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The Law [24]         Paragraph 11 of the PASF states: “ The Appellant used the proxy method of claiming overhead costs for its SR&ED claim in the 2010 Taxation Year. ” Counsel for the Appellant confirmed that the parties are referring to the election that is made under clause 37(8)(a)(ii)(B) and subsection 37(10) of the Act. [25]         With respect to salary and wages, since the Appellant made the so-called proxy election, it was only entitled, under subclause 37(8)(a)(ii)(B)(IV), to include as an expenditure on or in respect of scientific research and experimental development “ that portion of an expenditure made in respect of an expense incurred in the year for salary or wages of an employee who is directly engaged in scientific research and experimental development in Canada that can reasonably be considered to relate to such work having regard to the time spent by the employee thereon... ”. ... As a result, 100% of those wages can reasonably be considered to relate to SR&ED and they represent an expenditure on or in respect of SR&ED. [32]         Counsel for the Respondent argued that, if I accept that the Appellant paid the $38,880 of wages solely for SR&ED, then Gary McCrea and Tom McCrea did not receive any compensation for the significant time they spent “ performing director or management activities ” for the Appellant. [33]         I do not accept this conclusion. ...

That issue can now be considered by the Court. Background [5]              What follows is a short summary of the evidence as previously reviewed in the oral reasons delivered on March 1, 2017. ... [14]         As indicated above, following the reasoning of this Court in Melanson, supra, the Applications to extend the time to file notices of objection were adjourned sine die to allow the Respondent to consider whether the letter of September 10, 2015 could be considered as valid applications. ...

There are many cases in which the matter has been considered both in this court and the Federal Court of Appeal. ... The question is whether, considered in the context of the law and the litigation process, the claim has no reasonable chance of succeeding. ...

Ng testified that when he read over the Declaration of Trust in June 2014 prior to signing it he considered that it reflected what he thought. ... Ng to purchase the property, but counsel said that they had not done this correctly. [18]         Respondent’s counsel cited several informal procedure decisions of this Court, most particularly noting Al-Houssain v R, 2014 TCC 379 (IP), at para. 27 where, on “similar facts” (per counsel), the Court per Lyons, J. considered that on a balance of probabilities the appellant in arguing agency was seeking to re-characterize the true legal relationship. ...

It has also been considered in intellectual property litigation: Consorzio Del Prosciutto Di Parma v Maple Leaf Meats Inc., 2002 FCA 417 (Maple Leaf Meats). [38]         Undoubtedly, the complexity of the issues raised in this appeal required a substantial volume of work in order for each party to be properly prepared for trial. ... Martin, 2015 FCA 95, [2015] 4 CTC 73 at paras. 18‑21 (application for leave to appeal dismissed with costs by the Supreme Court of Canada ([2015] SCCA No. 233)), the conduct of the parties prior to the litigation process is generally not a factor that will be considered by the Court in order to assess costs: 18        It is well-settled law that in exceptional circumstances conduct that occurs prior to a proceeding may be taken into account if that conduct unduly and unnecessarily prolongs the proceeding. ...

Section 160 of the ITA is a collection measure, and when the Minister acts as a “collector,” he should be considered a third party under section 1452 of the C.C.Q.: Bolduc v. ... St-Laurent, 2014 QCCA 553, where the Court considered the interpretation of section 14.4 of the Tax Administration Act, RSQ, c A‑6.002, the language of which is the same as that of subsection 160(1) of the ITA. ...

.; e)       the appellant did not report this amount of $15,000 on her income tax return for 2012; f)         at the time of the transfer, on December 19, 2012, the ceding company 9192-9737 Québec Inc. owed an amount of $115,062.14 in fees, interests and penalties under tax laws, including an amount of $18,941.18 under Part IX of the ETA representing 16.46% of its total tax debt; g)       the company 9192-9737 Québec Inc. transferred an amount of $15,000 to the appellant, the shareholder’s daughter, for no consideration; h)       therefore, following the transfer, the appellant received an advantage of $15,000; i)         therefore, the Minister considered that the amount by which the FMV of the transferred property ($15,000) at the time of the transfer exceeded the FMV of the consideration paid ($0) by the appellant for the transferred property was $15,000; j)         the appellant is thus jointly and severally liable to pay the amount the ceding company (9192-9737 Québec Inc.) owes under the ETA for its reporting period including the time of the transfer, including interest and penalties. ... The verbal agreement made between the appellant and her father on the renovation work could also be considered a gift rather than a loan. [37]          The testimonies of the appellant and her father contradict a notarial act, i.e., the legal mortgage intended to guarantee payment for the renovation work, which is itself based on a false invoice. ...

At that time the filing of a NRRPR application by the Appellant would not have been beyond the legislated two year deadline for so doing, counting from February 2013 when the residential had been substantially completed. [39]          I consider it possible if not likely that the Minister at the time of the February 20, 2014 assessment and during the audit leading up to that assessment considered that the Appellant could well qualify for the NRRPR and sought relevant information, such as would be included in an application for a NRRPR, to confirm whether he did so qualify. [40]          However, despite the Minister’s suggestions in the February 14, 2014 letter and the February 20, 2014 notice of (re)assessment itself that an NRRPR application be submitted, the Appellant did not then do so. [41]          When, two years later, the Appellant did file an NRRPR application (shortly prior to confirmation by the Minister of the February 20, 2014 assessment herein appealed), that application was rejected for having been filed beyond the two year legislated deadline for so doing. [42]          The matter of whether the Appellant would qualify for an NRRPR was not argued before me and accordingly I am unable to express any finding on this point. ... Certainly the Minister had encouraged the Appellant in February 2014 when the NPR application was denied to submit a NRRPR application; signalling that the Minister considered that the Appellant might well qualify for that rebate. [43]          In my view having the Minister now make a subsection 296(2.1) determination as to “allowable rebate” would be in the nature of redressing the February 20, 2014 assessment, which is the assessment currently before this Court. ...

For the purposes of subsection 6(16), sections 118.2 and 118.3 and this subsection, (a)     an impairment is prolonged where it has lasted, or can reasonably be expected to last, for a continuous period of at least 12 months; (b)     an individual's ability to perform a basic activity of daily living is markedly restricted only where all or substantially all of the time, even with therapy and the use of appropriate devices and medication, the individual is blind or is unable (or requires an inordinate amount of time) to perform a basic activity of daily living; (b.1)  an individual is considered to have the equivalent of a marked restriction in a basic activity of daily living only where all or substantially all of the time, even with therapy and the use of appropriate devices and medication, the individual's ability to perform more than one basic activity of daily living (including for this purpose, the ability to see) is significantly restricted, and the cumulative effect of those restrictions is tantamount to the individual's ability to perform a basic activity of daily living being markedly restricted; (c)     a basic activity of daily living in relation to an individual means (i)      mental functions necessary for everyday life, (ii)      feeding oneself or dressing oneself, (iii)     so as to be understood, in a quiet setting, by another person familiar with the individual, (iv)     hearing so as to understand, in a quiet setting, another person familiar with the individual, (v)     eliminating (bowel or bladder functions), or (vi)     walking; (c.1)     mental functions necessary for everyday life include (i)      memory, (ii)      problem solving, goal-setting and judgement (taken together), (iii)     adaptive functioning; (d)     for greater certainty, no other activity, including working, housekeeping or a social or recreational activity, shall be considered as a basic activity of daily living; (e)     feeding oneself does not include (i)      any of the activities of identifying, finding, shopping for or otherwise procuring food, or (ii)      the activity of preparing food to the extent that the time associated with the activity would not have been necessary in the absence of a dietary restriction or regime; and (f)      dressing oneself does not include any of the activities of identifying, finding, shopping for or otherwise procuring clothing. 118.4(2) Reference to medical practitioners, etc.  ...

In May of 1992, a dispute arose between Gurm and the Appellant, among other things, regarding the portion of the Total Commission to which Gurm was entitled: a) the Appellant considered that Gurm was entitled to 30% of the Total Commission, totalling $29,620.13; b) Gurm considered that he was entitled to 60% of the Total Commission totalling $59,240.25. 11. ...