Hugessen
J.T.C.C.:
—
The
Appellant
maintained
horses
which
he
raced.
He
argues
that
this
resulted
in
his
having
two
separate
sources
of
business
income:
the
maintenance
of
horses
for
racing
and
racing
itself.
Of
these,
only
the
former
would
fall
within
the
extended
definition
of
“farming”
in
section
248:
248(1)
Definitions
—
In
this
Act,
..“Farming”
—
“farming”
includes
tillage
of
the
soil,
livestock
raising
or
exhibiting,
maintaining
of
horses
for
racing,
raising
of
poultry,
fur
farming,
dairy
farming,
fruit
growing
and
the
keeping
of
bees,
but
does
not
include
an
office
or
employment
under
a
person
engaged
in
the
business
of
farming;
The
Appellant’s
argument
cannot
be
reconciled
with
this
Court’s
decision
in
Juster
v.
R.
sub
nom.
Juster
v.
The
Queen,
[1974]
C.T.C.
681,
74
D.T.C.
6540
(F.C.A.)
and,
in
particular,
with
the
words
of
Jackett
C.J.
at
page
6542
that
the
definition
envisages
“the
business
of
the
businessman
engaged
in
racing”.
We
are
not
persuaded
that
Juster
was
wrongly
decided.
Clearly
the
Appellant
was
not
engaged
in
two
businesses
but
in
one,
which
the
Tax
Court
judge
correctly
described
as
an
“undivided
entity”.
The
appeal
will
be
dismissed
with
costs.
Appeal
dismissed.
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