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Cairns was actively considered by the Appellant in 1969 for employment upon the acquisition by the Appellant of a large wholesale grocery business. the negotiations for the acquisition of which proved abortive at that time. 25. ... According to the witness, the building was transferred at $24,880 which was the undepreciated capital cost — possibly to avoid recapture but also because it was considered to be part and parcel of a reasonable price for the overall deal. ... Since 1968 it has changed its charter and its name, and has filed documents in other jurisdictions to protect the name of Valu-Mart. it was actively considered by management for the acquisition of the assets of another company. ...

It is not disputed that the Dodge car for the purpose of capital cost allowance fell in Class 10; or that the claims for such allowances for 1967 and 1968 respectively of $554 and $1,395 would have been correct if the appellant were entitled to the full amount without the apportionment provided for in Section 20(6)(e) of the Act which reads: 20. (6) For the purpose of this section and regulations made under paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of section 11, the following rules apply: (e) where property has, since it was acquired by a taxpayer, been regularly used in part for the purpose of gaining or producing income therefrom or for the purpose of gaining or producing income from a business and in part for some other purpose, the taxpayer shall be deemed to have acquired, for the purpose of gaining or producing income, the proportion of the property that the use regularly made of the property for gaining or producing income is of the whole use regularly made of the property at a capital cost to him equal to the same proportion of the capital cost to him of the whole property; and, if the property has, in such a case, been disposed of, the proceeds of disposition of the proportion of the property deemed to have been acquired for gaining or producing income shall be deemed to be the same proportion of the proceeds of disposition of the whole property; In the Cumming case (supra) Thurlow, J. in considering the provisions of that subsection said at page 441 [477]: On the basis of mileage alone, the use made by the taxpayer of the Chevrolet for the purposes of his practice appears to me to have been no more than 25 per cent of the total use and if this were the only thing to be considered as being “use” of an automobile the basis for calculation of the appellant’s capital cost allowance would, it seems, necessarily be limited by Section 20(6) (e) to 25 per cent of the total capital cost of the automobile. The appellant on the other hand, and his accountant, considered that 90 per cent of the use of the car was use for the purposes of the practice and this I think was derived by considering its use from the point of view of the time involved in keeping it available for operation in the practice. Thus on a day when the appellant drove the car to the hospital, left it standing there while he was at the hospital, drove it again to return home and perhaps made several more trips with it to the hospital and back in the course of the day and at no time had any occasion to drive it for any purpose not associated with the practice, the car might well be considered as having been used throughout that day solely for the purposes of the practice. ...

., her total 2018 net income), and only the excess could reasonably be considered out of pocket medical expenses paid by the Appellant. [22] Considering the issue in dispute as exposed above, the question to be answered by the Court is whether the Appellant paid the $19,484 as medical expenses in respect of Mrs. ... The Court takes this excerpt to mean that eligibility for the credit can be considered to the extent that the taxpayer's financial capacity is adversely affected by the expenses incurred. ... The financial consideration of the complete operation and the legal context governing the rights of the parties involved must be considered in order to reach a reasonable interpretation of the text. [56] Finally, Mr. ...

By this clause it was provided that the offer to purchase was “subject to the Purchasers being approved as Licensees by the Liquor Control Commission and should the Purchasers not be approved, the Offer to Purchase is to be considered cancelled, null and void and the Purchasers' deposit returned to them”. 24 This clause obviously indicates that unless the purchasers could obtain liquor licences they would not purchase the hotel. 25 One additional opinion is cited here, that of Mr E Karl Farstad & Associates Ltd. ... He also stated that it was one of the circumstances to be considered. 43 Nor did J O Weldon, QC say that in all cases the agreement must be decisive. ... It seems to me that the determination of the foregoing respective amounts can best be determined by ascertaining the reasonable value of the property and the deduction of that amount from the total consideration results in the amount attributable to something else. 61 In the Canadian Propane case no allowance had been made for “goodwill”, one of the appellant's principal witnesses stating that the appellant considered it had no value. ...

For example, the Appellants could have succeeded by establishing, on a balance of probabilities, new facts not considered by the Minister when making the reassessments; by showing that the travel expenses were incurred for business purposes; or by demonstrating that the Minister’s assumptions of fact in making the reassessments were wrong. ... I have also considered the overall reasonableness of the reassessments in my determination of whether to allow the appeals. [71] No supporting documentation was adduced in evidence to show that the disallowed expenses were incurred by Opco for the purpose of gaining or producing business income. ... John’s Testimony [84] For the following reasons, I find that John’s testimony was vague, not convincing and not credible. [85] His testimony was that all expenses referred to in the schedules to the replies to the notices of appeal were business expenses of Opco and should not be considered personal travel expenses of the Siblings and other family members. [86] Disallowed travel expenses included the following expenses: (i) Maria: Expenses incurred in Sint Maarten and at various restaurants; however, the evidence showed that Maria is not an employee of Opco and, therefore, John’s testimony that these are business expenses is not credible; (ii) Kostantinos: Travel expenses incurred at the Fairmont Tremblant in Mont-Tremblant, in Nassau and at a garden store in Saint‑Eustache; no credible evidence was adduced as to the purposes of these expenses, and no supporting documentation was adduced at the hearing to show that these expenses were incurred by Opco for business purposes; (iii) Kostantina: Travel expenses incurred in Mont-Tremblant and at Marriott’s Aruba Surf Club; no supporting documentation was adduced at the hearing. ...

However, it was understood among them that the diamond should be sold, the three to share in any profit realized or to bear any loss incurred in proportion to their contributions, although Marun considered himself indebted to his partners in the amounts advanced by them and they, in turn, considered him so indebted. ... Marun then decided, with the concurrence of Minogue, that the prospects of selling the diamond would be greater if the diamond were cut, but Minogue, whose ardour about the transaction had somewhat cooled, in giving his concurrence reminded Marun that he still considered him indebted to the extent of $10,000. ...

In this appeal there are two issues, which are unrelated and, therefore, each will be considered separately. ... Knight, in forming his opinion as to the amount of deduction to be made to arrive at what he considered to be the ‘‘fair market value’’, was not aware of the error from which it follows that his estimate should have ‘been $141,261.77 (being the total of the amounts listed in the last column of the tabulation), less than $400,000. ... The appellant, on its part, also considered itself a member otherwise it would not have been able to sell its interest to Mr. ...

Preston at what he considered was the actual cost and sold the frontage lot to Mr. ... The appellant claims that the ten and twelve sales made respectively in 1931 and 1932 were made by him ‘‘with the view of getting the return of my capital on what I considered more desirable property that I wanted to keep for my retirement’’. ... There are many companies which in their very inception are powered for such a purpose, and in these eases it is not doubtful that, where they make a gain by a realisation, the gain they make is liable to be assessed for income tax. ’ ’ And then the Lord Justice Clerk laid down the test to be applied as follows: “What is the line which separates the two classes of cases may be difficult to define and each case must be considered according to its facts; the question to be determined being—1s the sum of gain that has been made a mere enhancement of value by realising a security, or is it a gain made in an operation of business in carrying out a scheme for profit making?” ...

And then the Lord Justice Clerk laid down the test to be applied as follows: ‘“What is the line which separates the two classes of cases may be difficult to define, and each case must be considered according to its facts; the question to be determined being— Is the sum of gain that has been made a mere enhancement of value by realising a security, or is it a gain made in an operation of business in carrying out a scheme for profit making?” ... The number of transactions was so considered by Kerwin, J., as he then was, in the Noak v. ... The cumulative effect of the foregoing, together with the whole course of conduct of the taxpayer, in my opinion, rejects what might under other circumstances be considered as investments and irresistibly drives me to the conclusion that the appellant’s profits from his mortgage discounts or bonuses constitute a gain made in the operation of a business in the carrying out of a scheme for profit making. ...

The appellant, on its part, also considered itself a member otherwise it would not have been able to sell its interest to Mr. ... I have considered with care all the evidence of these witnesses bearing on this point and have reached the conclusion that it should be found as a fact that by March 31, 1957, the fair market value of the appellant’s interest in the Jerd Syndicate did not exceed $1. ... In this Court, [1955] S.C.R. 824; [1955] C.T.C. 271, the point was not considered. ...