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Budnick stated BTI received two letters- both dated April 3, 1998- (Tabs 1 and 2)- advising that the Department of Human Resources Development had requested a ruling from Revenue Canada on the insurability and pensionability of each worker and the resultant ruling was that each worker was considered to be an employee under a contract of service with BTI. ... She stated BTI had been advised by Hansford when speaking to her husband, Terry Budnick, that he had applied for employment insurance benefits based on his previous employment as a dispatcher at Temor and had never regarded himself as having been in an employment relationship with BTI. [8]            Counsel for the appellant submitted the most important factor to be considered was the absence of control by the appellant over the work being performed by the workers either as to the manner of the hours during which the services were provided. ... M.N.R. 97-470(UI), a decision of The Honourable Judge Mogan, T.C.C., dated November 24, 1997, Judge Mogan considered the status of a person- Freeman Walters, the intervenor- who drove a truck for the appellant, a corporation carrying on business as a supplier to pizza restaurants. ...

MacDonald reviewed the tax problem from both GMCL's and GMAC's perspectives and considered that a major problem was that the nature of the relationship between the two corporations had never been documented. ... In the appeals at bar one is faced with contracts and relationships validly created in the normal course of business and I am not prepared to ignore them. [53] McLachlin J., as she then was, considered the matter of the respondent challenging a taxpayer's legal relationships in Shell Canada Ltd. v. ... Fridman describes an agency relationship in the following manner: Agency is the relationship that exists between two persons when one, called the agent, is considered in law to represent the other, called the principal, in such a way as to be able to affect the principal's legal position in respect of strangers to the relationship by the making of contracts or the disposition of property. [19] [64] The Civil Code of Quebec defines "mandate": [20] Le mandat est le contrat par lequel une personne, le mandant, donne le pouvoir de la représenter dans l'accomplissement d'un acte juridique avec un tiers, à une autre personne, le mandataire qui, par le fait de son acceptation, s'oblige à l'exercer. ...

Explain schooling and background A director has many duties in addition to meeting the payments due to the crown. we must act honesty and in the best interests of the company. a director can not be held liable for errors in judgement. directors are not expected to be trustees, their duties can be more varied and complex. at times directors are required to exercise business judgement and to take business risks that can range from conservatism to outright speculation. we did not go so far as outright speculation, we took calculated risks based on sound knowledge and the expectation that other people would act rationaly, who would expect that an investor who wants to regain his funds would block any action that would allow him to achieve that end. in the end our position was correct and rana did come to the table, however it was too late. as i do not have extensive schooling, no degrees but have relied on some night school to improve my business knowledge i should be expected to show a lower level of experience than an mba or fully trained manager, in that case we should rely on the skill of a professional and that we did. at all times we had consultants and mentors with years of professional experience to assist us. bill humphries head of small business division of earnst and young art brueton, ex manager for ibm, instrucor at ubc peter mogan, lawyer howard jones ex vp bank nova scotia paul sabina director vantage house section 227 should be considered in part with the canada business corporations act in that the wording is very close and it should be considered that the legislators intended the acts to work in concert with each other. in that event a director has other duties in addition to ensuring that the crown recieves there funds. a director must act honestly and in the best interests of the company. this means that we can not take deposits received from clients as these funds are taken so as to provide materials and labor to fulfill our contractual obligations. we must rely on profits to satisfy our debts. the standard of care is inherantly flexable, it must mirror the situation and circumstances at the time and take into account the experience and knowledge of the directors. the act requires directors to act proactively to prevent lapses and to remedy them if the occur. we did both to the extent of our resources and abilities. at all times we had a reasonable expectation that the company could be saved and that rc and our creditors would be satisfied, this is in keeping with more of the requirments placed on a director than just section 227. we were not, in our opinion at the time, wasting our efforts and we were at no time planing or acting to avoid, hide or prevent payments being made to rc. just the opposite. when we realized that we would not be able to remedy the situation through our work and that we would have to rely on preuter as a white night we offered our ecievable to rc, names and amounts so that they could be collected by rc. we met standard of care required. case should be dismissed. if not we should expect respite from interest. ... That being said, both of these directors must be charged with a high standard of care when one considers the test of “reasonable care” as set out in Soper, supra and the other cases. [98] According to the evidence of the Appellants themselves they considered their duty as directors to collect and remit the deductions to Revenue Canada as a very substantial duty and they were both aware that if the company did not make the requisite deductions and remittances that they could be held liable as directors. ...

I have now received and considered those written submissions. [6] While the opinions of the three expert witnesses are voluminous, and the documents relied upon by them, which were entered into evidence by consent of the parties, are even more so, there is no substantial difference among them as to the basic facts of history leading up to and surrounding the making of the treaties of 1760-61. ... They had long been victimized by unscrupulous traders; they wanted, and they got, assurances that in future they would receive fair value for the goods that they brought to trade. [35] The Appellants rely upon all the treaties entered into between the British and the Mi'kmaq between 1725 and 1768, but the focus of the argument was upon the identically worded treaties of 1760-61, which were those considered by the Supreme Court of Canada in Marshall. They must, of course, be considered in the light of the whole history of relations between the parties, including the other treaties. ...

RESPONDENT’S POSITION [24]         The respondent argues that the questions should be answered since the questions are relevant as they deal with issues raised in the pleadings. [25]         The respondent submits that in decisions dealing with trading, where the Courts had to determine whether a taxpayer was operating a business or whether the taxpayer was in the business of building and selling at a profit, this Court and the Federal Court of Appeal have indicated that the trading history of shareholders and officers should be considered in determining the intention of the corporation. ... Lemay should not be considered a third party since he is a shareholder, the president and an employee of the appellant. [27]         Finally, the respondent argues that the questions do not constitute a fishing expedition since the questions are relevant to the matters in issue. ... It is sound policy for the Court to adopt a liberal approach to the scope of questioning on discovery since any error on the side of allowing questions may always be corrected by the trial judge who retains the ultimate mastery over all matters relating to admissibility of evidence; on the other hand any error which unduly restricts the scope of discovery may lead to serious problems or even injustice at trial. [37]         It is also a well-known principle that a question can only be posed at discovery if the question is relevant. [38]         In Lehigh Cement Limited, Justice Dawson of the Federal Court of Appeal held that a question will be considered relevant if there is a possibility that it will help the party asking the question, damage the position of the opposing party or lead to a series of questions that will accomplish one of the two precedent possibilities. [3] However, she also held, that even if relevance is established, the Court still has discretion to disallow a question. [4] She explained as follows: 35   Where relevance is established the Court retains discretion to disallow a question. ...

In drawing the line between "ordinary" negligence or neglect and "gross" negligence a number of factors have to be considered. ... The case also considered whether that Court could hear and decide a constitutional issue when it had not been raised in the courts below by complying with the usual requirements of notice to the interested parties. ... No. 955, at paragraphs 41-43). [37]         I had the benefit of reading recent decisions by the Honourable Rommel Masse, Deputy Judge, in the cases of Chartrand v Canada, 2015 TCC 298, [2015] TCJ No. 231 (QL) and Spurvey v Canada, 2015 TCC 300, [2015] TCJ No. 232 (QL), wherein he conducted a thorough review of the relevant jurisprudence and the various factors to be considered when deciding whether the penalty imposed pursuant to the relevant subsection is justified. ...

Although I may not specifically refer to some of these authorities in my reasons for judgment, I can indicate that I have read and considered all of them in arriving at my decision. [20]         I begin by observing that our system of taxation is both self-reporting and self-assessing. ... He stated: 43. . . the law will impute knowledge to a taxpayer who, in circumstances that dictate or strongly suggest that an inquiry should be made with respect to his or her tax situation, refuses or fails to commence such an inquiry without proper justification. [31]         It has been held that in drawing the line between “ordinary” negligence or neglect and “gross” negligence, a number of factors have to be considered: (a)     the magnitude of the omission in relation to the income declared, (b)     the opportunity the taxpayer had to detect the error, (c)      the taxpayer’s education and apparent intelligence, (d)     genuine effort to comply. ... There may be other factors that need to be considered depending on the circumstances of any particular case. [34]         Therefore, in my view, liability for the gross negligence penalties provided for by subsection 163(2) of the Act can be found when the individual taxpayer has actual knowledge of the false statement contained in his return, is wilfully blind as to the existence of the false statement or has demonstrated recklessness or was otherwise grossly negligent in the making of, participating in, assenting to or acquiescing in the making of, the false statement. [35]         In the case at bar, I am satisfied that the Appellant did not knowingly make a false statement. ...

First, as stated in subsection 163(3) of the Act, the burden of establishing the facts justifying the assessment of the penalty is on the Minister. [11]         It is also recognized that each case must be considered on its own merits and that the facts must be given careful consideration by the Court to determine whether the Minister was able to meet his burden of proof. [12]         During oral argument, counsel for the Minister did not argue that the two taxpayers knowingly made a false statement or omission in their returns. ... Roy, not only as his lawyer, but also as a lawyer for his corporations, for about thirty years and considered him a friend and honest man, Mr. ... Côté considered him his friend, as Mr. Roy attended his mother’s funeral, and there was no reason to believe he was dishonest. ...

Groscki’s actions fall entirely within the definition of a legal representative in possession and control of EMI Macao’s property who, as legal representative: (1) under subsection 159(1), is jointly liable for EMI Macao’s unpaid tax liability during the currency he possessed and controlled the property and/or; (2) under subsection 159(3), failed to obtain a clearance certificate or pay the tax liability owing prior to distributing the property under his possession and control. d)     The necessary elements of section 159 (i) The statute [40]          A useful excerpt of the relevant subsections of section 159 and the relevant definition section within the Act are as follows: (1) Person acting for another 159 (1) For the purposes of this Act, where a person is a legal representative of a taxpayer at any time, (a) the legal representative is … liable with the taxpayer (i) to pay each amount payable under this Act by the taxpayer at or before that time and that remains unpaid, to the extent that the legal representative is at that time in possession or control, in the capacity of legal representative, of property that belongs or belonged to, or that is or was held for the benefit of, the taxpayer or the taxpayer’s estate, and (ii) to perform any obligation or duty imposed under this Act on the taxpayer at or before that time and that remains outstanding, to the extent that the obligation or duty can reasonably be considered to relate to the responsibilities of the legal representative acting in that capacity; and … (2) Every legal representative (other than a trustee in bankruptcy) of a taxpayer shall, before distributing to one or more persons any property in the possession or control of the legal representative acting in that capacity, obtain a certificate from the Minister, …, certifying that all amounts (a) for which the taxpayer is or can reasonably be expected to become liable under this Act at or before the time the distribution is made, and … have been paid …. ... In the absence of facts and circumstances that indicate a trustee and beneficiary relationship, it does not appear that the lawyer or law firm acting on behalf of a client in a commercial transaction would be considered to be a “legal representative” as defined in subsection 248(1) of the Act. … However, under subparagraph 159(1)(a)(i), a legal representative’s liability is limited to the property in his or her possession or control, in the capacity of legal representative, at the time that an amount becomes payable under the Act. [47]          In turn, the relevant excerpt from the Technical Note provides as follows: (say a parent corporation that wound up its subsidiary and acquired its assets) … The liability of the legal representative acting in good faith is limited to the property in the possession and control of the legal representative when that person is called upon to make a payment on behalf of the taxpayer, or to any proceeds of disposition and replacement property obtained by the legal representative from that property. … For example, a representative who has a general power of attorney will have broader responsibilities than one whose authority is limited to certain assets of the taxpayer. e)      Analysis and Findings [48]          As a third party liability and collection mechanism, section 159 has critical components which must be present before the provision is engaged. ... Conclusions [57]          If the present context includes only examples of deceased persons, but the extended purpose is thought to be expanded through the Interpretation Bulletin and Technical Note, then dissolution (or cessation) and liquidation must be considered. ...

When the evidence is considered as a whole, it appears to me that the Appellant and the owner-operators have formed a joint venture to carry on a taxi passenger service business. [124] The parties operate the business together. ... The relative weight of each will depend on the particular facts and circumstances of the case. [130] [53]   In addition to the Wiebe Door factors, a jurisprudential trend has emerged where the subjective intentions of the parties must also be considered. ... Furthermore, the remittance of EI premiums suggests that initially the Appellant-Intervenor was considered by the Appellant as an employee.   ...