Search - considered

In view of the fact that the back premises had been vacant for several months and that the lease for the front premises had not yet been signed, Claude Lévesque considered that it would not pay him to purchase the property for $350,000. ... Furlong’s analysis, based on the direct comparison approach, refers only to a single transaction, considered by him to be the only comparable one, concluded on November 15, 1991 and involving a property located at 1850 Boulevard Laflèche, in a different area but regarded as equivalent to that in which the appellant’s property was located. ... Nonetheless, having considered all the evidence before the Court, I feel that Mr. ...

The amount paid for acquiring these shares cannot realistically be considered by a reasonably well-informed person to be a deductible expense. ... With respect to the loan in the amount of $25,909.00 made by the Appellant to Ambrosia, it cannot be considered to have arisen in the course of trading transactions, as far as the Appellant himself is concerned, as contrasted with Ambrosia which was actually carrying on the restaurant business. ... In coming to the conclusion that the Appellant is entitled to the deductions of the amounts of $35,200.00 and $2,700.00 in computing his income for the years 1989 and 1990, I have considered the matter of the negative inference that may be drawn from the Appellant’s decision not to have called Mr. ...

NOTICES AND BRANCH OF ACCOUNT: Any notice, direction or instruction to CIBC under this Agreement must be delivered or mailed postage prepaid to CIBC at Commerce Court Postal Station, Toronto, Ontario MSL 1A2, or any other address as CIBC may advise in writing and will be considered to have been given to CIBC on the day that it is actually delivered to or received by CIBC. Any notice statement, receipt or advice given by on behalf of CIBC to me or my Spouse must be delivered personally or mailed postage prepaid to me or my Spouse at the address recorded in CIBC’s books, and if mailed, will be considered to have been received five days after mailing. ... We should indicate that the concept of “commercial mainstream” is not a test for determining whether property is situated on a reserve; it is merely an aid to be used in evaluating the various factors being considered. ...

Miller considered the testimony of two independent witnesses. The first one viewed the property once it was completed and saw “no furniture” and only “an area rug in the living room” (para. 10). ... Miller then considered the factors set out in Happy Valley Farms Ltd. v. ... Analysis of Issue # 1 [41] The Appellant contends that the Vendor was a “builder” for the purposes of the ETA based on his conclusion that she acquired the Property in 2015, that the existing dwelling was demolished, that she engaged the services of a general contractor to build a new home, that the premises were never occupied by her after its construction and that it was listed for sale shortly thereafter. [42] The Appellant relies on Sangha, Seni and Wall, described above, and submits that the Vendor was involved in a similar pattern of activity such that this Court should conclude that she was a “builder” and that she was engaged “in the course of a business or adventure or concern in the nature of trade.” [43] The difficulty with this argument is that in those proceedings, the court heard direct evidence from the taxpayers involved in the alleged business activity and possibly other independent witnesses, and then considered the various factors identified in Happy Valley Farms. ...

In order for such a payment, which in itself, of course, is not made for the purpose of earning a profit, to be nonetheless considered to meet the requirement in paragraph 18(1)(a) of the Act, it must be seen as the unfortunate consequence of a risk that the taxpayer had to take and assume in order to carry on his trade or profession. And in order for the payment to be seen as such, it is an essential condition, I believe, that it be directly related to an act that was necessary in order to carry on the trade or profession and that it could potentially have been considered to have been performed improperly. 9 I have no problem in acknowledging that the question of the deductibility of the payment of damages cannot be made to depend on how serious the contractual fault was which resulted in liability. 1 do not believe that we can introduce moral concerns of this sort into the application of fiscal rules, and in any event we have no scale against which we can classify faults in terms of their gravity, since the civil liability that arises therefrom operates in the same manner in all cases. ... The delictual act cannot in that case be considered as being necessary for carrying on the trade or profession. ...

I have specifically considered the following cases on subject: Rozen v. ... This case was also considered favourably by Jerome A.C.J. in the Mina case (above), when he summarized it as follows:...the taxpayer was a member of the Canine Division of the Regina City Police Department. ... In the normal course of events, her cost of travel between her residence and the administrative centre would be considered personal in nature. ...

Paragraph 147(3)(j) provides that the Court may also consider any other matter relevant to the question of costs. [20] Although consideration of the specific factors is itself within the discretion of the Court, [15] no doubt addressing the specific factors and any other factors considered relevant by the Court significantly mitigates the risk that an award of costs would be perceived as arbitrary. [21] The positions of the Respondent and Husky on the factors listed in paragraphs 147(3)(a) to (i.1) are as follows: 1. ... However, the word “unnecessary” must be read in context, which necessarily includes the immediately preceding words “improper, vexatious, or”. [48] Read in this context, the word “unnecessary” suggests to me that to be considered in an award of costs in respect of an appeal, the stage in issue must be completely unnecessary and without merit. [49] The Respondent submits that its own motions were unnecessary because Husky rejected actions requested by the Respondent or failed to provide a suitable nominee for discovery. ... Husky’s position is in line with the Respondent’s own comparative. [27] [65] I have considered the positive factors in the context of the appeal as a whole and the quantum of legal fees claimed by the Respondent and I conclude that a reasonable and fair contribution to the legal fees of the Respondent is the amount of $300,000. ...

Most of the 12 cheques in Exhibit A-2 are listed individually on page 3 of Exhibit A-1 except for two sequences where one deposit is considered to have been made for two cheques. On the unidentified deposits list on page 3 of Exhibit A-1, the $17,132 deposit (dated February 11, 2016) of Exhibit A-1 is considered to be for cheques in the amount of $14,132 and $3,000 (dated February 9 and 10, 2016, respectively) of Exhibit A-2, and the deposit of $4,225 (dated June 6, 2016) of Exhibit A-1 is considered to be for cheques in the amount of $3,530 and $695 (both dated June 3, 2016) of Exhibit A-2. [40] 10 cheques are from the Appellant (inter-account transfers) and two are from a third party. ...

Paragraph 147(3)(d) – any offer of settlement in writing [26] Paragraph 147(3)(d) of the Rules lists “any offer of settlement in writing” as a factor that may be considered in determining an award of costs. ... General Comments and Conclusion [39] Based on all of the above, and having carefully considered the factors listed in subsection 147(3) of the Rules, I find that the Appellants are entitled to costs beyond the Tariff. ... I find that it appropriately contributes to the costs incurred by the Appellants in the conduct of these appeals. [40] I find that in considering the quantum of “higher costs” there are elements of the evidence introduced at trial from all parties that ought to be considered. ...

Justice Pizzitelli concluded that the licenses had a value of between 13 cents and 26 cents each. [18] The Appellant’s expert report was unreliable [19] because the expert valued the wrong asset, [20] considered the wrong market, [21] and failed to consider the effect of supply of the licenses in the market. [22] The appraisals provided by the Malones in these appeals were those very appraisals. ... Win/Win scenario and donative intent [20] In Mariano, Justice Pizzitelli considered the three requisite elements of a gift, based on the Federal Court of Appeal decision of Linden J.A. in The Queen v Friedberg, 1991 CanLII 14017 (FCA), 92 DTC 6031, at page 6032, (affirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada). ... Mariano testified that she was motivated by her desire to help others as well. [28] While I appreciate the subjective intention of the appellants must always be considered, such stated intention is not determinative but must be based in some objective reality. ...