Docket:
A-280-13
Citation: 2014 FCA 265
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CORAM:
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NOËL C.J.
STRATAS J.A.
NEAR J.A.
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BETWEEN:
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HUMANICS INSTITUTE
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Appellant
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and
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THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL REVENUE
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Respondent
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REASONS FOR
JUDGMENT
NOËL C.J.
[1]
This is an appeal brought pursuant to subsection
172(3) of the Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.) (the Act)
from a decision by the Minister of National Revenue (the Minister) confirming a
decision by the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) denying the appellant’s application
to be registered as a charity under the Act.
[2]
The Minister denied the appellant’s application
on the basis it had not demonstrated, as required under subsection 149.1(1),
that all its resources were devoted to charitable activities carried on by the
organization itself. This conclusion was based on several premises. First, the
appellant’s purposes and objects were broad and vague. Second, the activities
proposed in support of its stated purposes, particularly the plan to build and
maintain a sanctuary and sculpture park, would not advance religion or education
in the charitable sense. Third, the appellant’s proposed funding of a foreign
scholarship would constitute neither the organization’s own activities nor the
funding of a qualified donee.
[3]
The appellant advances three grounds of appeal,
arguing that the Minister’s decision was unreasonable, procedurally unfair, and
in violation of sections 2(a), 2(b), and 15 of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the Charter). For the following
reasons, each of these arguments must be rejected.
[4]
The appellant’s central argument is that, in
requiring faith in and worship of a supreme being and disqualifying the
appellant’s proposed sanctuary and sculpture park as an activity advancing
religion in the charitable sense, the Minister applied an overly narrow
conception of religion (appellant’s memorandum at paras. 18 to 22 and 33).
[5]
In my view, the Minister made no such error.
Accepting that the Minister had to proceed on proper principle, the concept of
“Oneness of Reality” advanced by the appellant is so broad and vague as to be
practically unascertainable. The appellant has failed to show the existence of a
“particular and comprehensive system of faith and worship”
or a body of teachings and doctrine that would bring the concept which it
promotes within the legal acceptation of the word religion (Syndicat
Northcrest v. Amselem, 2004 SCC 47, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551 at para. 39).
[6]
Even if the values promoted by the appellant do
constitute a religion, however, the state of the law is such that, in order to
advance a religion, there must be a targeted attempt to promote it (Fuaran
Foundation v. Canada (Customs and Revenue Agency), 2004 FCA 181, [2004]
F.C.J. No. 825 at para. 15 [Fuaran]). It is not enough to “simply make
available a place where religious thought may be pursued” (ibidem).
[7]
In its communication with the appellant, the CRA
cited this requirement, and took the view that the appellant was proposing to
do precisely what this Court described in Fuaran when illustrating
activities that would fall short of the advancement of religion in the
charitable sense (appeal book, vol. 2, p. 603). While the appellant has attempted
to distinguish Fuaran on the basis that other considerations were at
play in that case, the proposition for which it stands is unaffected. The
appellant has not shown that the conclusion reached by the Minister was
unreasonable.
[8]
Though the appellant claims that it will
actively promote religion by “initiating and supporting multi-religious,
educational programs and services and will organize lectures, workshops and
seminars” (appellant’s memorandum at para. 24), this Court has held that
merely expressing aspirations does not entitle an applicant to charitable
status (Sagkeeng Memorial Arena Inc. v. Canada (National Revenue), 2012
FCA 171, [2012] F.C.J. No. 827 at para. 8). Rather, the Minister may require
the applicant to provide detailed and credible plans for the latter’s proposed
activities (ibidem at para. 9).The Minister did so in this case, and determined that the
appellant had failed to meet this requirement. The appellant has not
demonstrated that this determination was unreasonable.
[9]
In alleging procedural unfairness, the appellant
argues that the Minister demonstrated a “closed mind” to its application and
also denied the appellant any opportunity to respond to certain information
gathered in the course of the Minister’s investigation. The first allegation
rests entirely on general assertions that find no support on the record. The
appellant has not shown, for instance, that the Minister ignored its submissions
or took a dismissive attitude towards the appellant. The second allegation is
of no relevance to this appeal, as the Minister’s decision was reasonably
justified without any reference to the material in question (Lord's
Evangelical Church of Deliverance and Prayer of Toronto v. Canada, 2004 FCA
397, [2004] F.C.J. No. 1984 at para. 18).
[10]
The appellant’s Charter arguments must
also fail. Its claim under section 2(a) of the Charter is only
partially argued, as its submissions go solely to the existence of a religious
belief, or what the Supreme Court has termed the “subjective part” of the
analysis (S.L. v. Commission scolaire des Chênes, 2012 SCC 7, [2012] 1 S.C.R.
235 at para. 24). The appellant has not shown how the Minister’s decision
objectively interferes with the appellant’s freedom of religion.
[11]
Its claim under section 2(b) of the Charter
is asserted without any supporting argument, and provides no basis for this
Court to interfere with the Minister’s decision (appellant’s memorandum at
para. 25).
[12]
Finally, its claim under section 15 of the Charter
is framed on the basis that the distinction applied by the Minister in failing
to recognize its non-secular spiritual belief system discriminates against the
appellant itself (appellant’s memorandum at para. 27). However, the appellant
is a not-for-profit corporation and this Court has expressly held that such
organizations are not individuals within the meaning of section 15 (National
Anti-Poverty Organization v. Canada, [1989] 3 F.C. 684 (FCA), leave to
appeal to SCC refused 1989 CarswellNat 1290 (SCC) at para. 22).
[13]
Moreover, as the above discussion illustrates,
the Minister’s refusal was not based simply on a distinction between the
beliefs promoted by the appellants and some other set of beliefs. Rather, the
appellant failed to show how it would promote those beliefs, and therefore
failed to meet the registration requirements under the Act.
[14]
I would dismiss the appeal with costs.
“Marc
Noël”
“I agree
David Stratas J.A.”
“I agree
D.G. Near J.A.”
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