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Conclusion [16]          The definition of "adjusted income" in section 122.5 of the Act reads as follows:                 "adjusted income" of an individual for a taxation year means the total of all amounts each of which is the income for the year of                 (a)            the individual, or                 (b)            the individual's qualified relation for the year; [17]          This definition indicates that income, not taxable income, is considered for the purposes of the goods and services tax credit. [18]          Section 3 of the Act, which defines the concept of income, reads as follows: 3.              ... In view of the absence of evidence that these documents do not represent the truth or that they should be considered as null and void because they were obtained through some irregularity rendering them invalid, I must consider them to be valid agreements. [23]          The appeal is dismissed on the basis that the taxable capital gain must be included in computing the appellant's income for 1994 and that the agreements on which the Minister relied must be considered valid. ...

Originally, the appellant had claimed, in filing his 1994 tax return, a business investment loss in the amount of $22,104, of which $16,578 was claimed as an allowable business investment loss ("ABIL"). [2] In support of his determination, the Minister relied upon the following assumptions of fact found in paragraph 6 of the Reply to the Notice of Appeal: a) for the 1994 taxation year, the Appellant declared an amount of $22,104 as Business Investment loss from "Multichange Foreign Exchange Limited Partnership"; and consequently, claimed a deduction in the amount of $16,578 as ABIL; b) "Multichange Foreign Exchange Limited Partnership" was not a Canadian-controlled private corporation; c) the Auditor mentioned that the head office of "Multichange Foreign Exchange Limited Partnership" was located in United States of America; d) "Multichange Foreign Exchange Limited Partnership" was not a small business corporation; e) "Multichange Foreign Exchange Limited Partnership" was a "limited partnership"; thus, it was not legally considered a corporation, that is to say, it was not legally considered a person; f) as well, the vouchers submitted by the Appellant were not valid for a Capital loss; g) consequently, the amount of $16,578 ($22,104 x 75%) claimed by the Appellant as ABIL in the Appellant's 1994 taxation year, was disallowed by the Minister; h) furthermore, as the loan was a non-interest bearing, the amount of $22,104 was not considered as Capital loss by the Minister. [3] At the hearing, the appellant admitted that he could not claim an ABIL according to the terms of the Act but he still claims that he should be allowed a capital loss. [4] It was disclosed in evidence that the appellant invested an amount of $2,000 in Multichange International Limited Partnership ("limited partnership") as a limited partner at the time that limited partnership was registered in the province of Quebec on March 15, 1993 (Exhibits R-2 and A-2). ...

The Court stated at page 6301:... it was not intended by the use of the expression "producing industrial minerals" to include the processing of industrial minerals to produce specialized industrial mineral products of the kind produced by the appellant's processing operations. [20] The Court also stated at page 6300:... it is noticeable that what is excluded by items (i) farming and fishing, (ii) logging, (iv) operating an oil or gas well and (v) extracting minerals from a mineral resource, if they are to be considered as manufacturing or processing operations at all, are at any rate essentially operations for the production of raw or resource material. [21] The Court therefore concluded the sand and gravel operation was a manufacturing or processing operation and the exclusion of "producing industrial minerals" was not meant to include the processing of industrial minerals to produce the sand and gravel products of Nova Scotia Sand and Gravel Limited. It is also clear from the decision that a distinction was made between the production of raw or resource material as being excluded and the processing of industrial minerals to produce mineral products which the Court found was not excluded, that is, not extracting minerals from a mineral resource. [22] The Federal Court (Trial Division) has considered the question in another context. ... In the decision under appeal, however, even though gravel is a non-mineral resource, the Minister found that the restoration of land strip-mined for gravel is considered "mining" for the purposes of the fuel tax rebate. ...

U-1; AND TAKE NOTE that in support of this motion the affidavit of Yves Fortier, appeals officer with the Department of National Revenue, and any other documentation that may be considered useful, will be filed; ALSO TAKE NOTE that if the Court decides that the appellant’s appeal was validly filed the respondent will by this motion ask for an extension of time to file his Reply to the Notice of Appeal. [5] Yves Fortier’s affidavit reads as follows: [TRANSLATION] I the undersigned, Yves Fortier, having an office at the Department of National Revenue, 305 Boul. ... FURTHER TAKE NOTE THAT: In support of this application a sworn statement by Régis Sirois and all other documents considered useful and necessary in support of the said application shall be filed. [8] The application for an extension of time reads as follows: [TRANSLATION] 1. ... This was an error on his part. [36] If that error had not been made the payer would have received this letter and the appellant, in his capacity as shareholder, would certainly have been informed of it. [37] The letter to the appellant from the appeals officer Claude Martel on July 26, 1996 was erroneous as the ministerial Notifications of July 4, 1996 were not sent to him at the payer’s address. [38] Reading Revenue Canada’s letters of July 4 and 26, 1996, the appellant did see the name of Claude Martel and so was entitled to conclude that the 90-day deadline mentioned in the letter of July 4, 1996 in the following terms: [TRANSLATION] “If you are not in agreement you may appeal this ruling to the Tax Court of Canada within 90 days of the sending of this letter” did not begin to run until July 26, 1996. [39] The Court believes completely the appellant’s statement that he never received the letter of determination of July 4, 1996. [40] The evidence did not disclose the precise reason why the letter of July 4, 1996 did not reach the appellant, but one thing is certain: if it had been sent to the payer’s correct address he would have received it. [41] The appeals officer, acting for the Chief of Appeals, did want the appellant to be aware of the ruling affecting him and that is undoubtedly why he contacted him by telephone and then sent him his letter of July 26, 1996. [42] It is significant that in his sworn statement Yves Fortier made no mention of the letter dated July 26, 1996. [43] Counsel for the appellant suggested that in ruling on the motion to dismiss the appeal the Court did not have to decide the application for an extension of time, but the Court is not of this view and feels that both applications should actually be disposed of so that there is nothing left outstanding. [44] It is true the Minister did not have to use registered mail but this did enable Claude Martel to see that the ministerial Notification of July 4, 1996 had not been sent to the payer at its correct address. [45] There is section 5(2) of our Rules, it is true, but in the instant case Claude Martel, acting for the Chief of Appeals, wanted to correct his error by his letter of July 26, 1996: this is to his credit but the fact remains that by acting in this way he led the appellant to think that the appeal deadline only began on that date. [46] The decision in Bowen is very interesting, but in the instant case Claude Martel thought he should seek further information and send the letter of July 4, 1996 again, and in so doing he caused the appellant as aforesaid to think that the time for filing an appeal only began to run on July 26, 1996. [47] It is true that the 90-day deadline is not mentioned in the letter of July 26, 1996 but it is clearly mentioned in its appendix, the letter of July 4, 1996. [48] Within the meaning of the decision in Gaudreau it is clear that the Minister did not send the notice of July 4, 1996 to the payer’s correct address, despite formal notice in Exhibit I-1. [49] It is clear that the time in which an appeal may be filed did not begin to run until July 26, 1996 and that by appealing on October 3, 1996 the appellant did so within the specified time. [50] The respondent’s motion to dismiss the appeal is dismissed and he is given 60 days within which to file his Reply to the Notice of Appeal, and the notice of appeal dated October 3, 1996 is considered as having been validly filed. ...

By questioning not the relevance or truth of the facts relied upon by the Minister but simply the weight to be attached to the various facts otherwise properly considered, the Tax Court Judge, in effect, overruled the Minister's discretionary determination without first having concluded that the determination had been made in a manner contrary to law. ... Analysis [65] It is true that the payer had no experience in salvage at the outset, though her husband did, but there is uncontradicted evidence that she could have founded the business even without such experience. [66] It is clear that the payer had no financial resources, that her mother-in-law stood surety for her credit line, that the male appellant stood surety for her purchase of a tractor-loader for $8,000 in addition to placing his truck at her disposal without charge, and that she used land belonging to the male appellant's brother-in-law without paying rent. [67] In arriving at his decision the Minister could not have known that the payer had hired other employees in December 1996 and so no conclusion can be drawn from that. [68] It is clear that the male appellant worked for the payer, but this employment was excepted and the Minister did not see fit to include it: all that the Court may therefore do is decide whether it should intervene. [69] The payer wanted to get into business: that was her right and there is no conclusion to be drawn from that or from the general operation of her business. [70] Apart from the fact that the payer could have started up this business without the benefit of her husband's experience, the Minister did take all the circumstances into account in deciding not to include the employment. [71] Counsel for the appellants was very skilful but she was really speculating when she suggested that the Minister would have reacted differently if the female appellant had opened a jewellery store or a clothing shop. [72] The fact that during the period at issue the male appellant worked more weeks than the minimum needed to qualify for unemployment insurance benefits clearly does not suffice for the employment to be included. [73] In hiring a truck there is always a charge for the use of the truck itself, and counsel for the appellants' argument on this point must be dismissed outright. [74] If the payer had not made use of financial assistance from her husband and family the situation might have been different, but that was not the case. [75] The male appellant may have worn two hats when he worked for his wife but as an employee he stood surety for her, had his mother stand surety for her, provided her with a truck free of charge and had his brother-in-law provide her with the use of land free of charge. [76] There is no basis for interference pursuant to the rule in Jencan as the Minister did not exercise his discretion in a manner contrary to law. [77] Even if he considered that the payer would have needed experience in order to get into this business, that she had none and that she benefited from her husband's experience, the other facts on which he relied were amply sufficient to support his determination. [78] According to Bayside, the Court does not have to decide on the importance or weight of specific facts which were properly considered by the Minister, as in doing so it would be usurping his discretionary authority. [79] It is true that the case law based on the old Act can also be applied to the new one. [80] The appellants had the burden of proof and have not discharged it. [81] Jencan and Bayside are very recent, are quite clear and do not really permit the Court to intervene. [82] The appeals are accordingly dismissed and the subject decision affirmed. ...

Even organic products cannot be considered safe. Wheat must not contain chemicals. ... There is also some doubt as to whether the time spent looking for and preparing food must be considered. [15]          I therefore consider it helpful to refer to Johnston v. ... The activity of feeding oneself includes meal preparation. [17]          When it comes to the activity of feeding oneself, it is not just the act of putting food in one's mouth that must be considered. ...

Canada (Attorney General), 2001 CarswellNat 1262, where Sexton J.A. considered subsection 165(3) of the Income Tax Act that requires the Minister to act “ with all due dispatch ” upon receipt of a Notice of Objection (at para. 12 and 13): [12]   I turn, therefore, to the period between the time of filing of the notice of objection and the final reassessment. Subsection 165(3) of the Income Tax Act requires the Minister to act "with all due dispatch" upon receipt of a notice of objection. [13]   The meaning of the phrase "with all due dispatch" has been considered by both the Tax Court of Canada and this Court. ... [my emphasis] [26]         Subsection 305(5)(a) then uses the conjunctive “ and ” and sets out a number of factors in (b)(i) to (iv) to be considered by this court when called to decide whether its discretion should be exercised so as to grant an extension of time. ...

I believe both Ayesha Barboza and Daniel Piatkowski. [13]         In the Reply to Notice of Appeal, the Minister assumed that Joshua Marrocco was Christina Menoudakis’ nephew and that he considered himself to be self-employed. John Menoudakis agreed with these assumptions of fact. [14]         The Minister also assumed that Caitlin Nugent and Ginevra Mormile considered themselves to be employees. ... It was limited to the cost of their guitar and laptop. [29]         All things considered, I conclude that the facts with respect to financial risk are more consistent with the Teachers being employees than being independent contractors. [30]         It is my view that an analysis of the Wiebe Door factors supports the Teachers’ intention to be employees. ...

Ranasinghe Counsel for the Respondent: Cynthia Isenor   ORDER           Whereas a judgment was rendered on July 29, 2014;           Whereas the parties were to provide written submissions on costs;           And whereas such submissions have been received and considered;           It is hereby ordered that the Appellant is awarded costs in the amount of $20,000 plus disbursements in accordance with the attached reasons. ... However, the settlement offers must be considered within the context of all the factors under subsection 147(3) when determining whether to grant increased costs. [21]         The Respondent argues that because both parties made written settlement offers and actively attempted to resolve the issues prior to trial, this factor should not weigh in favour of granting increased costs. [22]         The Appellant argues that his last settlement offers were very close to the result at trial and that this should result in increased costs in his favour. [23]         Given the closeness of the Appellant’s settlement offers to the ultimate result, it seems appropriate to grant some additional costs on the basis of the settlement offers, although not the substantial indemnity costs that the Appellant requests. ... However, these elements are factors to be considered in relation to the volume of work rather than the complexity of the issues. [29]         This factor does not weigh in favour of granting additional costs. ...

Intention of the parties must also be ascertained and considered in determining the issue (Royal Winnipeg Ballet v. ... It is in the second step that the Wiebe Door factors must be considered. At paragraph 42, Justice Mainville, in Connor Homes, summarized the test as follows: … The first step of the analysis should always be to determine at the outset the intent of the parties and then, using the prism of that intent, determining in a second step whether the parties’ relationship, as reflected in objective reality, is one of employer-employee or of independent contractor. … [5]              It must be emphasized that the factors usually referred to in the “four‑in‑one test” are not an exclusive list of factors to consider. [2] To give but one example, whether or not the individual can hire helpers to assist or replace him is a commonly considered factor. ...