Docket: IMM-23383-24
Citation: 2025 FC 2002
Ottawa, Ontario, December 18, 2025
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Ahmed
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BETWEEN: |
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ADEDUNNI OLUBANKE AKINTUNDE-IGE |
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Applicant |
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and |
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION |
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Respondent |
JUDGMENT AND REASONS
I. Overview
[1] The Applicant, Adedunni Olubanke Akintunde-Ige, seeks judicial review of a decision made by the Refugee Appeal Division (“RAD”
), dated November 27, 2024, confirming the decision made by the Refugee Protection Division (“RPD”
) that the Applicant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection pursuant to sections 96 and 97(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27. The determinative issue was the existence of a viable internal flight alternative (“IFA”
) in Abuja, Nigeria.
[2] For the reasons that follow, I find that the RAD’s decision is reasonable. This application for judicial review is dismissed.
II. Background
[3] The Applicant is a 61-year-old citizen of Nigeria.
[4] The Applicant is currently retired but previously worked for an American oil company in Nigeria. The Applicant states that she retired from the company because Muslim fundamentalists and Ijaw Militants threatened and attacked her and her family. The Applicant also served as a volunteer nurse in her hometown as part of her Christian missionary work.
[5] On May 25, 2022, the Applicant left Nigeria. In November 2022, after staying in the United States and United Kingdom, the Applicant came to Canada and filed a refugee claim.
[6] In a decision dated May 22, 2024, the RPD refused the Applicant’s refugee claim because it found that she had an IFA in Abuja. The Applicant appealed the RPD’s decision to the RAD.
[7] In a decision dated November 27, 2024, the RAD affirmed the RPD’s decision that the Applicant had a viable IFA.
[8] The RAD found that the Applicant did not provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate that Ijaw militants or Muslim fundamentalists attack retirees or would recognize her if she relocates to Abuja. Specifically, the RAD noted that, as a retiree, the Applicant would no longer have visible signs of employment with an oil company. The RAD acknowledged the Applicant’s belief that Ijaw militants have a prolific presence and already recognize and target her. But the RAD found that it lacked evidence to show that the militants targeted retirees across Nigeria and found that the Applicant was speculating about the Ijaw militant’s ability to track her.
[9] Further, the RAD was not convinced that the Applicant’s medical philanthropy in her hometown would lead Muslim fundamentalists to pursue her in Abuja. The RAD found that the evidence failed to show that Muslim fundamentalists communicated between the Applicant’s hometown and Abuja. The RAD noted that the Applicant faced elevated risk as the sole financer of a Christian ministry in her hometown, but she would be one of many financers in Abuja.
[10] Because the RAD found the Applicant did not face the same risks as when she worked for the oil company, the RAD determined that she would not have to live in hiding or hire armed escorts in Abuja.
[11] The RAD also concluded that relocating to Abuja is reasonable. The Applicant submitted that relocating to Abuja would negatively impact her health. But the RAD found that the impediments to the Applicant’s health did not rise to the level of “actual and concrete evidence”
that relocating to Abuja is unreasonable.
III. Issue and Standard of Review
[12] The sole issue in this judicial review is whether the RAD’s decision is reasonable.
[13] The standard of review is reasonableness (Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 (“
Vavilov”
)).
[14] Reasonableness is a deferential, but robust, standard of review (Vavilov at paras 12-13). The reviewing court must determine whether the decision under review, including both its rationale and outcome, is transparent, intelligible and justified (Vavilov at para 15). A reasonable decision is one that is based on an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis and that is justified in relation to the facts and law that constrain the decision-maker (Vavilov at para 85). Whether a decision is reasonable depends on the relevant administrative setting, the record before the decision-maker, and the impact of the decision on those affected by its consequences (Vavilov at paras 88-90, 94, 133-135).
[15] For a decision to be unreasonable, the applicant must establish the decision contains flaws that are sufficiently central or significant (Vavilov at para 100). Not all errors or concerns about a decision will warrant intervention. A reviewing court must refrain from reweighing evidence before the decision-maker, and it should not interfere with factual findings absent exceptional circumstances (Vavilov at para 125). Flaws or shortcomings must be more than superficial or peripheral to the merits of the decision, or a “minor misstep”
(Vavilov at para 100).
IV. Analysis
[16] The Applicant submits that the RAD unreasonably focused on her retirement status from an oil company, instead of her volunteering as a missionary nurse, when it concluded that she had a viable IFA. The Applicant further submits that the RAD erred in concluding that Abuja is a reasonable IFA because she would have to pay for security guards and live in hiding. At the hearing, the Applicant also submitted that the RAD incorrectly raised the standard of proof for the Applicant to show that the IFA is unreasonable.
[17] I am not persuaded that the RAD ignored evidence when it found that Ijaw militants and Muslim fundamentalists would not target the Applicant in Abuja due to her volunteer nursing. The RAD accepted that the Applicant’s volunteer work in her hometown may have led Muslim fundamentalists to target her, especially because she was the sole financer of the ministry. The RAD nevertheless found that there was simply not enough evidence showing that the Muslim fundamentalists in the Applicant’s hometown communicate with those in Abuja.
[18] Moreover, the RAD’s assessment of the reasonableness of the IFA does not conflict with this Court’s precedent. Contrary to the Applicant’s submission at the hearing, the RAD’s statement that the Applicant must show “actual and concrete”
evidence reflects the applicable standard and does not form a basis for a reviewable error (Ranganathan v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)(CA), 2000 CanLII 16789 at para 15 (FCA); Obregon Caicedo v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 CanLII 68761 at para 13 (FC)).
[19] Further, I agree with the Respondent that the Applicant raised arguments in this review about the IFA’s reasonableness that she failed to raise before the RAD. In particular, the Applicant did not contest the reasonableness of the IFA due to her need to hire armed escort when she appealed to the RAD. The Applicant cannot now claim an error in the RAD’s analysis because it did not address an argument that the Applicant did not raise until this judicial review (Kumar v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 839 at para 24).
[20] In any case, the RAD addressed whether the Applicant would be required to hire an armed escort in Abuja. It found that the Applicant did not face the same risks in Abuja as when she worked for the oil company and was required to maintain armed escorts in the city.
[21] In my view, the RAD reasonably found that Abuja is a viable IFA for the Applicant. I accept the Respondent’s argument that the Applicant has failed to identify any overriding error within the RAD’s decision that warrant this Court’s intervention. Instead, the Applicant simply disagrees with the outcome that the RAD reached upon weighing the evidence before it. In the absence of any exceptional errors, I find that this Court must refrain from interfering with the RAD’s factual findings (Vavilov at para 125).
V. Conclusion
[22] The RAD’s determination that Abuja is a viable IFA is transparent, intelligible, and justified in light of the factual and legal constraints before it (Vavilov at para 99). The RAD did not misapprehend the Applicant’s evidence or ignore her key arguments. I therefore find that the RAD’s decision is reasonable and dismiss this application for judicial review.
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