Docket: IMM-5247-25
Citation: 2026 FC 761
Toronto, Ontario, June 9, 2026
PRESENT: The Honourable Justice Thorne
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BETWEEN:
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Juan Camilo RAMIREZ TAMAYO
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Applicant
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and
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
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Respondent
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REASONS AND JUDGMENT
I. Overview
[1] The Applicant in this matter seeks judicial review of a negative Pre-Removal Risk Assessment [PRRA] decision of an Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada officer, dated November 26, 2024 [Decision]. Juan Camilo Ramirez Tamayoer] determined that the Applicant, Juan Camilo Ramirez Tamayo, was not a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection under section 96 or section 97 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act [IRPA].
[2] The Applicant submits that the Officer erred in their assessment of the state protection available to the Applicant. He further contends that the Applicant’s former counsel had provided inadequate representation in failing to advise as to, and supply the Officer with, the supporting documents required to rebut the Applicant’s presumption of state protection. As such, it is contended that the former counsel’s misconduct subjected him to a breach of procedural fairness.
II. Background
[3] The Applicant is a citizen of Colombia. He alleges that he fears harm in that country from Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia [FARC] dissidents who had attempted to extort the cellphone shop that he and his business partner had operated in Cali, Colombia.
[4] He states that a year after opening this business, they were approached by the FARC dissidents, but that they had refused to cooperate and instead closed the business and moved to Medellin. They returned to Cali 20 days later, as the Applicant asserts that FARC dissidents were also operating in Medellin. The Applicant states they then decided to leave Colombia shortly after their return to Cali, since they had begun receiving threats again.
[5] On May 24, 2022, the Applicant left Colombia for Mexico, and from there made his way to the U.S. border where he claimed asylum. However, on February 11, 2023 he decided to come to Canada, where he crossed the border near Montreal and claimed refugee protection.
[6] On June 27, 2023, the Applicant was reported to be inadmissible to Canada under section 36(1)(a) of the IRPA for serious criminality, as he was convicted on June 22, 2023 of breaking and entering a dwelling house shortly after arriving in Canada, contrary to section 348(a)(b) of the Criminal Code. The Applicant’s refugee claim was thus determined to be ineligible pursuant to section 112(3) of the IRPA, and a Deportation Order was issued on March 8, 2024.
[7] On May 15, 2024, the Applicant submitted a PRRA application, stating that he faced persecution or risk to his life or of torture or cruel and unusual treatment or punishment, were he to return to Colombia. As part of this, the Applicant alleges that his friend and former business partner had returned to Colombia on November 10, 2023, and was killed twenty days later after he went back to the site of their former business.
[8] The PRRA Officer issued their Decision on November 26, 2024. In this, after having assessed publicly available country condition information for Colombia in conjunction with the Applicant’s evidence and personal circumstances, the officer concluded that there was no reasonable possibility of persecution on any Convention ground as per s 96 of IRPA, and nor did the Applicant face a personalized risk to his life or of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment, or of a danger of torture, as per subsection 97(a) or (b) of IRPA. The Decision turned on the issue of state protection, and reads, in part:
Based on the information before me, both from what has been provided by the applicant and from publicly available sources of information, I accept that the situation in Colombia in relation to FARC dissidents continues to present challenges to the country. However, I find that the applicant has not rebutted the presumption of state protection. The state is presumed capable of protecting its citizens unless there is a complete breakdown of the state apparatus
I do not find there has been a breakdown of the state apparatus in Colombia. I note that Colombia has a ceasefire in place with FARC and the government has taken steps to enhance and increase security. While I acknowledge the ongoing challenges in Colombia, there is insufficient evidence that the system has completely broken down to the point where it is unable to protect its citizens. The above research indicates a state taking serious measures to protect its citizens and combat corruption.
[9] On July 3, 2025, the Applicant was granted a stay of removal by this Court, pending the final disposition of the Applicant’s leave and judicial review in relation to the negative PRRA decision.
[10] The Applicant argues that a determinative issue in the Officer’s decision was the lack of evidence submitted by the Applicant to rebut the presumption of state protection.
III. Issues and Standard of Review
[11] The issues at play in this matter are whether the decision under review is reasonable, and whether it was tainted by procedural unfairness.
[12] The parties submit, and I agree, that the standard of review applicable to PRRA decisions is reasonableness: Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 at para 23 [Vavilov]; Singh v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 1645 at para 13; Shah v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 1741 at para 15. A reasonable decision is “one that is based on an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis and that is justified in relation to the facts and law that constrain the decision maker”
: Vavilov at para 85. Although the party challenging the decision bears the onus of demonstrating that the decision is unreasonable: Vavilov at para 100, the reviewing court must assess “whether the decision bears the hallmarks of reasonableness, justification, transparency and intelligibility”:
Vavilov at para 99.
[13] On the question of procedural fairness, such issues are reviewed on a correctness standard, or at least a standard akin to correctness: Canadian Pacific Railway Company v Canada (Attorney General), 2018 FCA 69 at paras 54 – 56 [Canadian Pacific Railway Company]; Ramanathan v Canada (Attorney General), 2023 FC 1029 at para 41. This requires the Court to analyze whether the procedure followed was fair, having regard to all the circumstances: Kawasaki v Canada (Attorney General), 2025 FC 936 at para 13 citing Canadian Pacific Railway Company at para 54. The reviewing court determines whether the applicant “knew the case to meet and had a full and fair chance to respond”
: Elykova v Canada (Attorney General), 2025 FCA 97 at para 5 citing Canadian Pacific Railway Company at para 56.
IV. Legal Framework
[14] A person claiming refugee status pursuant to section 96 of the IRPA must meet the applicable legal test to establish that there is a “serious possibility”
or “reasonable chance”
of persecution in the event of a return to the country they have fled. In particular, they must establish, on a balance of probabilities, that they have a subjective fear of persecution on the basis of race, religion, nationality, membership in a social group or political opinion, and that objectively this fear of persecution is well-founded. The claimant must demonstrate that there is a serious chance that persecution will occur: Adjei v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 1989 CanLII 9466 (FCA), [1989] 2 FC 680. However, I note that in this matter, the Applicant is ineligible for a refugee claim under section 112(3) of the IRPA, on the grounds of serious criminality.
[15] In order to establish that one is a person in need of protection pursuant to subsection 97(1) of the Act, the claimant must establish that, on a balance of probabilities, they would be personally subject to a danger of torture or a risk to their life or of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment, were they to return to their country of origin. This is an objective test administered in the context of “
present or
prospective risk for the claimant”:
Sanchez v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FCA 99 at paras 14-15, emphasis in original.
V. Analysis
A. Preliminary Motion to strike the affidavits of Monica Jimenez, Charles Vernio, and Sarah Benoit
[16] A central issue in this proceeding is the Applicant’s allegation that previous counsel displayed incompetence in failing to properly advise him as to the evidence required to support his PRRA claim, and that this triggered a breach of his right to procedural fairness.
[17] In response to these allegations, the Applicant’s former counsel, Ms. Umudi, filed five affidavits, including those of Monica Jimenez, Charles Vernio, and Sarah Benoit, providing evidence to rebut the allegation of negligence and to challenge the Applicant’s credibility.
[18] Pursuant to an order of this Court dated March 12, 2026, the parties had been granted the right to cross-examine the affiants. However, counsel for the Applicant was only able to cross-examine two of the five affiants, as for a various reasons former counsel only supplied contact information for three of the affiants, and Applicant’s counsel was further unable to settle on an appropriate time for cross-examination with another of the three affiants.
[19] The Applicant’s counsel accordingly brought a motion at the outset of the hearing to have the three affidavits of the parties who were not cross-examined (Sarah Benoit, Monica Jimenez and Charles Vernio) struck from the record. After hearing the submissions of both parties, the Court declined to strike the three affidavits, but held that the inability to cross-examine on these documents would be factored into their consideration by the Court, and particularly the weight that would be accorded to that evidence.
B. The Applicant has not established a breach of procedural fairness or natural justice
Allegations of incompetent representation
[20] As noted, the Applicant argues that he was provided with incompetent representation by his former counsel. He states that after he had retained this party, it had been difficult to reach them or receive communication. He essentially alleges that the former counsel did not properly advise and represent him in his PRRA application, as they failed to: 1) instruct him that he needed to provide supporting documentation and evidence for the application, 2) apprise him as to what supporting evidence he should gather, and 3) submit certain supporting documents that would have been helpful in rebutting his presumption of state protection. These included documents pertaining to country conditions in Colombia, and a video and documents relating to the murder of his former business partner. The Applicant alleges that he told former counsel about the items relating to the murder on May 24, 2024, when they met for him to sign his PRRA application, but that he had been told there was no need to submit evidence at that stage.
[21] The Applicant alleges that after he received a January 25, 2025 letter from Canada Border Services Agency [CBSA] informing him that a decision on his PRRA application had been made and that he was to attend an interview with an officer, he began gathering evidence as he thought he could present this information at the interview, and that he went to former counsel’s office, where he met with her assistant. On February 13, 2025, the Applicant attended the meeting with the CBSA officer, where he was served with the negative decision on his PRRA application. He states that the documents that he had gathered were not looked at by the CBSA officer.
[22] The Applicant states that after this, his former counsel informed him they could no longer represent him, as the Judicial Review would be before the Court, and that his current counsel later apprised former counsel of the allegations of incompetent representation.
[23] Former counsel strongly denies the allegations, and has submitted the five aforementioned affidavits in relation to this. Former counsel essentially states that it was the Applicant who was unresponsive in dealing with her and her staff, that he missed appointments and at other times simply showed up unannounced, and that the Applicant had also not been responsive with respect to working on or supplying information related to his claim. Former counsel denies that they discouraged the Applicant from gathering documents and evidence, and notes that, in fact, they and their staff had provided the Applicant with a document list that he signed, and that in going over this list, they had discussed supporting evidence but had been told by the Applicant that he had no such documents that he could provide. The Applicant, in turn, denies this and also disputes that he was ever provided with the document list or that he had given permission to sign this list, which had his electronic signature affixed. The parties further disagree about the date of his signing of certain of his documents. The Applicant filed a complaint against former counsel with the Law Society of Ontario on April 4, 2025.
Determination
[24] Upon review of the record, I cannot find that the test for incompetence of counsel amounting to procedural fairness has been met in this matter.
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Legal Framework
[25] By way of background, incompetence of counsel amounting to a breach of procedural fairness involves a tripartite conjunctive test. The analysis also begins with the "strong presumption that counsel's conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance"
and incompetence of counsel resulting in a breach of natural justice will occur only in “extraordinary circumstances”
: Rendon Segovia v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 99 at para 22; Memari v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 1196 (CanLII), [2012] 2 FCR 350 at para 36.
[26] The three criteria to be met are to: (1) corroborate the allegation by giving notice to the former counsel and providing them with an opportunity to respond; (2) establish that the former counsel’s act or omission constituted incompetence without the benefit and wisdom of hindsight (also called the performance component); and (3) establish that the outcome would have been different but for the incompetence (also called the prejudice component): Rady v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2024 FC 1733 at para 15; Reyes Contreras v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 1453 [Reyes Contreras]; Abuzeid v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 34 at para 21; Badihi v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FC 64 [Badihi] at para 17, citing Galyas v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 250 at para 84.
[27] Further, to demonstrate incompetence, “[t]he burden is on the applicants to establish the performance and the prejudice components of the test to demonstrate a breach of procedural fairness”
: Reyes Contreras at para 39, citing Badihi at para 18.
[28] In addition, the Applicant must follow the Court’s Protocol, dated March 7, 2014, entitled “Allegations against Counsel or other authorized representative in Citizenship, Immigration and Protected Person cases before the Federal Court”
, now included in the December 31, 2025 “Consolidated Practice Guidelines for Citizenship, Immigration, and Refugee Protection Proceedings”
. This includes the obligation to notify former counsel of the allegations against them and seek their response.
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Analysis
[29] I find that the first element of the tripartite test is met. The Applicant’s current counsel contacted former counsel to advise of the allegations, and former counsel was provided with an opportunity to respond. As noted, they did so, providing a detailed reply, along with affidavits and evidence, which are part of the Application Record.
[30] With respect to the second element of the test, in which the Applicant must demonstrate that former counsel’s conduct was negligent or incompetent, the Applicant is required to discharge a two-fold burden. They must establish the facts on which they rely in impugning the conduct of the former counsel, and must further establish that the alleged conduct fell below the standard of reasonable professional assistance or judgment: see R v GDB, 2000 SCC 22 (CanLII), [2000] 1 S.C.R. 520 at para 27 [GDB].
[31] In doing so, the Applicant is required to meet a high threshold to establish the performance component of an allegation of ineffective assistance, given the strong presumption that the former counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of professional assistance: GDB at para 27. This Court’s jurisprudence has clearly stipulated that a reviewing court is to be careful to avoid second-guessing the tactical decisions of counsel and that the wisdom of hindsight is to have no place in the assessment. Moreover, expressions of general dissatisfaction with counsel’s conduct are insufficient; the allegation of negligence or incompetence must be specific and clearly supported by the evidence: Shirwa v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 1993 CanLII 17477 (FC), [1994] 2 FC 51 (CA) at para 12.
[32] In the current matter, the central point of contention between the Applicant and his former counsel relates to the evidence gathered by the Applicant pertaining to the alleged murder of his former business partner (including a video, photos and affidavits), along with country condition documents pertaining to the threat of the FARC. The Applicant maintains that such information went to his ability to rebut his presumption of state protection, and would have established his risk upon return to Colombia. To this end, the Applicant asserts that these documents “are clear and convincing evidence available to the Applicant showing that Colombia was not a safe place for him. The former counsel failed to properly advise and represent the Applicant in the PRRA application by failing to submit such documents in support of the PRRA Application”
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[33] In their response, former counsel states that the Applicant was advised with respect to the need for supporting documents, that the Applicant told her office that he had none, and that a document checklist was provided to the Applicant when counsel was first retained. Former counsel has also provided a copy of this document list which bears the Applicant’s signature. The Applicant asserts that he never saw this document or gave permission for his digital signature to be affixed to it. The impugned affidavits supplied by the former counsel also contain testimonials as to the explanations and information disseminated to the Applicant, and as to the services allegedly provided by former counsel to Mr. Tamayo, including assertions that the document checklist had been directly presented to and signed by the Applicant.
[34] In essence then, this matter involves competing accounts offered by the Applicant and former counsel. In such circumstances, I note the words of my colleague, Justice Fothergill, in Oppong-Sagoe v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 1154: “The burden of proof to demonstrate the incompetence of counsel is a heavy one. The evidence must be so clear and unequivocal and the circumstances so deplorable that the resulting injustice caused to the claimant is blatantly obvious”
: para 26. Justice Fothergill concluded in that decision that “the evidence of incompetence consists of counsel stating one thing and the Applicant stating another. This is insufficient to meet the high threshold of incompetence”
, citing Vardalia v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 300 at paras 35-38, citing Khan v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 855. The case at bar is similar, and ultimately, I come to the same conclusion. Though it is clear that the Applicant’s former counsel seemingly did little on his behalf, and definitely failed to submit much of anything in the way of supporting evidence, it is not clear whether this was because of former counsel’s incompetence and lack of initiative, or because the Applicant had told former counsel that he had no supporting evidence when he had been asked about this. Upon the record before me, and in the absence of clear evidence as to the exchanges between the Applicant and former counsel as to this, or demonstrating that the Applicant did not receive the document list and that he had not authorized his former counsel to affix his electronic signature to the disputed list, I find that the threshold required to establish incompetence has not been met, and that the high bar of second prong of the test is not satisfied.
[35] In any event, and most importantly, I find that the third element of the test has also not been satisfied. For this prong of the test, the Applicant must establish that the misconduct of former counsel resulted in a miscarriage of justice. This includes circumstances where former counsel’s conduct has compromised the reliability of the result of the earlier proceeding and where former counsel’s conduct has affected the fairness of the earlier proceeding: GDB at para 28.
[36] Here, the Applicant alleges that the conduct of former counsel influenced the negative PRRA decision. To satisfy this prong of the test, it falls to the Applicant to demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for the incompetence of his former counsel, this result would have been different: Bisht v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2022 FC 1178 at para 24.
[37] I do not find that the Applicant succeeded in doing so.
[38] As noted above, the determinative issue in the PRRA Decision was the finding that the Applicant had not rebutted his presumption of state protection. The evidence that the Applicant asserts should have been submitted constitutes videos and photographs pertaining to the alleged murder of his friend and former business partner, along with a death certificate, forensic report, an affidavit from the friend’s sister, and an affidavit from the Applicant’s mother.
[39] However, the PRRA Decision establishes that the officer did directly consider the friend’s return to Colombia and the fact that this party was allegedly killed shortly after doing so. It notes:
The applicant states that Cesar recently returned to Colombia and twenty days after he arrived, he went to the location of their business and was killed. The applicant states FARC dissidents have continued to look for him at his relatives' homes and have been threatening them. He submits that the FARC dissidents are everywhere in Colombia and will target the applicant. The applicant submits that he will be unable to obtain protection from the Colombian police are corrupt and ineffective and that it well documented that the Colombian police is corrupt, brutal and unsympathetic.
[40] The Officer was not unaware of the alleged murder of the Applicant’s friend, and nor was this allegation refuted or in any way discounted. Rather, the Officer decided that despite this, after its evaluation of the country condition evidence pertaining to the capabilities of the Colombian state to investigate and prosecute violent crime, the Applicant had not rebutted his presumption of state protection in Colombia. Given this, even if one simply accepts the Applicant’s account that the actions of former counsel had resulted in his failure to provide the Officer with the video and other information relating to his friend’s death, it is unclear why the provision of those documents would have altered the Officer’s determination with respect to the presumption of state protection and thus changed the outcome of his PRRA application. That is, the documents would merely reiterate what the Officer had already acknowledged and considered.
[41] Accordingly, I do not find that the Applicant has demonstrated a reasonable probability that, but for the alleged incompetence of his former counsel, the outcome in this matter would have been different. While this might have been the case had the Officer been unaware of or not considered the alleged killing of his friend, it is clear from the record that this is not the case.
[42] Similarly, I note that while the Applicant states that former counsel may have been incompetent in failing to provide country condition documentation as to the efficacy of state protection as part of his PRRA application, I find that here too it has not been established that, but for this, the result would have been different.
[43] Officers are presumed to have acquired knowledge of the most up to date country conditions, whether submitted or not, and rely upon this knowledge and all information before them, absent evidence to the contrary: Idu v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 1081 at paras 32-33. Indeed, this Court’s jurisprudence has recognized the duty of PRRA officers to consider recent, credible country condition evidence: Hussain v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 158, Rizk Hassaballa v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 489 at paras 33-38 [Rizk Hassaballa]; Jama v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, 2014 FC 668 at paras 17-18 [Jama]). Further, this duty is not limited to material filed by an Applicant: Rizk Hassaballa at para 33; Jama at para 17. The Decision establishes that the Officer clearly did consider such recent, relevant evidence, as they evaluated and directly discussed various pertinent country condition articles in their state protection analysis.
[44] As a result of these considerations, I do not find that the Applicant met the heavy burden of showing that counsel’s conduct met the performance and prejudice components required by the jurisprudence, and he has not established that he was subject to a procedural fairness violation due to incompetent counsel representation.
C. The PRRA decision is reasonable
[45] I note that the Applicant also makes a second argument against the decision: that the PRRA officer erred by unreasonably assessing the state protection available to the Applicant. Specifically, the Applicant contends that the officer undertook a selective review of the country conditions documents with regard to the availability of state protection.
[46] I do not agree.
[47] A review of the record indicates that the Officer considered the Applicant’s submissions as to state protection, and that while these were broad and largely void of specific evidence to rebut the presumption that the Applicant could avail himself of state protection, they did generally reference the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada’s May 31, 2024 National Documentation Package [NDP] on Colombia.
[48] As noted, the Officer reviewed the NDP and specifically referred to two reports found in it: the US Department of State 2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Colombia, and the Colombia section of the 2024 report from Freedom House – Freedom in the World 2024. Again, officers are presumed to have acquired knowledge of the most up to date country conditions, whether submitted or not, and to have relied upon this knowledge and all information before them, absent evidence to the contrary.
[49] I also note that when it comes to the assessment of contradictory evidence by a decision-maker, this Court has a very limited role – it is not the role of this Court to reweigh the documentary evidence before a decision-maker: Negm v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 272 at para 34; Rauda Paniagua v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 1085 at para 8; Orellana Ortega v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 611 at para 14.
[50] I do not find that the Officer engaged in a selective review of the country condition documents. Given the presumption that an officer has reviewed the entirety of the documentary evidence submitted, is taken to be knowledgeable about up to date country conditions and that they are necessarily empowered to determine what documentary evidence they prefer over others, I find that the Decision was reasonable as it falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law in this matter.
[51] Finally, with respect to state protection, in general, states are presumed to be capable of protecting their nationals, however this presumption may be rebutted on a balance of probabilities. In particular, the Applicant bears the onus of rebutting this presumption with clear and convincing evidence that the state is unwilling or unable to provide adequate protection: Brzezinski v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 936 at para 24; Lakatos v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 367 at para 20; GS v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FC 599 at para 22. Here, the Applicant simply contends that the evidence of his friend’s murder back in Colombia, whom he describes as a “similarly situated person (…) establishes that state protection is not available to the Applicant”
. With respect, I do not agree that this constitutes “clear and convincing evidence”
that the state cannot and is not willing to provide him adequate protection should he return to Colombia.
[52] First, there is an onus on a claimant to seek state protection, though the extent of this obligation varies with the nature of the democracy involved and is commensurate with the state’s ability and willingness to provide protection: Moya v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 315 at para 75. In the words of my colleague Justice Gascon, from Cardenas Medina v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2024 FC 388:
[25] For democratic countries, refugee protection claimants will normally have to demonstrate that they sought state protection. The more democratic the institutions, the more claimants must have done to exhaust all courses of action open to them, except in the event that they can show that it would likely have been futile for them to approach the state for protection, as protection would have been ineffective (Flores Carrillo at para 32; Vargas Bustos v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 114 at paras 31–32).
[53] However, in this matter, no evidence was provided to indicate that the Applicant ever sought protection from the state in the first place. Indeed, from the tenor of the Applicant’s submissions, it seems clear that this was simply never done by the Applicant. This is why the Decision’s determination that there has been no breakdown of the state in Colombia such that it would be unable to protect its citizens is pertinent. It is generally only in such cases that an Applicant would need not to have affirmatively sought state protection, for the reason that doing so would be futile in those circumstances. As this is not the case, and nor has the Applicant provided evidence that he sought state protection, I cannot find it unreasonable for the Officer to conclude that the Applicant had failed to rebut that presumption with clear and convincing evidence that the state was unwilling or unable to provide adequate protection. At best, the Applicant is merely assuming that this would be the case.
[54] Second, I also find problematic the contention that because the Applicant’s former business partner had been murdered, and that, as he was similarly situated to the Applicant, this provides the required clear and convincing evidence. This is because there is also no evidence as to whether this party had sought state protection prior to his death. I further do not find persuasive the Applicant’s bald assertion that since no perpetrator has been successfully located and prosecuted for the murder, this must mean that the state lacked the capacity to protect his friend in the first place. This is clearly a logical fallacy.
[55] In my view, it was therefore open to the Officer to conclude that the Applicant had not rebutted the presumption on state protection. I cannot find the Officer’s decision unreasonable or untenable, in light of these legal and factual constraints.
[56] The burden is on the Applicant to show that the Decision is unreasonable by establishing that there are sufficiently serious shortcomings in the Decision such that it could not be said to exhibit the requisite degree of justification, intelligibility and transparency: Vavilov at para 100. Having considered the evidence on the record and the submissions of the parties, I am not satisfied this burden has been met. I do not find the Decision to be unreasonable.
VI. Conclusion
[57] For the foregoing reasons, this application for judicial review is dismissed. I note that the parties proposed no question for certification, and I agree that none arises.
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