Docket: IMM-5595-25
Citation: 2026 FC 915
Ottawa, Ontario, July 8, 2026
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Lafrenière
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BETWEEN:
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OSMAN SANKOH
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Applicant
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and
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
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Respondent
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REASONS AND ORDER
I. Overview
[1] The settled practice of this Court is not to give reasons when rendering its decisions on applications for leave to seek judicial review in immigration matters. However, this case raises issues relating to the date of notification of an immigration tribunal’s decision that often arise and that, as far as I know, have not been squarely decided, at least by any cases binding upon this Court.
[2] The time period within which an applicant must bring an application for leave and for judicial review [ALJR] of a negative immigration decision is found in section 72 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA]. The pertinent provisions read as follows:
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72 (1) Judicial review by the Federal Court with respect to any matter—a decision, determination or order made, a measure taken or a question raised—under this Act is commenced by making an application for leave to the Court.
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72 (1) Le contrôle judiciaire par la Cour fédérale de toute mesure — décision, ordonnance, question ou affaire — prise dans le cadre de la présente loi est, sous réserve de l’article 86.1, subordonné au dépôt d’une demande d’autorisation.
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(2) The following provisions govern an application under subsection (1):
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(2) Les dispositions suivantes s’appliquent à la demande d’autorisation :
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[…]
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[…]
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(b) subject to paragraph 169(f), notice of the application shall be served on the other party and the application shall be filed in the Registry of the Federal Court (“the Court”) within 15 days, in the case of a matter arising in Canada, or within 60 days, in the case of a matter arising outside Canada, after the day on which the applicant is notified of or otherwise becomes aware of the matter;
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b) elle doit être signifiée à l’autre partie puis déposée au greffe de la Cour fédérale — la Cour — dans les quinze ou soixante jours, selon que la mesure attaquée a été rendue au Canada ou non, suivant, sous réserve de l’alinéa 169f), la date où le demandeur en est avisé ou en a eu connaissance;
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[Emphasis added.]
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[Je souligne.]
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[3] On March 12, 2025, the Applicant filed an ALJR of the decision of the Refugee Protection Division [RPD] of the Immigration and Refugee Board [IRB] dated February 10, 2025 [Decision]. The ALJR states that “[t]he written notice of decision dated February 18, 2015 (
sic) and the written reasons were communicated to the applicant on 27th day of February 2015 (
sic).”
This allegation is disputed by the Respondent.
[4] What the evidence does show is that the Decision and the Notice of Decision were served by a Registry Officer with the IRB on the Applicant’s counsel of record by “My Case portal”
[My Case] on February 18, 2025. My Case is a secure digital platform that allows registered users to electronically submit evidence, forms, and documents to the RPD and to receive official communications.
[5] Two issues are raised here. First, whether service of the Decision on counsel of record constitutes effective notice on the Applicant. Second, if so, when should the Applicant be deemed to have been “notified”
of the Decision.
[6] As explained below, I conclude that the first issue should be answered in the positive. As for the second issue, I find on the facts of this case that the Applicant should be presumed to have been notified of the Decision on the date it was transmitted electronically to counsel via My Case.
II. Background Facts
[7] The Applicant is a citizen of Sierra Leone.
[8] On November 20, 2023, the Applicant entered Canada from the United States and made a claim for refugee protection. A Departure Order was issued against him on January 11, 2024.
[9] On February 10, 2025, the Applicant’s claim for refugee protection was rejected by the RPD. The RPD found that the Applicant was neither a Convention refugee according to section 96 of the IRPA, nor a person in need of protection according to paragraphs 97(1)(a) and (b). The determinative issue was the credibility of the Applicant and his evidence.
[10] The Applicant’s appeal to the Refugee Appeal Division [RAD] was dismissed on March 17, 2025 for lack of jurisdiction. The Applicant did not apply to this Court for leave to seek judicial review of the RAD’s decision.
[11] On April 12, 2025, the Applicant’s Departure Order became a deemed Deportation Order.
[12] On consent of the parties, the Applicant was granted an extension of time to perfect his application. The Applicant served and filed his Application Record on July 28, 2025.
[13] By letter dated July 31, 2025, the Applicant was informed by the Canada Border Services Agency that the removal order made against him was now enforceable and that arrangements had been made for his departure from Canada to Sierra Leone on August 22, 2025.
[14] On August 8, 2025, the Applicant filed a motion to stay his removal. Attached as exhibits to the Applicant’s affidavit are various documents relating to the proceedings before the RPD, including a “Statement that a document was provided”
of an IRB Registry Officer confirming that the “Notice of Decision and Reasons (all)”
were served on Applicant’s counsel on February 18, 2025.
[15] In response to the Applicant’s motion, the Respondent submitted, amongst other arguments, that the Applicant was not in compliance with subsection 72(2) of the IRPA because he failed to bring this ALJR within 15 days of the Decision, and that nowhere in his submissions did the Applicant make a request for an extension of time to do so.
[16] By Order dated August 20, 2025, the Applicant’s motion was dismissed on the basis that irreparable harm had not been shown: Sankoh v Canada (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship), 2025 CanLII 83027 (FC). The reasons included the following observations at para 27:
Fourth, the ALJR states that “the written notice of decision dated February 18, 2025 and the written reasons were communicated to the applicant on 27th day of February, 2015.”
However, the RPD’s Decision was communicated to Applicant’s counsel on February 18, 2025, as evidenced by the “Statement that a Document was Provided”
at page 24 of the Applicant’s motion record. At the hearing, counsel for the Applicant maintained that the ALJR was filed within the 15-day deadline set out in paragraph 72(2)(b) of the IRPA. However, the ALJR was only filed on March 12, 2025, 22 days after the Decision is deemed to have been communicated to him, through counsel.
[17] On August 20, 2025, the Respondent filed a memorandum of argument in response to the Applicant’s Record raising once again the Applicant’s failure to comply with subsection 72(2) of the IRPA.
[18] In his reply memorandum dated August 27, 2025, the Applicant insists that he filed the ALJR within the statutorily mandated 15 days, arguing as follows:
According to Rule 6(2) of the Federal Courts Immigration and Refugee Protection Rules, an applicant for judicial review is presumed to have received the decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) on the tenth day after the day on which it is mailed to them, unless the applicant provides that it was received on a later date. In this case, the Notice of Decision of the RPD is dated and presumable mailed out on February 18, 2025; and therefore, by the operation of Rule (2) of the Federal Courts Immigration and Refugee Protection Rules, it must be presumed to have been received by the Applicant on February 28, 2025. The Applicant would then have had up to March 15, 2025 to submit his ALJR. Since the Applicant submitted his ALJR on March 12, 2025, he did not need to make a request or an application for an extension of time to file his ALJR, since he filed same with the time allowed by the Rules.
III. Analysis
[19] For the reasons set out below, I consider the Applicant’s arguments to be fundamentally flawed.
[20] First, Rule 6(2) of the Federal Courts Citizenship, Immigration and Refugee Protection Rules, SOR/93-22 [FCCIRP Rules] has no application to the circumstances of this case. The Rule simply provides that a request for an extension of time shall be determined at the same time, and on the same material as the application for leave. The Applicant made no such request in the ALJR nor after his motion to stay his removal was dismissed.
[21] Second, the Applicant appears to be relying instead on Rule 4.1 of the FCCIRP Rules. However, the “deemed receipt of documents”
provisions in this Rule also have no application to the facts of this case. Rule 4.1 only applies to a document that is required to be sent under the FCCIRP Rules. The ALJR does not fall within this class of documents because the originating document is required to be served pursuant to a statute. Moreover, while paragraph 4.1(a) deems a document sent by ordinary mail to be received on the tenth day after the day on which it was mailed, there is no evidence that the Decision was sent by mail.
[22] Before turning to the two issues identified earlier in these reasons, I wish to cite with approval the comments of Justice John Norris in Nava Aguilar v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2024 FC 1714 at para 15:
[15] The date on which the RAD’s decision was communicated to the applicant is a question of fact. When this date is a matter of dispute, as is the case here, it must be established by evidence… At the hearing of this application, counsel for the applicant simply maintained the position that the statement in the notice of application that the decision was communicated to the applicant on August 6, 2023, is correct. That statement, however, is not evidence of anything.
A. Whether service of the Decision on counsel of record constitutes effective service on the Applicant
[23] A Practice Notice issued by the IRB entitled “Electronic Exchange of Documents using My Case”
[IRB Practice Notice] provides that all Divisions of the IRB allow the exchange of documents electronically using the self-service web portal.
[24] Subsection 38(3) of the Refugee Protection Division Rules, SOR/2012-256 [RPD Rules] prescribes how a document must be provided to a person represented by counsel of record:
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Providing documents to person other than Minister
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Documents transmis à une personne autre que le ministre
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(3) A document to be provided to a person other than the Minister must be provided to the person’s counsel if the person has counsel of record. If the person does not have counsel of record, the document must be provided to the person.
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(3) Le document à transmettre à une personne autre que le ministre doit parvenir à cette personne ou, si elle est représentée par un conseil inscrit au dossier, à ce dernier.
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[25] The Applicant’s own evidence shows that the Applicant’s counsel of record was a registered user of My Case and that he used it to communicate regularly with the RPD regarding the Applicant’s case. The evidence also shows that the Decision and the Notice of Decision were transmitted electronically to counsel via the My Case portal on February 18, 2025.
[26] The common law has long held that notice to a solicitor is considered notice to their client: Bank of British North America v St John & Quebec R Co, 1920 CanLII 376 (NB CA) aff’d 1921 CanLII 574 (SCC); Toth v Kancz, 1975 CarswellSask 110 at para 19 (QB), 1975 CanLII 2518 (SK QB); Kirilenko and Kirilenko v Lavoie and Sinclair, 1981 CanLII 2211 at para 30; Stoimenov v Stoimenov, 1985 CarswellOnt 234 at para 11 (CA), 1985 CanLII 2166; and Burns v Kelly Peters & Associates Ltd, 1988 CarswellBC 440 at para 23, [1988] BCJ No 2273 (Sup Ct).
[27] A number of cases have also held that knowledge of a solicitor may be imputed to their client for the purpose of calculating limitations periods: Jack v Canada (Attorney General), 2004 CanLII 6217 (ON SC) at para 116; Soper (Guardian of) v Southcott, 1998 CarswellOnt 2906 at para 21 (CA), 1998 CanLII 5359; Fanshawe College v AU Optronics, 2015 ONSC 2046 at para 59; and Pepper v Sanmina-Sci Systems (Canada) Inc, 2017 ONSC 1516 at para 62 rev’d on other grounds 2017 ONCA 730.
[28] I conclude, based on the wording of subsection 38(3) of the RPD Rules and the jurisprudence cited above that service of the Notice of Decision and the RPD’s reasons on counsel of record constitutes effective notice on the Applicant.
[29] I would add that interpreting paragraph 72(2)(b) of the IRPA as requiring actual notice to the Applicant by means of personal notification for the clock on the 15-day period to start would be contrary to the object and intent of Parliament and would produce an illogical result. As stated by Justice Denis Gascon in Singh v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 CanLII 105977 (FC) at para 5: “on application for judicial review of RAD decisions, the delay starts from the date of notification or sending of the reasons to the Applicants, and cannot start from the time when an applicant ‘otherwise becomes aware of the matter.’”
[30] To rule otherwise would mean that counsel of record could in theory indefinitely extend the statutory deadline by simply keeping their client in the dark.
B. When should the Applicant be deemed to have been “notified”
of the Decision
[31] The My Case portal is similar to the one used by the Canada Revenue Agency [CRA] called “My Account”
: DiPierdomenico v The King, 2023 TCC 146 at para 17. CRA mail available in My Account is presumed to have been received on the date that the email notification is sent: subsection 244(14.1) of the Income Tax Act, RSC 1985, c 1 (5th Supp), as amended [ITA]. There is no such statutory presumption in the IRPA or the RPD Rules.
[32] The IRB Practice Notice states that: “Documents provided by a Division to a registered user are considered received by the registered user on the date of receipt indicated by the electronic time stamp in My Case.”
In addition, the IRB’s “My Case user guide”
indicates that when the IRB sends a document, the recipient receives an email notification at the email address provided in the registered user’s profile.
[33] There is a gap in the evidence since the Applicant has not produced an electronic time stamp showing the date of receipt of the Decision by counsel. Moreover, there is no evidence from the Applicant showing when his counsel received the Decision or how and by whom the Decision was “communicated”
to him. Further, there is no indication that an email notification was not sent or that the My Case portal transmission was unsuccessful.
[34] The Court is left with the statement of the IRB Registry Officer confirming that the Applicant’s counsel was served with the Notice of Decision and RPD’s reasons via the My Case portal on February 18, 2025. The statement creates a presumption that the Decision was received by counsel on the date when the document was entered into My Case and became capable of being retrieved: Braimah v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2025 CanLII 133597 (FC) at para 11.
[35] It was open to the Applicant to rebut the presumption; however, he failed to do so.
[36] In the circumstances, I find that the IRB Registry Officer’s statement establishes, on a balance of probabilities, that the Applicant’s counsel, and consequently the Applicant, were notified of the Decision on February 18, 2025.
IV. Conclusion
[37] The Applicant filed the ALJR on March 12, 2025, 22 days after he was effectively notified of the Decision. It is untimely by virtue of the strict deadline fixed at para 72(2)(b) of the IRPA.
[38] The Applicant has never sought or been granted an extension of time. Even though the extension that would be required appears to be relatively short, the Court cannot ignore the requirements of the law. In the absence of an order extending the time to commence the application for judicial review, this application is not properly before the Court. For this reason alone, it must be dismissed.
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