Search - considered

Cantin also alleges that since January 27, 2006, she has had custody of Miguël approximately 43% of the time, and if the time during which her mother, Carmen Cantin, babysat him while he was in his father's custody is considered, Ms.  ... For the purposes of paragraph (h) of the definition "eligible individual" in section 122.6 of the Act, the following factors are to be considered in determining what constitutes care and upbringing of a qualified dependant:   (a) the supervision of the daily activities and needs of the qualified dependant;   (b) the maintenance of a secure environment in which the qualified dependant resides;   (c) the arrangement of, and transportation to, medical care at regular intervals and as required for the qualified dependant;   (d) the arrangement of, participation in, and transportation to, educational, recreational, athletic or similar activities in respect of the qualified dependant;   (e) the attendance to the needs of the qualified dependant when the qualified dependant is ill or otherwise in need of the attendance of another person;   (f) the attendance to the hygienic needs of the qualified dependant on a regular basis;   (g) the provision, generally, of guidance and companionship to the qualified dependant; and   (h) the existence of a court order in respect of the qualified dependant that is valid in the jurisdiction in which the qualified dependant resides ... To do so, the factors specified in section 6302 of the Regulations must be considered. ...

For the purposes of paragraph (h) of the definition of  "eligible individual" in section 122.6 of the Act, the following factors are to be considered in determining what constitutes care and upbringing of a qualified dependant:   (a) the supervision of the daily activities and needs of the qualified dependant;   (b) the maintenance of a secure environment in which the qualified dependant resides;   (c) the arrangement of, and transportation to, medical care at regular intervals and as required for the qualified dependant;   (d) the arrangement of, participation in, and transportation to, educational, recreational, athletic or similar activities in respect of the qualified dependant;   (e)  the attendance to the needs of the qualified dependant when the qualified dependant is ill or otherwise in need of the attendance of another person;   (f) the attendance to the hygienic needs of the qualified dependant on a regular basis;   (g) the provision, generally, of guidance and companionship to the qualified dependant; and   (h) the existence of a court order in respect of the qualified dependant that is valid in the jurisdiction in which the qualified dependant resides     [6]      The appellant was represented by her spouse, the father of the minor child in question in this appeal. ... I am even persuaded that she did what she considered needful to enable her daughter to become a mature, responsible adult. ... Furthermore, the Court cannot imagine why the father would have considered it a good idea to assert such things in his application if they were lies ...

Any amount deducted from this payment and remitted as a source deduction in relation to the Appellant’s income tax liability, or any other liability of the Appellant, would still be considered to be an amount paid to the Appellant (Morin v. ... If the answer to that question is in the negative, then a sufficient nexus exists between the receipt and the loss of employment for the payment to be considered a retiring allowance ...   [18] It is quite clear then that in addition to the “but/for” test, where the purpose of a payment is to compensate a loss of employment it may be considered as having been received “with respect to” that loss ...

However, in order to have this "reasonable expectation of profit" the artistic or literary endeavors, as the case may be, of the artist or writer must be carried on in a manner such that, based on the criteria in 5 above, they may be considered for income tax purposes to be the carrying on of a business rather than, for example, a hobby. and to the following comments with respect thereto by Bowman J. in LeBlanc v. ... Thus, where the nature of a taxpayer's venture contains elements which suggest that it could be considered a hobby or other personal pursuit, but the venture is undertaken in a sufficiently commercial manner, the venture will be considered a source of income for the purposes of the Act. 53        ... 54         It should also be noted that the source of income assessment is not a purely subjective inquiry.    ... We would also emphasize that although the reasonable expectation of profit is a factor to be considered at this stage, it is not the only factor, nor is it conclusive.    ...

Further, the Court must be satisfied that it is “plain and obvious” that the impugned claim is without merit. [2] Finally, the pleadings must be considered as drafted, without evidence to rehabilitate any shortcomings. ... Among the many points of information provided to the Court was the fact that he considered himself a sort of “unlicensed” lawyer and that as such, he had appeared frequently in Court and learned a lot about litigation from these experiences. ... Having carefully reviewed the pleadings and considered the submissions of the parties, however, I am persuaded by the Respondent’s argument that the Notices of Appeal ought to be struck out in their entirety and the appeals dismissed. ...

He says that it is, however, relevant to the question of penalties which were imposed for 1999 and 2000 under subsection 247(3) of the Income Tax Act which reads:   (3)  Penalty — A taxpayer (other than a taxpayer all of whose taxable income for the year is exempt from tax under Part I) is liable to a penalty for a taxation year equal to 10% of the amount determined under paragraph (a) in respect of the taxpayer for the year, where         (a)  the amount, if any, by which            (i)  the total of                   (A) the taxpayer’s transfer pricing capital adjustment for the year, and                   (B) the taxpayer’s transfer pricing income adjustment for the year         exceeds the total of            (ii)  the total of all amounts each of which is the portion of the taxpayer’s transfer pricing capital adjustment or transfer pricing income adjustment for the year that can reasonably be considered to relate to a particular transaction, where                   (A) the transaction is a qualifying cost contribution arrangement in which the taxpayer or a partnership of which the taxpayer is a member is a participant, or                   (B) in any other case, the taxpayer or a partnership of which the taxpayer is a member made reasonable efforts to determine arm’s length transfer prices or arm’s length allocations in respect of the transaction, and to use those prices or allocations for the purposes of this Act, and            (iii) the total of all amounts, each of which is the portion of the taxpayer’s transfer pricing capital setoff adjustment or transfer pricing income setoff adjustment for the year that can reasonably be considered to relate to a particular transaction, where                   (A) the transaction is a qualifying cost contribution arrangement in which the taxpayer or a partnership of which the taxpayer is a member is a participant, or                   (B) in any other case, the taxpayer or a partnership of which the taxpayer is a member made reasonable efforts to determine arm’s length transfer prices or arm’s length allocations in respect of the transaction, and to use those prices or allocations for the purposes of this Act, is greater than         (b) the lesser of            (i)  10% of the amount that would be the taxpayer’s gross revenue for the year if this Act were read without reference to subsection (2), subsections 69(1) and (1.2) and section 245,            and            (ii)  $5,000,000 ... It reads:   (4) Contemporaneous documentation — For the purposes of subsection (3) and the definition “qualifying cost contribution arrangement” in subsection (1), a taxpayer or a partnership is deemed not to have made reasonable efforts to determine and use arm’s length transfer prices or arm’s length allocation in respect of a transaction or not to have participated in a transaction that is a qualifying cost contribution arrangement, unless the taxpayer or the partnership, as the case may be,         (a) makes or obtains, on or before the taxpayer’s or partnership’s documentation-due date for the taxation year or fiscal period, as the case may be, in which the transaction is entered into, records or documents that provide a description that is complete and accurate in all material respects of               (i)  the property or services to which the transaction relates,               (ii) the terms and conditions of the transaction and their relationship, if any, to the terms and conditions of each other transaction entered into between the participants in the transaction,               (iii) the identity of the participants in the transaction and their relationship to each other at the time the transaction was entered into,               (iv) the functions performed, the property used or contributed and the risks assumed, in respect of the transaction, by the participants in the transaction,               (v) the data and methods considered and the analysis performed to determine the transfer prices or the allocations of profits or losses or contributions to costs, as the case may be, in respect of the transaction; and.....              ... The denial of the Crown’s Motion to Strike is particularly appropriate in this situation because the application of subsections 247(3) and 247(4) of the Act has not yet been judicially considered;           (e)      At this early point in the proceedings, the Appellant also cannot be certain whether the CRA relied on information obtained during these earlier taxation audits of the Appellant’s deposit guarantee arrangements to formulate its assumptions underlying the reassessments of the Appellant’s Relevant Taxation Years. ...

Debbie Scott [1], the Federal Court of Appeal considered the case of tuition paid at a private school that provided children with learning disabilities, special attention in terms of personnel trained to work with the particular needs of such children. ... The Report, although admitted contrary to a strict application of the hearsay rule and given without expert qualification and without affording the Respondent a cross examination opportunity, on its face appears very thorough and might well be considered as adequate to stand as a certification for the purposes of the subject provision of the Act. ... Secondly, the expense being considered, in context, is a “medical” one incurred “for the care or the care and training” of a “patient” not for the expense incurred for “training” alone- including developing essential cognitive skills in slow learners or even mentally handicapped children. ...

Therefore the payments made by the appellant in 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005 (subject to the provisions of subsection 60.1(3) of the Act) could not be considered to be made under this agreement as this agreement did not exist until 2006 ...   [8]               Subsection 60.1(3) of the Act provides that in certain situations payments made prior to an agreement in writing being made could be considered to be made under that agreement. ... Since this part was stricken from the agreement before the Appellant’s spouse would sign the agreement, this part cannot be considered to be part of the agreement that was made in 2006 and the payments made in 2005 (which would be the preceding year) are not deductible ...

He added that the Régie des rentes du Québec and his employer have considered him disabled since January 2004 ...     [10]          I would add that the use of a CPAP device is not to be considered "therapy" for the purposes of paragraph 118.3(1)(a.1) of the Act. ... It also seems that the use of the CPAP device would not be considered therapeutic care. ...

  [4]      On September 23, 2005, the Minister confirmed the redetermination dated May 20, 2005 and the determination dated July 20, 2005 based on the same facts, that is to say, the facts set out in paragraph 6 of the Reply to the Notice of Appeal:             [TRANSLATION]   (a)     The Appellant is Pavlo Stelmazuk's common-law spouse; (admitted)   (b)    Pavlo Stelmazuk is the father of two children:   i)                     Kevin, born May 4, 1994, and ii)                    Kamélie, born January 4, 1996; (admitted)   (c)     From the date of the children's births to March 2003, Julie Lavigne, the biological mother, was considered to be the parent who primarily fulfilled the responsibility for the children Kevin and Kamélie's care and upbringing; (denied)   (d)    Pavlo Stelmazuk and Julie Lavigne lived together until August 2000; (admitted)   (e)     Since Pavlo Stelmazuk and Julie Lavigne agreed to joint custody of the children Kevin and Kamélie, six months' worth of the child tax benefits were allocated  to each spouse for the period from April 2003 to June 2004; (denied)   (f)      The Appellant, by virtue of the female presumption, was the tax benefit beneficiary in respect of Kevin and Kamélie for the period from March to August each year, but Julie Lavigne cashed the said benefits for the period from September to February each year; (admitted)   (g)     In July 2004, Julie Lavigne notified the Minister that Kevin and Kamélie lived with her from June 18, 2004 to August 20, 2004, and she claimed the tax benefits for the months of July and August 2004; (admitted)   (h)     On July 28, 2004, the Minister notified Julie Lavigne that the children were under a joint custody arrangement and refused to accede to her request; (no knowledge)   (i)       Julie Lavigne served a Notice of Objection on the Minister in February 2005, complaining that the Minister failed to revise her tax benefits for the months of July and August 2004; (no knowledge)   (j)      On February 22, 2005, following the service of a Notice of Objection by Julie Lavigne in respect of the 2003 base year, the Minister sent the Appellant and the biological mother Julie Lavigne a questionnaire to fill out, and a request for documents, for the period commencing in June 2004, in order to determine which of the two was the parent eligible to receive the child tax benefits in respect of Kevin and Kamélie; (admitted)   (k)    The Appellant provided no documents in response to the letter dated February 22, 2005, such as notes from dentists, doctors, school authorities or sports associations, in support of her application to be considered the eligible parent of Kevin and Kamélie; (admitted) and   (l)       The Minister determined that he did not consider the Appellant the eligible individual in respect of the children Kevin and Kamélie for the 2003 and 2004 base years. ... The law   [7]      The definition of "eligible individual" in section 122.6 of the Income Tax Act was worded as follows at the time:   "eligible individual" in respect of a qualified dependant at any time means a person who at that time   (a)  resides with the qualified dependant;   (b)  is the parent of the qualified dependant who primarily fulfils the responsibility for the care and upbringing of the qualified dependant;   (c)  is resident in Canada or, where the person is the cohabiting spouse or common-law partner of a person who is deemed under subsection 250(1) to be resident in Canada throughout the taxation year that includes that time, was resident in Canada in any preceding taxation year;   (d)  is not described in paragraphs 149(1)(a) or 149(1)(b);   (e)  is, or whose cohabiting spouse or common-law partner is, a Canadian citizen or a person who   (i)         is a permanent resident within the meaning of subsection 2(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act,   (ii)        is a temporary resident within the meaning of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, who was resident in Canada throughout the 18 month period preceding that time,   (iii)       is a protected person within the meaning of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act,   (iv)       was determined before that time to be a member of a class defined in the Humanitarian Designated Classes Regulations made under the Immigration Act,   and for the purpose of this definition,   (f)  where the qualified dependant resides with the dependant's female parent, the parent who primarily fulfils the responsibility for the care and upbringing of the qualified dependant is presumed to be the female parent;   (g)  the presumption referred to in paragraph 122.6 eligible individual (f) does not apply in prescribed circumstances; and   (h)  prescribed factors shall be considered in determining what constitutes care and upbringing ... For the purposes of paragraph (h) of the definition "eligible individual" in section 122.6 of the Act, the following factors are to be considered in determining what constitutes care and upbringing of a qualified dependant:   (a)        the supervision of the daily activities and needs of the qualified dependant;   (b)        the maintenance of a secure environment in which the qualified dependant resides;   (c)        the arrangement of, and transportation to, medical care at regular intervals and as required for the qualified dependant;   (d)        the arrangement of, participation in, and transportation to, educational, recreational, athletic or similar activities in respect of the qualified dependant;   (e)        the attendance to the needs of the qualified dependant when the qualified dependant is ill or otherwise in need of the attendance of another person;   (f)        the attendance to the hygienic needs of the qualified dependant on a regular basis;   (g)        the provision, generally, of guidance and companionship to the qualified dependant; and   (h)        the existence of a court order in respect of the qualified dependant that is valid in the jurisdiction in which the qualified dependant resides ...