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  [11]     Kevin Kilbride, the Appellant’s brother, testified that the Appellant has always been considered to be an independent contractor. ... It has not been considered by the Supreme Court of Canada. If it is considered by the Supreme Court of Canada the dissenting judgment of Evans J.A. in Royal Winnipeg Ballet will have to be taken into account.   ... If integration is to be considered at all, it certainly lends support to the position that the Appellant is an employee. ...

The Minister considered the purported “first assessment” as a nullity. ... When the Court considers all the evidence, it leads to the undeniable conclusion that the Minister considered the “first assessment” to be an “assessment” not a “nullity”. ... There is nothing in the evidence which supports the argument of counsel for the Respondent that the Minister at any time considered the “first assessment” to be a “nullity”, nor was there any evidence to support his argument that the Minister considered the assessment of August 15, 1988 to be the “original assessment”. ...

Smith Appearances: Counsel for the Appellant: Peter Aprile James Roberts Counsel for the Respondent: Ainslie Schroeder   ORDER WHEREAS the Status Hearing originally scheduled for March 30, 2022 was adjourned sine die pending the disposition of a motion made by the Appellant to hold his appeal in abeyance, which motion has now been considered and dismissed; AND WHEREAS the parties have agreed that the litigation steps in this appeal should proceed in parallel fashion with the appeals of the other Corporate Appellants (as listed in the Common Reasons for Order); AND for reasons set out in the Common Reasons for Order; THEREFORE THE COURT HEREBY ORDERS AS FOLLOWS: 1. ... Smith Appearances: Counsel for the Appellant: Peter Aprile James Roberts Counsel for the Respondent: Ainslie Schroeder Anita Balakumar   ORDER WHEREAS the Status Hearing originally scheduled for March 30, 2022 was adjourned sine die pending the disposition of a motion to have the appeal of Adrian Robinson held in abeyance, which motion has now been considered and dismissed; AND WHEREAS the parties have agreed that the litigation steps in this appeal should proceed in parallel fashion with the appeals of the other Corporate Appellants (as listed in the Common Reasons for Order) and the appeal of Adrian Robinson in Court File 2021-825(IT)G; THEREFORE THE COURT HEREBY ORDERS AS FOLLOWS: The parties shall file a joint request for a timetable order prior to September 29, 2023, ensuring that the litigation steps for this appeal move forward in parallel fashion with the other Corporate Appellants and the appeal of Adrian Robinson in Court File 2021-825(IT)G. ... The Respondent was opposed to this, arguing that it would be more cost-effective that AR’s appeal and those of the Corporate Appellants move forward together following the same timeline. [8] All things considered, the Court issued an Order on an interim basis on March 31, 2022 that: i) the Status Hearing be adjourned sine die; ii) AR’s appeal and the corporate appeals all be held in abeyance on an interim basis; and, iii) the parties to report to the Court by no later than June 30, 2022. [9] The parties did so and the Respondent maintained its position that all appeals, including the corporate appeals, should move forward without further delay. ...

This document was in Western’s file and it was considered by CRA during the audit of Western. ... There was evidence that only Document 20 was considered during the audit of Western. ... There is no evidence that the document was considered by officials of CRA during the audit of the Appellants. ...

  [1]               The appellant is appealing from a decision of the Minister of Human Resources and Skills Development (the Minister) concerning the determination of the amount of the monthly Guaranteed Income Supplement (the supplement) under the Old Age Security Act (OASA). [1]   [2]               The decision under appeal was made based on the facts assumed in the following subparagraphs:   [Translation] (a)        The appellant has been receiving a disability pension from the CSST since 1967;   (b)        The appellant has been receiving guaranteed income supplement benefits since 2003;   (c)                 The form entitled "Application for the Old Age Security Pension" received on January 28, 2003, as submitted by the appellant;   (d)                The T5007 statements issued by the CSST in the appellant's name for 2007 and 2008, which indicate in box 10 the amount of the disability pension received by the appellant that has to be included in her income and, therefore, considered as such for the purposes of calculating her GIS.   ... He also admitted that the appellant's disability pension payments from Quebec's Commission de la Santé et Sécurité du Travail (CSST) were considered to be income for the purposes of calculating her guaranteed income supplement benefits starting in July 2009.   4.       ... The fact that the appellant's CSST income was never considered for the purposes of calculating the appellant's benefits resulted in an overpayment of $2,808.00.   9.                  ...

  [11]          I have also considered whether the Court should award party and party costs above the Tariff ...   [12]          This Court and the Federal Court of Appeal has considered, on numerous occasions, the issue of when the Court should award party and party costs above the Tariff. I agree with the approach taken by Justice Hogan in General Electric: the factors listed in subsection 147(3) of the Rules should be considered when determining whether to award party and party costs above the Tariff. ...

M'Seffar, dated June 8, 2004, which confirms that the Appellant was suffering from the following problems:             [Translation]             (a)      after-effects of an L4-L5 laminectomy and discectomy with pain and severe restriction;             (b)     mild oligoarticular psoriatic arthritis;             (c)     severe and treatment-resistant fibromyalgia; and             (d)     carpal tunnel syndrome,   and that, consequently, he considered the Appellant to be totally and permanently disabled ...   [13]     In light of the evidence produced at the hearing, the Court is satisfied that the disallowed expenses set out in paragraph 2 were not prescribed by a medical practitioner and could not be considered one or more devices to assist the Appellant in walking. ...   [15]     The Court is not persuaded that the disallowed expenses, set out in paragraph 2, can be considered related to renovations or alterations to an actual dwelling for the purpose of enabling the Appellant to gain access to the dwelling or be mobile or carry out the activities of daily living therein. ...

The issue is whether a $25,000 repayment and $1,636 in professional fees—for a total of $26,636—must be considered in calculating the undepreciated capital cost of the property in question or whether they are instead personal or living expenses. [2] The respondent assumed the following facts as justification for the reassessments disallowing the carryback of a non-capital loss for the 1990, 1991 and 1992 taxation years: [TRANSLATION] (a) in filing his tax return for the 1993 taxation year, the appellant: (i) claimed a net rental loss on the property of $58,365.25, including a terminal loss of $58,254.25 [sic], the latter being calculated as follows: Undepreciated capital cost $130,254.25 Minus: Proceeds of disposition considered at 100% rental use $74,000.00 Terminal loss on the property $56,254.25 (ii) and requested a carryback of the non-capital loss of $27,395.22 as follows: $8,697.61 for each of the 1990 and 1991 taxation years and $10,000 for the 1992 taxation year; (b) in response to information obtained from the objections division of the Quebec Department of Revenue, the Minister revised the terminal loss down to $28,511 based on the following calculation: Undepreciated capital cost $130,254.25 Minus: Disallowed expenses- Insurance repayment $25,000- Professional fees $1,636 $26,636.00 Revised undepreciated capital cost $103,618.25 Business portion: 60% of this amount $62,171.00 Plus: Change in use in 1992 Total FMV $93,800 Land FMV $4,700 $89,100 x 40% $35,640.00 Revised capital cost- business $97,811.00 Minus: Proceeds of disposition $74,000 Minus: Land $4,700 $69,300.00 Revised terminal loss $28,511.00 (c) the $25,000 the appellant had to repay the insurance company is an amount he was obliged to lay out because he was found to be partly liable in respect of the fire at his first home in 1987; (d) the professional fees of $1,636 are lawyer’s fees relating to the appellant’s defence against the claim by the insurance company referred to in the preceding paragraph; (e) the insurance repayment and the professional fees totalling $26,636 should not be considered in calculating the undepreciated capital cost of the property for the 1993 taxation year, since they are actually personal or living expenses of the appellant; (f) the net rental loss on the property for the 1993 taxation year was correctly revised down to $28,622; (g) that net rental loss has now been completely absorbed in the 1993 taxation year; (h) accordingly, the non-capital loss was revised down to nil for the 1993 taxation year and the loss carrybacks to the 1990, 1991 and 1992 taxation years were correctly disallowed. [3] Before the hearing began, the Court explained clearly to the appellant that he bore the burden of proving the soundness of his claims. [4] The appellant thereupon briefly explained that the home of which he was renting a part to his daughter had been completely destroyed by a fire. [5] The appellant was compensated for the losses he incurred, and he rebuilt after acquiring his daughter’s title to the land. ...

Jiang could not be considered an "eligible individual" within the meaning of section 122.6 of the Income Tax Act and section 6302 of the Income Tax Regulations, since she did not meet the first two requirements of the definition, set out in paragraphs (a) and (b). ... Appendix 122.6 “ eligible individual ”  in respect of a qualified dependant at any time means a person who at that time (a) resides with the qualified dependant, (b) is a parent of the qualified dependant who (i) is the parent who primarily fulfils the responsibility for the care and upbringing of the qualified dependant and who is not a shared-custody parent in respect of the qualified dependant, or (ii) is a shared-custody parent in respect of the qualified dependant,   (h) prescribed factors shall be considered in determining what constitutes care and upbringing. […] 6302 For the purposes of paragraph (h) of the definition eligible individual in section 122.6 of the Act, the following factors are to be considered in determining what constitutes care and upbringing of a qualified dependant: (a) the supervision of the daily activities and needs of the qualified dependant; (b) the maintenance of a secure environment in which the qualified dependant resides; (c) the arrangement of, and transportation to, medical care at regular intervals and as required for the qualified dependant; (d) the arrangement of, participation in, and transportation to, educational, recreational, athletic or similar activities in respect of the qualified dependant; (e) the attendance to the needs of the qualified dependant when the qualified dependant is ill or otherwise in need of the attendance of another person; (f) the attendance to the hygienic needs of the qualified dependant on a regular basis; (g) the provision, generally, of guidance and companionship to the qualified dependant; and (h) the existence of a court order in respect of the qualified dependant that is valid in the jurisdiction in which the qualified dependant resides.   122.6 «  particulier admissible  »  S’agissant, à un moment donné, du particulier admissible à l’égard d’une personne à charge admissible, personne qui répond aux conditions suivantes à ce moment: a) elle réside avec la personne à charge; b) elle est la personne — père ou mère de la personne à charge — qui: (i) assume principalement la responsabilité pour le soin et l’éducation de la personne à charge et qui n’est pas un parent ayant la garde partagée à l’égard de celle-ci, (ii) est un parent ayant la garde partagée à l’égard de la personne à charge; […] h) les critères prévus par règlement serviront à déterminer en quoi consistent le soin et l’éducation d’une personne. 6302 Pour l’application de l’alinéa h) de la définition de particulier admissible à l’article 122.6 de la Loi, les critères suivants servent à déterminer en quoi consistent le soin et l’éducation d’une personne à charge admissible: a) le fait de surveiller les activités quotidiennes de la personne à charge admissible et de voir à ses besoins quotidiens; b) le maintien d’un milieu sécuritaire là où elle réside c) l’obtention de soins médicaux pour elle à intervalles réguliers et en cas de besoin, ainsi que son transport aux endroits où ces soins sont offerts; d) l’organisation pour elle d’activités éducatives, récréatives, athlétiques ou semblables, sa participation à de telles activités et son transport à cette fin; e) le fait de subvenir à ses besoins lorsqu’elle est malade ou a besoin de l’assistance d’une autre personne; f) le fait de veiller à son hygiène corporelle de façon régulière; g) de façon générale, le fait d’être présent auprès d’elle et de la guider; h) l’existence d’une ordonnance rendue à son égard par un tribunal qui est valide dans la juridiction où elle réside.   ...

I have considered the evidence, the arguments submitted and the cases cited. ... However, the rationale in that case is of some import and must be considered in dealing with the facts before me. ... M.N.R., [1981] C.T.C. 2400; 81 D.T.C. 281 deals with a somewhat distinguishable situation, and on the facts in that case it is clear that the expenses sought to be deducted by the taxpayer were not and could not in any way be considered to be selling costs. ...