Date: 20260313
Docket: T-1207-25
Citation: 2026 FC 347
Ottawa, Ontario, March 13, 2026
PRESENT: The Honourable Madam Justice Turley
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BETWEEN: |
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RICHARD DAVIES |
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Applicant |
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and |
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THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA |
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Respondent |
JUDGMENT AND REASONS
I. Overview
[1] The Applicant, a self-represented litigant, was denied Employment Insurance [EI] benefits because the Employment Insurance Commission [Commission] determined that he did not have just cause for leaving his employment as there were other reasonable alternatives. On reconsideration, the Commission maintained the denial of benefits.
[2] The Social Security Tribunal’s General Division upheld the Commission’s decision, and the Tribunal’s Appeal Division refused to grant the Applicant leave to appeal the General Division’s decision. The Applicant seeks judicial review of the Appeal Division’s denial of leave, arguing that it made numerous factual and legal errors.
[3] I am dismissing the judicial review application because the Applicant has failed to demonstrate any reviewable errors in the Appeal Division’s decision, which found that an appeal had no reasonable chance of success.
II. Background
A. Application for EI benefits
[4] The Applicant worked as a bunk haul truck driver with Scamp Transport Ltd. [Employer] for thirteen months (between June 27, 2023, and August 1, 2024). On August 1, 2024, he resigned and applied for EI benefits. In his application, the Applicant stated that he had been “dismissed or suspended”
because he “refused to perform a specific job”
outside his job description: Application for EI benefits, Respondent’s Record [RR], Vol I at 151–154.
[5] The Applicant further asserted that his employment ended due to his “constructive dismissal”
as his Employer had unilaterally changed his terms and conditions of employment, and that he had been subjected to “harassing behaviour from dispatch”
: Application for EI benefits, RR, Vol I at 156.
[6] According to the Record of Employment [ROE] filed by the Employer, the Applicant “quit”
his job: ROE dated August 7, 2024, RR, Vol I at 166.
[7] Between August 30, 2024, and September 19, 2024, a Service Canada EI benefits officer contacted both the Applicant and the Employer to request further details, information, and documentation about the Applicant’s reason for separation from employment: Supplementary Records of Claim, RR Vol I at 168, 180–182.
[8] The Applicant maintained that he was constructively dismissed as he was hired as a bunk driver or long haul truck driver but was occasionally asked by dispatch to make in-town deliveries. He explained that he had been asked to do in-town work approximately five times during his thirteen months of employment. The Applicant further asserted that truck dispatch was intentionally manipulating his shifts: Supplementary Record of Claim dated September 11, 2024, RR, Vol I at 180.
[9] The Employer stated that the Applicant voluntarily left his employment. The Employer’s Human Resources and Payroll officer [HR officer] told the Service Canada officer that, after completing his shift on August 1, 2024, the Applicant advised her that he was not happy with the workload he had been given that day. The Applicant advised her that he was giving his two weeks’ notice and resigning: Supplementary Record of Claim dated August 30, 2024, RR, Vol I at 168.
[10] Later that day, the Employer’s Human Resources Manager [HR Manager] emailed the Applicant advising him that the HR officer had passed on his message. He asked the Applicant whether he preferred to work during the two weeks’ notice period or end his employment then: Email dated August 1, 2024, RR, Vol I at 322. According to the Applicant’s notes, during a call with the HR Manager, the Applicant told him he had “lost trust in dispatch”
due to intentional, deliberate delays since July 2024: Applicant’s notes dated August 1, 2024, RR, Vol I at 323.
[11] The Commission decided that the Applicant was not eligible for EI benefits because he voluntarily left his employment without just cause, as defined in the Employment Insurance Act, SC 1996, c 23 [EI Act]. More particularly, it determined that “leaving [his] employment was not the only reasonable alternative in [his] case”
: Letter dated September 23, 2024, RR, Vol I at 183.
[12] The Applicant sought reconsideration of the Commission’s decision under section 112 of the EI Act. In support, the Applicant submitted documents outlining his allegations about the Employer’s actions, including harassment, bullying, and constructive dismissal: Request for Reconsideration dated October 2, 2024, RR, Vol I at 185–233.
[13] A Service Canada officer spoke with the Applicant on January 2, 2025, about his reasons for leaving his employment. The Applicant stated that he had no alternative to leaving as he was being bullied and harassed at work, but he could not provide specific incidents or persons involved. Further, he said he felt undermined at work due to the intentional delays by dispatch that led to long wait times and further delays that resulted in him having to make in-town deliveries on his fifth day of work. Finally, the Applicant said that “everything really compounded”
in his last month of work, that he had not looked for work prior to quitting because he had some money saved, and that he had a solid resume so he “thought he would be hired easily”
: Supplementary Record of Claim dated January 2, 2025, RR, Vol I at 241–242.
[14] During the call, the Service Canada officer explained that the decision to deny the Applicant EI benefits would be maintained on the following basis:
Explained to client that the duties of having to fill his shift with in-town work was not unreasonable given the conditions of his employment, and that there is no proof that hew as [sic] targeted or that the delays were intentional to harass him, and that a reasonable alternative to explore prior to quitting given the circumstances would have been to find alternative employment.
Supplementary Record of Claim dated January 2, 2025, RR, Vol I at 242
[15] This decision was confirmed by letter dated January 2, 2025: RR, Vol I at 244. As the Appeal Division noted, however, there is a typographical error in that letter in that it says the decision was “reversed”
where it should have said it was “maintained”
: Social Security Tribunal of Canada, Appeal Division – Leave to Appeal Decision dated March 11, 2025 [Appeal Division Decision], RR, Vol I at 15.
B. The General Division Decision
[16] In his appeal to the General Division, the Applicant argued that leaving his job was his only reasonable option because he was being harassed and had been placed in an unsafe work environment. He stated that he was provided with shifts that were paid less money and included in-town work, even though he was only hired for bunk or long haul work. He asserted that this amounted to constructive dismissal. He also alleged that his shifts would be changed at the last minute without any prior notification and that this impacted his pay. As a result, the Applicant argued that he was forced to leave his employment and therefore had just cause: Social Security Tribunal of Canada, General Division – Employment Insurance Section Decision dated February 17, 2025 [General Division Decision] at paras 6–7, RR, Vol I at 40.
[17] As a first step, the General Division determined that the Commission had established that the Applicant voluntarily left his employment; that he was not terminated: General Division Decision at paras 10–13, RR, Vol I at 41–42. The General Division found that the Applicant submitted his resignation out of frustration, thinking that his Employer “would reach out to him to try to fix the problem.”
Instead, the HR Manager accepted his resignation: General Division Decision at para 11, RR, Vol I at 41.
[18] Next, the General Division considered whether the Applicant had established “just cause”
for leaving his employment, in accordance with section 30 of the EI Act: General Division Decision at paras 14–34, RR, Vol I at 42–45. In that regard, it dealt with each of the three reasons the Applicant had cited as support for having just cause to quit.
[19] First, the General Division was not satisfied that the Employer placed the Applicant in an unsafe work condition. This allegation arose out of one incident involving an implied request that he work longer than 15 hours. The General Division found that the Applicant “refused this request and nothing further came of it”
: General Division Decision at paras 21–22, RR, Vol I at 43.
[20] Second, the Applicant argued that he was constructively dismissed from his job because the Employer unilaterally changed the terms of his employment contract. The General Division explained that where an employee leaves their job voluntarily, the only relevant inquiry is whether they had just cause: General Division Decision at para 27, RR, Vol I at 44.
[21] The General Division concluded that the Applicant had failed to demonstrate that there had been significant changes in work duties to establish just cause. The evidence was that he had only been requested to work in-town on a few occasions. Furthermore, the General Division determined that the Applicant had reasonable alternatives to leaving his job, such as speaking to human resources or refusing to take the in-town shifts, as he had done in the past: General Division Decision at paras 23–25, RR, Vol I at 43–44.
[22] Finally, the General Division considered the Applicant’s allegations of bullying and harassment by dispatch; that they would change his shifts and send him on in-town deliveries: General Division Decision at para 29, RR, Vol I at 55. In the circumstances, the General Division found that the Applicant had alternatives to quitting. He could have filed a complaint with either the Workers’ Compensation Board or Employment Standards or sought alternative employment before leaving: General Division Decision at paras 31–34, RR, Vol I at 45.
C. The Appeal Division Decision
[23] The Applicant sought leave to appeal the General Division’s decision, arguing a breach of procedural fairness, as well as errors of fact and law: Application to the Appeal Division dated February 2, 2025, RR, Vol I at 31–38. The Appeal Division found that none of these arguments had a reasonable chance of success and thus denied leave to appeal: Appeal Division Decision at paras 6, 38, RR, Vol I at 15, 21.
[24] With respect to a breach of procedural fairness, the Applicant argued that the General Division’s process was unfair because it “cut him short on time”
and he was not permitted to speak about the law and the Commission’s Digest of Benefit Entitlement Principles [Digest]: Appeal Division Decision at para 12, RR, Vol I at 16. Having listened to the audio recording of the hearing, the Appeal Division determined that the General Division did not rush the Applicant nor cut him off at any point. Rather, it found that the “hearing concluded naturally.”
Furthermore, the hearing went overtime by nearly 45 minutes: Appeal Division Decision at paras 15–18, RR, Vol I at 17. On this basis, the Appeal Division concluded that there was “no arguable case that the General Division didn’t follow a fair process”
: Appeal Division Decision at para 18, RR, Vol I at 17.
[25] The Appeal Division rejected the Applicant’s arguments that the General Division erred in law by failing to follow the Digest, by not affording him the “benefit of the doubt,”
and by imposing a requirement that he contact a third party to receive benefits: Appeal Division Decision at paras 19–25, RR, Vol I at 18–19.
[26] The Appeal Division held that the Digest is an administrative tool that does not have the force of law and therefore need not be followed. Moreover, it concluded that the EI Act benefit of doubt provision (section 49(2)) is only for the Commission to apply. In addition, it determined that although the law may not explicitly require an employee to contact a third party, the EI Act does require claimants to demonstrate that they had no reasonable alternative to leaving their employment. Here, the Applicant failed to establish that he had no reasonable alternative to leaving his employment. On these grounds, the Appeal Division found there was no arguable case that the General Division made any errors of law: Appeal Division Decision at para 26, RR, Vol I at 19.
[27] Lastly, the Appeal Division determined that there was no arguable case that the General Division made any errors of facts that justified granting leave to appeal. While the General Division made a minor factual error in stating that a man named Timo (a manager) was also a truck driver, the Appeal Division found that this error had no impact on the outcome of the Applicant’s case: Appeal Division Decision at paras 27–30, RR, Vol I at 19.
[28] The Appeal Division further determined that the General Division reasonably found, based on the evidence, that the Applicant had voluntarily left his employment on August 1, 2024, and that there was no indication it ignored, misunderstood, or failed to assess relevant evidence. Additionally, the Appeal Division found that the General Division considered the Applicant’s allegations and personal circumstances and reasonably concluded that he did not have just cause for leaving his employment as he had reasonable alternatives available to him, such as filing an external complaint or seeking alternate employment, before leaving: Appeal Division Decision at paras 31–35, RR, Vol I at 20–21.
III. Issues and Standard of Review
[29] On judicial review, the Applicant argues that the Appeal Division erred in refusing leave to appeal the General Division’s Decision. More particularly, he asserts that the Appeal Division erred in failing to find that the General Division’s hearing was unfair and that the General Division erred in law and fact when concluding that he voluntarily left his employment without just cause: Notice of Application dated April 9, 2025, RR, Vol I at 9.
[30] Both parties argued that the applicable standard of review is reasonableness. Indeed, it is well established that the standard of reasonableness applies to the merits of Appeal Division decisions refusing leave: Cecchetto v Canada (Attorney General), 2024 FCA 102 at para 4 [Cecchetto]; Kuk v Canada (Attorney General), 2024 FCA 74 at para 5; Bhamra v Canada (Attorney General), 2023 FCA 121 at para 3; Uvaliyev v Canada (Attorney General), 2021 FCA 222 at para 7.
[31] A reasonable decision is “one that is based on an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis and that is justified in relation to the facts and law that constrain the decision maker”
: Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 at para 85 [Vavilov]; Mason v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 SCC 21 at para 8 [Mason]. A decision should only be set aside if there are “sufficiently serious shortcomings”
such that it does not exhibit the requisite attributes of “justification, intelligibility and transparency”
: Vavilov at para 100; Mason at paras 59–61.
[32] However, Justice Southcott recently noted a divergence in the jurisprudence regarding the standard of review where an applicant challenges the Appeal Division’s determination concerning the fairness of a General Division proceeding: Halimeh v Canada (Attorney General), 2025 FC 2013 at para 19 [Halimeh]; Tymchuk v Canada (Attorney General), 2025 FC 1958 at paras 24–25; Yang v Canada (Attorney General), 2025 FC 169 at paras 25–26, 28 [Yang].
[33] As Justice Southcott points out, the Federal Court of Appeal’s decision in Milner v Canada (Attorney General), 2024 FCA 4 [Milner], supports the view that reasonableness is the proper standard of review when the issue at hand is whether the Appeal Division erred in assessing the fairness of the General Division’s process: Milner at para 24. In an earlier decision, however, the Federal Court of Appeal adopted the correctness standard: Sjogren v Canada (Attorney General), 2019 FCA 157 at paras 5–7, 10. Justice Southcott determined that it was not necessary to resolve the uncertainty because either standard of review produced the same result: Halimeh at para 26; Yang at para 28.
[34] Since the issuance of Justice Southcott’s decisions, the Federal Court of Appeal has concluded that the Federal Court correctly identified reasonableness as the applicable standard of review when determining whether the Appeal Division properly assessed allegations of procedural fairness in the General Division’s process: Sturgeon v Canada (Attorney General), 2026 FCA 46 at paras 9, 12 [Sturgeon]. Based on Sturgeon and Milner, I conclude that reasonableness is the appropriate standard of review to apply. That said, as set out below, the Appeal Division’s consideration of the Applicant’s procedural fairness argument withstands scrutiny under either standard.
IV. Analysis
[35] The Appeal Division’s jurisdiction on a leave application is “narrow”
: Ponomarov v Canada (Attorney General), 2026 FCA 50 at para 4. It can only grant leave to appeal if the proposed appeal has a reasonable chance of success on at least one of the grounds listed in subsection 58(1) of the Department of Employment and Social Development Act, SC 2005, c 34 [DESDA]: Cecchetto at para 5. These grounds are: (a) failure to observe a principle of natural justice or otherwise acting beyond or refusing to exercise its jurisdiction; (b) an error of law; or (c) an erroneous finding of fact made in a perverse or capricious manner or without regard for the material before it.
[36] A “reasonable chance of success”
has been interpreted as “having some arguable ground upon which the proposed appeal might succeed”
: Osaj v Canada (Attorney General), 2016 FC 115 at para 12; see also: Fancy v Canada (Attorney General), 2010 FCA 63 at paras 2–3; Gloglo v Canada (Attorney General), 2024 FC 1923 at para 35; Dubeau v Canada (Attorney General), 2019 FC 725 at para 28.
[37] For the reasons set out below, the Applicant has failed to establish that the Appeal Division made any reviewable errors in refusing leave to appeal.
A. No breach of procedural fairness
[38] The Applicant argues that the Appeal Division erred in failing to find that the General Division’s process was unfair. In particular, he asserts that the General Division concluded the hearing before he had finished submitting evidence: Notice of Application dated April 9, 2025 at 4, RR, Vol I at 9.
[39] After listening to the audio recording of the General Division hearing, the Appeal Division determined that the process was fair:
[16] The hearing was held in-person and it was scheduled for 60 minutes. It lasted around 1 hour and 43 minutes. There is no indication from the audio recording that the General Division rushed the Claimant or “cut him off” during the hearing. The Claimant spoke for most of the hearing and explained his position to the General Division. And the General Division asked him relevant questions throughout the hearing.
[17] Near the conclusion of the hearing, the General Division asked the Claimant if there was anything else to add. The Claimant then referred to the Digest suggesting that the General Division member was well versed with it. He pointed out that a lot of stuff in the Digest was not followed by “previous people.” However, he didn’t say anything else specifically about the law or the Digest. Since there were no further questions from the General Division, the hearing concluded naturally.
[18] The audio recording shows that the General Division did not stop or prevent the Claimant from presenting his case at any point during the hearing. The hearing lasted longer than was scheduled and the audio recording shows that the Claimant had an opportunity to present his case. There is no arguable case that the General Division didn’t follow a fair process.
[Citations omitted]
Appeal Division Decision, RR, Vol I at 17
[40] Based on the Appeal Division’s analysis, I am not persuaded that it erred, on either standard of review (reasonableness or correctness), in assessing the fairness of the General Division’s process. As demonstrated, the Appeal Division was alive to the relevant considerations: whether the Applicant knew the case to meet and had a full and fair opportunity to be heard: Canadian Pacific Railway Company v Canada (Attorney General), 2018 FCA 69 at para 56. The evidence simply does not support the conclusion that the Applicant’s right to procedural fairness was breached.
B. No errors of law
[41] Throughout his oral submissions before this Court, the Applicant continue to assert that he did not voluntarily leave his employment, but that he was constructively dismissed. The General Division dealt with this argument in a comprehensive manner: General Division Decision at paras 23–28, RR, Vol I at 43–44. The Appeal Division, in turn, concluded that the General Division had “correctly cited the law, the legal test and referred to relevant case law in its decision”
: Appeal Division Decision at para 26, RR, Vol I at 19.
[42] Notably, relying on the Federal Court of Appeal’s decision in Canada (Attorney General) v Peace, 2004 FCA 56 [Peace], the General Division explained that where an employee voluntarily leaves their employment, the only relevant inquiry under the EI Act is whether they had just cause: General Division Decision at para 27, RR, Vol I at 44. In Peace, the Court of Appeal held that the common law concept of constructive dismissal is “a different issue from the issue of whether an employee has voluntarily left employment under the [
EI Act] such that he may not be entitled to EI benefits”
: Peace at para 15; see also: Ponomarov v Canada (Attorney General), 2025 FC 328 at para 30.
[43] Subsection 30(1) of the EI Act makes clear that a claimant is disqualified from receiving EI benefits if they leave their job voluntarily and without just cause. What constitutes “just cause”
is governed by paragraph 29(c) of the EI Act. The test for determining whether an individual had just cause under section 29 of the EI Act is whether, having regard to all the circumstances, on a balance of probabilities, they had no reasonable alternative to leaving their employment: Canada (Attorney General) v Macleod, 2010 FCA 301 at para 2. Demonstrating that quitting is the only reasonable option is “an essential condition”
of paragraph 29(c) of the EI Act: Canada (Attorney General) v Hernandez, 2007 FCA 320 at para 2.
[44] The determination of whether an individual voluntarily left their employment without just cause is thus a fact-intensive inquiry. As discussed below, the Appeal Division reasonably found that the General Division made no factual errors in finding that the Applicant had voluntarily left his employment without just cause.
[45] The Applicant further argues that the Appeal Division erred in finding that the General Division’s failure to follow the Digest was not an error of law. I agree with the Respondent that the Appeal Division reasonably found that the Digest was an administrative tool that was not legally binding on the Commission or the General Division in the same way as legislation or jurisprudence: Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Thamotharem, 2007 FCA 198 at para 59.
[46] The Applicant also takes issue with the General Division’s conclusion that he had reasonable alternatives to leaving his employment, namely that he could have filed a complaint with the Workers’ Compensation Board or Employment Standards: General Division Decision at paras 31, 34, RR, Vol I at 45. He argues that there was “no statute or regulation that stipulates a claimant must contact a third party to qualify for receiving EI benefits”
: Application to the Appeal Division, RR, Vol I at 33. I find that the Appeal Division reasonably rejected this argument in concluding that while the law may not explicitly require a claimant to contact a third party, it does require them to prove that they had no reasonable alternative to leaving their job: Appeal Division Decision at para 24, RR, Vol I at 18.
[47] As already discussed, paragraph 29(c) of the EI Act specifically requires a claimant to establish that they had no reasonable alternatives to quitting. Here, the General Division found that the Applicant had several reasonable alternatives open to him. Filing an external complaint was simply one of them.
[48] Based on the foregoing, I find that the Appeal Division reasonably determined that the General Division made no errors of law.
C. No factual errors
[49] In seeking leave to appeal, the Applicant also argued that the General Division made several errors of fact.
[50] In accordance with paragraph 58(1)(c) of the DESDA, the Appeal Division can only grant leave to appeal where the General Division bases its decision on erroneous factual findings “made in a perverse or capricious manner or without regard for the material before it”
. This has been articulated as “a more stringent test than evidentiary reweighing and asks the [Appeal Division] to consider whether the factual findings of the General Division were unreasonable, not whether they were incorrect”
: Garvey v Canada (Attorney General), 2018 FCA 118 at para 5 [Garvey].
[51] The Appeal Division acknowledged that the General Division made a “minor factual error”
in stating that Timo was a driver, in addition to a manager, at the Employer. However, it reasonably determined that the General Division’s decision “was not based on this particular fact”
: Appeal Division Decision at para 30, RR, Vol I at 19. In other words, the precise role of Timo, the individual to whom the Applicant raised concerns regarding dispatch, was not material to the General Division’s analysis.
[52] The Applicant further asserted that the General Division made a factual error in finding that he voluntarily left his employment and that he did not have just cause since reasonable alternatives to quitting existed. As the Appeal Division correctly articulated, the General Division is the trier of fact; the Appeal Division is thereby not entitled to reassess or reweigh the evidence to reach a more favourable outcome: Garvey at para 11.
[53] The Appeal Division reasonably determined that the General Division’s finding that the Applicant voluntarily left his employment was wholly consistent with the evidence:
The evidence in the file shows that the [Applicant] gave a verbal resignation to another staff member after what he described as a frustrating day at work on August 1, 2024. His own notes show that he “gave X two weeks notice—she will talk to X and advise him.” His record of employment says that he “quit.” The employer also told the Commission that the [Applicant] quit his job. And the [Applicant] told the Commission that he left his job and provided his reasons for doing so.
[Citations omitted]
Appeal Division Decision at para 32, RR, Vol I at 20
[54] Moreover, the Appeal Division made no reviewable error in finding that the Applicant had no arguable basis to challenge the General Division’s conclusion that he lacked just cause to leave his job. Whether an individual has established just cause is “a factually-suffused question”
: Green v Canada (Attorney General), 2020 FCA 102 at para 9.
[55] After considering the Applicant’s allegations and circumstances, the General Division found that the Applicant had several reasonable alternatives to leaving his employment, such as speaking to his manager, refusing to take in-town shifts (as he had done previously), filing a complaint with the Workers’ Compensation Board or Employment Standards, or seeking alternate employment. I agree with the Appeal Division that, in the circumstances, these were all reasonable steps open to the Applicant, in accordance with paragraph 29(c) of the EI Act, as opposed to quitting. The jurisprudence is clear that a claimant, in most cases, is required “to attempt to resolve workplace conflicts with an employer, or to demonstrate efforts to seek alternative employment before taking a unilateral decision to quit a job”
: Canada (Attorney General) v White, 2011 FCA 190 at para 5.
[56] For these reasons, I find that the Appeal Division reasonably concluded that the Applicant had no reasonable chance of success on appeal with respect to the errors of fact alleged.
V. Conclusion
[57] The Applicant has failed to establish that the Appeal Division made any reviewable errors in refusing leave to appeal the General Division’s decision. The Respondent did not seek their costs, and I agree that none should be payable.
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