Heald,
       
        J.:—We
      
      do
      not
      need
      to
      hear
      you,
      Ms.
      Lee.
      We
      are
      all
      of
      the
      view
      
      
      that
      the
      learned
      trial
      judge
      correctly
      applied
      the
      provisions
      of
      paragraph
      
      
      20(1
      )(c)
      of
      the
      
        Income
       
        Tax
       
        Act
      
      to
      the
      facts
      of
      this
      case.
      We
      share
      his
      view
      
      
      that
      an
      essential
      requirement
      for
      interest
      deductions
      thereunder
      is
      the
      continued
      
      
      existence
      of
      the
      source
      to
      which
      the
      interest
      expense
      relates.
      We
      
      
      also
      agree
      that
      where,
      as
      in
      this
      case,
      the
      source
      has
      been
      terminated,
      the
      
      
      interest
      expense
      is
      no
      longer
      deductible.
      If
      there
      were
      any
      ambiguity
      in
      the
      
      
      English
      words
      "a
      business
      or
      property”
      in
      subsection
      20(1)
      as
      to
      whether
      the
      
      
      indefinite
      article
      "a”
      should
      be
      understood
      to
      be
      repeated
      before
      "property”,
      
      
      that
      potential
      problem
      is
      removed
      by
      the
      French
      version
      of
      the
      Act,
      
      
      where
      the
      indefinite
      article
      is
      inserted
      before
      both
      nouns:
      "d'une
      enterprise
      
      
      ou
      d’un
      bien”
      (emphasis
      added).
      This
      is
      also
      true
      of
      the
      French
      versions
      
      
      of
      the
      same
      phrase
      when
      used
      in
      subsections
      9(1),
      9(2),
      12(1)
      and
      18(1)
      
      
      of
      the
      Act.
      The
      word
      "property”
      in
      subsection
      20(1)
      clearly,
      therefore,
      cannot
      
      
      have
      the
      collective
      meaning
      urged
      by
      the
      appellant.
      
      
      
      
    
      Accordingly
      the
      appeal
      is
      dismissed.
      Since
      this
      appears
      to
      be
      a
      test
      case
      in
      
      
      this
      Court,
      the
      Court
      exercises
      its
      discretion
      in
      favour
      of
      the
      appellant
      and
      
      
      does
      not
      award
      costs
      against
      him
      in
      this
      Court.
      
      
      
      
    
        Appeal
       
        dismissed.