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For the purposes of subsection 6(16), sections 118.2 and 118.3 and this subsection, (a)     an impairment is prolonged where it has lasted, or can reasonably be expected to last, for a continuous period of at least 12 months; (b)     an individual's ability to perform a basic activity of daily living is markedly restricted only where all or substantially all of the time, even with therapy and the use of appropriate devices and medication, the individual is blind or is unable (or requires an inordinate amount of time) to perform a basic activity of daily living; (b.1)  an individual is considered to have the equivalent of a marked restriction in a basic activity of daily living only where all or substantially all of the time, even with therapy and the use of appropriate devices and medication, the individual's ability to perform more than one basic activity of daily living (including for this purpose, the ability to see) is significantly restricted, and the cumulative effect of those restrictions is tantamount to the individual's ability to perform a basic activity of daily living being markedly restricted; (c)     a basic activity of daily living in relation to an individual means (i)      mental functions necessary for everyday life, (ii)      feeding oneself or dressing oneself, (iii)     so as to be understood, in a quiet setting, by another person familiar with the individual, (iv)     hearing so as to understand, in a quiet setting, another person familiar with the individual, (v)     eliminating (bowel or bladder functions), or (vi)     walking; (c.1)     mental functions necessary for everyday life include (i)      memory, (ii)      problem solving, goal-setting and judgement (taken together), (iii)     adaptive functioning; (d)     for greater certainty, no other activity, including working, housekeeping or a social or recreational activity, shall be considered as a basic activity of daily living; (e)     feeding oneself does not include (i)      any of the activities of identifying, finding, shopping for or otherwise procuring food, or (ii)      the activity of preparing food to the extent that the time associated with the activity would not have been necessary in the absence of a dietary restriction or regime; and (f)      dressing oneself does not include any of the activities of identifying, finding, shopping for or otherwise procuring clothing. 118.4(2) Reference to medical practitioners, etc.  ...

In May of 1992, a dispute arose between Gurm and the Appellant, among other things, regarding the portion of the Total Commission to which Gurm was entitled: a) the Appellant considered that Gurm was entitled to 30% of the Total Commission, totalling $29,620.13; b) Gurm considered that he was entitled to 60% of the Total Commission totalling $59,240.25. 11. ...

Evans by telephone in late-December 2015 that a notice of objection should have been filed “years ago”, that “[w]e certainly have been led to believe that our matter had merit, and that it was being looked into by CRA.” [18]          Maple submits that in all the circumstances it should be considered as having constructively filed a notice of objection. ... It was after this that Maple determined that HC had submitted for ITCs and resultant refunds, that Maple considered it should have been able to seek. [22]          Maple then engaged a local law firm to seek a ruling from CRA. ...

(F.C.A.) the Federal Court of Appeal had similarly said the traditional Sagaz/Wiebe Door factors must be considered “in the light of the parties’ intent.” 11 This second step is otherwise the same as how the Court would proceed in cases where there is no common shared intention regarding the characterization of the work relationship by the parties.. . . 27. . . ... Conclusion [27]          The Appellant has not been able to establish with sufficient credible evidence that the Connor Financial workers covered by the decisions were, on a balance of probabilities, in a working relationship that would be characterized in law as an independent contractor and not as an employee. [28]          Given especially the extent of Connor Financial’s rights to direct the performance of the work duties and its actual monitoring and reporting requirement practices, and given the very limited financial risks to the workers, the absence of any financial investment by the workers, and the relatively fixed financial rewards by which they can only generate more income by working additional hours or days, these particular facts and circumstances considered as a whole quite strongly give rise to insurable employment under the EI Act and pensionable employment under the CPP. [29]    The appeals are dismissed. ...

Correctness is the standard of review that applies. [26]            As a preliminary matter, I would comment about the determination of the Tax Court that the relevant provision to be considered is subsection 232(1) of the Act. ... Crédit: Opération par laquelle une personne met une somme d’argent à la disposition d’une autre; (operation by which someone puts a sum of money at the disposal of someone else) Le Petit Robert (2006) [32]            In addition to the ordinary meaning of “credit,” the context and purpose of the legislation must be considered. ...

However, paragraph 5(3)(b) of the EIA stipulates that this employee, while not dealing with the employer at arm’s length, could be considered to hold an insurable employment if the Minister of National Revenue is satisfied that, having regard to all the circumstances of the employment, it is reasonable to conclude that the parties would have entered into a substantially similar contract of employment. ... In any event, all things considered, I share the Minister’s opinion that an employee in an arm’s-length relationship with Sylvain Girard’s business, 9250-6971 Québec inc., would not have entered into a substantially similar contract of employment, having regard to all the circumstances. [21]   In my opinion, such a person would not have agreed to continue working for the payer after being laid off, as was the case with Marie-Antoinette Boivin, unless he or she had been offered very preferential conditions of employment allowing him or her to optimize his or her Employment Insurance benefits. ...

The reasons for a decision will be considered to be reasonable “if the reasons allow the reviewing court to understand why the tribunal made its decision and permit it to determine whether the conclusion is within the range of acceptable outcomes” (Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union v. ... “Cancelling a penalty based on an inability to pay or financial hardship” is not generally considered, unless extraordinary circumstances, such as a natural disaster, prevent compliance (Circular at para. 28). ...

Thus, he could refer, on a balance of probabilities, to new facts that would not have been considered by the Minister showing that he did not earn the alleged income, or else, present evidence that the assumptions of fact on which the Minister based herself to issue the reassessments are erroneous. ... The Queen, 2005 TCC 545, [2005] TCJ No. 396 (informal procedure), the Honourable Chief Justice Bowman stated the following: 11   In drawing the line between “ordinary” negligence or neglect and “gross” negligence, a number of factors have to be considered. ...

According to the CRA, if the resolution in question were annulled by the Superior Court, the amounts of $86,567 and $381,260 paid to the appellant on December 31, 2008 and 2009, would have to be considered as having been received unjustly, such that the appellant would be indebted to the Corporation for those amounts. [17]   Because the assessment proposed by the CRA was for the 2009 taxation year, the CRA had to issue it no later than May 20, 2013, that is, the end of the appellant’s normal reassessment period for that taxation year, to be within the prescribed limitation period (see subsection 152(3.1) of the ITA). ... CCQ‑1991 (C.C.Q.). [22]   The TCC judge also considered whether such enrichment could give rise to a debt within the meaning of subsection 15(2) of the ITA (reasons, paragraph 57). ...

Her Majesty, [1998] TCJ No. 252, Teskey, J. of this Court considered whether an agreement between the appellant owner of a malting plant and a village was a joint venture agreement. ... Her Majesty, 2009 TCC 139, Campbell, J. considered whether a joint venture reflected in the teaming of the appellant’s company and another company in each pooling or contributing cash to fund purchasing by the other party of certain inventories for resale with gross proceeds divided between the parties; where both companies, although the appellant’s to a lesser extent, participated in deciding what and whether to purchase and on what terms etc. ...