDENT