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., the principal and interest were therefore to be considered as being an amount owed to the Appellant;     e)         The financial statements of the company Les Habitations Durab Inc. for the fiscal periods ending on December 31, 1999 and December 31, 2000 clearly show as liabilities loans in the amount of one hundred and twenty thousand dollars ($120,000) which were in fact taken out personally by the Appellant;   f)          It is in error that the loans totalling one hundred and twenty thousand dollars ($120,000) appear in the financial statements of the company Les Habitations Durab Inc., since these should have been shown as an amount owed to a director, bearing interest at the rate agreed to with the Caisse populaire Desjardins du Vieux-Québec;   g)         As can be seen in the calculation document Exhibit A-6,  Louise Laroche, the Respondent’s employee, acknowledged that the sum of one hundred and twenty thousand dollars ($120,000) owed on the houses in stock should have been applied against the advances owed by the Appellant to Les Habitations Durab Inc.;   h)         The Respondent’s employee erred however, since she should have applied in favour of the Appellant personally, a credit of one hundred and twenty thousand dollars ($120,000), and that from the date when the latter took out these loans, namely from July 11, 1997, as well as all the interest that the latter paid on the said loans, since this amount was as a matter of fact borrowed on that date and was owed to the Appellant from that date;   i)          If the Respondent had correctly credited to the Appellant the amounts that were owed to him as principal and interest from July 11, 1997, the assessments with regard to the interest demanded from the Appellant would have been null ... It always considered the mortgage as its own debt.   [12]     The financial statements (Exhibit A-14) show that the amounts [TRANSLATION] “Advances without interest to a director” at the end of 1999 and 2000 are $ 134,395 and $108,416. ...

., 88 DTC 1382 (" Martens "), Justice Rip considered the correct assessment of refundable investment tax credits in a nil assessment year. ... Canada, 94 DTC 1475, Justice Bowman held that the determination of capital losses in a nil assessment may be considered by the Court if they affect the taxpayer's position in subsequent years (i.e., loss carry-forwards). ...

Also in the Bates appeal, although there was doubt as to whether the Order of the Senior Master, Sedgwich clearly indicated the payments were to be free of tax, Mogan J. made the following analysis on the basis that the Order be considered as having so indicated. 7           According to the pleadings in this appeal, the Minister of National Revenue ("M.N.R. ... But that is of little assistance to her cause since what facts the Georgia Court may have considered or was entitled to consider in granting the Decree is not germane to my determination of whether the maintenance payments received by the Appellant in 1990 and 1991 were properly included in her income by the Minister. 16         The superior court of any province has jurisdiction to order payments for the maintenance of a spouse or children upon the break-up of a marriage. ...

. – any amount (other than a prescribed amount) paid or payable by virtue of an obligation imposed by statute or a contractual obligation substituted for an obligation imposed by statute to             (i)         Her Majesty in right of Canada or a province,   (ii)        an agent of Her Majesty in right of Canada or a province, or   (iii)       a corporation, commission or association that is controlled by Her Majesty in right of Canada or a province or by an agent of Her Majesty in right of Canada or a province   as a royalty, tax (other than a tax or portion of a tax that may reasonably be considered to be a municipal or school tax), lease rental or bonus or as an amount, however described, that may reasonably be regarded as being in lieu of any such amount, and that may reasonably be regarded as being in relation to   (iv)       the acquisition, development or ownership of a Canadian resource property, or   (v)        the production in Canada of …   (B)       metal, minerals (other than iron or petroleum or related hydrocarbons) or coal from a mineral resource in Canada to any stage that is not beyond the prime metal stage or its equivalent, …   [5]      The deductions claimed by Cogema for surcharges paid under the Saskatchewan Act were:                                1994            $2,020,888                                1995            $1,612,637                                1996            $1,879,699   They were paid pursuant to section 13.1 of the Saskatchewan Act, which in those years read in part:   13.1     In addition to any tax payable pursuant to subsection 13(1), a resource corporation shall, with respect to each of its fiscal years, pay a tax in an amount equal to the positive difference between:               (a)        the aggregate of: …   (iii)       if a fiscal year or portion of a fiscal year commences on or after April 1, 1993, 3.6% of the resource corporation's value of resource sales in that fiscal year or portion of that fiscal year; and   (b)        the tax payable, if any, by the resource corporation pursuant to this Act determined in accordance with subsection 13(1) for the corresponding fiscal year mentioned in clause (a) ... The second question is whether the payments may reasonably be considered to relate to the exercise of Mobil's right to remove the oil from the ground. ...

[2]      To make and justify the reassessments in question, the Minister of National Revenue (the "Minister") assumed the following facts: (a)         in his income tax return for the 1989 taxation year, the Appellant claimed, as a charitable donations credit, an amount of $2,089 with respect to the property (stamps) purportedly "given" to the Fondation Amérindienne Tecumseh; (b)         in his income tax return for the 1990 taxation year, the Appellant claimed, as a charitable donations credit, an amount of $5,190 with respect to the property (stamps) purportedly "given" to the Fondation Amérindienne Tecumseh; (c)         in his income tax return for the 1991 taxation year, the Appellant claimed, as a charitable donations credit, an amount of $6,870 with respect to the property (stamps) purportedly "given" to the Fondation Amérindienne Tecumseh; (d)         the Appellant did not genuinely donate of any of that property in 1989, 1990 or 1991; (e)         the Appellant did not have animus donandi to give that property to the Fondation Amérindienne Tecumseh; (f)          the Appellant bought a tax deduction each year; (g)         the Appellant only sought to obtain an undue tax advantage for the 1989, 1990 and 1991 taxation years since each year the transaction was conditional upon receiving a receipt for an amount larger than the amount he had to spend to obtain it; (h)         in addition, the value declared by the Appellant for 1989, 1990 and 1991 for the property in question, of which the description provided in the documents submitted by the Appellant was not admitted, was not attributed by an independent expert and was not, in any case, the fair market value of the property in question; (i)          the receipts submitted by the Appellant do not comply with section 3501 of the Income Tax Regulations; (j)          the Appellant is therefore not entitled, for 1989, 1990 and 1991, to any charitable donations credit with regard to the property in question; (k)         the Appellant did not fill in Schedule 3 on his income tax returns concerning the gains realized on the disposition of listed personal property; (l)          the Appellant, knowingly or under circumstances amounting to gross negligence, made, participated in, assented to or acquiesced in the making of a false statement or omission in his income tax returns for the 1989, 1990 and 1991 taxation years and as a result the income tax that would have been payable if it had been established based on the information provided in his returns would have been $503.96, $1,312.54 and $1,751.90 less, respectively, than the income tax actually payable for the 1989, 1990 and 1991 taxation years; (no confirmation in the file) (m)        the penalties accordingly imposed on the Appellant under subsection 163(2) of the Income Tax Act amount to 50% of that tax differential, namely, $251.98, $656.27 and $875.95, respectively, for the 1989, 1990 and 1991 taxation years. [3]      The Appellant admitted the statements in paragraphs (a), (b), (c), and (k); he denied all the others, specifically, (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), (i), (j), (l), and (m). [4]      Only the Appellant, a chartered accountant (CA), testified in support of his appeal. [5]      The Appellant, who has been truly fond of stamps since a very young age, had gathered a significant number of them over the years, which he considered to be a collection. Many members of his family had made it their duty to gather stamps for him; with time and the help of his family and friends, he had accumulated so many that he considered himself an amateur stamp collector. [6]      In parallel with this hobby, he was interested in tracing his ancestors to build his family tree; when he learned that some of his ancestors were of Amerindian origin, he became interested in that community and wanted to help them. [7]      Due to a lack of time and interest, and with his fondness for stamps waning, he apparently then decided to help the Fondation Amérindienne Tecumseh by donating part of his collection to the foundation in three different donations during 1989, 1990 and 1991. [8]      In consideration for the donations to the Fondation Amérindienne Tecumseh, he received three receipts in the amounts of $2,089.70, $5,189.81 and $6,870. ...

Alberta, [1989] AJ No. 755 (CA) at p. 10 (QL) as follows:       The scope of questions which may be properly asked in examination for discovery has been considered in several reported decisions. ... " The question of the scope of examination for discovery was also considered in Drake v. ...

"qualified farm property" of an individual (...) at any particular time means a property owned at that time by the individual,...that is (a)         real property that was used by             (i)          the individual,            ... in the course of carrying on the business of farming in Canada and, for the purpose of this paragraph, property will not be considered to have been used in the course of carrying on the business of farming in Canada unless (vii)       where the property is a property last acquired by the individual or partnership before June 18, 1987, or after June 17, 1987... the property... was used by the individual... principally in the course of carrying on the business of farming in Canada (A)        in the year the property was disposed of by the individual, or (B)        in at least 5 years during which the property was owned by the individual... ... I see it more in that light, than as a whole new separate venture, as the Respondent suggests. [19]     Having reached the conclusion there was only one business of farming being carried on, I turn to the second aspect of the Respondent's argument; that is, even if the Penticton property is considered part of Mr. ...

He later invested the money with Canada Trust and never considered the tax implications nor did he discuss the matter with his wife. ... Such inaction could be considered to be gross negligence by some but it is not that conduct that needs to be assessed. ...

Paré is not considered support within the meaning of subsection 56.1(4) of the Act unless it was paid under the terms of an order or written agreement. ... These words, in my opinion, must be interpreted strictly and the words "written agreement" in a context which includes a decree, order or judgment of a competent tribunal must, of necessity, mean a formal agreement between the parties concerned. [9]      As it is expressly set out that the Summary is not binding on the parties, it cannot be considered a formal agreement of the type required by the Act. [10]     While it may be that a verbal agreement existed and was proven, it nonetheless remains that it is only a verbal agreement. ...

Not one of the factors summarized by Rothstein, J.A. in Rich v.Canada [5], was seriously considered by Mr. ... With respect to loans to 128 Ltd. and 134 Inc., I doubt whether he considered the realistic chances of earning interest on the loans. ...