Docket: IMM-6352-25
Citation: 2026 FC 490
Montréal, Québec, April 14, 2026
PRESENT: The Honourable Madam Justice Ferron
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BETWEEN: |
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DAMNEET SINGH BHULLAR
JANOOR SING BHULLAR |
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Applicants |
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and |
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION |
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Respondent |
JUDGMENT AND REASONS
I. Overview
[1] The Applicants, Damneet Singh Bhullar and Jasnoor Singh Bhullar, are citizens of India and are both minors. They fled India with their mother for fear of harm from the Punjab police who assaulted her in April 2022, after their father disappeared, and from “goons”
connected to a woman with whom their father had a relationship outside of his marriage. The Refugee Protection Division [RPD] granted refugee protection to the Applicants’ mother upon finding that she faces a serious possibility of persecution in India as a woman facing gender-based violence. However, the RPD refused the Applicants’ claims for protection under sections 96 and 97 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA].
[2] The Applicants appealed the RDP decision to the Refugee Appeal Division [RAD]. They argued that they are in the same situation as their mother and that the RPD did not consider their situation as minors. They submitted that they are in a vulnerable position because their mother now has refugee status in Canada and their father is missing.
[3] On March 5, 2025, the RAD upheld the decision of the RPD that dismissed the Applicants’ application for protection because they did not show that they would face a serious possibility of persecution, which would be required for them to be granted refugee status under section 96, nor that they face a risk to their life or a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment or a danger of torture [section 97 harm] in India [Decision].
[4] For the reasons that follow, the Application for judicial review will be dismissed.
II. Decision under Review
[5] The RAD’s Decision is the only one under review. The RAD based its Decision on the following conclusions: 1) the Applicants have not shown a risk of being targeted by their mother’s persecutors because they are members of her family; 2) the totality of evidence (provided by the Applicants and available in the National Documentation Package [NDP] for India) does not show that a return to India as male teenage-aged minors without parents would give rise to a well-founded fear of persecution or to a risk of section 97 harm.
[6] To support its conclusions, the RAD notably noted that:
1) there is no evidence that their mother’s agents of persecution ever showed any interest in the Applicants be it before they left India or since their departure;
2) the NDP shows that India “has an adequate legal framework to protect children” and that the Applicants could have access to care, shelter, and healthcare even should none of their relatives take them in;
3) although the Applicants may not have access to further free education given that they are over 14 years old, this does not equate to persecution, and there is no difference in access between children with parents and abandoned or orphaned children;
4) although abandoned or orphaned children may be more exposed to other risks, including sexual abuse and violence, boys such as the Applicants are less at risk than girls and the NDP shows that “India continues to work on improving access to justice for children who are victims of offences or who have their rights violated”.
III. Standard of Review
[7] The parties submit, and the Court agrees, that the applicable standard of review is reasonableness. In accordance with the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 [Vavilov]. A reasonable decision is “one that is based on an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis and that is justified in relation to the facts and law that constrain the decision-maker”
(Vavilov at para 85; Mason v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 SCC 21 at para 8). A reviewing court must not assess an administrative decision-maker’s reasons against a standard of perfection (Vavilov at para 91). Rather, their reasons are to be read holistically and contextually in order to understand “the basis on which a decision was made”
(Vavilov at para 97). In order to withstand scrutiny, a decision must exhibit the requisite attributes of justification, transparency, and intelligibility (Vavilov at para 99). A decision should only be set aside if there are “sufficiently serious shortcomings”
such that it does not exhibit the requisite attributes of “justification, intelligibility and transparency”
(Vavilov at para 100)
IV. Analysis
[8] Given that the RPD granted refugee protection to the Applicants’ mother, one could legitimately expect that the same decision would automatically be rendered for her two minor children, if only based on the principle of family unity. However, this Court has recognized that family unity is not considered at the time of refugee status determination In fact, the law is clear that each family member must establish their right to refugee status or protection individually so “a grant of refugee status does not, by itself, entitle the other members of the same family to refugee status”
except when a child’s claim is inextricably linked to that of their parent (Ly v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 379 [Ly] at paras 11-13 cited approvingly in Ekema v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 1556 [Ekema] at para 14; Vartia v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 1426 at para 22; Hidalgo Cahuich v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2024 FC 1963 at para 36).
A. The RAD did not err in finding that the Applicants do not face a serious possibility of persecution or a likely risk of section 97 harm based on their mother’s persecution
[9] The Applicants submit that the RAD erred in its conclusion that they do not face a serious possibility of persecution based on being members of their mother’s family. They argue that they are in the same situation as their mother and therefore face the same risk as her. As the RAD states in its Decision, the Applicants “argue that they are easy targets for their parents’ persecutors because they are minors and there would be no one to protect them against the agents of harm”
.
[10] The Respondent submits that the Applicants are only expressing disagreement with the RAD’s findings and asking the Court to reweigh the evidence to come to a more favourable result. During the hearing, the Respondent noted that the Applicants’ memorandum before this Court is nearly identical to the one presented before the RAD, thereby supporting this position. The Respondent further argues that the RAD examined the evidence and reasonably found that the agents of persecution who targeted the Applicants’ mother did not show interest in them, be it when they were in India or after their departure.
[11] First, the fact that the submissions made to this Court and those presented to the RAD are largely similar, as the Respondent highlighted, is evident when the two are compared. In fact, the memorandum of argument that the Applicants presented to this Court is titled “Appellants’ Memorandum”
, and the Applicants are often referred to therein as “the Appellants”
, as if we were before the RAD.
[12] Second, the RAD notes in its Decision that “the evidence in the record shows that both alleged agents of persecution (…) have not harmed or threatened the Appellants before they left India”
and, since they left, the police and the “goons”
who visited their relatives only enquired regarding their parents. A review of the file shows that the RAD’s statement is reasonable. For instance, the Applicant’s uncle relates in his affidavit: “The police visited my house after every 2-3 months till now and questioned me and my mother to reveal the address and location of Sukhjit and her husband”
. He adds that “ASI Hamam Singh raided my house in the evening of 20th March 2024 and started looking for Sukhjit and Karamkeet”
. The same transpires from the Applicants’ grandmother’s affidavit.
[13] A review of the RPD hearing transcripts also confirms that the RAD’s conclusion was reasonable. The mother said to the RPD when speaking about her persecutors: “They said to me that I should leave my husband, and if I don’t, they start beating us up, and they said to my husband that he should listen to Preeti, otherwise, they will kill him”
. Further, to the questions as to whether these people harmed, made threats and said anything to her sons, she responded “no”
. To the questions as to whether “Preeti’s goons”
or the police ever made threats against her sons, she again responded “no”
. Finally, the transcript also shows that Damneet, one of the Applicants who was directly questioned by the RPD, said that the “goons”
had never said anything to him.
[14] At the end of the RPD hearing, the transcript shows that the RPD member tells the Applicants’ counsel that he would be particularly interested to find in counsel’s submissions the “forward-facing risk for the two minor claimants”
. In response, the counsel’s submissions focused on a speculative risk to the Applicants: “certainly the police, given the type of society they live, that the police would come to know of their return and in one way or the other, perhaps they would cross paths with them and (….) that they make it out on their children”
. As for the harsh consequences that they would face going back to India, counsel stated “it would be unduly harsh in the case of the children to be taken away from their mother”
and “I think it’s relevant that one must consider the emotional state of the claimant as a factor that is relevant to the question of reasonableness of IFA”
.
[15] The RAD again highlighted that “[t]he Appellants have provided limited arguments on their fear of persecution based on their status as minors. They have not given details on how their rights would be violated in a sustained or systemic manner, and why the state would fail to protect them”
.
[16] In light of the above, I find that the Applicants did not demonstrate how they would face a serious possibility of persecution or a likely risk of section 97 harm based on their mother’s persecution. The RAD properly weighed the evidence and reasonably concluded that since no threats had been made to or against them when they were in India (as well as since they left), the agents of persecution had no ongoing interest in harming them. The Applicants failed to discharge their onus to demonstrate that the RAD’s conclusion on the lack of forward-looking risk was unreasonable.
[17] Last, the Applicants never specifically pleaded that their claims were inextricably linked to the one of their mothers. There is no exhaustive definition of what constitutes inextricably linked claims but having reviewed the examples in the Federal Court’s jurisprudence (see notably Ly at para 15), I fail to see how the case at bar could fall in this category. Given the conclusion laid out above, the Applicant’s have not established any legitimate fear arising from the same source as their mother’s.
B. The RAD did not err in finding that the Applicants do not face a serious possibility of persecution or a likely risk of section 97 harm if they return to India as minors without parents
[18] The Applicants submit that the RAD failed to take into account special considerations in dealing with minors. They argue that the deprivation of necessities that will happen should they be separated from their mother (as their father is nowhere to be found) is “more of a certainty rather than a mere possibility”
. According to them “undeniably, [the Applicants] in this case face persecution as defined by Chairperson’s Guideline 3”
(Chairperson’s Guideline 3: Proceedings Involving Minors at the Immigration Refugee Board) [Guideline 3]. Specifically, they argue that they will be “denied of their necessities, especially their caregiver, emotional support, and most likely even health care and education”
should they return to India without their parents to care for them, which would “constitute harm rising to the level of persecution for minors”
, without citing any caselaw to support their argument.
[19] They also contend that there would not be anyone who could “protect them against the agents of harm”
should they return alone to India, hence making the possibility of harm being committed to them “not at all speculative”
. To support this argument, they cite objective evidence from the NDP, which shows that India does not have adequate systems to care for minors, let alone orphans, and Guideline 3.
[20] Finally, they submit that the RAD failed to consider the best interests of the children, leading to a decision which not only “disregards the appellants’ well-being but also fails to recognize the trauma associated with separating them from their primary caregiver – their lone remaining parent”
and cite article 3 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, May 28, 1990, Can TS 1992 No 3, which mandates that the best interests of the child be taken into account in any decision concerning them, and article 9 which provides that “[n]o child should be separated from his or her parents against their will unless it is in the child’s best interests. Children whose parents have separated have the right to contact and a relationship with both parents, unless that’s not in the child’s best interests”
.
[21] At the hearing, counsel for the Applicants also put emphasis on paragraph 3(2)f) of IRPA, which states that one of the objectives of the legislation is “to support the self-sufficiency and the social and economic well-being of refugees by facilitating reunification with their family members in Canada”
.
[22] In response, the Respondent instead submits that the RAD’s findings regarding the Applicants’ situation as minor children without parents are reasonable. The Respondent argues that the RAD applied the appropriate guideline and principles outlined in the case law regarding the persecution of minor children and conducted a thorough assessment of the information contained in the NDP.
[23] The Respondent further argues that the consideration of the Applicants’ best interests, as children, relates to procedural safeguards rather than the substantive aspect of refugee determination, and disagrees with the Applicants that the RAD failed to consider family separation in their refugee claim determination. The Respondent contends that family unity is not a factor that can be considered when assessing a claim for protection under sections 96 and 97 of IRPA.
[24] A review of the evidence shows that the Applicants did not provide any evidence that adequately supports their arguments. The Applicants refer to objective evidence in the NDP that shows that: 1) “a significant portion of the Indian children population is stunted”
; 2) there is a great disadvantage “affecting orphans – which appellants effectively are – with respect to access to something as basis as water and sanitation”
; 3) “orphaned and/or abandoned children are also more at risk for abuse”
; and 4) “orphanhood negatively affects virtually all facets of a child’s personality, but most especially their psychological well-being”
. While all of these conclusions can indeed be drawn from NDP, the RAD found that the Applicants did not show how specifically this would apply to them. Indeed, the Applicants are teenagers, close to becoming adults, and the evidence they relied upon is not relevant to their particular circumstances. They instead relied mostly on general country evidence.
[25] The RAD undertook a thorough analysis of the objective country evidence. The RAD first cited Kim v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 149 [Kim] from which it excerpted the four following principles:
● The denial of rights recognized in international human rights instruments such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) may determine if a child has a well-founded fear of persecution.
● If a child’s rights under the CRC are violated in a sustained or systematic manner demonstrative of a failure of state protection, that child may qualify for Convention refugee status.
● There are nuances to the determination of whether a child fits the Convention refugee definition. These nuances are based on an appreciation that children have distinct rights, are in need of special protection, and can be persecuted in ways that would not amount to persecution of an adult.
● The best interests of the child cannot substantively influence whether a child is a refugee, but the best interests of the child are central to the procedure by which to reach a decision.
[26] The Court finds no error in this summary.
[27] The RAD then assessed the information contained in the NDP while examining the following points specifically: 1) the legal framework to protect children; 2) access to care and shelter; 3) access to healthcare; 4) access to education; and 5) protection against other vulnerabilities and access to justice. The RAD concluded that the Applicants would not be denied access to any fundamental rights based on their status as minors living without their parents and that a return to India as minors without parents would not give rise to a well-founded fear of persecution, including given their gender and their age. A review of the evidence in front of the RAD confirms the reasonableness of its conclusions.
[28] Furthermore, and despite the Applicants’ argument that suggests that the RAD’s Decision leads to an “absurd”
situation in which the Applicants will face a greater risk of persecution in India should they be separated from their mother (Ekema at paras 13-14), as mentioned above, the Court has stated on numerous occasions that family unity is not a consideration in determining whether an individual is a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. In Ly, at paragraphs 11-13, Justice Grammond provides a relevant summary of the principle of family unity in Canadian law and confirms that this principle is not taken into account at the time of refugee status determination. Therefore, the granting of refugee status does not, by itself, entitle the other members of the same family to refugee status.
[29] As Justice Diner summed up in Sadiq v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 267: “harsh as it may be, families may be split up through the refugee determination process. There are certainly claims where siblings or cousins, for instance, do not enjoy the same result, as their factual bases differ”
(at para 28).
[30] With regards to the argument made by the Applicants that the RAD did not adequately take into account the best interests of the children in its analysis, I agree with the Respondent’s reliance on the Ekema decision in which Justice Diner stated that « [t]his concept that the best interests of the child relate to procedural safeguards, rather than substantive content of refugee determination, is also reflected in the Chairperson’s Guideline 3: Child Refugee Claimants – Procedural and Evidentiary Issues, which states that “in determining the procedure to be followed when considering the refugee claim of a child, the [decision maker] should give primary consideration to the best interests of the child”
. The applicability of the best interests analysis to refugee claims was recently discussed by this Court in Weche v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 649, where Justice McHaffie held at paragraph 45 that “the RAD did not err when it determined that it did not have the discretion to consider the best interests of the child in dealing with the claim for refugee protection at issue”
.
[31] This is consistent both with article 3 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and with this Court’s jurisprudence on the link between a Best Interest of the Child (BIOC) analysis and the refugee determination process. As Justice Shore stated in Kim at paragraph 7 through 9 and 76:
[6] Turning to the context before the Court, it is noted that section 96 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (IRPA) is not discretionary, but instead prescribes a certain test which must be met by a claimant. The IRPA does not permit the section 96 test to be compromised even if it is in the best interests of the child to remain in Canada. It is clear that the best interests of the child cannot substantively influence the answer with regard to whether a child is a refugee, but the best interests of the child are central to the procedure by which to reach a decision.
[7] The Guidelines for Child Refugee Claimants (Chairperson’s Guidelines Refugee Protection Division. Guideline 3: Child Refugee Claimants: Procedural and Evidentiary Issues: Guidelines Issued by the Chairperson Pursuant to Section 65(3) of the Immigration Act, effective September 30, 1996) (Guidelines) direct the RPD to take the best interests of the child into consideration in a procedural, not a substantive, manner. The Guidelines state: “In determining the procedure to be followed when considering the refugee claim of a child, the CRDD [now the RPD] should give primary consideration to the best interests of the child” (Guidelines, at page 2). The majority of the Guidelines are devoted to ensuring the procedures used by the RPD are in the best interests of the child.
[8] The Court notes that Article 3(1) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child [November 20, 1989, [1992] Can. T.S. No. 3] (CRC) does not stipulate how the best interests of the child are to be considered. Article 3(1) of the CRC states:
In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.
[9] It is clear that Article 3(1) of the CRC does not state that the best interests of the child are to be a substantive consideration of every decision which affects children. The Court concludes that there is more than one manner by which decision makers may consider the best interests of the child. Section 96 of the IRPA takes the best interests of the child into account because of the specific procedural and evidentiary considerations in the Guidelines. It is recognized that procedural and evidentiary considerations may be different for other determinations outside of the refugee framework; the key is to ensure that the best interests of the child are considered in context, within the framework of the determination to be made by a tribunal or entity deciding the case, dependent on its particular jurisdiction and legal purpose as set out in legislation.
[…]
[76] The Canadian immigration system provides for several methods by which to gain entry into Canada, one of which is to be a refugee under section 96. Section 96 provides a strict definition that is either met or not by the claimant in question. If the definition is met, then the claimant may be able to enter Canada as a refugee. If, on the other hand, the definition is not met, then the claimant may not enter Canada pursuant to that section and other options become available to him or her. One remaining option is pursuant to section 25, wherein the Minister in his discretion may grant an exemption “from any applicable criteria or obligations of” the IRPA. It is under section 25 that a substantive and thorough analysis of the best interests of the child is performed. At the stage of a section 96 application, it is sufficient that the best interests of the child are taken into account procedurally, as directed by the Guidelines. The Court must reiterate that the best interests of the child cannot shoehorn a refugee claimant into the section 96 definition if the child’s claim would otherwise be rejected, but it can influence the process which leads to that decision.
(All underlining in the original)
[32] As concerns the importance of family reunification both as an objective of IRPA and a principle enshrined in the Convention on the Rights of the Child, this question was cogently addressed by Justice Grammond in Ly (at paras 12-14). He explained that “in Canadian law, the principle of family unity is not taken into account at the time of refugee status determination”
(underlining added) and:
[14] The principle of family unity is incorporated into Canadian law by different means. A person who has obtained refugee status may include family members in their application for permanent residence: Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227, sections 1(3), 2 and 176. Eligible family members are the spouse or common-law partner, a dependent child or a dependent child of the dependent child, but not the parents of the person who has obtained refugee status. When a person cannot rely on these provisions of the Regulations, it is possible to make an application based on humanitarian and compassionate considerations, pursuant to section 25 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA]. Several of the decisions mentioned above allude to these possibilities.
[33] The Applicants, in their memoranda (both to the RAD and to this Court), relied on the decision X (Re), 2019 CanLII 127361 (CA IRB) and stated that “although the minor appellant in that case was not found to be a Convention refugee, it is submitted that one major factor which influenced the decision is the fact that the minor appellant had a father in Lebanon which would be responsible for him”
. A close read of the decision does not indicate that the relationship with and location of the Applicant’s father was the determinative factor in the analysis.
[34] In light of all of the above, I find that the RAD’s assessment of the evidence and its application of the jurisprudence of this Court to this particular case was reasonable. It was reasonable to conclude that there was no evidence in the record to suggest that the Applicants would face a serious possibility of persecution or a likely risk of section 97 harm should they return to India as male teenage-aged minors without parents. I agree with the Respondent that the Applicants cited general principles and guidelines that the RAD had already cited and applied. Hence, the Applicants did not demonstrate specifically how the RAD’s decision was unreasonable.
V. Conclusion
[35] Upon reviewing the record before the Court, including both parties’ written submissions, as well as the applicable law, the Court finds that the Applicants did not meet their onus to demonstrate that the RAD’s decision is unreasonable. Therefore, the application for judicial review will be dismissed.
VI. Other recourses for the Applicants
[36] The Applicants, through their counsel, admitted during the audience that their mother had included them in her permanent residence’s application. Legal principles and the Court’s caselaw indeed suggest that this is the appropriate avenue to have the two minors stay Applicants in Canada (Ly at para 14):
A person who has obtained refugee status may include family members in their application for permanent residence: Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227, sections 1(3), 2 and 176 . Eligible family members are the spouse or common-law partner, a dependent child or a dependent child of the dependent child, but not the parents of the person who has obtained refugee status. When a person cannot rely on these provisions of the Regulations, it is possible to make an application based on humanitarian and compassionate considerations, pursuant to section 25 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA].
[37] Thus, as previously noted, there remain viable and meaningful pathways for the Applicants to seek permanent residency in Canada. Furthermore, the best interests of the child carry significant weight in an H&C application.
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