Dockets: IMM-5218-24
IMM-5854-25
Citation: 2026 FC 740
Ottawa, Ontario, June 4, 2026
PRESENT: Madam Justice Sadrehashemi
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BETWEEN:
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Ilir SHEHU
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Applicant
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and
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THE MINISTER OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
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Respondent
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REASONS AND JUDGMENT
I. Overview
[1] I am considering eight motions involving three different applications for judicial review. The foundational principle that connects these motions is straightforward. If the Court quashes the decision to refer a matter to a tribunal – the subsequent tribunal decision that arose from that same referral must also be quashed.
[2] In the immigration context, this principle arises in the admissibility process. A Minister’s Delegate under section 44(2) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA] decides whether to refer a case to the Immigration Division for an admissibility hearing. The Immigration Division cannot hold an admissibility hearing unless there is a referral decision under section 44(2). It is well-established in the immigration jurisprudence of this Court that where a referral decision is quashed, a subsequent admissibility determination that relies on that referral must also be quashed (Hernandez v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 429 at para 5 [Hernandez]; Abdul v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2019 FC 154 at para 24 [Abdul]; Lawrence v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 1637 at para 5 [Lawrence]; Compère v Canada (Public Safety), 2025 FC 299 at para 30).
[3] In October 2024, Acting Chief Justice (“ACJ”) St-Louis quashed the Canada Border Services Agency’s [CBSA] decision to refer the Applicant, Mr. Shehu, to an admissibility hearing at the Immigration Division. As part of her Order, ACJ St-Louis ordered the CBSA to redetermine whether Mr. Shehu’s matter ought to be referred to the Immigration Division. At the time of ACJ St-Louis’ Order, there was also a pending application for leave and judicial review challenging the Immigration Division’s admissibility decision that had proceeded based on the same referral that now had been quashed (IMM-5218-24).
[4] Following ACJ St-Louis’ decision, the Minister opposed the Applicant’s efforts – first through settlement negotiations and later by way of motion – to quash the Immigration Division’s admissibility decision. The Minister now agrees that the Immigration Division’s admissibility decision should be quashed and agrees that the referral decision made on redetermination, following ACJ St-Louis’ decision, should also be set aside.
[5] The remaining issues in dispute are Mr. Shehu’s claims that the Minister’s conduct amounts to an abuse of process that warrants a permanent stay of the admissibility proceedings and that costs are owed on a substantial indemnity basis. The Minister argues there is no abuse of process or “special reasons”
to award costs because this was a procedurally odd situation partly of the Applicant’s own making.
[6] To evaluate these claims, I have considered the sequence of events that led to these eight motions, including counsels’ conduct throughout. I find the Minister unreasonably delayed agreeing to the Applicant’s request that the Immigration Division’s decision be quashed and this led to a series of unnecessary steps, which caused a significant waste of time and resources for the Applicant and this Court. This is a sufficient basis to find that there are “special reasons”
within the meaning of Rule 22 of the Federal Courts Immigration and Refugee Protection Rules, SOR/93-22 (“Federal Court Rules”) to order costs against the Respondent. I do not, however, find that the Applicant has demonstrated that this conduct, under the residual abuse of process category, threatens the integrity of the justice system in a manner that warrants the granting of a stay of the proceedings. Nor do I find that costs on a substantial indemnity basis are owed. I have also reduced the Applicant’s costs award because the Applicant filed additional unnecessary motions and made a number of serious, unfounded allegations about Respondent’s counsel.
II. Procedural History
[7] Mr. Shehu is a citizen of Albania who arrived in Canada in January 2012. He became a permanent resident in December 2014.
[8] The interconnected procedural steps involved with the three applications for judicial review underlying these motions may be easier to understand with reference to a diagram:
[9] In December 2020, the CBSA prepared a report under section 44(1) of IRPA alleging that Mr. Shehu is inadmissible under section 36(1)(b) of IRPA for “serious criminality”
because of a conviction in Albania. In July 2022, the CBSA referred the matter to the Immigration Division for an admissibility hearing (“July 2022 Referral”). Mr. Shehu challenged the July 2022 Referral (IMM-7042-22). The parties reached a settlement agreement. The judicial review was discontinued, and the matter was sent back to be redetermined by a different Minister’s delegate.
[10] In April 2023, another Minister’s Delegate referred Mr. Shehu’s case to an admissibility hearing at the Immigration Division (“April 2023 Referral”). Mr. Shehu challenged the April 2023 Referral (IMM-6817-23). Mr. Shehu argued procedural fairness was breached by the Minister’s failure to provide adequate disclosure – namely, the judgment from Albania that the CBSA relied upon to find he was convicted in absentia for drug trafficking in Albania. Prior to leave being decided in IMM-6817-23 – the challenge to the April 2023 Referral – the Immigration Division proceeded with the admissibility hearing in November 2023. In March 2024, the Immigration Division found Mr. Shehu inadmissible under section 36(1)(b) of IRPA and issued a removal order (“Admissibility Decision”). That same month, Mr. Shehu challenged the Admissibility Decision (IMM-5218-24).
[11] On June 6, 2024, this Court granted leave to hear Mr. Shehu’s challenge to the April 2023 Referral.
[12] On July 31, 2024, the Court Registry inquired by email whether the parties would consent to have the related matters (April 2023 Referral and Admissibility Decision) heard together. Mr. Shehu’s counsel indicated that he opposed this approach, while the Minister thought it would be possible to proceed in this way. I note that at this point, leave had not been granted with respect to the Admissibility Decision, and the hearing of the April 2023 Referral was set to be heard two weeks later, on August 14, 2024. Ultimately, neither of the parties nor the Court took any further steps to join the matters.
[13] The judicial review hearing of the April 2023 Referral proceeded on August 14, 2024, before ACJ St-Louis. On October 2, 2024, ACJ St-Louis found the Minister’s Delegate breached procedural fairness on the basis of the lack of disclosure of the judgment in absentia from Albania (Shehu v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2024 FC 1532).
[14] From October 2024 until the end of January 2025, Mr. Shehu’s counsel contacted counsel for the Minister in an effort to reach an agreement that the Admissibility Decision was null and void following ACJ St-Louis’ decision quashing the April 2023 Referral. In two letters sent in November 2024, Mr. Shehu’s counsel advised the Court if no agreement was reached between the parties, the Applicant would file a “motion for directions”
regarding the legal effect of ACJ St-Louis’ judgment.
[15] On January 21, 2025, this Court issued a Production Order in the judicial review of the Admissibility Decision.
[16] On February 11, 2025, a Minister’s Delegate advised Mr. Shehu that they will be redetermining whether his matter should be referred under section 44(2) of IRPA to an admissibility hearing. Mr. Shehu made further submissions in that process.
[17] On February 19, 2025, Mr. Shehu filed a motion in writing asking that the Admissibility Decision be declared “void and of no force or effect”
. Mr. Shehu also alleged that Respondent’s counsel was acting in bad faith. The Minister did not respond directly to this motion. Instead, approximately two weeks later, the Minister filed a motion asking the Court to suspend the determination of Mr. Shehu’s motion and hold in abeyance the judicial review of the Admissibility Decision. The Minister advised that this was necessary because “the Respondent intends to file a motion pursuant to Rule 399(2)(b) of the
Federal Court Rules in file IMM-6817-23, requesting that the Court set aside the order of Justice St-Louis as the respondent has reasons to believe it was obtained by fraud.”
The Minister did not explain in this motion the basis for their fraud concern.
[18] The Minister’s motion for a suspension and abeyance then prompted Mr. Shehu to file, on March 10, 2025, a motion asking for a permanent stay of proceedings. Mr. Shehu argued in this motion that the Minister’s conduct in this matter now amounted to an abuse of process that warranted a stay of proceedings.
[19] On March 15, 2025, on redetermination, the Minister’s Delegate again found that Mr. Shehu’s case had to be referred to the Immigration Division (“March 2025 Referral”). Mr. Shehu promptly filed an application for leave and judicial review challenging the March 2025 Referral (IMM-5854-25).
[20] A few days later, the Minister asked that the files be specially managed. Mr. Shehu opposed this request, arguing that the motion for a permanent stay of proceedings was determinative of all the issues raised in the various motions and the Court needed to address it first. The Court ordered that the judicial review applications of the Admissibility Decision and the March 2025 Referral be specially managed and a case management judge was assigned.
[21] On April 9, 2025, Mr. Shehu brought another motion asking for a permanent stay of proceeding in relation to the judicial review application of the March 2025 Referral. In their response to this motion, dated April 22, 2025, the Minister indicated for the first time that they were no longer considering bringing a reconsideration motion with respect to ACJ St-Louis’ judgment. Further, the Minister now agreed that the Admissibility Decision should be quashed and not sent back to be redetermined, and that the March 2025 Referral should also be quashed. Mr. Shehu replied that the Minister’s sudden change in position further supported their view that a permanent stay of proceedings and costs on a substantial indemnity basis were warranted.
[22] Approximately five weeks later, the Minister filed two further motions – one in each of the pending judicial review files (the Admissibility Decision and the March 2025 Referral). The Minister called each of these motions a “motion for consent to judgment”
. The Minister argued that the Court should order the Admissibility Decision to be quashed on the basis of ACJ St-Louis’ judgment and the March 2025 Referral should be quashed and remitted back to a Minister’s Delegate for the referral process to “start anew”
. The Minister also asked that these motions be heard orally. Mr. Shehu’s counsel did not directly respond to the Minister’s two new motions and instead responded by filing further motions in both pending judicial review files, arguing that the Minister’s most recent motions were not “on consent”
and this was a further reason that a permanent stay of proceedings and costs were warranted.
[23] At this point, with eight motions pending before the Court, the case management judge asked for the parties to each explain their position on the sequencing of the motions for the hearing or on the disposition of the motions. The parties could not agree on how to proceed. The Court ordered that any remaining responses to the pending motions be filed by July 11, 2025. The Minister filed responses to Mr. Shehu’s motions. The Minister also filed a Notice of Abandonment with respect to its motion that sought an abeyance of the judicial review of the Admissibility Decision and the suspension of Mr. Shehu’s motion to declare the Admissibility Decision “void and of no force or effect”
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[24] The Court set the motions to be heard over two days in December 2025. On the Friday, before the Monday hearing, Mr. Shehu’s counsel indicated that he could not attend the hearing due to a health-related condition but asked that the Court proceed with the hearing in his absence as he would rely solely on his written representations in the motions. On December 8, 2025, the Court held a short hearing.
III. Analysis
[25] Given the interrelated nature of the various motions, and the fundamental shift in the Minister’s position regarding both the motions and underlying judicial review applications, I will not address each motion separately in strict chronological order.
A. Admissibility Process
[26] The process for proceeding with an admissibility allegation against an individual begins with a section 44(1) report that sets out the allegations. The Immigration Division can only adjudicate that allegation if the Minister’s Delegate makes a referral under section 44(2) to the Immigration Division for an admissibility hearing.
44 (1) An officer who is of the opinion that a permanent resident or a foreign national who is in Canada is inadmissible may prepare a report setting out the relevant facts, which report shall be transmitted to the Minister.
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44 (1) S’il estime que le résident permanent ou l’étranger qui se trouve au Canada est interdit de territoire, l’agent peut établir un rapport circonstancié, qu’il transmet au ministre.
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(2) If the Minister is of the opinion that the report is well-founded, the Minister may refer the report to the Immigration Division for an admissibility hearing, except in the case of a permanent resident who is inadmissible solely on the grounds that they have failed to comply with the residency obligation under section 28 and except, in the case of a foreign national, in the prescribed circumstances. In those cases, the Minister may make a removal order.
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(2) S’il estime le rapport bien fondé, le ministre peut déférer l’affaire à la Section de l’immigration pour enquête, sauf s’il s’agit d’un résident permanent interdit de territoire pour le seul motif qu’il n’a pas respecté l’obligation de résidence ou, dans les circonstances visées par les règlements, d’un étranger; il peut alors prendre une mesure de renvoi.
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[27] The core issue animating the motions before me was raised in Mr. Shehu’s first motion: namely, whether when a referral to the Immigration Division under section 44(2) of IRPA is quashed, the admissibility decision issued by the Immigration Division which resulted from the section 44(2) referral, must also be quashed.
[28] This principle is no longer a contentious issue between the parties. The Minister now cites in their last motions, filed in May 2025, the very jurisprudence cited by Mr. Shehu in settlement discussions, and in his first motion before this Court, namely: Hernandez at para 5; Abdul at para 24; and Lawrence at para 5.
[29] This is certainly not a new issue. Over twenty years ago, Justice Snider explained in Hernandez at paragraph 5:
The third of the decisions--the deportation order-[from the Immigration Division]-came as a consequence of the officer's report and the subsection 44(2) referral. If I overturn either of those two decisions, the order deporting the applicant should not stand. Conversely, should I affirm those two decisions, the deportation order is valid. No separate submissions were made and no issue arises with respect to the deportation order.
[30] Justice Walker reiterated this position in Abdul at paragraph 24:
If either or both of the subsection 44(1) and 44(2) decisions are quashed by this Court, the ultimate decision by the ID removing an applicant should not stand (see Hernandez v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 429 at para 5).
[31] This makes sense. The Immigration Division’s determination cannot be sound if the very basis for the referral to it has been quashed. Moreover, to conclude otherwise would lead to the untenable situation in which Mr. Shehu has found himself in – namely, the CBSA considering whether to refer him to an admissibility hearing to determine whether a removal order should be issued when a removal order is already in place.
[32] All parties accept that the Immigration Division’s Admissibility Decision must be quashed because the referral to the Immigration Division was already quashed. Further, all parties agree that the March 2025 Referral must also be set aside because it was made when the Immigration Division’s removal order was still in place. The remaining two issues – whether there has been an abuse of process warranting a stay of the admissibility proceedings and costs – both require an assessment of counsels’ conduct in these proceedings.
B. Remedy of Permanent Stay Not Warranted
[33] Mr. Shehu argues that the Respondent’s conduct in these proceedings is so egregious that it amounts to an abuse of process that warrants a permanent stay of the admissibility proceeding against Mr. Shehu.
[34] Abuse of process is a discretionary, flexible remedy that is rooted in a court’s inherent jurisdiction to prevent a misuse of its process that would be unfair to a party or otherwise bring the administration of justice in disrepute (Law Society of Saskatchewan v Abrametz, 2022 SCC 29 at para 35 [Abrametz]; Toronto (City) v C.U.P.E., Local 79, 2003 SCC 63 at paras 35 and 37.
[35] Mr. Shehu is not arguing that the Respondent’s conduct has affected his ability to have a fair admissibility determination process. He argues, under the residual abuse of process category, that to continue with the admissibility proceedings in these circumstances, where he contends the Respondent’s conduct has been “abusive, oppressive and retaliatory”
, is to bring the administration of justice into disrepute.
[36] I do not find that there is a sufficient basis on the record before me to find, as the Applicant argues, that the Respondent attempted to mislead the Court or engaged in retaliation. To make these findings, the Court would have to make a number of inferences and assumptions about the Respondent’s conduct that are not supported by the record.
[37] I agree with the Applicant, however, that there was no sound basis for the Respondent’s opposition to quashing the Immigration Division’s decision after ACJ St-Louis’ decision. The Respondent’s delays in coming to this realization caused a significant waste of resources for the Applicant and the Court both in having to address these motions but also because it resulted in the March 2025 Referral that must be set aside and redetermined anew.
[38] That being said, these delays, at most, if calculated from ACJ St-Louis’ decision to when the Respondent agreed that the Admissibility Decision could not stand, amounts to approximately six months of delay. I also acknowledge that the Applicant prepared submissions for the redetermination of the March 2025 Referral — a decision which the Respondent could have foreseen might need to be set aside because the removal order was still in place at the time. Ultimately, I find that the conduct at issue has caused a relatively short delay as well as the extra work in replying to motions and having to participate in a referral redetermination process that was faulty from the start and then having to challenge that faulty process in this Court.
[39] I do not find that the Respondent’s conduct in these proceedings meets the high threshold required to obtain a permanent stay of proceedings. It could not be described as “the ‘clearest of cases’, when the abuse falls at the high end of the spectrum of seriousness”
(Abrametz at para 83, citing Blencoe v British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), 2000 SCC 44 at para 120).
[40] In determining whether a stay is the appropriate remedy, “a balance must be struck between the public interest in a
fair administrative process untainted by abuse and the competing public interest in having the
complaint decided on its merits”
[emphasis in original] (Abrametz at para 84; see also Mamut v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2024 FC 1593 at para 117). In these circumstances, the balance is between a fair admissibility determination process untainted by abuse and the public interest in having a determination on whether Mr. Shehu is inadmissible to Canada based on an alleged criminal conviction in his country of citizenship. This leads to the question: “would going ahead with the proceeding result in more harm to the public interest than if the proceedings were permanently halted?”
(Abrametz at para 85).
[41] The answer here is straightforward given the conduct at issue is far from meeting the high threshold required. There also remains significant unresolved questions to be determined through the admissibility process about the alleged criminal conviction and annulment process in Albania.
C. Special Reasons for Costs
(1) Costs are Warranted
[42] Costs are generally not awarded to either party in citizenship, immigration or refugee protection matters before this Court. Rule 22 of the Federal Court Rules provides that costs may only be awarded where there are “special reasons”
. Misleading or abusive conduct or unreasonable and unjustified delay have been found to constitute a “special reason”
that may justify making a cost award (Ndungu v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FCA 208 at para 7; M.F.S. v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 321 at para 5).
[43] The Minister takes the position that there are no “special reasons”
to grant costs because it is a procedurally odd and complex situation that is, in part, of the Applicant’s own making. The Minister argues that Mr. Shehu should have consented to having both matters (the judicial review applications of the April 2023 Referral and the Admissibility Decision) heard together as proposed by the Court Registry. Further, the Minister argues that their initial reluctance to have the Immigration Division’s Admissibility Decision quashed was reasonable given that there was evidence of inconsistent statements by Mr. Shehu in the two proceedings.
[44] While the various motions have added to the complexity of these proceedings, I do not find the core issue at the heart of the initial dispute was complex. Nor do I find that the presence of alleged inconsistent statements by Mr. Shehu or not having the matters heard together supports the Minister’s view that this made the matter complex or that the Applicant was to blame for how the events unfolded.
[45] Ideally, the two related matters (the judicial reviews of the April 2023 Referral and the Admissibility Decision) would have been heard together. In this case, unlike many that are heard together, there was a significant time delay between the April 2023 Referral and the Admissibility Decision issued approximately a year later in March 2024. This meant that when the judicial review of the April 2023 Referral was to be heard, leave had not yet been granted with respect to the Admissibility Decision challenge.
[46] Moreover, often in these cases, the judicial review of an admissibility decision relies on the same arguments raised in the challenge to the referral decision – in recognition that the Immigration Division’s decision will fall if the section 44(2) referral decision falls. In this case, on judicial review of the Admissibility Decision, Mr. Shehu only raised arguments about the substance of the Admissibility Decision and none about the April 2023 Referral Decision. In these circumstances, given the time lapse between the two matters and the distinct issues raised in the challenge to the Admissibility Decision, it is unsurprising that these matters were not joined.
[47] To support its view that the procedural issues were a problem of the Applicant’s making, the Minister relies heavily on email exchanges between both counsel and the Court Registry approximately two weeks prior to the judicial review hearing of the April 2023 Referral. I am not persuaded that these emails assist the Minister’s position.
[48] The Court Registry asked if the parties consented to having the two related matters joined. Mr. Shehu’s counsel responded that they opposed joining the matters because distinct legal issues were raised and, in any event, a favourable decision in the judicial review of the April 2023 Referral would make the issues at stake moot in the challenge to the Admissibility Decision. Mr. Shehu’s counsel also pointed out that there was a pending motion at the leave stage with respect to the application for leave and judicial review of the Admissibility Decision – the Respondent’s motion requesting an extension of time to file their record.
[49] The Respondent’s counsel took the position that the matters should be heard together so that the Court would have the complete record for both files. The Respondent’s counsel also noted that, for the matters to be heard together, the Court would have to adjourn the judicial review hearing of the April 2023 Referral, which was scheduled to be heard in two weeks. In the other matter, there was no decision on leave, the Respondent had not filed a record and was awaiting a decision on an extension of time, and no certified tribunal record had been produced. Mr. Shehu’s counsel responded that he acknowledged the Respondent’s counsel’s position on joinder of the files and indicated that he had no further submissions on the issue, but added that, should the Court decide to join the files, the matters should be heard by videoconference.
[50] The Minister points to these emails to argue that Mr. Shehu’s opposition to joinder of these matters is the source of the problem. I cannot accept this. Mr. Shehu’s counsel stated their views as to why the matters should not be joined. There is nothing inherently unreasonable about the position given the circumstances. The Court did not join the files. The Minister did not make a motion to the Court to have the files joined. The April 2023 Referral judicial review hearing proceeded on August 14, 2024. The Minister did not raise any concerns with proceeding in this way.
[51] In the meantime, the Minister was granted an extension of time to file submissions in the Admissibility Decision judicial review and did so on August 15, 2024, a day after the judicial review hearing of the April 2023 Referral. The same counsel was responsible for both judicial review matters at this stage – the Admissibility Decision and the April 2023 Referral. Yet, even after filing arguments in the challenge to the Admissibility Decision, the Minister raised no concern to ACJ St-Louis about alleged inconsistency of evidence between the two files.
[52] The second issue the Minister raises is that the procedural complexity is of Mr. Shehu’s own making because he took inconsistent positions in the two matters. The evidence relied on by the Minister to establish this alleged inconsistency is far from clear. I will not comment further on the nature of the alleged inconsistency for two reasons.
[53] First, the Minister never brought a motion for reconsideration of ACJ St-Louis’ Order. On the expectation that a motion for reconsideration would be brought, the Minister asked in February 2025 for the Court to suspend both Mr. Shehu’s initial motion and the judicial review of the Admissibility Decision. Recall that at this point, the Minister had access to the materials at issue in the Admissibility Decision judicial review since at least April 2024, had filed written submissions in that matter in August 2024 and had been in settlement discussions since October 2024. In April 2025, within a response to another motion, the Minister advised that no motion for a reconsideration of ACJ-St-Louis’ Order would be filed. The Minister formally abandoned the motion for suspension of Mr. Shehu’s motion and the Admissibility Decision judicial review in July 2025.
[54] Second, and more importantly, even if the Minister had brought this motion for reconsideration, it remains unclear to me why it would impact the core issue – the Immigration Division’s admissibility decision cannot stand where the underlying referral decision has been quashed. In other words, had the Minister succeeded in having ACJ St-Louis’ decision reconsidered, the decision to quash the Admissibility Decision would also necessarily have fallen as well. There was never a sound basis to not agree to and delay quashing the Admissibility Decision.
[55] The Minister’s opposition is particularly perplexing because the Minister never sought to suspend the effect of ACJ St-Louis’ Order that the section 44(2) referral be redetermined. This then led to the unsurprising result that the Minister’s Delegate, on redetermination, referred Mr. Shehu to an admissibility hearing (March 2025 Referral) at a time when Mr. Shehu’s removal order, that had been issued as a consequence of the April 2023 Referral, was still in place. The Minister now agrees the March 2025 Referral must be overturned because of a situation which was easy to foresee at the time the April 2023 Referral was sent to be redetermined.
[56] I also note the Minister has not explained the reason for the delays in determining whether it would pursue a motion for reconsideration. During the relevant time, the Minister was represented by the same counsel in the April 2023 Referral judicial review and the Admissibility Decision challenge. The Minister had access to the materials where there was an alleged inconsistency since at the latest June 2024 (when Mr. Shehu filed his further affidavit in the April 2023 Referral matter). In these circumstances, it is hard to understand why the Minister still did not know whether they would be seeking a motion to reconsider ACJ St-Louis’ Order at the time that Mr. Shehu brought his initial motion in February 2025, and further, why it took another two months to decide to not pursue it, and then another approximately three months to finally abandon its motion to suspend.
[57] I find that the Respondent’s actions, while not animated by bad faith, have caused unreasonable and unjustified delay resulting in a significant waste of resources for the Applicant and the Court. It is on this basis that I find there are special reasons within the meaning of Rule 22 of the Federal Court Rules to award costs against the Respondent. The core principle at issue in these proceedings was clear from the outset. The Immigration Division’s decision could not stand when the section 44(2) referral underlying it had been quashed. There was nothing particularly complex or unusual that would justify not agreeing that the Immigration Division’s decision had to be quashed.
(2) Quantum of Costs
[58] The Applicant is asking for substantial indemnity costs. I am not satisfied that the Applicant has demonstrated this sort of exceptional relief is warranted in these circumstances (Jahazi v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2024 FC 2072 at paras 32-33; Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Shen, 2025 FC 1175 at para 17).
[59] As I have explained, I do not agree with the Applicant that the Respondent’s conduct has been misleading, abusive, retaliatory or animated by bad faith. I do not find the evidence in the record supports these serious allegations. For example, I do not find that the Respondent’s counsel’s actions were animated by “vengeance”
and “retaliation”
when they argued that the Applicant’s memorandum of argument should not be accepted for filing because in their view, it exceeded the page limit requirements. Nor do I find that the Respondent’s counsel was attempting to mislead the Court by naming their motion a “motion for consent to judgment”
when the Applicant had not consented; while the title on the front page may have caused confusion, it is abundantly clear from the Respondent’s submissions that the Applicant continued to oppose settlement in the manner proposed by the Respondent. There is also no basis to the Applicant’s assertion that the Respondent’s “motion for consent to judgment”
is a “thinly veiled attempt”
to distract the Court from adjudicating the Applicant’s motions for permanent stays of proceedings.
[60] The costs owed are reduced because I find the Applicant contributed to the prolonging of these proceedings by bringing unnecessary motions. For example, having already asked for a permanent stay of proceedings in earlier motions, it was unnecessary to bring further motions in both files asking again for a permanent stay of proceedings based on the Respondent filing a “motion for consent to judgment”
. The Applicant could have simply responded to the Respondent’s motion.
[61] The costs are also reduced because Applicant’s counsel made a number of unfounded, serious allegations about the Respondent’s counsel throughout his motion materials that led to additional complexity in resolving these proceedings (Contreras Monterroso v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 170 at para 12).
[62] Having considered the circumstances of the motions before me, I exercise my discretion to award the Applicant an all-inclusive lump sum cost award of $1500.00.
IV. Disposition
[63] In conclusion, the parties and the Court agree that the application for judicial review in IMM-5218-24 (the Admissibility Decision) is allowed. The Admissibility Decision is set aside. The application for leave and judicial review in IMM-5854-25 (the March 2025 Referral) is allowed and the matter is sent back to be redetermined by a different Minister’s Delegate. The Applicant’s motions for a permanent stay of proceedings are denied. With respect to both files (IMM-5218-24 and IMM-5854-25), the Applicant is awarded an all-inclusive lump sum cost award of $1500.00.
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