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He referred to Interpretation Bulletin IT-114 which discussed the various criteria that the Courts have considered in concluding whether or not a particular transaction is an adventure or concern in the nature of trade. [49] It was counsel’s position that when one examines all the facts and the circumstances as disclosed by the evidence given in Court, the conclusion should be that this transaction was clearly not an adventure or concern in the nature of trade, that the taxpayers here merely realized an accretion of capital from an investment. [50] With respect to the question of the penalty the Minister must establish more than a mere failure to use reasonable care. ... In any event they only acted after being advised by Revenue Canada of the omission and that was already too late. [79] On that issue the Court is in agreement with counsel for the Respondent and the Court is satisfied that the reasonableness of the actions of the Appellants must be considered at the time that they filed their returns or at least at any time up to the time Revenue Canada made it clear to them that their returns were being reconsidered. [80] The Court disagrees with counsel for the Appellants that the state of the law is such that every time a bonus or discount is received on a mortgage that the amount is an accretion to capital and not income. [81] The case of Harold Wood, supra, does not stand for that proposition. ...

He stated that, for the purposes of the audit, all the amounts deposited at the bank had been considered as income whereas he had received non-taxable amounts, in particular damages in connection with an accident his wife had had in Virginia. ... The size of the unreported amounts relative to the taxable income reported was also considered. ...

The following criteria should be considered: the profit and loss experience in past years, the taxpayer’s training, the taxpayer’s intended course of action, the capability of the venture as capitalized to show a profit after charging capital cost allowance. ... In Land & Sea Enterprises Ltd. v The Queen, 2011 TCC 101, [2011] TCJ No. 70, at paragraph 14, I stated the following in respect to business activities conducted in the initial start up phase: [14] It is clear that an activity may be considered a commercial activity well in advance of the stage of profitability. ...

The March 12 th 2014 inscrutable statement of account and the March 14 th, 2014 inexplicable return of cheques are constructive acknowledgment by CRA that all taxpayer extension and/or abeyance requests were consented to or, given the general confusion such communications caused, constitute a more equitable start date for the grace period in which to bring an application to extend the time to file a notice of appeal and/or Notice of Objection. [20]         For the reasons which follow, the applications of Thomas for an extension to file a Notice of Appeal for 2011 and a Notice of Objection for 2012 are dismissed. [21]         While the inscrutable and non-descript statement of account dated March 12, 2014 and the unexplained return of cheques dated March 14, 2014 are confusing per se, when logically considered against the specifically referable and addressed communications by CRA, especially the specific response letter of March 11 th, 2014, any such confusion is resolved. [22]         In addition, the letter of Thomas’ accountant dated February 11, 2014 is no  beacon of clarity. ... Respondent’s counsel advised the Court on May 26 th, 2016 that the Minister considered Emmanuel’s request of August 26 th, 2015 to be a request for an adjustment (presumably under sub-section 154(4.1)) and not a loss determination request under sub-section 152(1.1). [32]         The Court, having undertaken a path to learn the Minister’s position regarding the purported loss determination request finds itself no further ahead. ...

Monjazeb indicated he considered himself a full-time employee in technical support. [9]              Three months later, a salesperson left PCS and a position became available in sales, and Mr. ... The traditional factors of control, ownership of equipment, risk of loss, chance of profit and responsibility for investment and management are considered in this analysis. [22]         The difficulty in this case, as I alluded at the outset, is that Mr. ...

The critical issue in this appeal is to determine who, for the purpose of that provision, meets the definition of “eligible individual”. [29]         Prior to the disputed period, it is apparent that the Appellant had the benefit of the presumption set out in paragraph 122.6 eligible individual (f) in that both A and C resided with her and, as the female parent, she was presumed to be the parent who primarily fulfilled the responsibility for their care and upbringing. [30]         However, the presumption noted above is rebuttable in two important instances i) where both parents meet the definition of “shared-custody parents” or where ii) another parent has filed an application claiming to be the primary caregiver (subsection 6301(1)(d) of the Income Tax Regulations (the “ITR”)). [31]         Section 122.6 contains a number of key definitions as follows: “ eligible individual ” in respect of a qualified dependant at any time means a person who at that time; (a) resides with the qualified dependant; (b) is a parent of the qualified dependant who; (i) is the parent who primarily fulfils the responsibility for the care and upbringing of the qualified dependant and who is not a shared-custody parent in respect of the qualified dependant; or (ii) is a shared-custody parent in respect of the qualified dependant; (c) is resident in Canada or, where the person is the cohabiting spouse or common-law partner of a person who is deemed under subsection 250(1) to be resident in Canada throughout the taxation year that includes that time, was resident in Canada in any preceding taxation year;... and for the purposes of this definition; (f) where the qualified dependant resides with the dependant’s female parent, the parent who primarily fulfils the responsibility for the care and upbringing of the qualified dependant is presumed to be the female parent; (g) the presumption referred to in paragraph 122.6 eligible individual (f) does not apply in prescribed circumstances, and (h) prescribed factors shall be considered in determining what constitutes care and upbringing; " shared-custody parent " in respect of a qualified dependent [sic] at a particular time means, where the presumption referred to in paragraph (f) of the definition "eligible individual" does not apply in respect of the qualified dependant, an individual who is one of the two parents of the qualified dependant who; (a) are not at that time cohabitating spouses or common-law partners of each other; (b) reside with the qualified dependant on an equal or near equal basis; and (c) primarily fulfil the responsibility for the care and upbringing of the qualified dependant when residing with the qualified dependant, as determined in consideration of prescribed factors. [32]         Where the court is satisfied that two parents meet the definition of “shared‑custody parents” including the requirement that the children reside with both “on an equal or near equal basis” and that both parents “primarily fulfil the responsibility for the care and upbringing” of the children when they are residing with them, the CCTB will be shared equally between them, subject to their adjusted income. ... Factors — For the purposes of paragraph (h) of the definition “eligible individual” in section 122.6 of the Act, the following factors are to be considered in determining what constitutes care and upbringing of a qualified dependant: (a) the supervision of the daily activities and needs of the qualified dependant; (b) the maintenance of a secure environment in which the qualified dependant resides; (c) the arrangement of, and transportation to, medical care at regular intervals and as required for the qualified dependant; (d) the arrangement of, participation in, and transportation to, educational, recreational, athletic or similar activities in respect of the qualified dependant; (e) the attendance to the needs of the qualified dependant when the qualified dependant is ill or otherwise in need of the attendance of another person; (f) the attendance to the hygienic needs of the qualified dependant on a regular basis; (g) the provision, generally, of guidance and companionship to the qualified dependant; and (h) the existence of a court order in respect of the qualified dependant that is valid in the jurisdiction in which the qualified dependant resides. [33]         Since the Court must determine which parent was the “qualified individual”, it is clear that this case is based almost entirely on the credibility of the Appellant and the father. ...

However, neither Des Chênes nor Calgary (City) considered Section 10. [58]         Thus, I cannot accept the Appellant’s submission that no supply was provided as consideration for the subsidy, that the subsidy agreement is simply a subsidy agreement, that the Agreement on access is independent from the subsidy and, as such, there cannot be any consideration for the subsidy. [59]         In my opinion, the Appellant is on the wrong track when it submits that these two agreements are completely independent. ... This right to use real property could be considered intangible personal property. [74]         However, subsection 136(1) of the ETA clearly provides that when there is an agreement on the use or right to use real property, the supply is then deemed to be a supply of this asset, the supply of real property. ...

Subsection 146(8.8) reads as follows: Effect of death where person other than spouse becomes entitled 146 (8.8) Where the annuitant under a registered retirement savings plan (other than a plan that had matured before June 30, 1978) dies after June 29, 1978, the annuitant shall be deemed to have received, immediately before the annuitant’s death, an amount as a benefit out of or under a registered retirement savings plan equal to the amount, if any, by which (a)   the fair market value of all the property of the plan at the time of death exceeds (b)   where the annuitant died after the maturity of the plan, the fair market value at the time of the death of the portion of the property described in paragraph 146(8.8)(a) that, as a consequence of the death, becomes receivable by a person who was the annuitant’s spouse or common-law partner immediately before the death, or would become so receivable should that person survive throughout all guaranteed terms contained in the plan. [18]         The legal obligations imposed under the Act to a legal representative of a deceased person are described in subsections 159(1) and (2) of the Act which read as follows: Person acting for another 159(1) For the purposes of this act, where a person is a legal representative of a taxpayer at any time, (a)   the legal representative is jointly and severally, or solidarily, liable with the taxpayer (i) to pay each amount payable under this Act by the taxpayer at or before that time and that remains unpaid, to the extent that the legal representative is at that time in possession or control, in the capacity of legal representative of property that belongs or belonged to, or that is or was held for the benefit of, the taxpayer or the taxpayer’s estate, and (ii) to perform any obligation or duty imposed under this Act on the taxpayer at or before that time and that remains outstanding, to the extent that the obligation or duty can reasonably be considered to relate to the responsibilities of the legal representative acting in that capacity; and (b)        any action or proceeding in respect of the taxpayer taken under this Act at or after that time by the Minister may be so taken in the name of the legal representative acting in that capacity and, when so taken, has the same effect as if it had been taken directly against the taxpayer and, if the taxpayer no longer exists, as if the taxpayer continued to exist. ... In this particular case, the CRA had reasons to believe that the estate did not have enough money to pay the total amount of the tax owed by the deceased. [27]         The $135,000 cheque remitted to Bruno in his personal capacity, approximately eight months before he was appointed as the legal representative of the estate, cannot be considered in any way as a payment of tax as the Act specifically requires that payments of any tax amounts owing be paid directly to the Receiver General. [28]         Concerning the appellant’s allegation that she was misguided by the information provided on the CRA’s website, I would simply reiterate that such information is of a general nature only and should not be relied upon by taxpayers. ...

Not surprisingly, the Crown submits that this argument should not be considered because the Crown would be prejudiced by the late notice. [6]              I agree with the Crown’s position on this issue. ... Overall, the testimony supporting these expenses was too vague to be considered reliable. [32]         Counsel for Mr. ...

E-15, as amended (the ETA), dated March 21, 2014, for the reporting periods from October 1, 2009, to December 31, 2009; from October 1, 2010, to December 31, 2010; and from October 1, 2011, to December 31, 2011 (the period at issue). [2]              Pursuant to the assessment dated March 21, 2014, the Minister is claiming a total of $5,169.65 from the appellant for net tax ($4,377), interest, and penalties for failing to file ($175.08). [3]              The Minister made the assessment on the basis of, among other things, the following findings and assumptions of fact: (a)   The appellant has been a drug dealer for many years; (b) On November 4, 2011, he was arrested in connection with an investigation by the Sûreté du Québec in the regional county municipality of Etchemins; (c)The appellant pleaded guilty to two counts of trafficking in narcotics and two counts of possession for the purpose of trafficking; (d) He was sentenced to one year's imprisonment; (e)   The appellant never reported the income he earned from his drug dealing business; (f)    Unable to access any accounting records kept by the appellant, the respondent used an alternative method to determine the appellant's income, namely, the net worth method, a recognized method that serves to uncover how much a taxpayer's wealth increases from one year to the next; (g)   The net worth method was applied to the appellant only, as his ex-spouse did not pay for any household expenses when they lived together; (h) The auditor spoke to both the appellant and his ex-spouse as part of his audit of the appellant; (i)     The respondent considered, among other things, the appellant's purchases, including several vehicles, pieces of furniture and immovables, as well as the tax paid on his other sources of income, his personal expenses and some unexplained withdrawals; (j)     The amounts not reported by the appellant for the years audited are as follows: i)        2008: $15,671 ii)     2009: $32,682 iii)   2010: $25,501 iv)   2011: $59,365 (k) On the basis that the income was business income, the Minister assessed the appellant pursuant to the Excise Tax Act; (l)     Given that he could be considered to be a small supplier, he was not assessed for 2008 and was assessed on only part of his income for 2009; (m)            The amounts assessed are as follows: Period Nature of amendment Statutory basis for penalty Taxable amount GST   From 01.01.09 to 21.12.09   Unreported supplies   280.1 ETA   $2,682   $134   From 01.01.10 to 31.12.10   Unreported supplies   280.1 ETA   $25,501   $1,275   From 01.01.11 to 31.12.11   Unreported supplies   280.1 ETA   $59,365   $2,968   Total         $4,377 (n) The appellant was assessed a penalty under section 280.1 of the Excise Tax Act for failing to file his returns; [4]              The appellant is challenging the validity of the assessment for the following reasons set out in paragraphs 9 to 13 of his notice of appeal: [translation]  9.     ...