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They state:   [translation] 1-                 At the hearing, the appellant admitted, for the purposes of the case only, that personal expenses of $60,692 had been incurred by the company Hockey Top Gun Inc.   2-                 The appellant challenges the validity of the assessment because it is based on subsection 5(1) and paragraph 6(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act (hereinafter the ITA).   3-                 The Minister of National Revenue (hereinafter the Minister) never considered assessing the appellant under subsection 15(1) of the ITA.   4-                 The respondent admitted paragraph 5 of the notice of appeal, namely that: [translation] "According to the CRA claim, this additional income was related to expenditures paid by Hockey Top Gun Inc. that were considered personal expenses by the appellant. ... Analysis and conclusion   [6]              The relevant provisions of the ITA state:   6(1)(a) Value of benefits-- the value of board, lodging and other benefits of any kind whatever received or enjoyed by the taxpayer in the year in respect of, in the course of, or by virtue of an office or employment, except any benefit   (i) derived from the contributions of the taxpayer’s employer to or under a deferred profit sharing plan, an employee life and health trust, a group sickness or accident insurance plan, a group term life insurance policy, a pooled registered pension plan, a private health services plan, a registered pension plan or a supplementary unemployment benefit plan,   (ii) under a retirement compensation arrangement, an employee benefit plan or an employee trust,   (iii) that was a benefit in respect of the use of an automobile,   (iv) derived from counselling services in respect of   (A) the mental or physical health of the taxpayer or an individual related to the taxpayer, other than a benefit attributable to an outlay or expense to which paragraph 18(1) (l) applies, or   (B) the re-employment or retirement of the taxpayer, or   (v) under a salary deferral arrangement, except to the extent that the benefit is included under this paragraph because of subsection 6(11);  ...   15(1) Benefit conferred on shareholder-- Where at any time in a taxation year a benefit is conferred on a shareholder, or on a person in contemplation of the person becoming a shareholder, by a corporation otherwise than by:   (a) the reduction of the paid-up capital, the redemption, cancellation or acquisition by the corporation of shares of its capital stock or on the winding-up, discontinuance or reorganization of its business, or otherwise by way of a transaction to which section 88 applies,   (b) the payment of a dividend or a stock dividend,   (c) conferring, on all owners of common shares of the capital stock of the corporation at that time, a right in respect of each common share, that is identical to every other right conferred at that time in respect of each other such share, to acquire additional shares of the capital stock of the corporation, and, for the purpose of this paragraph,   (i) where   (A) the voting rights attached to a particular class of common shares of the capital stock of a corporation differ from the voting rights attached to another class of common shares of the capital stock of the corporation, and (B) there are no other differences between the terms and conditions of the classes of shares that could cause the fair market value of a share of the particular class to differ materially from the fair market value of a share of the other class,   the shares of the particular class shall be deemed to be property that is identical to the shares of the other class, and   (ii) rights are not considered identical if the cost of acquiring the rights differs, or   (d) an action described in paragraph 84(1)(c.1), 84(1)(c.2) or 84(1)(c.3),   the amount or value thereof shall, except to the extent that it is deemed by section 84 to be a dividend, be included in computing the income of the shareholder for the year. [7]              In my opinion, the wording of subsection 15(1) of the ITA provides that, for a benefit to be included in a shareholder's income calculation, the corporation must confer the benefit, which implies that the corporation must do something, namely perform the act of conferring. ...

This kind of arrangement is considered as an employment on-the-campus which doesn’t require a separate work permit. ... The remedy being sought and the consequences which would flow from a finding that a contract is unenforceable have to be considered in determining the nature and the effect of the illegality. ... It would indeed go against public order for a person to benefit from that person's own wrong. [19] I wish now to refer to several passages of the Still decision: [39] A contract which is either expressly or impliedly prohibited by statute is normally considered void ab initio. ...

Since the Cash Payment is income from a specific source (employment), it cannot be considered income from any other source, i.e. a capital gain. ... The TCC judge considered this new issue without a formal amendment. At the FCA, it was held that the new issue should not have been considered without first giving the Minister the chance to provide evidence on that issue. ...

Alternatively, if a business is considered to have been carried on, the respondent alleged that the expenses incurred by the appellant were personal and living expenses, i.e. not incurred to earn income from a business. ... We would also emphasize that although the reasonable expectation of profit is a factor to be considered at this stage, it is not the only factor, nor is it conclusive. The overall assessment to be made is whether or not the taxpayer is carrying on the activity in a commercial manner.  ... [29]         Concerning the first question in the two-stage approach, I am satisfied that the appellant’s activities as a consultant in financial services could not be considered as a personal endeavour.  ...

He considered the linkage of the threat of penalties, repeated request for numerous documents and the setting of unilateral time lines for response to be “shocking” when he discovered them contained in the initial letter from the CRA, a government agency. ... The CRA considered these requests, reviewed same among various officers and acceded to the extensions in each case, but in the final stage subject to the reciprocity of receiving the mutual waiver. [21]         Mr. ... Radelet, reflect cordial, normal and considered exchanges which attempted to resolve, at Mr. ...

You are considered sovereign, thus having the free will to govern yourself. [8]               This section concludes, stating: The underlying principle in the C2++ Process is that loans are NOT revenues. ... It involves a high degree of negligence tantamount to intentional acting or indifference as to whether the law is complied with or not. [21]          I have considered the decisions of Torres v R, 2013 TCC 380; Strachan v R, 2015 FCA 60; Lauzon v R, 2016 TCC 71; Lauzon v R, 2016 FCA 298; Tomlinson v R, 2016 TCC 246; Chartrand v R, 2015 TCC 298. [22]          As noted in Torres (supra) at paragraph 62, it is settled law that gross negligence can include wilful blindness. ... But to give the Appellant the benefit of the doubt, I will decide this appeal on the basis of wilful blindness constituting gross negligence. [25]          The guiding jurisprudence in this regard is Torres (supra) which sets out a check-list of items to be considered as “red flags” suggestive of an enquiry, absent which wilful blindness constituting gross negligence may be found. [26]          One red flag is magnitude of the advantage or omission sought. ...

Analysis: [10]          I have considered the following jurisprudence submitted by the Respondent – Van Boekel v. ... “eligible individual” in respect of a qualified dependant at any time means a person who at that time (a) resides with the qualified dependant, (b) is a parent of the qualified dependant who (i) is the parent who primarily fulfils the responsibility for the care and upbringing of the qualified dependant and who is not a shared-custody parent in respect of the qualified dependant, or (ii) is a shared-custody parent in respect of the qualified dependant, (c) is resident in Canada or, where the person is the cohabiting spouse or common-law partner of a person who is deemed under subsection 250(1) to be resident in Canada throughout the taxation year that includes that time, was resident in Canada in any preceding taxation year, (d) is not described in paragraph 149(1)(a) or 149(1)(b), and (e) is, or whose cohabiting spouse or common-law partner is, a Canadian citizen or a person who (i) is a permanent resident within the meaning of subsection 2(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, (ii) is a temporary resident within the meaning of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, who was resident in Canada throughout the 18 month period preceding that time, or (iii) is a protected person within the meaning of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, (iv) was determined before that time to be a member of a class defined in the Humanitarian Designated Classes Regulations made under the Immigration Act, and for the purposes of this definition, (f) where the qualified dependant resides with the dependant’s female parent, the parent who primarily fulfils the responsibility for the care and upbringing of the qualified dependant is presumed to be the female parent, (g) the presumption referred to in paragraph (f) does not apply in prescribed circumstances, and (h) prescribed factors shall be considered in determining what constitutes care and upbringing;- and- “shared-custody parent” in respect of a qualified dependent [sic] at a particular time means, where the presumption referred to in paragraph (f) of the definition “eligible individual” does not apply in respect of the qualified dependant, an individual who is one of the two parents of the qualified dependant who (a) are not at that time cohabitating spouses or common-law partners of each other, (b) reside with the qualified dependant on an equal or near equal basis, and (c) primarily fulfil the responsibility for the care and upbringing of the qualified dependant when residing with the qualified dependant, as determined in consideration of prescribed factors. [13]          I find on the evidence, summarized above, that for the earlier of the two pertinent periods- July 2012 to June 2013- Michael was a “shared-custody parent” and hence an “eligible individual”. ... ITR 6302 provides: 6302 For the purposes of paragraph (h) of the definition “eligible individual” in section 122.6 of the Act, the following factors are to be considered in determining what constitutes care and upbringing of a qualified dependant: (a) the supervision of the daily activities and needs of the qualified dependant; (b) the maintenance of a secure environment in which the qualified dependant resides; (c) the arrangement of, and transportation to, medical care at regular intervals and as required for the qualified dependant; (d) the arrangement of, participation in, and transportation to, educational, recreational, athletic or similar activities in respect of the qualified dependant; (e) the attendance to the needs of the qualified dependant when the qualified dependant is ill or otherwise in need of the attendance of another person; (f) the attendance to the hygienic needs of the qualified dependant on a regular basis; (g) the provision, generally, of guidance and companionship to the qualified dependant; and (h) the existence of a court order in respect of the qualified dependant that is valid in the jurisdiction in which the qualified dependant resides. [15]          Regarding ITR 6302(a), I find on the totality of the evidence that Michael did have supervision of the daily activities and needs of DF when Michael was residing with DF. ...

Given that according to paragraph 5(2)(b), the employee must control more than 40% of voting shares, the votes held by Gestion cannot be considered in this calculation. ... Thus, the Court found that an employee who holds 100% of a corporation, which in turn holds 50% of another corporation that controls 100% of the employer corporation, will be considered as controlling more than 40% of the voting shares in the employer corporation (para 20). [29]   In Remstar Distribution Inc et al. v MNR, [2002] TCJ No. 479 (QL), this Court found that the jobs of Maxime and Julien Rémillard were not insurable employment because they controlled more than 40% of the voting shares in the corporations that employed them. ... The respondent adds that the work conditions in that regard need to be considered and, in this specific case, since the salary was set according to market conditions and since bonuses were paid, there was an arm’s-length relationship between Mr.  ...

He considered Mr. Karamitsos a friend who had experience in the restaurant business. ... Karamitsos was considered to be a friend and an advisor and that he came for coffee to the restaurant every time he came to play the races at Kenzo. ... Karamitsos on the premises of her restaurant, namely, in the kitchen to show how to make the food, the Commission des normes du travail considered that he had worked for her. [43]   Finally, the owner of the appellant indicated that she did not have the means to pay a $16 hourly wage to Mr. ...

.- any particular amount (other than a prescribed amount) received by the taxpayer in the year, in the course of earning income from a business or property, from (i) a person or partnership (in this paragraph referred to as the “payer”) who pays the particular amount (A) in the course of earning income from a business or property, (B) in order to achieve a benefit or advantage for the payer or for persons with whom the payer does not deal at arm's length, or (C) in circumstances where it is reasonable to conclude that the payer would not have paid the amount but for the receipt by the payer of amounts from a payer, government, municipality or public authority described in this subparagraph or in subparagraph (ii), or (ii) a government, municipality or other public authority, where the particular amount can reasonably be considered to have been received (iii) as an inducement, whether as a grant, subsidy, forgivable loan, deduction from tax, allowance or any other form of inducement, or... to the extent that the particular amount (v) was not otherwise included in computing the taxpayer's income, or deducted in computing, for the purposes of this Act, any balance of undeducted outlays, expenses or other amounts, for the year or a preceding taxation year,... (viii) may not reasonably be considered to be a payment made in respect of the acquisition by the payer or the public authority of an interest in the taxpayer, an interest in, or for civil law a right in, the taxpayer's business or an interest in, or for civil law a real right in, the taxpayer's property; II. ... This exclusion applies, in part, where the inducement (the Signing Bonus) may reasonably be considered to be a payment made in respect of the acquisition by the payer (Enbridge) of an interest in the taxpayer’s (the Appellant’s) property. [33]   The specific question the Court must answer is whether the Signing Bonus was a payment made in respect of the granting of the easement, i.e., the acquisition by Enbridge of an interest in the Appellant’s land. [34]   The Supreme Court of Canada, in the following often-quoted passage from Nowegijick v. the Queen [2] states that: The words “in respect of” are, in my opinion words of the widest possible scope. ...