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If the property was not maintained in connection with a business carried on for profit or with a reasonable expectation of profit then the Act, at subsection 248(1), provides that the expenses of that property are personal or living expenses; personal or living expenses are not deductible by a tax payable in computing income: paragraph 18(1)(h). [25]          In 1977 the Supreme Court of Canada [2] considered the question of what is required by a taxpayer to have a profit or reasonable expectation of profit from a venture so that the expenses of a property would not be categorized a personal or living expenses. ... The following criteria should be considered: the profit and loss experience in past years, the taxpayer's training, the taxpayer's intended course of action, the capability of the venture as capitalized to show a profit after charging capital cost allowance. ... One would not expect a farmer who purchased a productive going operation to suffer the same start-up losses as the man who begins a tree farm on raw land. [27]          Recently the Federal Court of Appeal has considered anew in Tonn et al. v. ...

In instances where the driver's means of financial support is [sic] inextricably bound up with the respondent we are of the view that he cannot be considered an independent contractor. ... The most that can be said is that control will no doubt always have to be considered, although it can no longer be regarded as the sole determining factor; and that factors, which may be of importance, are such matters as whether the man performing the services provides his own equipment, whether he hires his own helpers, what degree of financial risk be taken, what degree of responsibility for investment and management he has, and whether and how far he has an opportunity of profiting from sound management in the performance of his task. ... Furthermore, nothing was heard on behalf of the Respondent that could lead the Court not to accept the evidence of the Appellant and his witnesses. [30] I am thus satisfied that the Appellant has proven on a balance of probabilities the existence of a contract of service. [31] I do not consider this decision to be a precedent for any other past or future periods of employment of the Appellant or other workers with the Payor or anyone else, the Minister maintaining the right to investigate any other periods of employment of workers for unemployment insurance purposes. [32] This decision applies to the Appellant for the periods of employment under review only, because these are the only periods of work that may be considered by this Court. ...

Larry Beber Jr. testified that he had been employed by the Appellant for 12 years and that he considered Wentland to be the owner and boss of the Appellant during the period in question. ... In particular, an individual who controls more than 40% of the shares of the employer will not be considered to be engaged in insurable employment. ... Hence, the Court considered the percentage ownership of voting shares in relation to other shareholders, the ownership of corporate debts, shareholders' agreements, commercial contracts, the possession of unique expertise required by the corporation, and potential influence of family members on the operation of the business. [25] The existence of de facto control on the part of Wentland is a question of fact based on the evidence adduced at trial. ...

There is much jurisprudence in Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States in which the question whether provisions in a statute are directory or imperative has been considered. ... In others, such prescriptions have been considered as merely directory, the neglect of them involving nothing more than liability to a penalty, if any were imposed, for breach of the enactment. ... " 1 It is impossible to lay down any general rule for determining whether a provision is imperative or directory. 2 "No universal rule," said Lord Campbell L.C., "can be laid down for the construction of statutes, as to whether mandatory enactments shall be considered directory only or obligatory with an implied nullification for disobedience. ...

Stéphane Lalancette is the only person named as a director. [14] On July 22, 1992, the appellant assigned all of his shares to the company (Tab 56, Exhibit I-1). [15] On October 13, 1992, according to the minutes (Tab 48, Exhibit I-1), the appellant was considered to be the company’s president. ... The appellant therefore had to be considered a de facto director and to assume the responsibilities imposed on him by law. ... Analysis [18] In this case, the appellant was not listed as a director in the 1990 annual report ([5]: 6(c)) or the declaration made to the prothonotary on August 2, 1990 ([12]: Tab 61). [19] However, based on a review of the above evidence in the light of the case law and other authorities, the appellant must be considered a de facto director, whether or not he is a shareholder or de jure director. ...

The Minister considered that the Appellant had received unreasonable increases of 9% in 1995 and 14% in 1996. ... The Minister obviously considered that it was not reasonable to retain the worker during the periods in issue because the landscaping part of the business was not profitable. [35] It was not reasonable for the Minister to so conclude. The Minister should have taken the whole operation into account, not just part of it. [36] In paragraph (n), the Minister considered, unfavorably to the Appellant, that the payor included income that he received when overseas. ...

Even if the Minister acted in an arbitrary manner during the audit, the facts assumed are generally considered to be true unless the taxpayer provides satisfactory evidence to the contrary in Court ... Sugnanam’s rental property’s expenses for year 2003 were not considered.   ... SECTION 15(1)     Benefit conferred on shareholder        (1)  Where at any time in a taxation year a benefit is conferred on a shareholder, or on a person in contemplation of the person becoming a shareholder, by a corporation otherwise than by   (a) the reduction of the paid-up capital, the redemption, cancellation or acquisition by the corporation of shares of its capital stock or on the winding-up, discontinuance or reorganization of its business, or otherwise by way of a transaction to which section 88 applies,   (b) the payment of a dividend or a stock dividend,   (c) conferring, on all owners of common shares of the capital stock of the corporation at that time, a right in respect of each common share, that is identical to every other right conferred at that time in respect of each other such share, to acquire additional shares of the capital stock of the corporation, and, for the purpose of this paragraph,   (i) where   (A) the voting rights attached to a particular class of common shares of the capital stock of a corporation differ from the voting rights attached to another class of common shares of the capital stock of the corporation, and   (B) there are no other differences between the terms and conditions of the classes of shares that could cause the fair market value of a share of the particular class to differ materially from the fair market value of a share of the other class,   the shares of the particular class shall be deemed to be property that is identical to the shares of the other class, and   (ii) rights are not considered identical if the cost of acquiring the rights differs, or   (d) an action described in paragraph 84(1)(c.1), 84(1)(c.2) or 84(1) (c. 3), the amount or value thereof shall, except to the extent that it is deemed by section 84 to be a dividend, be included in computing the income of the shareholder for the year.   ...

Under conditions similar to those that follow a transaction is considered to be a sale rather than a lease:   (a)        the lessee automatically acquires title to the property after payment of a specified amount in the form of rentals,   (b)        the lessee is required to buy the property from the lessor during or at the termination of the lease or is required to guarantee that the lessor will receive the full option price from the lessee or a third party (except where such guarantee is given only in respect of excessive wear and tear inflicted by the lessee),   (c)        the lessee has the right during or at the expiration of the lease to acquire the property at a price which at the inception of the lease is substantially less than the probable fair market value of the property at the time or times of permitted acquisition by the lessee. ... As a result certain costs or obligations that are usually considered incidental to ownership, such as taxes, insurance, maintenance and other obligations become the responsibility of the lessee. ... Such conditions only add corroborative support where a transaction can be considered to be a sale under the circumstances stated in paragraph 3 above ...

More specifically, the shareholders of Location Raybec inc. are:              - the appellant:                          60%            - Benoît Noreau's wife: 10%            - Benoît Noreau's son:              30%   (d)        Because of financial difficulties, Location Raybec inc. did not pay the appellant the amount owed ($26,166, including taxes);   (e)        At September 30, 1997, which was the end of the appellant's fiscal year, the appellant claimed a bad debt of $26,166;   (f)         The appellant repurchased the same vehicle for $22,847 (including taxes) on July 21, 1997, and subsequently resold it to a third party;   (g)        On July 5, 2000, following an audit, the Minister issued a notice of reassessment adding $23,254 to the appellant's income;   (h)        That $23,254 corresponds to the difference between the bad debt amount claimed by the appellant ($26,166) and the bad debt amount considered allowable by the Minister ($2,912);   (i)         The bad debt amount considered allowable by the Minister ($2,912) corresponds to the difference between the amount of the sale by the appellant to Location Raybec inc. ...   [28]    To answer this question, one of the causes of extinction of obligations, that is, compensation, must be considered. ...

Section 146(9) when read with Section 146(8) violates this principle and should be considered as an unenumerated ground for discrimination.                 ... A taxpayer is not considered to have a right or thing in respect of a registered retirement savings plan, whether matured or not, of which he was, until his death, the annuitant. ... Similarly, a taxpayer is not considered to have a right or thing in respect of a registered retirement income fund or a registered home ownership savings plan. [10]          I find the wording of subsections 70(2), 146(8) and 146(8.8) clear and unambiguous. ...