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In the circumstances of this case, considering the terms of the Minutes of Settlement and the Supreme Court Order, I am satisfied that the payments made by the Applicant to the mortgage (sic) should be considered maintenance payments for the support of the children. [8]            The Order of the Court issued with the above "Reasons for Judgment" read in part as follows: THIS COURT ORDERS that maintenance has been paid from April 1, 1995 to October 22, 1999 in accord with the Order of this Court of October 18, 1995 in the amount of $58,883.72; THIS COURT FURTHER ORDERS that the application to cancel arrears of maintenance is allowed save and except $1,568 [3] owing for January, 1998 through to August, 1998; [9]            The Agency disallowed as deductions to the Appellant, the amounts in issue described above. ... Although subsection 60.1(3) provides relief in respect of payments if an Order provides that they are to be considered to have been paid, none of the Appellant's mortgage payments described in the 1999 Order qualified as a "support amount". ...

Briefly, I will tell you that I am the breadwinner in a single-parent family with one child who is considered "disabled" because he has to take medication every day if he is to be able to keep up the same pace (or relatively the same) as other children his age at school. ... No. 36, in which I mentioned the relevant case law in paragraph 15: The concept of the receipt of an amount and the relevant taxation year has already been considered by the courts; I am referring, inter alia, to Vegso v. ...

The Court requested a transcript of those arguments, which was received on January 12, 2000. [3]            The parties agree that the evidence established the truth of the facts alleged in the notice of appeal, the notices of intervention and the respondent's replies to those notices. [4]            The following facts are therefore considered to be proven: [TRANSLATION] By notice of assessment dated May 11, 1998, the Minister of National Revenue assessed the appellant for employment insurance and unemployment insurance premiums, including applicable interest, for 1995, 1996 and 1997. ... This comment by the Federal Court of Appeal applies to the instant case. [21]          The judgments rendered in the following cases were brought to the attention of the Court, which considered them carefully:                -                Kawa v. ...

Gunn and I have specialized and successfully treated fibromyalgia patients with this technique and are considered as the two medical practitioners of last resort for patients with F.M.S. ... I think technically the travel expenses would be considered additional medical expenses, so perhaps-- HIS HONOUR: Well, the auditor can surely add the two figures. ...

The Appellant was only created to assist in gathering useful information for police agencies. [21] I considered the question of drawing an inference that the money was in fact provided for the Appellant and notwithstanding the intervening activities of the City of Fredericton and the police coordinator, the Appellant was the ultimate beneficiary of the funds. I rejected that position for the reasons set above. [22] The question of employer by delegation was considered in Minacori c. ...

In so reassessing the Appellant for the 1996 and 1997 Taxation Years, determining the Appellant's CTB for the 1995, 1996 and 1997 "base taxation years" and redetermining the Appellant's GST Credit for the 1995, 1996 and 1997 Taxation Years, the Minister made the following assumptions of fact: (a) at all relevant times to the years in appeal, the Appellant was married to, lived with and was supported by the Spouse; (b) the Appellant and her Spouse had three children (hereinafter the "Children") as follows: Name Date of Birth Nicholas Patrick Gartner February 26, 1979 Becky Jo Gartner April 16, 1980 Jordan Steven Gartner July 21, 1982 (c) the combined net incomes of the Appellant and the Spouse (hereinafter referred to as the "Family Net Income") are as follows: 1995 1996 1997 Net Income – Appellant $32,191 $33,488 $35,082 Net Income – Spouse 43,710 52,834 51,025 Family Net Income $75,901 $86,322 $86,107 (d) the Appellant's Spouse is considered a "cohabiting spouse" of the Appellant; [5] Finally, the Appellant was able to afford to proceed to divorce and obtained a judgment dated April 4, 2000 (Exhibit A-1, Tab 2) which reads, in part, that the couple "commenced living separate and apart (although under the same roof) on March 28, 1992" and that they continued so until the date of judgment. ... The Court has considered the facts in this matter and the law relating to this appeal as to the award of costs. ...

The following criteria should be considered: the profit and loss experience in past years, the taxpayer's training, the taxpayer's intended course of action, the capability of the venture as capitalized to show a profit after charging capital cost allowance. ... That may be in some measure correct, however, it is something which the Appellant must have been aware of prior to her embarking on this venture. [4] She was cognizant of the fact that they were considered high risk borrowers, were not able to obtain favourable interest and payment terms and would likely be required to incur mortgage broker's fees to obtain financing. ...

The Minister considered the loan to be income under subsection 15(2). [7] The appeal raised three questions: first, whether it is necessary, for subsection 15(2) to apply, that the loan be made to a shareholder as a shareholder; second, whether the taxpayer was right in contending that the subsection was inapplicable in the circumstances because he was not a shareholder of the company; and third, whether the exception or exceptions in paragraph 15(2)(a) excluded the loan from the provisions in issue. [8] The Court of Appeal noted that the trial judge had erred in finding that the requirement of payment within a reasonable time had been met. ... I agree with the following passage from the appellants’ “Written submission”: [TRANSLATION] Written submission: the Federal Court of Appeal considered what interpretation should be given to the term “reasonable assistance” in the context of subsection 15(2). [16] When a statute describes a reasonable time or any other reasonable measure or conduct, one can be sure that what is meant is not something rigidly specific, eternal, universal or regulating, or even a verity. ...

The new provisions now speak of insurable hours, not insurable weeks. [20]          Section 9.1 of the Employment Insurance Regulations is worded as follows: 9.1 Where a person's earnings are paid on an hourly basis, the person is considered to have worked in insurable employment for the number of hours that the person actually worked and for which the person was remunerated.                                                                                                 ...    (3) Where an insured person is remunerated by the employer for a non-working day and (a) works on that day, the person is deemed to have worked in insurable employment for the greater of the number of hours that the person actually worked and the number of hours that the person would normally have worked on that day; and (b) does not work on that day, the person is deemed to have worked in insurable employment for the number of hours that the person would normally have worked on that day. 10.2 For the purposes of sections 9.1, 10, 10.1 and 22, (a) an hour of work performed in insurable employment is considered to be a single hour of insurable employment, even if the hour is remunerated at an overtime rate of pay; and (b) if the addition of hours of insurable employment falling between the first day and the last day worked in a given period of employment results in a total number of hours that contains a fraction of an hour, the fraction shall be counted as a whole hour. [22]          On a reading of the various requirements laid down by the Act, there is no doubt that the compensation equal to three months' wages does not meet those requirements. ...

I agree that all these factors should be considered. However, for reasons that I shall come to, I do not believe that the second of them should be given great weight. [3] The appeal is from an assessment made by the Minister of National Revenue (the Minister) under Part IX of the Excise Tax Act, requiring the Appellant to pay goods and services tax (GST) in respect of certain sales of natural gas. ... That right was lost when the Attorney General decided to elect the general procedure. [11] I have considered all five factors. ...