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The Respondent says that where the deceased has given or purported to give property to trustees under a trust whereby the income from that property is to be paid in the discretion of the trustees either to persons named in the trust document, or, in the trustees discretion, to other persons not named therein, the value of the property so transferred may not be deducted under Section 7(1) (d) of the Estate Tax Act since: (a) neither the trust nor the trustees are “an organization constituted exclusively for charitable purposes” within the meaning of Section 7(1) (d) of the Estate Tax Act; (b) the alleged gift to the trustees is not in law a gift to them that is absolute and indefeasible since they are a mere conduit pipe or vehicle the function of which is to hold the property subject to the terms of trust and to pay the income therefrom to named or unnamed recipients in their discretion; (c) to the extent that the gift may, in law, properly be considered to be a gift to the ultimate recipients or beneficiaries thereof, it is not absolute and indefeasible since there is no assurance that any of them will receive any portion of the alleged gift. ... John Frederick Pemsel, [1891] A.C. 531; that the evidence established that the alternative “educational institutions” which the trustees of The Harshman Foundation could select for the purpose of paying them the income from the fund of The Harshman Foundation instead of to either or both of the Institute of Citizenship or the Macdonald Institute, were intended by the deceased to be only educational institutions in Canada* [1]; and that the purposes of the gifts inter vivos and by the will in this case were ‘‘absolute and indefeasible’’ within the meaning of Section 7(1) (d) of the Estate Tax Act as judicially considered in the Guaranty Trust Company of Canada in the capacity of Executor of the Will of Dorothy Elgin Towle, deceased v. ... M.N.R., [1941] Ex.C.R. 33; [1940-41] C.T.C. 330, were all cases where the Court held that under the relevant statutory provisions being considered in each, the trust was not a “charitable institution”. ...

First the cost of animal fats is higher than other available oils and secondly the product so manufactured is hard and not considered as desirable as those manufactured with other oils. ... Northern Crown Bank (supra) the question that the Supreme Court considered was whether sawn lumber is a product of the forest’’ within the meaning of those words in the Bank Act. ... I do not think that, in common parlance, the words ‘‘ product of fish’’ can be considered as comprehending margarine, even though it contains fish oil as one of its principal ingredients. ...

He was familiar with it, having become interested in it first in 1964, when he considered that it would be a good revenue producing development. ... However, although these are valid considerations, there is the other side of the coin to be considered also. ... But I find it difficult to believe his insistence that the thought of selling the property never crossed his mind and that he had never even considered the possibility of selling it. ...

The motel units were acquired by the appellant in Edmonton in September 1959, because the appellant considered them to be a good deal. ... The appellant also incorporated a finance company to deal in conditional sales agreements which were considered too risky for acceptance by established companies in this field. ... However, the appellant considered that the purchase of the motel units was too good a deal to pass up. ...

On these facts, counsel for the appellants submitted, among other things, that it was not necessary to establish a legitimate business reason for these series of transactions but that in any event, there was such a reason in this, namely to enable the said son and said son-in-law of the appellant Craddock to purchase an equity in the business; that the legal form of the transactions should govern, which was critical here because all the transactions were real and none artificial; that the appeals are against the assessments which were based on a deemed dividend under Section 81(1) of the Income Tax Act and therefore Section 137(2) of the Act could not be considered in deciding whether or not the appellants are taxable as a result of what was done here; that alternatively if Section 137(2) of the Act could be considered, that subsection was not a ‘‘gateway’’ into Section 81(1) of the Act; that alternatively, also, if a “gateway”, Section 81(1) of the Act was inapplicable because the “benefit” referred to in Section 137(2) of the Act must be conferred on shareholders of a corporation and at the time of the liquidation dividend the appellants were not shareholders of Allied Heating Supply Ltd.; that in any event, Section 137(2) of the Act deals with taxes on ‘‘benefits’’ and in these inter-related transactions there was either a quid pro quo or a loss, and therefore no “benefit”; and that the tax advantage obtained cannot be the “benefit” because a tax advantage cannot be conferred by anyone in that it arises by operation of law. ... (In like manner, if the circumstances of the inter-related transactions are such that it is correct that such ‘‘benefit’’ be ‘‘deemed to be a payment to a non-resident person to which Part III applies”, then for taxation purposes Section 137(2) of the Act should be considered in effect as being a separate section in Part III of the Act.) (In like manner, if the circumstances are such that it is correct that the “payment” be ‘‘deemed to be a disposition by way of gift to which Part IV applies’’, then for taxation purposes Section 137(2) of the Act should be considered in effect as being a separate section in Part IV of the Act.) ...

It was agreed between counsel that the matter might be considered as though the appellant held the land in fee simple and there was no dispute between them as to the amount of the gain realized by the appellant. ... If, after consideration of these facts, it should be concluded that the inference to be drawn is one of “trading”, then the matter must be considered to ascertain if there is some satisfactory explanation, consistent with the facts as found, which would negative that prima facie inference. ... Apparently the appellant considered the apartment to have been his most readily liquable asset. ...

The unlikelihood of the Syndicate ever drilling a well on its own account was expressed very clearly by Kidd, who, when asked if the Syndicate had ever considered drilling a well, said, “We talked if it come to the worst we would drill a well because we had, a few of us had a few dollars, we have businesses and farms’’. ... There is nothing in any of the Syndicate’s agreements which evidenced the intention of the members to hold and operate the leases themselves, and while they may have considered that the most desirable method, it is obvious they were willing to consider other methods, including the disposal of the leases themselves. ... It is what he did that must be considered and his declaration that he did not intend to make a profit may be overborne by other considerations of a business or trading nature motivating the transaction.’’ ...

Where an individual was resident in Canada during part of the taxation year, and during some other part of the year was not resident in Canada, was not employed in Canada and was not carrying on business in Canada, for the purpose of this Act, his taxable income for the taxation year is (a) his income for the period or periods in the year during which he was resident in Canada, was employed in Canada or was carrying on business in Canada computed as though such period or periods were the whole taxation year minus (b) the aggregate of such of the deductions from income permitted for determining taxable income as may reasonably be considered wholly applicable to such period or periods and of such part of any other of the said deductions as may reasonably be considered applicable to such period or periods.” ... R. 621, that: “To determine whether a person has ceased to be resident of any particular place, the duration of his previous residence, his connections with that community and his interest in it are circumstances to be considered.” ... As pointed out by Taschereau, J., in the Thomson case at p. 218 [[1946] C.T.C. at p. 58]: “Moreover in the majority of these cases, the taxpayer was held liable not because his visits to England were of such a nature that they were considered sufficient to qualify him as a resident’, but for the reason that he had never ceased to be a resident of England, and that his occasional absence had never deprived him of the status of British resident.’’ ...

The tenant of the supermarket had previously exhibited an interest in purchasing the premises that it occupied but this was not considered by the appellant. ... In order to obtain a realistic appreciation of the circumstances it is impossible to look solely to the activities of the appellant company, but rather the activities of all companies in the group must be considered together with those of Mr. ... From this conclusion it follows that the reason advanced for the sale must be considered. ...

In its income tax return for 1949 the appellant claimed an allowance under Section 1201 of the Regulations of $796,023.22, being 3312 per cent of $2,388,069.65, which it considered as its net profits for the year reasonably attributable to the production of oil and gas from the wells operated by it at a profit. ... In its income tax return for 1950 the appellant claimed an allowance of $981,738.41, being 3314 per cent of $2,945,215.23, which it considered as its net profits for the year reasonably attributable to the production of oil and gas from the wells operated by it at a profit. ... The amount of the allowance to which it was entitled must be considered in the light of the section read as a whole. ...