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He also argued that even if the Court was not bound by the relevant Information Circular, his course of conduct and his spirit of cooperation should be considered as factors bearing on the issue of penalty. ... It is clear that this payment could not be considered as a gift. The Appellant recognized that when he was first retained by Mr. ...

FACTS [5] From the various documents and testimony at trial, the following facts were assembled, determined to be relevant and considered by the Court. ... It must be considered in light of the successful appeal on the issue of sub-contractor expenses and the unique facts in this appeal. ...

</p>] 37 Counsel for the Respondent went on to compare the situation in the present case with that considered in each of the above-mentioned cases. ... Judge Lamarre Proulx of this Court commented as follows at page 155: On the evidence that was before me, I can only conclude that the Appellant's activities do not meet the threshold required for him to be considered as ‘carrying on a business’. ...

Pat Hasiuk: Re: Corporate Income Tax Returns for 1987, 1988, 1990 and 1991 Following our examination of Nasha Properties Ltd. for the above noted years, we are proceeding to initially assess the following as taxable income of the corporation for the years given: 1987 Unreported business income from various lot sales (see attached schedules) $43,797 Unreported taxable capital gain on the sale to Edison Carvalho ($54,439- $32,000- $4,122) × 50% $9,159 $52,956 1988 Unreported business income from various lot sales (see attached schedules) $72,594 1990 Unreported business income on the sale to Robert Hasiuk (see attached schedules) $14,599 Unreported taxable capital gain (reserve of $4,122 × 75%) 3,092 $17,691 1991 Unreported business income on the sale to Bill Hasiuk (see attached schedules) $19,599 The completion of our examination should not, however, be considered as permission to destroy any books and records. ... My examinations of the records shows that the Minister considered the application for an extension of time for the 1987 and 1988 taxation years, but refused it because it was not filed within the time limited by subsection 166.1(7) of the Act. ...

I have come to this conclusion based on the following analysis. [62] The perspective of the purchaser is widely considered to be a key factor in classifying a supply. ... The TCC considered which component was the “dominant element of the supply”; [45] and concluded the reward points in questions were “the most substantive aspect of the supply to which all else relates but there is in my view no substantive single supply of the financial services variety relied on by the Appellant.” [46] [70] I have concluded that the supply the Appellant provided to the Clients is best classified as a supply of nursing services. ...

He wrote as follows: [50] The subjective nature of the wilful blindness standard also means that the personal attributes of the individual may be considered in determining whether the individual is wilfully blind. [51] In contrast, the objective nature of the gross negligence standard means that the personal attributes of the individual are not relevant unless the individual establishes that he or she is incapable of understanding the risk the individual has failed to avoid (see R. v. Beatty, 2008 SCC 5, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 49 at paragraph 40). [48] In cases dealing with penalties assessed under subsection 163(2), and although not an exhaustive list, the courts have considered the following personal attributes and particular circumstances to be relevant: education, intelligence, knowledge and experience of the taxpayer; the magnitude of the advantage or omission; the opportunity to detect the false statement; the explanations provided by a tax preparer (see for example Torres v R, 2013 TCC 380, conf. ...

In Buckingham, the Federal Court of Appeal added that these circumstances must be taken into account, but must be considered against an objective, “reasonably prudent person standard.” [56] The Federal Court of Appeal in the Buckingham decision clarified that, in order to rely on the due diligence defence, a director must have taken active steps to prevent the failure to remit, rather than simply having taken steps after the fact to remedy the failure to remit. ... I was just giving him the list of costs and the list of materials that we need.” [79] Explicitly and intentionally not making remittances in the hopes of eventually being able to make them, as the Appellant did in this Appeal, has been considered by the jurisprudence. ...

.: — It was agreed at the commencement of the trial that the evidence given in one would be considered in the other, where applicable. ... Rebuttal In rebuttal counsel for the Respondent indicated that his argument with respect to the Appellants’ only having one horse at a time was made to show that there was no proper capitalization of assets and this had to be considered in whether or not there was a reasonable expectation of profit. ...

Choudhury stated that he had also considered that the laneway house was not a newly constructed property. ... However, I am prepared to accept the amount of $255,607.90 as construction costs on the basis of it being indicated on the partial worksheet (Exhibit A-4) and the Respondent having included this assumption of fact by virtue of the combination of paragraphs 14b) and c) in the Reply without raising any related concerns in the Reply or at the hearing. [42] Regarding the estimate of $100,000 for the land contiguous to the laneway house, the Appellant did not provide any details of how he arrived at his estimate other than to indicate that he considered the size of the land occupied by the garage. ...

He further submits that, if the Investor and Operating Partnerships were both valid partnerships in law: a) Each of the Investor Partnership, the Operating Partnership and Luxell did not deal with the others at arm’s length at all times material to this appeal within the meaning of section 251 of the Act. b) Under paragraph 69(1)(a) of the Act, the Operating Partnership is deemed to have acquired the assets of Luxell at their fair market value at that time, which was not $29,000,000 but nil; c) In computing its business income for the 2006, 2007 and 2008 fiscal periods the Operating Partnership is not entitled, pursuant to paragraph 20(1)(a) of the Act and Regulation 1100, to deduct any CCA in respect of the assets acquired from Luxell because their capital cost is nil; d) In computing its business income for the 2006, 2007 and 2008 fiscal periods, the Operating Partnership is not entitled, pursuant to paragraph 18(1)(a) of the Act, to deduct the expenses identified by the Minister as non-deductible and detailed in the attached Schedule “A”, as those expenses were either: i) not expenses of the Operating Partnership because they were the sole responsibility of Luxell under the Support Agreement; ii) double-claimed because the Operating Partnership deducted management fees paid to Luxell on the basis that Luxell was an independent contractor; or iii) not transferable to the Operating Partnership under the Support Agreement. a) In computing its income for the 2008 fiscal period, the Operating Partnership is required, pursuant to subsection 78(1) of the Act, to include the outstanding amount of the Service Note issued on December 31, 2005, because the Operating Partnership and Luxell were not dealing at arm’s length and the amount owing under that note remained unpaid at the end of the second taxation year following the taxation year in which the Service Note was issued. b) The losses of the Operating Partnership that may be allocated to the Investor Partnership do not exceed the amounts determined by the Minister as detailed in the attached Schedule “B”. c) The Operating and Investor Partnerships are both “tax shelter investments” for purposes of section 143.2 of the Act because an interest in either partnership was a property that is a tax shelter for purposes of subsection 237.1(1) of the Act. d) The losses of the Operating Partnership in the 2006, 2007 and 2008 fiscal periods are reduced under subsection 143.2(6) of the Act by the value of the outstanding Service Notes, including accrued interest, because: i) the value of the outstanding Service Notes was an “at-risk adjustment” of the Operating Partnership, within the meaning of subsection 143.2(2) of the Act, in respect of the expenditures represented by those notes; and ii) the value of the outstanding Service Notes was a “limited-recourse amount” of the Operating Partnership, within the meaning of subsection 143.2(7) of the Act, that can reasonably be considered to relate to the expenditures represented by those notes. i) The losses of the Investor Partnership are subject to a reduction under subsection 143.2(6) of the Act by the value of the outstanding Investor Notes and by the value of the outstanding Service Notes, plus accrued interest, because: i) the value of the outstanding Investor Notes was a “limited-recourse amount” of the Investors, within the meaning of subsection 143.2(7) of the Act, that can reasonably be considered to relate to those losses; and ii) the value of the outstanding Service Notes was an “at-risk adjustment” of the Investor Partnership, within the meaning of subsection 143.2(2) of the Act, in respect of those losses. ...